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*Social Networks and Employee Performance*—Castilla

*Exchange Theory in Mate Selection*—Rosenfeld

*Fundamental Causality*—Lutfey and Freese

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*First Grade and Educational Attainment*—Entwisle, Alexander,  
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## Information for Contributors

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(Rev. 3/98)

# Social Networks and Employee Performance in a Call Center<sup>1</sup>

Emilio J. Castilla  
*University of Pennsylvania*

Much research in sociology and labor economics studies proxies for productivity; consequently, little is known about the relationship between personal contacts and worker performance. This study addresses, for the first time, the role of referral contacts on workers' performance. Using employees' hiring and performance data in a call center, the author examines the performance implications over time of hiring new workers via employee referrals. When assessing whether referrals are more productive than nonreferrals, the author also considers the relationship between employee productivity and turnover. This study finds that referrals are initially more productive than nonreferrals, but longitudinal analyses emphasize posthire social processes among socially connected employees. This article demonstrates that the effect of referral ties continues beyond the hiring process, having long-term effects on employee attachment to the firm and on performance.

For decades, we have seen a stream of theoretical and empirical studies in economic sociology and labor economics examining how recruitment sources relate to employees' outcomes such as turnover and tenure, starting wages, and wage growth (for a detailed review of these studies, see

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful for the financial support provided by the Social Sciences Research Council (Program of the Corporation as a Social Institution). I have benefited enormously from the extensive and detailed comments of Roberto M. Fernández, Mark Granovetter, and John W. Meyer. I thank Robert Freeland, Ezra Zuckerman, and Dick Scott for their wonderful suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. I also thank my colleagues in the Management Department at Wharton, especially Mauro F. Guillén, Anne-Marie Knott, Lori Rosenkopf, Nancy Rothbard, Christophe Van den Bulte, Steffanie Wilk, and Mark Zbaracki, and all the attendees of the M-square seminar for their comments on earlier drafts. I am also extremely thankful to the entire Fernández family for all their love and support. Direct correspondence to Emilio J. Castilla, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2021 Steinert Hall – Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. E-mail: ecastilla@wharton.upenn.edu

Granovetter [1995], and more recently, Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel [2000] and Fernández, Castilla, and Moore [2000]). Although many of these studies have sought to determine whether hires made through personal contacts are better matched than those made through other channels, none have focused specifically on the performance implications of hiring new employees by using current employees' connections.

Examining information on employee productivity promises to advance research in this area constructively. Such information is crucial because social relations and productivity can be related in complicated ways (and more important, they are likely to be confounded). In general, economists believe that social networks are not independent of productivity and are therefore valuable proxy variables when performance data is not available. For instance, the better match argument common in labor economics argues that social connections provide high-quality information that will improve the match between the job and the person. Under this theory, social relations act as a proxy for information about the job candidate that is difficult and expensive to measure or observe directly, such as employee productivity. However, a more sociological explanation suggests that regardless of whether personal connections reliably *predict* future employee performance, connections among employees can still *produce* more productive employees even after they have been screened and hired. Social interactions that occur among socially connected employees at the new job setting may enrich the match between the new hire and the job, and may thus affect employee performance over time. This "embeddedness" account emphasizes how the presence of personal contacts and their departure at times facilitates and at times lessens employees' productivity and attachment to the firm. However, the field's lack of direct measures of employee productivity renders us incapable of adjudicating between these two competing theoretical accounts.

One way to make progress on this subject is to directly examine the relationship between personal networks and worker performance. Using comprehensive employees' hiring and productivity data from a large call center in the United States, I examine, for the first time, the performance implications of hiring new workers via employee referrals, using referrals as indicators of preexisting social connections. My study also provides a further understanding of how workers' interdependence influences their performance. I structure my argument as follows. First, I test the central prediction of the "better match" theory in economics. The proposition here is that if referrers help to select better-matched employees, one would expect that, after controlling for observable human capital characteristics, workers hired via employee referrals should be more productive than nonreferrals at hire. Second, I examine whether referrals' performance advantages are manifested in a steeper posthire performance improvement



curve. If productivity improvements occur as a result of employees' acquiring knowledge and skills, network ties might affect both potential levels of performance as well as the rate at which employees learn. Third, since turnover and performance are likely to be related, I consider the process of turnover when assessing whether referrals are better than nonreferrals (i.e., the fact that referrals might exhibit lower turnover than nonreferrals). Finally, I test a more sociological proposition which presumes that interaction between the referral and referrer at the workplace enriches the match between the new hire and the job.

My present study uses a direct measurement of what constitutes a "better" employee, one that is an *objective* measure of productivity. Thus, this is an exceptional opportunity to tackle an important research question that has never been addressed before. Consistent with the better match argument, I find that employee referrals are initially more productive than nonreferrals. In the long run, however, my analyses do not seem to support the better match explanation. Instead I find support for the more sociological argument that stresses how posthire dynamics of social relations among socially connected employees influence employee productivity over time. Given the results of my analyses, I suggest that the better match mechanism should be complemented by the social interaction and embeddedness arguments in sociology. Even if one assumes that referrals and nonreferrals have equivalent work abilities, perform equally well in the interview, or even exhibit similar performance trajectories, employers may still prefer to hire referrals at a higher rate simply because of the benefits of social integration in the workplace. Referrers might mentor and train their referrals. At the same time, the social support provided through networks might also increase positive work attitude and job satisfaction (and therefore productivity) and minimize turnover in an organization. In this study, I show that the effect of referral ties goes beyond the hiring process, having significant long-term effects on employee attachment to the firm and on performance. I find that the referral effect on performance is contingent on the referrer's continued presence in the firm. The departure of the referrer has a negative impact on the performance of the referral, even after the referral has been working in the organization for some time.

### HYPOTHESES

#### Better Match Implies Better Performance

It has been argued that the social connections inherent in referral hiring benefit the hiring organization by improving the quality of the match between worker and job. In the economic literature on referral hiring,

this argument is known as the “better match” account. It proposes that personal contact hires perform better than isolated hires because social connections may help to obtain difficult and more realistic information about the job and the candidate.<sup>2</sup> Wanous (1978, 1980), for example, posits that individuals who possess more accurate and complete information about a job will be more productive and satisfied with the organization than will individuals who have less accurate and complete information. This is mainly because job candidates who have more complete, relevant, and accurate information will have a clearer understanding of what the job entails and will thus be more likely to perform well on the job than will candidates lacking such information.

Ultimately, the better match theory posits that employers may benefit from referral hiring because referrals simply exhibit superior performance and are therefore better workers than nonreferrals. However, the traditional posthire indicators of employees’ better matches used in existing empirical studies have been anything but direct measures of productivity; consequently, evidence for the better match hypothesis is quite mixed.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the main reason for the inconclusive nature of these studies is that none has satisfactorily analyzed performance, the most important indicator of whether a referral employee is a better worker than a non-referral employee. Therefore, it is difficult to claim to have examined the match quality in depth without having measured productivity, one of the bases upon which employees are evaluated and compensated. Here, I use a direct measurement of what constitutes “better”: an objective measure of employee productivity.<sup>4</sup> Thus, I can provide a strong test of whether referrals are better matched than nonreferrals. If referrals are better matched to the job than nonreferrals, one would then expect some performance advantage associated with referrals at hire:

*Hypothesis 1.*—Referrals initially perform better than nonreferrals.

This hypothesis could be questioned on the grounds that all hires (re-

<sup>2</sup> Previous theoretical accounts of the role of networks in screening and hiring discuss in detail the different mechanisms that could be producing the better match (see Fernández et al. [2000] for a review).

<sup>3</sup> The traditional posthire indicators of employees’ better matches used in this literature have been higher starting wages and slower wage growth (Quaglieri 1982, Simon and Warner 1992), lower turnover (Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan 1980; Datcher 1983, Decker and Cornelius 1979; Quaglieri 1982; Gannon 1971; Simon and Warner 1992, Sicilian 1995; Wanous 1980), different time path of turnover (Fernández, et al. 2000), and even better work attitudes and lower absenteeism (Breaugh 1981; Taylor and Schmidt 1983)

<sup>4</sup> Admittedly, some studies have shown that people hired through social contacts received better *subjective* performance evaluations (Breaugh 1981; Breaugh and Mann 1984, Caldwell and Spivey 1983; Medoff and Abraham 1980, 1981; Swaroff, Barclay, and Bass 1985).

ferred and nonreferred) have been screened on performance-based criteria. Employees are selected on observable individual characteristics gathered from their résumés or observed during the interview. Nonetheless, if one does not take into account the selection process—the fact that employers hire the survivors of the organization's screening process—the effect of the referral variable on initial performance might be biased (Berk 1983; Heckman 1979). For this reason, previous studies analyzing only hires when relating recruitment source and employee's outcomes are likely to be biased (Breaugh 1981; Breaugh and Mann 1984; Quaglieri 1982; Taylor and Schmidt 1983; for an exception, see Fernández and Weinberg [1997]). The present study tests hypothesis 1, correcting for the selection of hires in prehire screening. This correction will help to perform the mental experiment of what the initial performance of all applicants would have been had they been hired without screening, and to determine whether there exists any difference in initial performance between referrals and nonreferrals at the time of hire.

Hypothesis 1 emphasizes referrals' advantages over nonreferrals at the beginning of their work contract with the organization. However, these accounts of the better match story are still incomplete because they ignore the tendency for networks to recruit employees with superior performance careers. In this sense, cross-sectional analyses may miss the role of personal contacts in building such a performance career. If the benefits of good early jobs found through contacts later translate into labor market advantages, the effect attributable to social networks is attenuated in the cross-section. The possibility that network ties themselves influence productivity over time needs to be further explored with longitudinal data on employee performance. Following the better match predictions, if referrals are better matched to the job than nonreferrals, they might not only perform better right after being hired, as suggested in hypothesis 1—they should also perform better than nonreferral hires in the long run. Even if hypothesis 1 was not supported, the advantages of social ties could be manifested over the tenure of the newly hired employee in two ways. First, referrers may provide information that helps employers choose recruits who can potentially reach a higher level of performance than nonreferrals. Second, referral hires might be able to learn the job and adjust to its requirements more quickly than nonreferrals. These two propositions imply:

*Hypothesis 2.*—Referrals have better performance trajectories than nonreferrals.

When assessing whether referrals perform better than nonreferrals, I will consider the issue of turnover. The obvious relationship between

turnover and performance has not been explored in empirical studies.<sup>5</sup> Generally, productivity can appear to improve through two separate processes. Under the first process, particular individuals show true improvement in performance over time. This process is consistent with the learning theory (Arrow 1962). However, there is a second process whereby performance growth is affected by turnover. Since turnover may change the composition of the workplace, the observed positive correlation between tenure and performance when measured across the cohort of workers (not for any particular individual) could be entirely a result of population heterogeneity. If low-productivity performers are leaving first (Tuma 1976; Price 1977; Jovanovic 1979), then what looks like productivity improvement is actually caused by a selectivity effect.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the average worker's productivity will improve as long as low-productivity employees leave the organization at a higher rate than good employees. The net effect of the different rates at which low- and high-productivity employees leave the firm could *look* like productivity improvement over time when measured across the cohort of workers. But this is not *true* longitudinal productivity improvement because of the change in the composition of the workforce.<sup>7</sup> Any attempt to assess whether referrals are better matched in this dynamic context requires separating these two processes. Therefore, hypothesis 2 will be tested controlling for the risk of turnover.

### Posthire Interdependence in Performance

The last mechanism by which referral hiring might affect performance is sociological; it emphasizes posthire social processes that occur among socially connected employees. This proposition presumes that interaction between the referral and referrer at the new job setting enriches the match between the new hire and the job. The experience of the referral hire might simply be a richer and more gratifying one because the referrer is

<sup>5</sup> A number of authors began a conceptual exploration of the positive organizational consequences of turnover (Dalton and Todor 1979; Mobley 1980, 1982; Staw 1980)

<sup>6</sup> Bartel and Borjas (1981) already introduced the question about the effect of labor turnover on wage growth within the job. They argue that the observed positive relationship between tenure and wage growth could be entirely caused by population heterogeneity. There exist some unobserved individual characteristics that lead to low wages and high turnover rates for some workers, and to high wages and low turnover rates for others.

<sup>7</sup> Few researchers have conceptually examined this individual performance-turnover relationship in depth (Porter and Steers 1973; Price 1977). In general, the findings of such studies are quite mixed. For example, Bassett (1967, 1972) found that high-productivity performers were more likely to leave the organization; Seybol, Pavett, and Walker (1978) found higher performers less likely to leave, and Martin, Price, and Mueller (1981) found no relationship between performance and turnover

around and available to help, answer questions, provide feedback, and participate in non-work-related social activities. In addition, referring employees can serve as informal mentors and enhance training and performance in the workplace. This process, termed the "social integration" or "social enrichment" process (Fernández et al. 2000), is distinct from the better match argument because it takes place after hiring has occurred. Thus, social relations between referrals and referrers affect new hires' attachment to and performance in the organization.

Fernández et al. (2000) present evidence for interdependence of referrals' and referrers' turnover patterns. They show that referral ties affect employees' attachment to their firm, but suggest that referrer turnover may have some implications for referral performance, even after the referral has been in the organization for some time. For example, the departure of the referrer may in itself prompt the referral to reevaluate her own satisfaction with the current job; such a reevaluation may subsequently lower her commitment to the job, and consequently, her performance. Another mechanism could be that the referrer's exit reduces the quality of the work setting to an unsatisfactory level, again lowering the referral's performance and possibly leading her to quit. Even if the referrer's employment termination does not affect the referral's performance, it may still increase her likelihood to quit; referrers who leave the organization may convey information about external job opportunities back to friends and colleagues, increasing the chance that the referral herself will be lured away to another company (Fernández et al. 2000). One final possibility is that the referral employee may feel a sense of obligation not to embarrass the referrer; such a sense of obligation might decline or even disappear after the referrer departs, lowering the referral's performance.<sup>8</sup> All previous scenarios suggest that referrer turnover has negative consequences for referral performance.

However, the Fernández et al. study does not focus on the fact that referrer turnover could also have some positive impact on the attitudes and performance of those referrals who remain in the organization. Krackhardt and Porter (1985) found in their study of three fast-food restaurants that the closer the employee was to those who left the restaurants, the more satisfied and committed she would become. This observation has support in dissonance studies: if a person observes a friend leaving and attributes dissatisfaction to the friend's decision to quit, that person's decision to stay may require more justification. One way the person could justify her decision to stay is to develop stronger positive attitudes toward the job and the workplace.

Clearly, it is difficult to predict the effects of referrer turnover on the

<sup>8</sup> I thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing out this mechanism.

performance of the referral. In this study, I examine what happens to the performance curve of employees whose referrer leaves; this involves comparing the performance curves among nonreferrals, referrals whose referrer leaves, and referrals whose referrer stays. If the referrer's decision to quit has a negative impact on the productivity of the referral, this leads to:

*Hypothesis 3a.*—The turnover of the referrer worsens the referral's performance improvement trajectory.

Assessing the social enrichment effect requires analyzing whether or not it is the presence of the referrer that improves referrals' performance. Thus, all the previous hypotheses about the better match argument could be complemented as being about social enrichment. For instance, if the referrer teaches the referral the ins and outs of the job at the beginning of the job contract or during the training, it is the presence of the referrer that accounts for any performance differential between referrals and nonreferrals—even between referrals whose referrer is present and referrals whose referrer is not present during the first months in the organization. Similarly, the referrer could help the referral along a quicker performance improvement trajectory. In fact, one could argue that if the referrer were to influence the referral, this influence should be strongest at the very beginning. Nonreferrals might subsequently build a social network that dissipates the referral's initial advantage. This leads to an alternative hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3b.*—The presence of the referrer improves the referral's performance improvement trajectory.

Finally, I explore whether the positive effect of workplace interaction between referrer and referral is enhanced when the referrer's level of performance is taken into account. After careful analysis of the classic Hawthorne plant data, Jones (1990) demonstrated that workers' productivity levels were highly interdependent. In my setting, Jones's finding suggests that there might be a relationship between the performance of the referred and referring employees: if referrals are exposed to high-performance referrers, their performance should be much higher than the performance of nonreferrals or individuals referred by low-productivity referrers. Conversely, social interactions with a low-productivity referrer at work might have a negative effect on referrals' productivity. If referrals' performance is affected by the amount of exposure to the referrer, the difference in results from exposure to a high-performance referrer as compared to a low-performance referrer should be explored.

## RESEARCH SETTING

The job I study is the phone customer service representative (CSR), an entry-level job at a large phone center within a large international financial services organization in the United States. CSRs are full-time employees, paid by the hour, whose duties consist of answering customers' telephone inquiries about credit card accounts. New hires are given approximately two months of classroom and on-the-job training before working on the phone. CSRs are trained in order to improve their accuracy, speed, and efficiency while processing phone calls. Managers often monitor phone calls to ensure that CSRs achieve the phone center's courtesy and accuracy goals.

I wish to highlight two important features of the organization under study. First, the phone center is a single site with a centralized human resources function. It keeps particularly clean and orderly databases, which allow every phase of the CSR hiring process to be identified. A second feature of the phone center particularly relevant to this study is that in addition to recording supervisors' subjective ratings of employee performance, the phone center collects objective and precise measures of productivity for the CSRs. This should greatly improve the estimates of the impact of recruitment source on employee productivity. I have also been able to learn about the phone center's screening criteria and performance expectations. Consequently, I can more precisely specify the set of appropriate individual control variables that affect labor market matching. In addition, I can consider the extent to which an applicant's referral status is a proxy for other characteristics that might make the applicant desirable to the recruiters at the phone center.

In the remainder of this section, I describe the employment process at the phone center as illustrated in figure 1. I start with the records of the phone center's hiring activities during the two years from January 1995 until December 1996. The phone center's human resources (PCHR) department tracked 4,165 external employment inquiries for CSR jobs over this two-year period. Only 8% (336) of the original applicants were hired. I tracked 334 of these employees from the time of their hire until June 1997, when I ended the performance data collection. Around 290 hires completed the two-month training period at the phone center. For those hired CSRs, I examine two of the most relevant posthire outcomes at the phone center: turnover and productivity. Whenever possible, I incorporate evidence that I gained through observation and interviews of the different professionals at the phone center (mainly from the PCHR staff).




FIG. 1.—Employment process under study

### Recruitment and Training

As a part of their standard operating procedures, PCHR professionals record the recruitment source for every employment inquiry. This information is recorded when a potential employee makes her initial contact with the phone center. I interviewed PCHR recruiters to determine the screening criteria and performance evaluations that were used to recommend candidates for employment. They informed me that given that the CSR job involves significant customer interaction, PCHR screens applicants based on verbal and interpersonal skills from brief interviews or phone interactions. PCHR recruiters also look for people with prior customer service experience. They also tend to look for applicants who they believe will be reliable employees, preferring applicants who are currently employed and who have had some previous work experience. In addition, they look for evidence of basic keyboarding and computer skills on the application. Very relevant to this study, the PCHR personnel emphasize that “referrals are treated the same as everyone else.”

The phone center runs the training session for a cohort or “class” of about 15–20 new hires. The training consists of about six weeks of classes and two weeks out of class, working in a controlled area (what they refer to as “on-the-job training” or OJT). The OJT takes place on the first floor of the phone center and not in the main area where the CSR would work (the main call area is located on the second floor of the building). The OJT period is important in this study for various reasons. First, during the training, performance is never measured or evaluated, and most important, both referrals and nonreferrals go through an identical hiring



and training process. As one of the PCHR managers put it: "Nothing will prevent a new hire [whether referral or nonreferral] from having to go through all the weeks of training. Our training is designed to better prepare our new hires to perform their duties as excellent CSRs." Second, during the training, recent hires learn about the CSR job, getting very clear information about what the job entails, including job content and responsibilities. Simultaneously, the employer learns whether the new employee is well suited for the job. As one PCHR member put it: "We can get a good idea of who is not going to be a good match to the CSR job; some hires do not even bother to show up to complete their training!" Quite a few new hires quit during the training period—during the period of my analysis, over 10% (44 of 334) of the hires left the firm during training. Therefore, I coded performance histories only for those 290 employees who were hired and completed the training process.

### Turnover and Performance

PCHR personnel are concerned about the performance of their hires. However, recruiters do not seem to learn much about the quality of the employee once she has passed through the hiring process, even though, as one of the PCHR managers joked: "It is all a selection issue; if recruiters were doing their job right, we would not see so much turnover in our phone center" (field quotation from a PCHR manager). Regardless of whether recruiters are screening candidates using the "right information" or not (quoting one PCHR member), PCHR professionals are aware of the limitations associated with the screening of candidates.

PCHR personnel are also concerned about the costs of high employee turnover (although turnover at this setting is low by call center standards). Answering phone call after phone call in a high-pressure, highly structured environment demands a set of skills for which it is difficult to screen. As the PCHR director put it: "People leave their jobs because of the working environment. The job burns you out!" The numbers confirm statements like these; almost half of the CSR terminations at the phone center were the result of job abandonment or job dissatisfaction (45.7% in 2000). One of the PCHR managers remarked: "People do not want to be in [the phone center] all day. So the question is how we can change the bonus structure so that we can help reduce turnover." In previous years, PCHR professionals have dealt with the issue by hiring more people when turnover is high. Although this hiring practice might help to keep a stable number of CSRs answering the phones, it does not solve the problem of the high costs associated with employee turnover.

In terms of performance, unit supervisors at the phone center pay close attention to the average handle time; that is, the amount of time in seconds

that it takes a CSR to complete a phone call with a client. A PCHR manager stated: "Average handle time is the ultimate variable we are looking at, always controlling for the quality of the call." Every year, one of the PCHR managers computes simple statistics (i.e., means) for the whole year, taking into account the tenure of the employee. This manager prepares a report that is presented and discussed at PCHR meetings. Henceforth, PCHR managers try hard to understand the main predictors of handle time and quality so they can better screen for well-performing employees. PCHR staff, however, do not seem to have any clear idea about the observable characteristics that could help them identify and hire individuals with higher productivity potential. As the head of the PCHR department put it: "Based on our experience of 30 years, what you see in the résumé or during the interview is not a predictor of performance at all." Although PCHR closely monitors performance, CSRs are hardly ever fired because of low productivity: only slightly more than 1% of all hires are terminated each year for performance issues. Still, supervisors intervene with poorly performing employees by rebuking them about their low productivity and/or low quality; they are also in charge of helping these CSRs to improve their performance. In addition to this monitoring and control, the phone center has a basic incentive plan where those employees with the highest performance ratings (i.e., highest average number of calls answered per hour) in a given time period get an increase of 5–10% in their salaries. Normally such salary revision occurs once or twice a year, and very few employees—less than 10%—get a raise.

### Measuring Tenure and Employee Performance

For hires, I coded the two main dependent variables in the posthire analysis: duration in the organization and performance during their tenure with the phone center from hire up until June 1997 when I ended the collection of performance data. Objective and subjective performance measures were examined at the beginning of each month. Because hires go through a training period of about two months, I have a maximum of 27 months of performance observations per employee hire.<sup>9</sup> Almost half of the hires were still with the organization at the end of my study. For hires, the days of tenure with the phone center range from a minimum

<sup>9</sup> The maximum number of performance observations is for those employees who were hired at the very beginning of my hiring window (January 1995) and who stayed in the organization until my last month of performance observation (June 1997). Because performance measures are available at the beginning of each month, the performance of hires is not available for the first three months (i.e., the two months of training, plus the first month after their training).

of 3 days up to a maximum 1,104 days, with a median of 480 and a mean of 528 days.

I measure performance using the average number of calls a CSR answers per hour in any given month (corrected for call quality).<sup>10</sup> This measure is calculated using handle time. The phone center computer automatically calculates the average time a CSR takes to complete a phone call. Compared with other available performance measurements, the average handle time provides a good measurement of how efficient a CSR is. This measure is exceptionally accurate: it is measured across a large number of calls that are randomly routed to CSRs by the phone center computer (over 5,000 calls per month for the typical CSR at about 2.5 minutes per call), and thus equates the difficulty of tasks across CSRs. In addition, it is measured automatically, and therefore is not subject to the normal problems of subjective performance ratings (e.g., supervisor evaluations). The maximum value observed in any month of tenure was approximately 26.5 calls answered in an hour, and the minimum was 19.5, with a mean of 20.3 phone calls per hour ( $SD = 3.63$ ). The number of phone calls answered per hour is on average initially low but tends to improve over the first year on the job, peaking at the fifteenth month, when an average CSR answers over 24 phone calls per hour. After the fifteenth month, the level of productivity worsens slightly—although variance in productivity also widens and the number of employee survivors decreases.

### Independent Variables

Two different sets of variables are used in this study to predict an employee's performance trajectory. The first set of variables includes human capital variables that are believed to influence not only screening decisions but also an individual's productivity. Years of education and previous job experience are two of the most important variables. Experience includes variables such as months of bank experience, months of nonbank

<sup>10</sup> Unit managers listen to a sample of calls for each CSR and rate the quality of their calls, evaluating each CSR on a monthly basis across courtesy and accuracy. Both measures of quality are typically at ceiling and exhibit little variance across people or over time. The evaluation scale ranges from zero up to one (when all monitored calls are of maximum accuracy or courtesy) for the whole sample during the months of observation. Because of the lack of variation across observations, I do not use such measures of employee productivity as dependent variables in this study. Instead, I divide the average number of calls answered per hour by the product of both quality measures to compute a quality-adjusted average handle time for each employee. This calculates the number of calls answered per hour, adjusted for quality. As expected, both measures (number of calls quality and non-quality adjusted) are highly correlated (with a correlation coefficient of .99).

experience, number of previous jobs, whether the hire was working at time of application, and tenure and wage in the last job (as a proxy for job status prior to the job at the bank site; these variables are coded as zero for people who had not had a previous job). Since work in the human capital tradition argues that the value of human experience declines over time, I captured this effect in the analyses by entering a squared term for months of nonbank experience. In the analysis, I also include measures of different individual skills and capabilities such as having some computer knowledge or speaking another language (both are dummy variables). I also include a dummy variable to distinguish repeat applicants from first-time applicants (one for repeat applicants; zero otherwise). The maximum number of applications from individuals is three. An important demographic variable is gender (coded one when male; zero when female). Finally, I also control for the state of the market; that is, the number of job openings and the number of applications on the date the candidate applied.<sup>11</sup>

The second set of variables includes those measuring the availability as well as the characteristics of referrers, not only at the time of the referral's application, but also during her employment at the phone center. The first network variable included is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a referral. My analyses are conservative tests (given the fact that I have only one of an employee's network ties) of the effects of social embeddedness of workers on productivity. The second set of variables measures the characteristics of the referrer, including variables such as wage, education, tenure in the firm, and performance rating in the organization. I also include variables about the referrer's structural accessibility to successful referrals, such as previous employment as a CSR.<sup>12</sup> All of the referrer's characteristic variables are allowed to change over time except for education, which is considered constant. For non-referrals, all these variables are coded zero. Hence, the effects of referrers' characteristics are conditional on the applicant's being a referral. I also coded a dummy variable to distinguish those referrers who received a

<sup>11</sup> One might expect that the higher the supply of jobs in the organization, the less selective the organization can be. This may possibly worsen the employee-job match, leading to increased turnover of the hires and a worsening of the hires' performance. The demand side of the state of the labor market economic argument implies that the higher the demand for jobs in the organization, the more selective the organization can be. This increased selectivity should be reflected in an overall better match of hires to their jobs, in lower employee turnover, and in improved performance.

<sup>12</sup> Studies show that when employees find their jobs through contacts with high rank and prestige, they tend to get better jobs themselves (Lin 1999; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988). Referrers may also vary in their accessibility to successful referrals (Fernández and Castilla 2001)

good subjective evaluation, as recorded in the phone center's computer files.<sup>13</sup> Finally, a time-varying dummy variable is coded as one once the referrer has left the organization.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables included in the performance and selection models for applicants and hires. The job is female dominated—only 22% of the hires are male. Hires on average have about 13.6 years of education, with about three months of bank experience, 71 months of nonbank experience, and 48 months of customer service experience. Less than 14% have a bachelor's degree, and 74% have some computing experience. Sixty-seven percent of the hires were working at time of application; their number of previous jobs is three on average, with approximately two years of tenure in their last job. Half of the hires were referred by an employee in the firm. The table also includes the initial performance variables for the new hires. The average number of calls answered per hour is initially 20 calls, with courtesy and accuracy levels close to one.

## METHODS

My hypotheses pertain to the performance implications of hiring new employees using referral programs. Accordingly, my methodological approach is to break down the posthire employment process into individual components and to model each of these pieces to understand performance careers within organizations (see figure 1). For those hired CSRs, I examine turnover and productivity, the two most relevant posthire outcomes at the phone center. I estimate (1) models for initial performance; and (2) models for performance growth. The initial performance models are estimated controlling for the screening of employees. The performance growth models are corrected for the turnover propensity of employees.

### Initial Performance Models

In order to analyze the determinants of starting performance, the dependent variable I use is the starting average number of phone calls answered

<sup>13</sup> In preliminary analyses, I also used the firm's information about bad evaluations. But this bad evaluation dummy variable is almost always zero, only 16 out of the 4,165 applications (.39%) were referred by employees who got bad evaluations. One of those candidates was hired and completed the training. In the case of good evaluations, 31 out of 350 applications made by "good" referrers were hired and completed the training.

TABLE 1  
MEANS AND SDs FOR VARIABLES IN THE PERFORMANCE MODELS

	APPLICANTS		HIRES		HIRES SURVIVING ONE YEAR	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<b>Independent variables</b>						
Gender (1 = male) . . . . .	.337	.473	224	418	.216	.413
Repeat application (1 = yes) . . . . .	.096	.295	.072	.260	.025	.157
Marital status (1 = married) . . . . .	.423	.494	.420	.494	.443	.497
<b>Skills</b>						
Computer . . . . .	731	443	741	.439	784	.413
Language . . . . .	196	.397	138	.345	131	.338
Years of education . . . . .	13 750	1.866	13.607	1.723	13.528	1.768
Bachelor's degree (1 = yes) . . . . .	.185	.388	138	345	146	.354
<b>Experience</b>						
Works at time of application . . . . .	550	.498	.679	468	.714	.453
Months of bank experience . . . . .	2.102	14.402	3.335	14.649	2.374	10.561
Months of nonbank experience . . . . .	64 629	62.361	71.721	60.136	72 631	55 334
Nonbank experience, squared . . . . .	8,064.834	28,859.890	8,746.934	20,540.150	8,321.410	14,600.030
Months of customer service . . . . .	34 195	44 877	48 085	53.577	47 272	47 023
No of previous jobs . . . . .	3 224	1.139	3.048	1.240	3.031	1.226
Tenure in last job (in days) . . . . .	576 968	1,032 603	776 493	1,264.242	815.091	1,234 666
Salary in last job . . . . .	6.431	3.659	6 086	3 450	6.426	3.198
<b>Application behavior:</b>						
No of applications . . . . .	19.937	16 783	18.534	15 246	18 126	13.624
No of job openings . . . . .	18.198	10.672	18.469	10.477	19 131	10.602
<b>Application source:</b>						
External referral . . . . .	.374	484	.510	.501	.548	.499

Referrer's characteristics at time of application:*									
Tenure (in years)	.....	4.019	3.984	3.478	3.523	3.819	3.622		
Wage	.....	9.749	5.635	9.536	4.816	9.821	5.237		
Years of education	.....	12.430	1.218	12.432	1.202	12.422	1.189		
Performance (1 = good evaluation)	.....	.228	.419	.209	.408	.211	.410		
Ever worked as a CSR (1 = yes)	.....	.297	.457	.351	.479	.330	.472		
Terminated	.....	.034	.182	.041	.198	.028	.164		
Dependent variables									
No. of calls answered per hour	.....			20.291	3.629	20.312	3.501		
No. of calls answered per hour (quality adjusted)	.....			20.044	3.594	20.059	3.477		
Maximum level of performance	.....			26.497		27.949			
Minimum level of performance	.....			19.458		19.319			
Courtesy (worst level = 0; best level = 1)	.....			.998	.007	.998	.008		
Accuracy (worst level = 0; best level = 1)	.....			.983	.024	.963	.022		
No. of cases	.....	4,114		290		199			

NOTE -- "Hires" includes those who survived the original training period (approx. two months). "Hires Surviving One Year" stayed in the company at least 12 months after their hiring date.

\* The means and standard deviations for these characteristics are calculated only for referrals (these referrers' characteristics are coded as zero for individuals who were not referred).

per hour (adjusted for call quality) immediately after the initial two-month training period.<sup>14</sup> I estimate the parameters of models of the form:

$$Y_0 = B'X + \varepsilon, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_0$  is the first available performance measure in the job as a CSR after training,  $X$  is a vector of covariates that contains characteristics of the individual at the time of entry into the phone center as coded from their job applications, and  $\varepsilon$  is the disturbance term assumed to be normally distributed and well behaved (uncorrelated with the covariates).

The performance equation proposed above has traditionally been estimated for the hires using the basic ordinary least squares (OLS) technique, a choice predicated on a lack of information about job applicants. As a result of observing performance only for the applicants who got hired, these past models do not correct for selection bias. To correct for such selection bias, I use the Heckman selection model (Gronau 1974; Lewis 1974; Heckman 1976). This model assumes a regression like the one described in equation (1). However, the dependent variable, *performance*, is not observed for all applicants or hires who were terminated during the two-month training. So there is a selection equation, and the applicant is hired and completes the initial training period in the organization if:

$$Y'Z + \mu > 0, \quad (2)$$

where  $Z$  is a vector of covariates that affect the chances of observation of performance for a given applicant, and  $\mu$  is normally distributed (mean = 0; SD = 1).<sup>15</sup> Presumably, firms hire those applicants who, based on available information from their résumés, are expected to be most productive. But firms may also take into consideration the state of the labor market: that is, the number of job openings that need to be staffed and the number of available applications (demand for jobs). Therefore,  $Z$  is a vector of covariates that contains the characteristics of the job applicant ( $X$ ) plus two variables controlling for the state of the market at the time of application. The correlation between  $\varepsilon$  and  $\mu$  is some parameter  $\rho$ ; so that when  $\rho \neq 0$ , only the Heckman selection model provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimates for the parameters in equation (1).

<sup>14</sup> The performance measure is normally distributed and no logarithm transformation was therefore required. Nevertheless, in addition to the modeling of starting performance, I also modeled the logarithm of starting performance and obtained very similar results (available upon request). I also used the number of phone calls per hour (without adjusting for the quality of the call) and obtained similar results.

<sup>15</sup> Following Stolzenberg and Relles (1997) and Winship and Mare (1992), I run several tests using different sample selection models to ensure my results are robust.



### Performance Growth Models

For the study of performance growth, I analyze longitudinal data using regression models of change. While a comparison of cross-sectional analyses at different points in time provides some insight into this process, models of change represent it explicitly. The performance data structure is a pooled cross-section and time series. The data are unbalanced: the number of observations varies among employees because some individuals leave the organization earlier than others (while many workers opt to stay in the organization). Research studies typically model such data with fixed-effect estimators, which analyze only the within-individual over-time variation. This choice is unappealing in this context because the majority of the independent variables (i.e., those variables coded from the application) do not vary over time.

To test my hypotheses about the determinants of change in productivity, I estimate various cross-sectional time-series linear models using generalized estimating equations (GEE). These models allow estimating general linear models with the specification of the within-group correlation structure for the panels. I report the robust estimators that analyze both between- and within-individual variation. Specifically, I use the method of GEE developed by Liang and Zeger (1986). This methodology requires the inclusion of a correlation structure when estimating these models.<sup>16</sup> Any of these estimated longitudinal models will be corrected for the turnover process. So following Lee (1979, 1983), Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980), and Lee and Maddala (1985), I control for the retention of employees over time by including the previously estimated turnover hazard when I estimate such longitudinal models. This results in a two-stage estimation procedure. The models I will be presenting are:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha Y_{i,t-1} + B'X_{i,t} + \delta \bar{\pi}(t, \mathbf{Z}_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (3)$$

where  $Y_{i,t}$  is the performance measure in the job at time  $t$  and  $\bar{\pi}$  is the estimated turnover hazard rate (using event-history analysis):

$$\pi(t, \mathbf{Z}_{i,t}) = \exp[\Gamma' \mathbf{Z}_{i,t}] q(t), \quad (4)$$

where  $\pi$  is the instantaneous turnover rate. This rate is commonly specified as an exponential function of covariates multiplied by some function of time,  $q(t)$ . The log-linear form for the covariates is chosen to ensure that predicted rates are nonnegative.  $\mathbf{Z}$  is a vector of covariates that affect the hazard rate of turnover for any given hire.  $\mathbf{Z}$  is indexed by  $i$  to indicate heterogeneity by case and by  $t$  to make clear that the values of explanatory

<sup>16</sup> Under mild regularity conditions, GEE estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal, and they are therefore more appropriate for cross-section time-series data structures.

variables may change over time.<sup>17</sup> I estimate the effect of the explanatory variables in model 2 using the Cox model that does not require any particular assumption about the functional form of  $q(t)$  (Cox 1972, 1975). I tested for the effect of turnover across different specifications, functional forms, and measures of turnover and always found similar results.

## RESULTS

### Initial Performance

Table 2 shows the differences in the levels of initial productivity by application source. The performance of referral workers appears superior to the performance of nonreferrals, especially if we look at both quality-adjusted and non-quality-adjusted number of calls: referrals' average number of calls answered is higher than nonreferrals' (although the difference of a half call is barely statistically significant at the .1 level). The table shows little difference between referrals and nonreferrals on other dimensions of performance such as courtesy or accuracy. In table 2, the exploration of performance differences between referrals and nonreferrals does not control for other individual variables or the screening process that CSR applicants undergo before starting to work at the phone center. In the next tables, multivariate regression models are used to further explore this difference in initial performance between referrals and nonreferrals.

Table 3 provides the results of the initial performance regressions correcting for both the selection of candidates from a pool of applicants and their retention during the training.<sup>18</sup> Employees are selected on observable individual characteristics from their résumés or during the interview. One needs to account for the fact that employers hire people who passed the organization's screening process. In table 3, I correct for the selection of hires in prehire screening by including the factors for which PCHR says they screen and the control variables that affect labor market matching in the selection equation of the Heckman model.<sup>19</sup> The first model includes

<sup>17</sup> The model in 2 is the most general form of any parametric models that are generally distinguished by the different choices of  $q(t)$ .

<sup>18</sup> OLS multivariate regressions were also estimated to examine the impact of the referral variable on initial performance (Castilla 2002). From the results of these traditional models, the only significant variable in the prediction of employee performance is nonbank experience, which has a negative impact. These results are available upon request, although I argue that these traditional OLS results might be biased because these traditional OLS models do not take into account the selection process, i.e., the fact that employers hire the survivors of their screening process.

<sup>19</sup> My analyses reported in table 3 do not change much when I exclude the two variables measuring the state of the market in the outcome equation

# Social Networks and Employee Performance

TABLE 2  
MEANS AND SDs FOR MEASURES OF INITIAL PERFORMANCE BY APPLICATION SOURCE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	ALL HIRES		REFERRALS		NONREFER- RALS		PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES BE- TWEEN REFER- RALS AND NONREFERRALS	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Difference	t-test
No. of calls answered per hour . . . . .	20 291	3.629	20.561	3 584	20.009	3.666	.552	1.296 <sup>+</sup>
No. of calls answered per hour (quality ad- justed) . . . . .	20.044	3 594	20 290	3.478	19 787	3.706	.502	1.191 <sup>+</sup>
Courtesy (worst level = 0; best level = 1) . . .	.998	.007	.998	.007	.999	.008	.001	.600
Accuracy (worst level = 0; best level = 1) . . .	.983	.024	.983	.023	.984	.025	.002	.579
No. of cases . . . . .	290		148		142		290	

NOTE —To be classified as a hire (All Hires), workers must survive the training period.

<sup>+</sup>  $P < .10$  (one-tailed test).

\*  $P < .05$

\*\*  $P < .01$ .

only the referral variable in the performance equation (col. 1 of the table). The second model includes all controls (col. 3); the third and final model (col. 5) includes only those individual controls with a  $z$ -value more than one in model 2 (i.e., language and months of nonbank experience).<sup>20</sup>

Referral appears to be an important variable at both the prehire and posthire stages of the employment process. First, referrals are more likely to be hired and to complete the initial training. More important, once I control for the other "observable characteristics," referrals show a better level of performance, as measured by a higher quality-adjusted average number of calls answered. Referrals answer, on average, an additional phone call per hour when compared to nonreferrals—the difference in the number of calls is slightly over .7. This is true for any of the three models of performance. The referral effect is significant ( $P < .05$ , one-tailed) in the model without controls or with those controls with a  $z$ -value higher than one (i.e., language and nonbank experience). When all control variables are included in the model (col. 2 of the table), the referral effect

<sup>20</sup> The effect of any independent variable with a  $z$ -value less than one can be considered very insignificant, and therefore negligible

TABLE 3  
INITIAL PERFORMANCE REGRESSION MODELS CORRECTING FOR SCREENING AND COMPLETION OF TRAINING  
(OLS Models with Sample Selection)

	ONLY REFERRAL		REFERRAL AND ALL CONTROLS		REFERRAL AND SOME CONTROLS	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Main model:						
Constant	18.551*** 745*	2.091 .435	21.410** .703 <sup>+</sup>	11.491 465	19.481*** .737*	2.002 .436
External referral			598	1.413		
Gender (1 = male)			-.404	1.058		
Repeat application (1 = yes)			-.090	1.047		
Computer			-1.030	777		
Language			-.046	.162	-1.076 <sup>+</sup>	.624
Years of education			.118	1.673		
Works at time of application			-.016	.015		
Months of bank experience			-.018*	.009		
Months of nonbank experience			.000	.000	- .01**	.004
Nonbank experience, squared			.002	.014		
Months of customer service			-.047	433		
Number of previous jobs			.000	.000		
Tenure in last job (in days)			.077	106		
Salary in last job			.001	.021		
Number of applications			.039	.020		
Number of openings						
Selection model:						



is still about .7 quality-controlled calls, but the difference is now barely significant ( $P < .10$ ).<sup>21</sup>

The results in the selection part of the Heckman model show that applicants are more likely to get hired and complete training if they are employed at the time of application, if they have more months of customer service experience and work experience outside the financial services sector, or if they report longer tenure on their last job. In the study, the number of previous jobs that candidates report has the expected negative sign (significantly related to being selected). This is consistent with the recruiter's preference for candidates with a lower number of previous jobs (since those who change jobs a lot during their work histories might be more likely to leave). While education did not emerge as a significant predictor, the dummy variable reporting some computer experience is a significant negative predictor of being selected. However, applicants with foreign language skills are less likely to be selected than applicants without such skills. The final human capital variable—candidate's last salary on the job—is not significant, although its coefficient has the expected sign. Applicants who report a higher wage on their last job seem less likely to be selected. This is consistent with recruiters' concerns that such candidates might be overqualified and more likely to leave the firm.

Controlling for other factors, males are less likely to be selected than females. PCHR recruiters speculate that females have a better sense of how to conduct customer service interactions, even though the substantive part of the equation demonstrates that females do not seem to perform any differently from males. The recruiters' preference for female employees may be an effect of gender stereotyping in the service industry. Even when there are no objective reasons showing that women perform better in any given service job, women are more often recruited for such positions. None of the variables controlling for the state of the market at the time of application has any significant impact on the likelihood of the candidate to be hired and to complete the training period. Finally, the dummy variable distinguishing between referrals and nonreferrals is statistically significant. Referrals are more likely to be hired and to complete

<sup>21</sup> Even when applicants with foreign language skills are less likely to be selected than applicants without such skills, foreign language skills seem to have a negative effect on CSR performance. Candidates with foreign language skills answer fewer phone calls per hour than candidates without such skills (the difference is not significant at the .05 level though). Work experience outside the financial services sector worsens the CSR average number of calls answered ( $P < .01$ ); customer service experience is never significant, although it has the expected sign.

their training than nonreferrals.<sup>22</sup> Although referrals appear to be more appropriate candidates for the CSR job, referrals' advantages at the interview and training stage cannot be explained by the individual background control variables alone.<sup>23</sup>

There are clear productivity advantages in the hiring of employees using referral programs (and the bonus associated with the referral program). In this setting, the referral program seems to bring measurable posthire advantages in the hiring of employees, even though certain PCHR representatives express their belief that the referral bonuses are counterproductive since people refer others for money. Only after completing my analyses on initial performance that control for the selection of hires, could I determine that these perceptions do not reflect reality. In actuality, the use of the referral program seems to provide two advantages in this particular phone center. First, there is evidence that the referral program increases the quantity of job applicants. Second, the referral program seems to recruit better-matched employees; there are definite initial performance advantages in the hiring of employees using the referral program. I show a net productivity gain of .7 phone calls per hour. Over an eight-hour day, this corresponds to five to six calls a day; over a 40-hour week to about 28 calls, or about an hour's worth of work that has been saved. So I estimate an initial productivity increase of about 2.5%.

Finally, there is another way in which referring employees can signal information about the performance quality of referral candidates. Employees can access "upstream" information that could be available because of the tendency of people to refer others like themselves. According to this homophily mechanism, referrals are more likely to be like referrers, and since referrers have already survived a prior screening process, the homophily mechanism would lead the applicants referred by employees to be better performers than nonreferred applicants (see Montgomery 1991; Ullman 1966). To address whether the referrer's characteristics and level of performance might influence the initial performance of the employee, I ran several Heckman regression models adding referrer's char-

<sup>22</sup> I estimated the same Heckman regression models excluding those 44 hires who were terminated during their training. The selection coefficient for referral is still statistically significant and has about the same magnitude. Moreover, the deletion of those 44 cases does not change the pattern of the effects of all the variables in both the selection and the substantive equations in the Heckman model.

<sup>23</sup> To complete my test of the better match argument at the time of hire, I analyzed terminations during the training period (Castilla 2002). There were 44 terminations during this period. My probit models with sample selection suggest that referrals seem less likely than nonreferrals to leave their job during the training. In termination models beyond training, however, the effect is not significant (consistent with Fernández et al. 2000).

acteristics to the main performance equation. I find no evidence that additional information about referrers improves the fit of the initial performance model.<sup>24</sup> The fact that recruiters never contact referrers or look up their information explains why I see no support for the homophily mechanism in this phone center.

### Performance Trajectory

I now analyze whether referrers help to recruit better-performing employees over time. Table 4 presents the results of the several performance growth regression models correcting for the turnover rate. I estimate the turnover-hazard-rate selection-regression models to test hypothesis 2—whether referrals have better performance trajectories than nonreferrals once we control for the risk of turnover. There does not, therefore, seem to be any support for the better match theory in the long run. In addition, most of the appropriate individual human capital characteristics have insignificant effects on employee performance over time. By looking at the results on table 4, it seems that the three significant variables in the prediction of employee performance growth are nonbank experience (which has a negative impact;  $P < .05$ ), customer service experience (which has a positive impact;  $P < .001$ ), and the number of applications at time of application (which has a positive impact;  $P < .05$ ). Looking at the coefficient for the estimated hazard rate in the performance growth model, one can see that the likelihood of turnover is associated with higher performance growth over time. In other words, the model seems to suggest that those employees who are more likely to leave the phone center are those whose performance improves over time.

By examining the results of the turnover-hazard-rate part of these selection-regression models (reported in the last two columns of table 4), I do not find statistically reliable evidence of referrals having a lower turnover rate.<sup>25</sup> As in the performance models, very few of the appropriate individual human capital and other control variables seem to have any significant effect on turnover. Additional months of bank experience seem

<sup>24</sup> These results are available in Castilla (2002). Referrers' characteristics do not seem to provide any additional information about the future performance of the referral ( $P < .776$ ; incremental  $\chi^2 = 1.78$ ,  $df = 4$ ); nor does information about the referrer's evaluation by the firm ( $P < .727$ , incremental  $\chi^2 = 0.12$ ;  $df = 1$ )

<sup>25</sup> Results do not change across a variety of parametric transition rate models (the Cox model presented in the table, the proportional exponential model, or the proportional Weibull model). I also performed these tests separately for voluntary (quitting) vs. involuntary (fired or laid off) turnover and found no reliable differences. Most of the turnover was voluntary, though; only 18 (11%) of the overall job terminations were involuntary.



to increase the rate of turnover, whereas months of customer service experience improve an employee's chances of staying in the phone center.

The model of employee performance reported in table 4 represents an important step toward correcting for a lack of empirical research concerning both the evolution of productivity and turnover decisions of hires within organizations. My model attempts to control for the process of turnover. I find that neither poor performers nor good performers are more likely to leave the phone center; the effect of the performance at time  $t - 1$  on the turnover rate is not significant. This finding seems to suggest that the performance of the employee is not a good predictor of turnover in this research setting. However, as pointed out above, the coefficient for the estimated hazard rate in the performance growth model shows that those employees who are more likely to leave the phone center tend to significantly improve their performance over time ( $P < .1$ ).

The initial performance models show clear productivity and early turnover advantages when employees are hired using referral programs. The analyses of performance growth, however, show that referrals do not perform any better than nonreferrals over time at the phone center. Moreover, the path of performance estimated for the employees at the phone center does not seem to reflect any improvement and/or skill acquisition (i.e., "learning by doing"; see Arrow 1962). In this phone center, on-the-job tenure does not seem to make a worker more productive, especially in the long run. My findings suggest that an inverse U-shape curve is very descriptive for the CSR performance curve (consistent with the findings in many other studies of service-oriented jobs; see Staw 1980). The performance improvement mostly occurs during the first three months at the job (including the training). After that, the performance tends to decrease (the coefficient for tenure is negative and significant in all estimated models; also the coefficient for average performance in the previous month is below one and significant in all models).

To address whether referrer's characteristics and level of performance might influence the performance trajectory of the employee referral, I also ran several models adding referrer's characteristics to the main performance equation. The results were similar to those in the initial performance models; I found no evidence that information about the referrer improves the fit of any performance improvement model.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Referrer's characteristics do not seem to predict or provide any information about the future performance of the referral ( $P < .575$ ; incremental  $\chi^2 = 2.90$ ,  $df = 4$ ); nor does information about the referrer's evaluation by the firm ( $P < .255$ ; incremental  $\chi^2 = 1.29$ ;  $df = 1$ ). These results are available in Castilla (2002)

TABLE 4  
TURN-OVER-HAZARD-RATE SELECTION-REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING PERFORMANCE CORRECTING FOR TURN-OVER RATE

	ONLY REFERRAL			ADDING CONTROLS			ADDING SOME CONTROLS			TURN-OVER RATE MODEL (Cox Regression Model)		
	Coef.			SE			Coef.			SE		
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Main model:												
Constant . . . . .	5.890***	.340	6.148***	.545	5.844***	.351						
Performance, month $T - 1$ . . . . .	.762***	.015	.748***	.015	.768***	.014					.012	.048
Tenure in months . . . . .	-.054***	.019	-.060***	.020	-.055***	.019						
External referral . . . . .	.037	.111	-.009	.113	-.015	.107					-.435	.320
Gender (1 = male) . . . . .			.103	.146							.254	.340
Repeat application (1 = yes) . . . . .			-.225	.194	-.179	.174					.541	.565
Computer . . . . .			-.074	.138							.168	.456
Language . . . . .			-.167	.157	-.161	.139					.510	.440
Years of education . . . . .			.013	.039							.052	.093



### Interdependence at Work

The dynamic models in table 5 include the “referrer leaves” dummy variable in order to evaluate whether the departure of the referrer has a negative impact on the referral performance curve. All four models show that the referral variable does not seem to have a significant effect on employee performance. Overall, referrals and nonreferrals do not differ in their productivity trajectories. These results again do not support the better match theory in the long run. Instead, I find statistically reliable evidence of interdependence between referrals’ productivity and referrers’ turnover. Consistent with hypothesis 3a, referrals whose referrer has left show a worse performance trajectory than those whose referrer has stayed (and even than nonreferrals). The “referrer leaves” coefficient in the dynamic regression models—including the most significant controls only—is  $-.28$  ( $P < .05$ , two-tailed test). I therefore find support for hypothesis 3a.<sup>27</sup>

This finding suggests that the effects of referral ties continue beyond the hiring process, having later effects not only on attachment to the firm but also on performance. The model shows that there are no statistically significant differences in productivity trajectories between nonreferrals and referrals whose referrer stays in the organization. I find, however, that the “breaking of the tie” between referrer and referral has important negative consequences for the productivity of the referred employee—to the extent that referrals perform worse than nonreferred employees if their referrer leaves the organization. In the last two columns of table 5, I report the event-history analysis results of the turnover process. Now the referral variable appears to have a significant negative impact on the likelihood of an employee leaving the organization. However, referrals

<sup>27</sup> I also tested the reciprocal effect that referrals had upstream on their referrers’ turnover and performance. Consistent with the social enrichment argument, one can easily imagine that the referrers might also be affected when their referrals depart. Thus, I explored the data for evidence of whether the referral turnover decreases referrers’ performance and/or increases the chances of referrer turnover. Unfortunately, the study design did not allow me to perform a robust test of this effect. First, in order to avoid problems of left censoring, I only looked at referrers who were themselves hired in the two-year hiring window ( $N = 82$ ). Of the 119 referrals these people made, only 18 were hired, and of these, only seven terminated. Second, given that not all employee referrers were (or had worked as) CSRs before (or during the period under study), their performance was not measured as number of calls per hour. Instead I used the organization’s yearly subjective employee evaluations which exhibit little variance across employees or over time. Despite the lack of statistical power, the effect of the referral’s terminating in both the turnover and the performance models is as predicted (the results are never statistically significant though). This is consistent with Fernández et al. (2000).

whose referrer has left show a lower survival rate than referrals whose referrer has stayed.

Hypothesis 3a is about examining the impact of the exit of the referrer on the referral's level of performance. Assessing the social enrichment effect also requires analyzing whether the presence of the referrer is what improves referrals' performance (hypothesis 3b). I was unable to test whether the presence of the referrer during training accounts for any initial performance advantage of referrals in comparison with nonreferrals. By the time referred hires complete their training, most of their referrers are still with the company, and therefore the referral variable and the referrer presence variable are almost identical.<sup>28</sup> I can, however, test whether the referrer can help the referral along a quicker performance improvement trajectory. To test hypothesis 3b, I run a model similar to the one in table 5 that includes now the variables "referrer stays" and "referrer leaves." The results of such analyses are displayed in table 6. Since the effects of the control variables on performance are almost identical to the effects reported in table 5, those effects are omitted in table 6. The referrer's continued presence does not seem to help the referral along a quicker performance improvement trajectory.

As some evidence supporting the social enrichment process in this phone center, I learned from my interviews with PCHR personnel about what they thought were important posthire determinants of retention and productivity. In a high-pressure, highly structured environment where CSRs answer up to 5,000 phone calls a month and where work is closely scrutinized, the PCHR staff have indeed thought about the potential benefits of the social enrichment process. As mentioned earlier, one trainer claimed: "People leave their jobs because of the working environment. The job burns you out!" Thus, it is not surprising that prior to my study, the staff had been considering introducing a formal "buddy" system, where long-time employees would be paired with new hires as a means of reducing turnover and increasing job satisfaction. The underlying theory is identical to that of the social enrichment process. One trainer highlighted the importance of having a friend on the job: "It really helps in making the job more comfortable." This trainer did not specifically say that the referrer might play an important role in this process. But when probed about the possibility that the referrer might be acting as an informal "buddy," she said that this was "probably right" (Fernández et al. 2000). Similarly, according to one hiring manager, "I once had two employees who were dating each other come together to let me know about their decision to leave the floor." When I probed about the possibility of their being referral

<sup>28</sup> Only 11 referrers left the organization during the training period of their respective referrals.

TABLE 5  
CROSS-SECTIONAL CROSS-TIME REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING PERFORMANCE CORRECTING FOR TURNOVER RATE

	ONLY REFERRAL		ADDING SOCIAL INTERACTION		ADDING CONTROLS		ADDING SOME CONTROLS		TURNOVER RATE MODEL (Cox Regression Model)	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Main model										
Constant . . . . .	5.890***	.340	5.859***	.341	6.149***	.546	5.823***	.352		
Performance, month $T - 1$ . . . . .	.762***	.015	.763***	.015	.748***	.015	.769***	.014	.015	.048
Tenure in months . . . . .	-.054***	.019	-.053***	.019	-.058***	.019	-.053***	.019		
External referral . . . . .	.037	.111	.061	.114	.020	.117	.012	.110	-.654*	.354
Referrer leaves (1 = yes) . . . . .			-.279*	.159	-.275*	.155	-.281*	.157	.966*	.504
Gender (1 = male) . . . . .					.105	.147			.271	.340
Repeat application (1 = yes) . . . . .					-.220	.192	-.174	.172	.537	.562
Computer . . . . .					-.065	.139			.105	.452
Language . . . . .					-.171	.156	-.162	.138	.537	.445

Years of education . . . . .	013	.039				.051	.092
Works at time of application . . .	— .007	.131				— .078	.362
Months of bank experience . . . . .	— .002	.004				— .019**†	.005
Months of nonbank experience . . .	— .005*	.002			.001	— .009+	.005
Nonbank experience, squared . . . . .	.000	.000			— .004***	.000*	.000
Months of customer service . . . . .	.004***	.001			.003***	.004	.004
Number of previous jobs . . . . .	— .015	.051				— .186	.160
Tenure in last job (in days) . . . . .	.000	.000				.000	.000
Salary in last job . . . . .	.022	.019				— .053	.049
Number of applications . . . . .	.006*	.003			.006*	.003	.013
Number of openings . . . . .	— .001	.006				— .013	.019
Turnover hazard rate <sup>a</sup> . . . . .	1.767 <sup>+</sup>	1 199	1.746 <sup>+</sup>	1.024	2 076 <sup>+</sup>	1 221	1 199
Wald chi-square statistic . . . . .	3.298***		2.098***		3.754***	3.713***	41 33***
$P > \chi^2$ . . . . .	.000		.000		.000	.000	.001
Person-month observations (employees) . . . .	2,983 (257)		2,983 (257)				3,188 (260)

NOTE.—Performance is measured as the average number of calls answered per hour (quality adjusted)

<sup>a</sup> The turnover hazard rate is estimated from the turnover Cox Regression Model reported in the table

\*  $P < .10$  (two-tailed tests except for the z-test for the effect of "external referral," which is one tailed).

\*\*  $P < .05$

\*\*\*  $P < .01$

\*\*\*  $P < .001$

TABLE 6  
PRESENCE OF THE REFERRER IN PREDICTING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REFERRAL

			TURNOVER RATE MODEL (Cox Re- gression Model)	
	COEF.	SE	Coef	SE
Main model:				
Constant .....	6.149***	.546		
Performance, month $T - 1$ .....	.748***	.015	.015	.048
Tenure in months .....	-.058***	.019		
Referrer stays (1 = yes) .....	.020	.117	-.654*	.354
Referrer leaves (1 = yes) .....	-.275*	.155	.966*	.504
Control variables included <sup>a</sup> .....				
Turnover hazard rate <sup>b</sup> .....	2.076 <sup>+</sup>	1.221		
Wald chi-square statistic .....	3,753.50***		41.33***	
$P > \chi^2$ .....	.000		.001	
Person-month observations (em- ployees) .....	2,983 (257)		3,188 (260)	

NOTE — Performance is measured as the average number of calls answered per hour (quality adjusted)

<sup>a</sup> The effects of the control variables on performances are very similar to those effects reported in table

5. They are not reported in this table.

<sup>b</sup> The turnover hazard rate is estimated from the turnover Cox Regression Model reported in this table

<sup>+</sup>  $P < .10$  (two-tailed test except for  $z$ -test for "referrer stays" and "referrer leaves," which is one tailed).

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$

\*\*\*  $P < .001$

and referrer, she said that this was "very possible given that many employees refer relatives and friends for the CSR job."

Finally, I also test whether referrer's characteristics and level of performance influence the performance trajectory of the referred employee. Again, adding the information about the productivity of the referrer who leaves the phone center does not improve the fit of any performance growth model.<sup>29</sup>

### Limitations and Future Research

This article expands the scope of previous recruitment source studies by analyzing unique, objective measures of performance. As with the results of any study based on one sample drawn from a single organization, caution needs to be exercised when generalizing the results of this study. Thus, I believe that this research can be extended in several interesting

<sup>29</sup> Once again, referrer's characteristics do not seem to predict or provide additional information about the future performance of the referral ( $P < .620$ ; incremental  $\chi^2 = 2.64$ ,  $df = 4$ ); nor does information about the referrer's evaluation by the firm ( $P < .308$ , incremental  $\chi^2 = 1.04$ ;  $df = 1$ ). Results are available in Castilla (2002).



directions. The first and most obvious area to be explored involves developing studies to continue testing the social integration and embeddedness arguments in more comprehensive and detailed ways. I have explored whether the effect of referral ties on employees' performance continues beyond the hiring process. A dummy variable for whether the respondent is a referral is included as a network variable. I focus on referrals as a matter of necessity. In particular, one can believe in social enrichment without believing that it has to come through a referral process. After all, once an employee enters the organization, she presumably develops a much wider network of employee connections and friendships. Studies need to look at the social enrichment process by including dynamic information about employees' multiple networks before and after they come to work at an organization. It is important to collect information about new workplace connections and personal relationships as they evolve over employees' tenure on the job. Additional research dealing with multiple ties over time (and their effect on individual performance) is much needed.

The second extension is closely related to the previous one. Although the current and previous studies have documented important recruitment source differences in several posthire indicators of employees' better matches, most of them exclusively focus on the bilateral nature of ties and their consequences. In my study, I only look at how the tie between two actors (referrer/referral) affects the performance for one of these actors. One point often emphasized in the "posthire interdependence" literature, however, is that the social relationships that affect outcomes are decidedly multilateral. In this regard, more research is required to understand how multilateral networks affect outcomes and how an employee's degree of integration into multilateral social networks might itself be affected by the referrer (perhaps by the referrer's status or simply by the referrer's position in the formal or informal network of the workplace). Without studies that collect and analyze data on more complex relationships, many of the intervening mechanisms are left open to speculation.

As a sociologist, my own bias is to be more interested in the "posthire interdependence in performance" aspect of this study. In order to better understand how posthire social integration lies at the root of any differential in performance, I suggest more qualitative data studies that can give us a better sense of the mechanisms at work. Despite my limited presentation of what I learned from interviews and observation at the phone center, there is no way I could have captured these more complex relationships in my data since I did not have information about these social networks over time within the phone center. In the absence of such data, many of the intervening mechanisms will thus be left open to speculation for future research on the effects of posthire personal interdependence on performance.

I do not directly address here the conditions that make network effects more or less important. Performance, turnover, and job satisfaction are much more salient in knowledge-intensive industries or jobs—or more generally, in industries that require skilled and highly paid labor, where firms are particularly concerned with attracting and retaining workers. Insofar as that is true, the present research on a specific lower-entry position at the phone center provides an especially stringent test of the hypotheses. The workplace that I chose to study does not involve particularly skilled workers, which makes its support of sociological hypotheses all the more remarkable; these are purported to be jobs in which network effects would be less salient. Future research should pay attention to the fact that the industry/job/firm-level factors might create variation in the strength of the network effects that I am investigating. This is particularly relevant given the mixed results from past studies on turnover and performance. After all, the relationships between turnover or performance and network referral may vary by industry, job, and even by location of the organization.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Organizations frequently use referral programs to recruit new employees. Implicit in referral hiring is the assumption that social relationships among existing employees and potential employees will benefit the hiring organization. This study provides a distinctive and substantive contribution to the literature of economic sociology and labor economics by evaluating the impact of referral ties on employee performance. For the first time in this tradition of research, I have been able to code and carefully analyze unique data on direct measures of employee productivity. As an immediate result, I have been capable of empirically distinguishing among the different theoretical mechanisms by which the hiring of new employees using referrals (as an indicator of preexisting personal connections) influences employee productivity and turnover over time. The dominant argument in economics posits that personal contact hires perform better than isolated hires because social connections provide difficult-to-obtain and more realistic information about jobs and candidates. A more sociological explanation, however, emphasizes posthire social processes that occur among socially connected employees. Employers may still hire referrals at a higher rate simply because personal connections help to *produce* more productive employees in the job. The social support and interactions that occur between referral and referrer can enhance an employee's productivity and attachment to the firm.

My study begins by testing the effectiveness of labor economic models

of employee referrals. My findings in the analyses of initial performance suggest that referral programs provide important economic returns to the organization at the very beginning of the job contract: not only do employees hired via referrals initially perform better than nonreferrals, but they are also more likely to complete their initial training in the organization. In the long run, however, referral programs do not seem to provide any economic returns: I provide robust evidence that employees hired via referrals do not perform any better than nonreferrals over time. In addition, I show that information from a candidate's résumé does not seem to predict her initial productivity, subsequent productivity growth, or tenure on the job.

This study is a significant step forward for the literature on social networks and employment because it illustrates the benefits of including the *posthire* dynamics of social relations to understand employee productivity over time. I argue that the finding that referrals perform better than nonreferrals initially, but not over time, does not provide adequate support for the better match argument. Instead, I show that the explanation for better performance by referrals over nonreferrals is sociological given that the initial performance differential seems to be caused by the possibility that the referrer is present to teach the referral the particulars of the job at the very beginning of the job contract or during the training period, or perhaps is simply making the workplace a better place to work. Thus, I find that the presence of the referrer seems to be the factor that accounts for any initial performance differential between referrals and nonreferrals.

Figure 2 provides a stylized representation of these findings, charting the effects of social interdependence on employee performance growth curves (note that the figure is not a plot of my model parameters, though). Referrals do appear to be better performers than nonreferrals right after their training. Any performance advantages of referrals over nonreferrals disappear soon after their first month working as a CSR at the phone center; I found no significant difference in performance careers between referrals and nonreferrals. This pattern of converging productivity for both groups of workers is very much related to the nature of the job selected for this study. Like many lower-entry jobs, working as a phone customer representative is a job with a "hard" performance ceiling. Employees hired via referrals peaked out earlier and were later caught up by those hired by nonreferrals. The performance improvement mostly occurs during the first three months at the job. The performance of the referral, however, is negatively affected by the referrer's departure at any point in time, even when the referral has been in the organization for a while. As shown in this figure, the leaving of the referrer results in a




FIG. 2.—Summary graph of the effects of social interdependence on performance growth curves. Note: This figure provides a stylized representation of my findings (it is not a plot of the model parameters)

significant predicted parallel downward shift of the performance curve.<sup>30</sup> This finding is of interest because an important predictor of performance evolution over time appears to be the referrer's continued presence in the firm. It is the "breaking of the tie" between referrer and referral that seems to have serious negative implications for the referral employee's productivity over time.

Clearly, the role of social connections goes beyond the screening and hiring of employees: it is an important tool for understanding the dynamics of employee outcomes such as turnover, job satisfaction, and performance. For this reason, researchers should not restrict their study of employee networks to examining whether employees are connected at a given point in time. The ability to develop prominent personal connections, whether "weak" or "strong," may not be the central determining factor of individual careers (Granovetter 1973). On the contrary, the main argument in this study is that individual career outcomes may depend more on whether those contacts are present in the right place at the right time. In this sense, I suggest bringing back the original notion of embeddedness (as in Gra-

<sup>30</sup> There is only an effect if the referrer left. As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, this may be caused by the fact that CSRs reach very high levels of performance during the first few months of employment, and the only way to go is down. However, I still find that for those referrals whose referrer leaves, this "going down" is more pronounced than for those whose referrer stays (or even for those who were not referrals)

novetter [1985]) and conceptualizing "embeddedness" as an ongoing set of social relationships whereby employees come to organizations with preexisting social ties (some of which vanish and some of which remain over time). Once employees get hired, they develop new sets of connections that prevail when they move on to other organizations. Influential and knowledgeable contacts thus depend on one's past mobility; in turn, these contacts influence one's future career moves

My research indicates that the presence of certain contacts at the workplace (and especially their departure) can influence one's productivity and attachment to the firm. In order to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms by which social relations matter in the hiring and posthiring of employees in organizations, future work in this field needs to consider the dynamics of these interactions of employees with both preexisting contacts as well as in new personal relationships developed at the workplace, and should use detailed longitudinal data such as those I have analyzed here. At a more general level, this type of research should continue facilitating necessary dialogue between economic and sociological theories (Baron and Hannan 1994). I also believe that such work is essential for expanding and further clarifying our current knowledge about the impact of social relations on economic behavior and outcomes.

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# A Critique of Exchange Theory in Mate Selection<sup>1</sup>

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Status-caste exchange theory predicts that in interracial marriages one partner's socioeconomic status is exchanged for the other's racial caste status. The author examines the contradictory literature on the theory specifically in relation to black-white intermarriage and offers three explanations for the divergent findings. First, black-white inequality has obscured the actual status homogamy typifying intermarriage. Second, gender differences among young couples have been mistaken for racially specific patterns of exchange. Third, the empirical findings that appear to support status-caste exchange are not robust. The author's conclusions favor the simplest tabular analyses, which cast doubt on status-caste exchange theory.

Several decades ago William Goode (1970, p. 8) wrote that "all courtship systems are market or exchange systems." Goode's claim only slightly exaggerates the influence of the market metaphor in scholarship about mate selection. More recently the influence of market, exchange, and utility-maximizing theories of the family have increased as the new economics of the family has gained more adherents (Becker 1991; England and Farkas 1986). "The marriage market" is an alliterative and ubiquitous phrase whose underlying assumptions are too rarely scrutinized.

One form of exchange theory predicts that men with high status and earnings should marry women of great physical beauty (Elder 1969; Waller 1937; Goode 1951; Taylor and Glenn 1976) and that the union between

<sup>1</sup> Thanks are due to Zhenchao Qian and Matthijs Kalmijn for help replicating their results, and to those who have provided comments on earlier drafts: Nancy Tuma whose comments were especially thorough, Robert Freeland, Noah Mark, Cecilia Ridgeway, Monica McDermott, Doug McAdam, Mark Granovetter, Susan Olzak, Aaron Gullickson, Kenny Dinitz, Steven Stigler, and *AJS* reviewers. Any remaining errors of fact or emphasis are mine. See <http://www.stanford.edu/~mrosenfe> for additional data sets and supplementary materials regarding this work. Direct correspondence to Department of Sociology, Stanford University, 450 Serra Mall, Building 120, Stanford, California 94305. E-mail: michael.rosenfeld@stanford.edu



two such individuals is supposed to represent an exchange of the man's economic resources for the woman's youth and attractiveness. In a second form of exchange theory, men with excellent labor-market skills are predicted to marry women with especially strong domestic skills (Becker 1991). The influence of these forms of exchange theory has declined somewhat as women have entered the labor force in greater numbers and as the traditional nuclear family of working husbands and dutiful housewives has lost some of its central dominance in American family life.

In a third form of exchange theory, whites of relatively low socioeconomic status (SES) marry blacks of higher SES in an exchange of racial caste position for economic resources and status (Davis 1941; Merton 1941; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989; Kalmijn 1993; Qian 1997; Fu 2001). This third form of exchange theory, status-caste exchange, has been especially popular in the recent literature on racial intermarriage.

In this article I examine the theoretical and empirical bases for status-caste exchange. Despite the claims of many researchers, including a wave of recent technically sophisticated research, I show that the empirical support for status-caste exchange is not as strong as it appears to be. Simple educational homogamy (i.e., the tendency for mates to have similar educational backgrounds) is the dominant educational marriage pattern, regardless of the race of either spouse.

### STATUS-CASTE EXCHANGE AS FIRST PROPOSED

A pair of articles in 1941 by sociological giants Kingsley Davis (1941) and Robert Merton (1941) introduced the idea of status-caste exchange. Merton and Davis based their theory on the literature about the Hindu caste system of India. Both Merton and Davis argued from purely theoretical grounds that status-caste exchange should have substantial relevance for marital choices in the United States, especially marriage between whites (the high-caste group) and blacks (the presumed low-caste group). According to Merton, blacks with low SES would hardly ever marry whites with high SES, but blacks with high SES might sometimes marry whites with low SES. According to Merton, marriage between high-status blacks and lower-status whites would represent a kind of informal exchange; that is, the higher SES of the black spouse would directly compensate the white spouse for the loss of social standing that the white spouse would experience for having thrown their lot in with black society.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Status-caste exchange theory has an influential if implicit place in U.S. culture. The first and most famous major Hollywood movie about interracial marriage was Stanley Kramer's 1967 *Guess Who's Coming to Dinner*. The movie starred Sidney Poitier as the dashing and accomplished black doctor about to accept a senior position with the

The status-caste exchange arguments of Merton (1941) and Davis (1941) are two early examples of what Ekeh (1974) refers to as *dyadic exchange*, and what Lévi-Strauss ([1949] 1969) referred to as *restricted exchange* (for more recent examples of dyadic exchange theories see Homans [1961] and Blau [(1964) 1986]). Dyadic exchange theories of mate selection contradict the fundamental finding of the mate selection research, which is that people find mates who are similar to themselves in status, class, and education (Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1998); religion (Johnson 1980; Kalmijn 1991a; Kennedy 1952); as well as race (Heer 1974; Kalmijn 1993; Lieberman and Waters 1988; Qian 1997). In other words, married partners tend to be the same on every dimension except gender. The exchange arguments of Merton (1941) and Davis (1941) require marriage partners to be different in at least two key dimensions (other than gender); without differences the "exchange" cannot take place. Exchange theorists are aware of the importance of homogamy, and they have their own perfectly reasonable explanation for status homogamy (Elder 1969; Goode 1951), which I discuss below.

The influence of status-caste exchange theory derives in part from the extraordinary intellectual reputations and broad achievements of both Merton and Davis. The empirical case for status-caste exchange, however, rests entirely on more recent work by other scholars because only "scanty" data were available in 1941 (Merton 1941, p. 364).

#### AN EMPIRICAL PARADOX

Ethnographic studies of interracial marriage in the United States have emphasized homogamy and solidarity between spouses and have been explicitly critical of status-caste exchange theory (Porterfield 1978; Root 2001; and especially Spickard 1989). Most black-white racial intermarriages are educationally homogamous, and simple tabular analyses have shown this to be true throughout the 20th century (Wirth and Goldhamer 1944; Bernard 1966; Heer 1974; Gadberry and Dodder 1993; Liang and Ito 1999). The fact of status homogamy in interracial couples casts substantial doubt on status-caste exchange theory, since if the husband and wife have the same level of education and social status, the kind of exchange envisioned by Merton (1941) and Davis (1941) cannot take

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World Health Organization. His intended bride was a 23-year-old white woman from a liberal family whose father initially opposed the union. The point of the movie was that the couple (an internationally recognized professional black man and a much younger and less accomplished white woman) was well matched, and only the young woman's family stood in the way of their happiness.

place.<sup>3</sup> These methodologically simple studies questioning status-caste exchange theory have been marginalized by recent methodologically sophisticated research which has (with some reservations) endorsed status-caste exchange (Qian 1997, 1999; Kalmijn 1993; Fu 2001; Hwang, Saenz, and Aguirre 1995; Okun 2001; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989). The two literatures, one that uses simple analyses to question status-caste exchange and a second that uses sophisticated methods to support status-caste exchange theory, are difficult to reconcile.

The disagreement between the simple tabular results and the more complex models represents an empirical paradox that can have two possible resolutions. The first possible resolution is that the complex models have captured something important that was too subtle to be apparent in the simple tabular analyses. The second possible resolution is that the complex models have, as a result of inscrutable complexity, overlooked the obvious. Complex models are necessarily more difficult than simple analyses for the reader to interpret. Simple tabular analyses at least have the advantage of transparency. Some argue that the believability of a model is inversely related to its complexity (Freedman 1991; Leamer 1983, 1985), or that the intellectual dominance of statistical models over other forms of inquiry is undeserved (Abbott 1988; Collins 1984; Freedman 1991; Turner 1989). Model complexity has been a special problem in the intermarriage literature (Kalmijn 1998).

The key question is not whether a single model can be found that produces certain results, but whether the result would be consistent across a range of reasonable models (Leamer 1983) and across a range of different types of models, with different assumptions about functional form and error specification (Berk 1991). That is, are the findings robust or fragile?

Freedman (1983) constructed a simple data set of pure noise and then demonstrated regressions that indicated significant associations between the parameters, an unsurprising result given our usual understanding of statistical significance.<sup>4</sup> Given the ability of our current generation of computers and software to estimate nearly unlimited numbers of models on data sets with scores or hundreds of variables (Mason 1991) and given the problem of publication bias, which favors positive and significant

<sup>3</sup> Merton and Davis's exchange theories were dyadic exchange theories (Ekeh 1974), which are easier to test because the exchange between the two parties is supposed to be direct and reciprocal. Generalized exchange (Ekeh 1974; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Bearman 1997) implies indirect or network exchanges (Yamagishi and Cook 1993). Generalized exchange in marriage markets has mainly been described for small, closed tribal communities (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Bearman 1997).

<sup>4</sup> If the test of a parameter is significant at the 5% level, this means that if the association the parameter measures were actually zero, we might expect a value for the parameter this far from zero (in either direction) as often as 5% of the time (for two-tailed tests)

findings (Begg and Berlin 1988; Card and Krueger 1995; Iyengar and Greenhouse 1988), it is nearly inevitable that statistically significant findings will be published for parameters where no real association exists.

Enough different authors have published technically sophisticated results supporting status-caste exchange that one might imagine that the findings must be robust indeed. There is, however, room for skepticism. Kalmijn (1993) and Qian (1997), whose findings support status-caste exchange are cautious about their findings. Black-white intermarriages still represent a tiny fraction of the population of married couples, usually less than 1%. Analysis of the patterns of educational mating among the black-white intermarried couples can only take place within an analysis of the overall trends in educational intermarriage. Because black-white marriages are such a small fraction of the overall married population, differences in how intermarriage is modeled at the general level can have an inordinate impact on findings for the special case of black-white intermarriage.

Freedman (1991) is especially critical of empirical exercises that attempt to measure secondary forces (see Freedman's discussion of Kanarek et al. [1980]). If the identified factor appears to increase cancer rates by 10 times (such as the effect of smoking on lung cancer), then we may have more confidence in the results. If the identified factor is thought to increase cancer rates by only 5%, then the results must be viewed with great skepticism regardless of the presence of statistically significant parameters. It is not that secondary forces cannot be important—they can be. Something that truly increased the risk of cancer by 5% might be an important subject for public health policy. The problem with secondary forces is that they are much harder to distinguish from the background noise. In the marriage market, educational homogamy and racial endogamy are the major forces. Status-caste exchange is a potentially secondary force that must be subjected to careful scrutiny if we are to have confidence that it is nonzero.

The literature that has endorsed status-caste exchange has generally not denied the importance of status homogamy, and in fact the force of status or educational homogamy is so great (like the effect of smoking on lung cancer) that it cannot be practically denied. The literature on status-caste exchange, starting with Merton (1941), has argued that status-caste exchange is simply another force, or an additional force, in the marriage market. My argument is that status homogamy is indeed a central force (a point on which nearly all authors agree) but that status-caste exchange is in fact probably not a factor at all.

The increasing frequency of citations of Merton (1941) and Davis (1941) is an indication that in the 60 years since their articles were published, status-caste exchange theory has never been conclusively debunked. The

empirical critiques of status-caste exchange, based as they are on simple tabular analyses, have been overlooked and marginalized precisely because of their simplicity. Bernard's (1966) classic research note is only three pages long and consists mostly of tables. Heer (1974) found no evidence for status-caste exchange but expressed doubt about his own findings. Wirth and Goldhamer's (1944) findings against status-caste exchange were reinterpreted by Drake and Cayton ([1945] 1993) as evidence *for* status-caste exchange. In this article I examine both sides of the empirical paradox of status-caste exchange.

*Simple tabular analyses.*—Following Freedman's (1991) and Mason's (1991) call for simpler analyses, I present tabulations of educational attainment for black-white couples. In addition, I examine census data from 1910 to 2000 using a variety of basic measures of SES for racially intermarried and racially endogamous couples. These analyses revisit the straightforward methods of Wirth and Goldhamer (1944), Bernard (1966), and Gadberry and Dodder (1993) but with wider temporal scope and a greater variety of measures of status.

*Complex models.*—The substantial critical literature on quantitative analyses in the social sciences demands that results be subjected to analyses of sensitivity and robustness to assumptions (Berk 1991; Blalock 1989, 1991; Freedman 1983, 1987, 1991; Leamer 1978, 1983, 1985; Lieberman 1985).<sup>5</sup> Following the prescriptions of this critical literature, I test the hypotheses of status-caste exchange with multivariate models in four ways. First, I test status-caste exchange with a series of log-linear models that make different assumptions about the general patterns of educational intermarriage. Log-linear models are the leading methodology for analysis of cross-tabulated marriage data (Botev 1994; Hout and Goldstein 1994; Kalmijn 1991a, 1991b, 1993, 1998; Pagnini and Morgan 1990; Rosenfeld 2001; Sandefur and McKinnell 1986).<sup>6</sup> Second, I reexamine the tests of status-caste exchange in these same models using robust standard errors for the parameters instead of the ordinary standard errors. Third, I test status-caste exchange with negative binomial instead of log-linear models. Fourth, I reexamine the findings of Fu (2001) and Qian (1997), two intermarriage discussions that used national-level data and log-linear models and that endorsed status-caste exchange theory.

<sup>5</sup> Leamer (1978) has in mind a very specific kind of formal sensitivity testing with Bayesian underpinnings, which has adherents and detractors (see McAleer, Pagan, and Volker 1985).

<sup>6</sup> Another important methodological strain of research was pioneered by Robert Schoen (Schoen 1986, 1988; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989).

STATUS-CASTE EXCHANGE DEFINED AND DISTINGUISHED FROM  
STATUS HOMOGAMY

Merton (1941) and Davis (1941) defined hypergamy as women "marrying up" in caste and hypogamy as men "marrying up" in caste, so black-white intermarriage would either be hypergamy or hypogamy depending on whether the wife or husband was black.<sup>7</sup> In place of gender-specific terminology, I will use the phrase "status-caste exchange" to describe all cases of intermarriage between blacks and whites where blacks have or are presumed to have higher status. I will take up the question of gender differences as a separate matter. By "status," I will mean class or SES. I use "caste" the way it was used by Merton and Davis, to indicate position within a carefully defined hierarchy of racial groups that are separated by nearly impermeable social barriers. The low-caste group is simply the group whose members face discrimination and barriers to advancement. In the 20th-century United States, blacks are the low-caste group.

Figure 1 is a schematic representation of status-caste exchange. The higher-caste group (whites) tends to have greater opportunities to exploit its talents, so its achieved status tends to be higher than that of the lower racial caste group (blacks). The key prediction of status-caste exchange theory is that when intermarriage happens, it will take place between high-achieving persons of the low-caste group, and low-achieving persons of the high-caste group. The assumption is that potential spouses of the same race and the same status are available. Merton and Davis puzzled over the problem of why a white person would marry a black person (given all the disadvantages of being black in America) when potential white spouses were available. According to the theory, the main reason a white person would choose a black spouse over a potential white spouse was that the black spouse had substantial extra endowments of skill, achievement, money, or fame. It is important to note that the high-status black spouse in figure 1 is not only high status when compared to most other blacks, but also has higher status than their white partner. It is the status gap between the partners that forms the basis of the "exchange" in status-caste exchange theory (Davis 1941; Merton 1941; Kalmijn 1993; Qian 1997).

I focus on black-white intermarriage for the same reasons that Davis and Merton did. Among all types of intermarriage in the United States, black-white intermarriage is the most important because the black-white division is the deepest and most enduring division in U.S. society (Massey

<sup>7</sup> In the Indian caste examples that Merton and Davis cite, hypergamy is much more common than hypogamy, while in the United States hypogamy is more common (there are many more black men married to white women than black women married to white men)




FIG. 1.—Status-caste exchange (diagonal arrow represents exchange)

and Denton 1993; Lieberman and Waters 1988; Myrdal, Sterner, and Rose 1944; White 1988). If intermarriage entails an exchange of social status for caste position, this exchange should be most pronounced for black-white intermarriage.

Figure 2 shows the intermarriage pattern based on status homogamy. In figure 2, people tend to seek out and marry partners with similar levels of education or achievement or SES to their own. Status homogamy has long been one of the organizing principles of mate selection (Kalmijn 1991a, 1991b), and figure 2 merely applies this principle to interracial marriages. Status-caste exchange theory and status homogamy theory make divergent and incompatible claims about the relative status of spouses in interracial marriages:

**HYPOTHESIS 1.**—*According to status-caste exchange, black spouses have higher SES or higher achievement than their white partners.*

**HYPOTHESIS 2.**—*According to status homogamy, spouses in racial intermarriages have similar levels of SES or achievement.*

If hypothesis 1 is correct, then status-caste exchange should decline over time as the racial boundaries in American society have declined (Wilson 1980). In other words, the empirical bases for status-caste exchange should be stronger in the 1940s when Davis and Merton wrote their seminal articles, and weaker in the post-civil rights era as racial intermarriage has become more common (Okun 2001).

Corollary to hypothesis 1.—*The empirical evidence for status-caste*




FIG 2.—Status homogamy across racial caste groups (horizontal arrow represents status homogamy).

*exchange should be especially strong in the pre-civil rights era, when racial caste boundaries were strongest.*

A generalized exchange theory (Ekeh 1974; Levi-Strauss 1969; Bearman 1997) for interracial marriage would make different assumptions than the dyadic exchange theory posited by Merton (1941) and Davis (1941). In generalized exchange, it would be possible for an exchange to take place even if the black-white intermarried spouses had equal status. The inequality between whites and blacks in the United States could lead whites to be more appreciated in the black community, where their income and status would be comparatively more impressive. Under such a hypothesis we would expect black society to celebrate cases of outmarriage to whites, because such marriages would bring whites (whose education and status are above the median for blacks) into the black community. The ethnographic evidence, however, shows that intermarried couples tend to be viewed unfavorably by both racial communities (DuBois [1899] 1996; Root 2001; Porterfield 1978). Given the lack of empirical or theoretical support for generalized exchange in the context of the U.S. marriage market, I operationalize status-caste exchange the way its advocates have—as an example of dyadic exchange.



## HOW STATUS HOMOGAMY CAN BE MISTAKEN FOR STATUS-CASTE EXCHANGE

Because whites have had on average higher socioeconomic status than blacks in the United States, the SES of interracial couples whose spouses have identical status appears different from the perspective of the two groups. The same objective level of SES may appear to be "low status" when compared to other whites, but "high status" when compared to other blacks. In figure 2, both spouses in the symbolic interracial couple share the same SES, yet this level of status is below the median (represented by the thick line in the middle of the box) of white status and above the median of black status.

Given the taboo of intermarriage (especially in the past) and the social distance between blacks and whites, and given the way that interracial couples were shunned by both communities, perfect information about such couples would not necessarily be known. Each community would know about their half of an intermarried couple. Blacks would know that relatively high-standing blacks had married out. Whites would perceive that whites of relatively low standing had married out. With imperfect or incomplete information, the combination of the two racial perspectives might lead to a popular perception that low-status persons of the dominant racial caste group are marrying high-status persons of the lower racial caste group, even in the absence of status-caste exchange. The difference between relative and objective status may be why Drake and Cayton (1993) and Wirth and Goldhamer (1944) came to different conclusions about status-caste exchange with the same data.

Observation.—*In a climate of inequality between groups, homogamy can be easily mistaken for exchange.*<sup>8</sup>

## THEORETICAL BASES FOR EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY

In lieu of status-caste exchange, I argue that educational homogamy, along with some minor variations in homogamy that are not specific to black-white intermarriage, explain the educational patterns of black-white in-

<sup>8</sup> The claim made by Elder (1969) and Taylor and Glenn (1976) is that high-status men marry women who are especially attractive. The classic articles by Elder and Taylor and Glenn both fail to take the husband's attractiveness into account. Both Elder and Taylor and Glenn note that attractiveness is correlated with social class. Therefore it is quite possible that the more prosperous young men were also the most dashing and "attractive," and so what was supposed to have been an "exchange" between people of unequal "attractiveness" may have instead been relationships that were homogamous with respect to attractiveness; see Buston and Emlen (2003).

termarriage. It is important to consider, briefly, what might be the theoretical bases of educational homogamy (see also Kalmijn 1998).

*Individual utility maximization or exchange.*—It is ironic perhaps, but some of the most articulate explanations for status and educational homogamy have come from the exchange literature (see, e.g., Elder 1969; Goode 1951). According to this explanation, every individual seeks to make the best possible bargain or exchange by mating with the spouse that has the highest possible SES, or the greatest promise for future earnings.<sup>9</sup> The desire of every individual to make the best possible match results in homogamy, as the highest-status man and woman mate with each other, and the second-highest man and woman mate with each other, and so on. People at the bottom of the status hierarchy mate with each other only because no better options remain. One prediction of the exchange theory is that individuals with higher educational attainments should always be more desirable mates, other things equal, than individuals with lower educational attainments. The exchange theories usually imply that the values of all potential spouses are knowable and can be scaled onto one dimension (England and Farkas 1986, chap. 3).<sup>10</sup>

*Affinity.*—Education implies certain kinds of tastes and lifestyles and cultural preferences that define a social circle that is closed to outsiders (Bourdieu [1979] 1984). Assuming that marriage is more than a unit for the division of labor and for profit maximization, but also a bond of solidarity and empathy and compassion, then it seems natural that people should seek as mates persons with whom they have a strong personal affinity (Buston and Emlen 2003). According to affinity theory, adults with high school educations marry each other because they enjoy each other's company, not because they have been rejected by the lawyers and doctors. Although William Goode (1951, 1970, 1971) was an energetic promoter of exchange theories of homogamy, in his later work (1971, p. 21) he recognized the importance of affinity as well: "The talented young

<sup>9</sup> Status-caste exchange theory is consistent with the spirit of Gary Becker's (1991, chap. 4) discussion of assortative mating. Becker assumes that assortative mating will take place when attributes of the spouses are complementary, but as Ben-Porath (1982) notes, Becker's production function of family goods is rather vague.

<sup>10</sup> Ellis and Kelley (1999) describe a simple experiment which they call "the pairing game." In the experiment subjects are given a card with a number on it. Subjects can see others' numbers, but not their own. Subjects are then asked to find the partner with the highest possible number, and pair off with them. The experiment very quickly results in assortative pairing, as the people learn to estimate their own number from others' reactions. The experiment shows how bargaining or exchange can lead to assortative mating, but only if potential mates can be easily scaled on one ordinal dimension, and only if everyone places the same value on every other potential mate in the society.

assistant professor . . . may seem attractive to his female students, but he may appear pretentious, unmanly, and boring to a lower-class woman."

*Propinquity and exposure.*—Education is also a physical reality taking place in actual classrooms and on campuses (Mare 1991). The educational system creates educational homogamy by grouping young people together based on educational level and taking them away from their family's supervision. Social theorists (Blau 1977;<sup>11</sup> Blau and Schwartz 1984; Feld 1981) argue that personal and intimate social networks are built around social structures (like education) which divide and stratify us. The college experience, and to a lesser extent the high school experience, creates educational homogamy not only among the general class of similarly educated young people, but also within each individual campus and classroom.

My empirical analyses do not distinguish between different possible sources of educational homogamy. I present the different sources here in order to indicate that exchange is not the only explanation for educational homogamy. Educational homogamy theory, like other forms of homogamy and endogamy, are not deterministic; in other words, they do not assume that all couples marry homogeneously.

## THE DATA

I use many different census samples derived from the coherent U.S. census microdata files from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS; Ruggles et al. 2004), which allow much easier cross-census comparisons than was previously possible. I will explain the particulars of the different samples as they are introduced in the text below. Following convention, black and white categories will include only non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites, except for the analysis that includes data from before 1970 when Hispanic self-identification was introduced in the census (Bean and Tienda 1987).

Census data record prevalence in the population at time of each decennial census survey. Observers who have written about black-white intermarriage, such as Davis (1941) and Merton (1941), who have not had access to computerized census records, would have most likely based their

<sup>11</sup> Blau's (1977) *Inequality and Heterogeneity* emphasizes the role of homogamy (by race and by status) in human affairs, which perhaps should have made Blau suspicious of status-caste exchange, but Blau's work is also fundamentally rooted in what Ekeh (1974) refers to as dyadic exchange theory, which predisposed him to assume status-caste exchange was correct. In subsequent work that was less influenced by exchange theory, Blau and Schwartz (1984) studied mate selection without making any mention of status-caste exchange.

observations on the couples they could observe; this would correspond to a prevalence sample of couples. Nonetheless, prevalence data are potentially problematic because different rates of marital dissolution could lead the prevalence sample to be a biased estimate of marital incidence. There is some evidence that intermarried blacks and whites have higher rates of divorce than racially endogamous whites (Kreider 1999). Researchers have addressed this problem by relying on young married couples, who presumably have had less exposure to marital dissolution bias (Qian 1997; Rosenfeld 2001; Fu 2001). The problem with relying on young couples, however, is that their educational attainment (the master variable that authors have used as a proxy for status) is potentially unfinished. A better proxy for marital incidence is to use recently married couples of all ages. Because age at first marriage is available in the 1980 but not the 1990 or 2000 censuses, my analysis will rely heavily on the 1980 census.

#### STATUS COMPARISONS BASED ON SUMMARY STATISTICS

Table 1 presents summary statistics on the relative educational attainment of spouses in black-white racial intermarriages from the U.S. census and from the published data of Kalmijn (1993), Qian (1997), and Fu (2001). Table 1 divides the black-white intermarried couples into three categories, by the relative education of the spouses. The first category contains couples with the same levels of education, the second category includes the couples whose black spouse has more education, and the third category includes couples whose white spouse has more education. In each of the three cited cases about half of the racially intermarried couples had the same level of education. Of the remaining half, the percentage of couples whose black spouse had more education is slightly larger than the percentage of couples whose white spouse had more education: 24.5% to 22.7% in Kalmijn (difference of 4.8%), 27.5% to 23.1% in Qian (difference of 4.4%), and 26.5% to 23.4% in Fu (difference of 3.1%). In each case the advantage of black spouses is small but statistically significant, and the differences all favor the hypothesis of status-caste exchange.

In every one of the data samples in table 1, the number of black-white couples is less than 1% of the total number of couples (sample size of all couples is not shown on table 1). The data published by Kalmijn, Fu, and Qian (table 1) offer *prima facie* evidence for status-caste exchange, not as a dominant force, but rather as a potentially important secondary force.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Merton's (1941, pp. 372–73) predictions about the relative frequency of different status patterns in interracial couples were that couples whose black spouse had more education or status (Merton's type 14) should be the largest group, and couples whose

TABLE 1  
AGE AND APPARENT STATUS-CASTE EXCHANGE

SOURCE, YEARS OF DATA AND TIME OF MARRIAGE, No. OF EDUCATIONAL CATEGORIES	RELATIVE EDUCATION OF SPOUSES				N OF COUPLES	% STATUS-CASTE EXCHANGE
	AGE RANGE	Black Spouse	White Spouse	More		
		Equal	More			
Published data that support status-caste exchange:						
Kalmijn (1993), 1970-86, 4 categories . . . . .	16-34	49.8	27.5	22.7	7,107	4.8***
Qian (1997), 1980-90, 4 categories . . . . .	20-29	49.4	27.5	23.1	2,083	4.4**
Fu (2001), 1990, 4 categories . . . . .	< 35	50.1	26.5	23.4	2,449	3.1*
Young couples with the maximum number of educational categories:						
1980, 23 categories . . . . .	20-29	33.9	37.6	28.5	1,126	9.1***
1990, 17 categories . . . . .	20-29	41.9	29.9	28.2	1,084	1.7
2000, 17 categories . . . . .	20-29	42.4	29.9	27.6	1,570	2.3
All ages census data showing no support for status-caste exchange						
1980, 23 categories . . . . .	All ages	28.6	35.0	36.5	4,527	-1.5
1990, 17 categories . . . . .	All ages	33.1	31.7	35.2	6,907	-3.5***
2000, 17 categories . . . . .	All ages	34.8	31.0	34.2	11,298	-3.2***
Status-caste exchange for young couples declines as cohorts age:						
1980, 9 categories . . . . .	20-29	43.5	32.1	24.4	1,126	7.7***
1990, 9 categories . . . . .	30-39	48.0	26.6	25.4	1,580	1.2
Duration of marriage has little effect on status-caste exchange:						
1980, 23 categories . . . . .	All ages	28.6	35.0	36.5	4,527	-1.5
1980, married before 1970, 23 categories . . . . .	All ages	26.0	34.8	39.2	1,920	-4.4*
1980, married 1970-80, 23 categories . . . . .	All ages	30.5	35.1	34.5	2,607	.6
1980, married 1979-80, 23 categories . . . . .	All ages	33.3	32.8	33.9	345	-1.2

NOTE.—Support for status-caste exchange in *italic* % status-caste exchange here is simply defined as the difference between “% black more” and “% white more” except for Kalmijn; all data are from U.S.-born persons from U.S. census microdata (unweighted), and black is non-Hispanic black, and white is non-Hispanic white. Kalmijn’s sample is all ages standardized to 16-34 age group, selected states, data from the National Center for Health Statistics.

\*  $P < .05$ ; two-tailed tests

\*\*  $P < .01$

\*\*\*  $P < .001$

The data samples from Kalmijn, Fu, and Qian understate somewhat the extent of educational differences such as status-caste exchange because they rely on a reduced set of educational categories. The smaller the number of categories, the more likely any two people are to be in the same category. The reduced set of educational categories are a requisite for estimating log-linear models (Agresti 1990). For the purposes of table 1, no such restrictions are necessary, and so I use the 5% census samples from 1980, 1990, and 2000 with the maximum number of educational categories available in each census (17 categories in the 1990 and 2000 censuses, 23 categories in the 1980 census, 9 categories when comparing 1980 and 1990<sup>13</sup>) so as to maximize the sensitivity with which status-caste exchange is measured. Using the maximum number of educational categories for young couples in 1980, table 1 shows a 9.1 percentage gap favoring status-caste exchange. The educational gaps between young blacks and their young white spouses were not statistically significant in 1990 or 2000.<sup>14</sup>

Among the data sets that are restricted to or are weighted to younger couples, the results associated with Kalmijn, Fu, and Qian and the 1980 census support status-caste exchange. In the all-ages samples the educational balance slightly favors the white spouses and rejects status-caste exchange. What could explain why young couples appear to show some evidence for status-caste exchange, but the wider group of couples of all ages shows no such evidence?

People in their twenties are problematic for studies of educational attainment and educational inequality because many are still in school. The research on education and intermarriage generally assumes that educational attainment is a fixed measure of status that predates the wedding, and usually it is, with the exception of young couples.

Husbands tend to be a year or two older than their wives. In black-white intermarriage in the post-1960 era, most of the couples have black husbands and white wives. Of the 1,126 young non-Hispanic black-non-Hispanic white couples from the 1980 census (see table 1), 900 of the couples were non-Hispanic black husbands married to non-Hispanic

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white spouse had more education or status (Merton's type 16) should be the smallest group.

<sup>13</sup> The IPUMS variable for education for 1980 is HIGRADEG. For 1990 and 2000, the variable is EDUC99, and for comparisons between 1980 and 1990 I use EDUCREC. Table 1 includes unweighted census data to preserve consistency with Qian (1997) and Fu (2001); household weighted data yield the same results.

<sup>14</sup> One of the reasons that there appears to be more educational inequality in the 1980 census than in the 1990 census (table 1) is that the 1980 census educational categories are based on years of education, so that college seniors and college juniors are different categories, while the 1990 census education categories were based on degrees (such as the associates' or bachelor's).

white wives. Since the husbands tend to be a little bit older (1.4 years older on average) and since some of the couples are still in school, it is not surprising that the husbands would tend to be further along in school. A college senior marrying a college junior would be an educationally unequal couple at the time of marriage, but if both spouses finish their college degrees the educational inequality is rather temporary.

One may certainly take the inequality between young spouses seriously, even if that inequality is temporary. After all, inequality at the time of marriage may be the most salient and proximate kind of inequality for young couples. The problem is that the gender- and age-based inequalities observed in young couples are not specific to black-white couples. In table 1, for young couples with the maximum number of educational categories from 1980 census data, 37.6% of the black spouses have more education, compared to 28.5% of the white spouses. If we examine the education gap between white husbands and their white wives, we find a similar gap: 34.7% of the white husbands had more education, whereas only 24.2% of the white wives had more education than their white husbands. What at first appears to be an inequality that is specific to black-white intermarriage is actually an artifact of age and gender. One may legitimately wonder why husbands are so commonly older than their wives, or why most black-white intermarried couples have black husbands, but those questions are beyond the scope of this article.

With prevalence data such as the census, one must guard against the possibility of marital dissolution bias. At the bottom of table 1, I present samples of interracial couples from the 1980 census that vary in the duration of their marriage from more than 10 years to less than one year. None of the samples shows any evidence for status-caste exchange. The shorter duration is especially important because this comes as close to marital incidence data as is possible with the U.S. census.<sup>15</sup>

### Educational Homogamy and Status Homogamy throughout the Century

If status-caste exchange has ever been a factor in black-white marriages in the United States, the force of status-caste exchange should have been strongest and easiest to measure in the past, when the racial caste barriers in the United States were more powerful.

<sup>15</sup> Since age at marriage is only reported in the 1980 census for first marriages, at least one of the spouses must be in their first marriage in order to determine the duration of the marriage. Couples in the last row of table 1 had at least one spouse who was not previously married, and who reported their age at the time of the census and their age at marriage to be the same

Although the literature on status homogamy and status-caste exchange has relied (for good reasons) almost exclusively on formal education as a measure of social status, the U.S. census provides other measures of status which I present in table 2 for the census years in which they are available. Table 2 contains the summary statistics from 1910–2000 for various measures of the status gap between spouses in black-white intermarriages. In table 2 the “black” and “white” categories include Hispanics to preserve consistency with pre-1970 data; the inclusion of Hispanics increases the number of black-white couples relative to table 1. The couples are U.S.-born married couples of all ages. The measures of social status are years of formal education (available for both spouses in 1940 and 1960–2000), literacy (1910–20), and occupational status (1910–2000 but applies only to the reduced number of couples both of whose partners reported an occupation). In all cases, the “gap” in status is defined as the black spouse’s level minus the white spouse’s level. The educational measure employs the maximum number of educational categories available in each census to allow for maximum sensitivity to differences.

Status-caste exchange theory predicts that black spouses will have higher status than their white partners. Contrary to the expectations of status-caste exchange theory, and regardless of the measure of status used, black-white intermarried couples have had levels of status that were usually indistinguishable. Where small but significant mean status gaps emerge, these have usually favored the white spouse (literacy in 1920; occupational status in 1950, 1980, 1990, and 2000; education in 1960, 1990, and 2000). The only case of significant black advantage compared to their white spouses is occupational status in 1910, for a sample of only 44 couples. Although the data in table 2 include couples of all ages, the absence of status-caste exchange is not an artifact of marital duration or marital dissolution bias. The same results are obtained with 1970 and 1980 data if the sample is limited to recently married couples (available from the author). For older couples who have been out of school for many years, educational attainment might seem to be an ancient and out-of-date measure of status, but the occupational attainment that couples report at the time of the census yields consistent results, that is, no pattern of support for status-caste exchange. Even in the pre-civil rights era when the inequalities between blacks and whites were far greater, there is little evidence of black status advantage in interracial marriages.

### The Validity of Different Measures of Status

How much of the actual status inequality between blacks and whites is captured in the census statistics of educational attainment, occupational status, and literacy? If the available statistics do not capture the funda-



TABLE 2

## STATUS COMPARISONS FOR BLACK-WHITE MARRIED COUPLES, U.S. CENSUS, 1910-2000

	CENSUS YEAR									
	1910	1920	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	
Census sample <i>N</i>	108	95	469	481	467	530	5,089	7,878	12,208	
Mean education gap, years (black spouse - white spouse)			- 09		- 05	- 28*	- 04	- 14***	- 09***	
% both spouses have same education			27		21	25	29	33	35	
% black spouse has more education			37		41	36	36	33	32	
% white spouse has more education			37		39	38	35	34	34	
Total			100		100	100	100	100	100	
Mean literacy gap (1-4 scale, black - white)	- 1	- 2*								
% both spouses equally literate	80	88								
% black spouse more literate	7	2								
% white spouse more literate	12	9								
Total	100	100								
Mean occupational status gap (1-100 scale, black - white)	48**	- 2 0	- 2 10	1 99	- 4 43***	- 2 27	- 5 17***	- 5 59***	- 5 21***	
<i>N</i> both spouses report an occupation	44	14	68	116	270	395	4,086	6,766	10,389	
% both spouses have same status (within 2 points)	30	43	38	28	28	16	15	15	13	
% black spouse has higher status (by more than 2 points)	50	36	22	36	29	41	36	35	36	
% white spouse has higher status (by more than 2 points)	20	21	40	35	43	44	50	50	51	
Total	100	100	- 100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

NOTE.—Support for status-caste exchange is shown in *italic*. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. "White" and "black" categories include Hispanics, to preserve consistency with pre-1970 data. Black-white couples include couples of all ages born in the US 1980, 1990, and 2000 samples are 5% samples, prior samples are 1% samples. SES comparisons presented for all available census years, see text.

\*  $P < .05$ , two-tailed tests, null hypothesis of status gap = 0

\*\*  $P < .01$

\*\*\*  $P < .001$

mental status gaps along race lines, then the lack of findings of status-caste exchange might be because of a lack of sensitivity of the measures rather than an absence of exchanges.

For the black-white status gap, the crucial status gap under consideration in this article, the census statistics *do* capture the essential reality of status inequality. Figure 3 shows box plots of the educational attainment of black adults and white adults from the 1940 and 1960–2000 censuses. The boxes describe the educational distributions of white and black adults, regardless of marital status. The lines inside the boxes represent the median educational attainments for the group. The arrows between the boxes show the mean educational attainments of black and white spouses in racial intermarriages.

In 1940, U.S.-born black adults had a median educational attainment of fifth grade and an interquartile range of three to eight, whereas whites had a median educational attainment of ninth grade and an interquartile range of eight to twelve. The educational distributions of whites and blacks were almost disjoint in 1940. And yet, among the 469 cases of blacks married to whites in the 1940 census, 1% microdata (see table 2), the spouses had very similar levels of education: 7.26 years on average for the black spouses and 7.35 years for the white spouses (yielding the  $-0.09$  education gap reported in table 2 for 1940). The nearly horizontal arrows for educational attainment of intermarried couples is the pattern that we would expect to see for homogamy under conditions of inequality; note the similarity to figure 2. Between 1940 and 2000 the educational gap between black and white adults narrowed, but the educational homogamy of black-white intermarried couples remained the same.

#### ANALYSIS OF 1980 CENSUS DATA USING LOG-LINEAR MODELS AND NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODELS

Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the spouses in black-white intermarried couples have comparable levels of SES; this, I have argued, bolsters a theory of status homogamy and undermines the theory of status-caste exchange. The literature that has endorsed status-caste exchange has generally eschewed this kind of simple tabular analysis and has argued directly from the results of complex multivariate models (chiefly log-linear models). This section evaluates the evidence from more complex models.

The data analyzed in tables 3–5 are the restricted subsample of U.S.-born couples married for the first time (first marriage for at least one spouse) within 10 years of the 1980 census. The data in this section are a cross-classified set of husband's race  $\times$  wife's race  $\times$  husband's education  $\times$  wife's education. There are three categories for each spouse's




FIG 3.—Educational homogamy despite inequality between blacks and whites. Boxes represent interquartile range of educational distributions for U S-born blacks and whites ages 18 and greater. Dark line inside the box is median educational level. Dark arrows between the boxes represent the mean educational attainments of intermarried blacks and whites. Horizontal arrows indicate educational homogamy Status-caste exchange theory predicts downward sloping arrows, that is, blacks should have higher education in intermarried couples. Source: U.S. census data from IPUMS, 1% files for 1940, 1960, and 1970, 5% files for 1980–2000.

race (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and other). "Other" race is a residual category that includes all Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans.<sup>16</sup> Education levels are reduced to six categories: (1) less than 10 years, (2) 10 or 11 years, (3) 12 years (high school diploma), (4) some college, (5) bachelor's degree, (6) greater than bachelor's (i.e., graduate school). Information is lost when the educational categories are collapsed from 23 to 6 levels, but the reduction in categories and the resulting reduction in the sparseness of the data is necessary in order to fit the models (Agresti 1990). Kalmijn (1993), Fu (2001), and Qian (1997) all used four educational categories in their analysis, so this data set with six educational categories should be at least as sensitive to patterns of educational intermarriage as theirs. There are  $6 \times 6 \times 3 \times 3 = 324$  cells, and the number of couples equals 578,994 (the full data set is presented in app. table A1).<sup>17</sup>

Table 3 contains the results of five different log-linear models. Each model has a different set of controls, and each model includes terms for status-caste exchange between non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites, along with a parallel measure of status-caste exchange, Kalmijn's hypergamy ratio, which yields similar results.<sup>18</sup> In simplified hierarchical terms, models 1–5 are described below.

model 1 =  $\log(U) = \text{constant} + \text{HRace} \times \text{HEd} + \text{WRace} \times \text{WEd}$   
 + racial endogamy + black endogamy + black  $\times$  white  
 + black-white status-caste exchange.

<sup>16</sup> Fu's (2001) analysis of black-white status-caste exchange excludes the Hispanics and Asians from the analysis, whereas Qian (1997) includes all the racial groups in his analysis. My analysis includes married couples of all races following Qian, but if one excludes the "other" racial category from the analysis, the results are substantively the same.

<sup>17</sup> In this data set there are 2,607 black-white couples, of whom 1,059 (40.6%) have the same level of education, 776 (29.8%) have a black spouse with more education, and 772 (29.6%) have a white spouse with more education. This is consistent with my reports in the bottom portion of table 1, with the difference that the educational categories have been condensed. A general note about census weights is germane here. The 1980 data contain household weights, and in theory the failure to consider these weights in the modeling process could bias the results. In actuality, the mean household weights vary only slightly across the 324 cells, from a minimum of 20 to a maximum of 20.3, so the weights have no substantial effect on the results.

<sup>18</sup> The hypergamy ratio was introduced by Kalmijn (1993) and was used by Qian (1997). The observed hypergamy is the ratio  $H_o = N^+/N^-$ , where  $N^+$  is the number of couples whose husband has more education and  $N^-$  is the number of couples whose wife has more formal education. The hypergamy ratio is  $H_o/H_e$ , where  $H_o$  is the hypergamy ratio from the actual data, and  $H_e$  is the expected hypergamy ratio based on predicted values of a model. For black women married to white men,  $H_o/H_e < 1$  is evidence for status-caste exchange, and for white women married to black men,

TABLE 3

STATUS-CASTE EXCHANGE FOR U.S.-BORN COUPLES MARRIED IN THE 1970s: COEFFICIENTS FROM LOG-LINEAR MODELS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Summary statistics					
$L^2$ . . . . .	277,491.9	2,372.3	1,569.7	948.8	130.96
$df$ . . . . .	285	260	200	140	103
$P$ . . . . .	0	0	0	0	.033
BIC . . . . .	273,710.2	-1,079.7	-1,085.8	-910.0	-1,236.6
Key model parameters					
Black-white . . . . .	-.55***	-.54***	-.56***	-.56***	-.99***
Black-white status-caste exchange . . . . .	.14***	.07***	.018	-.05	-.06
Educational homogamy . . . . .		1.74***	1.73***	1.71***	1.71***
General racial endogamy . . . . .	2.29***	2.26***	2.26***	2.24***	3.02***
Black endogamy . . . . .	4.20***	4.32***	4.27***	4.30***	4.06***
Hypergamny ratio					
Black women-white men . . . . .	.90	1.03	1.35	1.44	1.14
White women-black men . . . . .	1.82	1.32	1.09	1.04	.98

SOURCE — 1980 US census 5% microdata via IPUMS.org

NOTE.—Support for status-caste exchange in italic 324 cells  $N = 578,994$   $df$  is the residual degrees of freedom  $L^2$  is the likelihood ratio chi-square for goodness of fit  $P$  is the probability  $P(\chi^2_d) \geq L^2$  White and black are non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black\*  $P < .05$ , two-tailed tests\*\*  $P < .01$ .\*\*\*  $P < .001$

model 2 = model 1 + HEd × WEd.

model 3 = model 1 + HBlack × HEd × WEd  
+ WBlack × HEd × WEd.

model 4 = model 1 + HRace × HEd × WEd  
+ WRace × HEd × WEd.

model 5 = model 1 + HRace × HEd × WEd + WRace × HEd  
× WEd + racial endogamy × HEd × WEd  
+ HBlack × WWhite + black × white × BlackEd.

Here,  $U$  represent the predicted values of the model; HRace and WRace are husband's race and wife's race, respectively; HEd and WEd are husband's education and wife's education, respectively; HBlack means husband is black; WBlack means wife is black, and BlackEd is the black spouse's education.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore

$$\text{racial endogamy} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if HRace} = \text{WRace} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{black endogamy} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if HRace} = \text{WRace} = \text{non-Hispanic black} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Black × white is the gender-symmetric black-white interaction equal to one for black-white couples and equal to zero for other couples. HBlack × WWhite is the gender-specific interaction, equal to one for black men married to white women, and equal to zero otherwise.

Black-white status-caste exchange equals black spouse's education on a scale of one to six minus white spouse's education (and it equals zero for other couples). Black-white status-caste exchange, in other words, measures the increased log odds ratio for black-white intermarriage for each category of educational advantage the non-Hispanic black spouse has over the non-Hispanic white spouse. A positive and significant coefficient is evidence *for* status-caste exchange. If the black-white status-

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$H_o/H_e > 1$  is evidence of status-caste exchange. The predicted values that are used to generate  $H_e$  come from the models that are reestimated without the status-caste exchange term. In tables 3–6 I have indicated hypergamy ratios that differ from one by more than 10% in the direction that is consistent with status-caste exchange, in lieu of hypothesis testing (since the distribution of the hypergamy index is unknown).

<sup>19</sup> Education is a categorical variable with six levels. BlackEd takes one degree of freedom and treats education as a continuous variable with values 1–6, because black-white status-caste exchange treats education in a similar way, see below.

caste exchange coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero, this means that the black and white couples have exactly the educational balance that the general rules of the marriage market would lead one to expect, and this is evidence against status-caste exchange. If black-white status-caste exchange is negative, this implies that in interracial marriages the white partners tend to have a bit more education compared to their black spouses than one would otherwise expect, and this would also be evidence *against* status-caste exchange. This measure of status-caste exchange is adapted from Fu (2001), with the difference that both spouses' educations are taken into account.<sup>20</sup> If status-caste exchange theory were correct, the black-white status-caste exchange term should be positive and significant in every model.

From model 1 to model 5, each successive model is strongly preferred over its predecessor by the likelihood ratio test (LRT). The  $L^2$  statistic (referred to in some sources as  $G^2$ ) is an LRT statistic comparing each model to the saturated model. The difference in  $L^2$  between models is also an LRT statistic for nested models such as these. For instance the LRT statistic for the comparison of model 3 and model 2 is 802.7 (2,372.4 – 1,569.7) on 60 additional degrees of freedom (260 – 200 = 60). The improvement in goodness of fit of 802.7 from model 2 to model 3 is very large in comparison to what one would expect from a chi-square distribution with 60 degrees of freedom,<sup>21</sup> so this comparison strongly favors model 3 over model 2.

The reason that each successive model improves the fit significantly (with model 5 fitting the best) is that each model adds new controls for the *general* pattern of educational intermarriage. Status-caste exchange, as hypothesized, is a *specific* deviation from educational endogamy that depends on the races of *both* spouses.

Model 2 introduces the saturated HEd × WEd interactions, which accounts for the full general pattern of educational intermarriage regardless of the race of either spouse. Model 3 allows the HEd × WEd to vary from the normal educational intermarriage pattern if either spouse is black, regardless of the race of the partner. It turns out that blacks are slightly more likely than other groups to marry someone whose education differs from their own, higher or lower, regardless of the race of the spouse (and 95% of blacks in the sample are married to other blacks). Model 4

<sup>20</sup> Following Fu (2001), the measure of status-caste exchange I use here is graduated, but is treated as a continuous variable and accounts for one degree of freedom. One could use, instead, a simpler dummy variable approach to status-caste exchange which would code black-white intermarried couples as “1” if the black spouse had more education (regardless of how much more), and code all other couples “0.” This different operationalization yields the same substantive results, available from the author

<sup>21</sup> The expected value of chi-square with  $n$  degrees of freedom is  $n$ .

extends model 3 so that each of the three racial categories in the data set has its own pattern of educational intermarriage, regardless of the race of the spouse. Finally, model 5 allows general racial endogamy to vary by the education of both spouses, and model 5 adds a single term to account for the gender imbalance in black-white intermarriage.<sup>22</sup>

### Assessing the Evidence for Status-Caste Exchange from the Log-linear Models

As the goodness of fit of the models improves from model 1 to model 5, there is a corresponding decline in the influence of status-caste exchange. Status-caste exchange is clearly not robust across these five models; the question is how to interpret these divergent findings.

The first point is that the other forces measured in these log-linear models (educational homogamy, general racial endogamy, and the additional force of black endogamy along with the special black-white distance in the marriage market)<sup>23</sup> are strong and robust across this set of models. It is only status-caste exchange whose significance and direction varies.

The status-caste exchange coefficient is most strongly positive in model 1. Model 1 fits so poorly by both the traditional LRT and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Raftery 1986; but see also Weakliem 1999) goodness-of-fit tests that model 1 is easy to dismiss. Model 1 fits poorly because it takes no account of any of the general patterns of educational homogamy. While model 1 can be easily discarded, model 2 is more interesting.

Model 2 fits very poorly compared to the saturated model by the traditional LRT (goodness-of-fit chi-square of 2,372.4 on 260 residual degrees of freedom), but it fits well under the parsimony favoring BIC (-1,079.7 would be preferred to the saturated model). Model 2 is, at least by the BIC standard, a reasonable model. Model 2 has the important advantages of simplicity and parsimony over models 3-5. The trade-off for simplicity is that model 2 lacks the three-way interactions (introduced in models 3-

<sup>22</sup> Because model 5 squeezes nearly all of the variance out of this data set, and because the data set is sparse in the off-diagonal cells, model 5 converges slowly. In Stata 7SE, on a 866 MHz Pentium III PC, the likelihood maximization of model 5 takes 378 iterations and about two minutes. If one specifies the "difficult" maximization option, the likelihood function is maximized in 18 steps, taking about 10 seconds. In all cases the likelihood function is appropriately concave at the maximum.

<sup>23</sup> In models 2-5 I include the saturated interactions for husband's and wife's education. I have chosen one of this full set of contrasts (HEd,WEd) = (BA,BA) compared to (BA, some college) as the typical contrast for educational endogamy. This educational endogamy term understates the real force of educational endogamy because it compares educational endogamy to educational difference of only one category.



5) between husband's education, wife's education, and the race of one spouse. Status-caste exchange is a four-way interaction between the education and race of both spouses. Estimating the four-way interaction without controlling for the underlying three-way interactions is a violation of the hierarchical rule for building log-linear models (Agresti 1990, p. 144), akin to measuring an interaction without including the main effects. The support of status-caste exchange in models 1 and 2 is nonhierarchical, and therefore problematic.

In model 2, the coefficient for status-caste exchange, though positive (0.07) and apparently significant, is small. The status-caste exchange coefficient of 0.07 indicates that the odds of black-white intermarriage increase by about 7% ( $e^{0.07} = 1.07$ ) if the black spouse has one level more education than his or her white partner. A 7% increase in the odds of black-white intermarriage (for black spouses who had an educational advantage of one category) might be enough to salvage status-caste exchange theory if the finding were robust and consistent across different models and data sets. The problem with secondary forces, however, is that they often turn out to be anything but robust (Freedman 1991).

Selective evidence from the models in table 3 could be used to convince the reader that status-caste exchange was either positive (using only model 2 and ignoring the problem of nonhierarchy) or zero (models 3, 4, and 5). Are both conclusions equally valid? If one admits all five models into evidence, one would conclude that status-caste cannot reliably be distinguished from zero in this particular data set. If one were forced to choose a single model from table 3, one would probably have to choose model 5 (which soundly rejects status-caste exchange), since that is the model that fits the data the best by both LRT and BIC and also measures status-caste exchange hierarchically, but limiting oneself to a single model would be to ignore the sensitivity of the results to different specifications (Leamer 1978, 1983).

Table 3's evidence for status-caste exchange is mixed. In the next two sections I use alternatives to the usual log-linear models to reexamine these findings. These alternative analyses are presented in the spirit of an exploratory sensitivity analysis (Leamer 1983).

### Revisiting the Log-linear Models, Part 1: Robust Standard Errors

Model 2 seems to support status-caste exchange, but how robust is this support? The ordinary standard errors produced by the log-linear model are estimated with the assumption that the model is a reasonable description of the data. The worse the model fits, the more unreliable the ordinary standard errors are. Huber (1967) and White (1980, 1981, 1982) have described a method for producing robust standard errors, also known

as heteroskedastic consistent standard errors.<sup>24</sup> The formula for the robust variance-covariance matrix is

$$\hat{V}_{\text{robust}} = \left( \frac{n}{n-1} \right) \hat{V}_{\text{ordinary}} [X^T \text{diag}(e_i^2) X] \hat{V}_{\text{ordinary}}, \quad (1)$$

where, for the case of log-linear models (Agresti 1990, p. 179)

$$\hat{V}_{\text{ordinary}} = (-\partial^2 L / \partial \beta^2)^{-1} = [X^T \text{diag}(u_i) X]^{-1}. \quad (2)$$

In the general case,

$$e_i = \partial L_i(x_i, \beta) / \partial(x_i, \beta), \quad (3)$$

where  $L_i$  is the log-likelihood function evaluated at the  $i$ th cell, and  $\beta$  is the vector of estimated parameters. Here  $e_i$  is simply the model residual for the  $i$ th cell.  $X$  is the  $n \times k$  design matrix where  $n$  is the number of cells in the data set (here  $n = 324$ ) and  $k$  is the number of parameters in the model (including the constant term), and  $u_i$  are the predicted cell counts from the model.

Table 4 reproduces the five log-linear models from table 3, with robust standard errors beneath the ordinary standard errors. The difference is striking. In models 1 and 2, the robust standard errors are far larger than the usual standard errors. In model 2 the coefficient for status-caste exchange is 0.07, and the ordinary estimated standard error is 0.018. This results in a  $Z$ -score of nearly four ( $0.07/0.018 = 3.89$ ), which was the basis for the claim that model 2 provided evidence for status-caste exchange. The robust standard error for status-caste exchange in model 2 is 0.044, and the resulting  $Z$ -score of  $0.7/0.044 = 1.6$  means that model 2 no longer supports status-caste exchange if one uses robust standard errors.

Robust standard errors are widely used in the economics literature in all sorts of models (Greene 2002). White's (1980) article has more than 3,000 citations in the Social Science Citation Index, but the approach is not widely used in sociology, so I offer a few comments. First, the coefficients and hence the fit statistics are the same regardless of which kind of standard errors are used (though some caution must be exercised in interpreting the fit statistics if one uses the robust standard errors and hence discards the assumption that the model is true). Second, if the model

<sup>24</sup> Robust SEs were produced by Stata, ver. 7 and 8. See Long and Ervin (2000) for a comparison of how different software packages estimate robust SEs. Other data-driven methods for calculating the SEs of parameters without making assumptions about the underlying model include the bootstrap and its predecessor the jackknife (Efron 1979). Bootstrap SEs (available from the author) were similar to robust SEs of the White (1980) type (see Weber [1986] for a note on the reasons for this similarity). See Long and Ervin (2000) for a discussion of alternative finite sample adjustments for robust SEs. Here the finite sample adjustment is  $n/(n-1) = 324/323$ .

TABLE 4  
SUBJECTING THE COEFFICIENTS FROM TABLE 3 TO MORE SCRUTINY

	SAME MODELS AS TABLE 3				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
$L^2$ . . . . .	277,491.9	2,372.3	1,569.7	948.8	130.96
$df$ . . . . .	285	260	200	140	103
Black-white . . . . .	-.55*** (.039) [.144]	-.54*** (.039) [.105]	-.56*** (.040) [.063]	-.56*** (.040) [.062]	-.99*** (.11) [.14]
Black-white status-caste exchange . . . . .	.14* (.012) [.066]	.070 (.018) [.044]	.018 (.033) [.044]	-.05 (.034) [.042]	-.06 (.035) [.032]
Educational homogamy . .		1.74*** (.049) [.093]	1.73*** (.055) [.023]	1.71*** (.057) [.005]	1.71*** (.353) [.152]
General racial endogamy . .	2.29*** (.008) [.121]	2.26*** (.008) [.034]	2.26*** (.008) [.034]	2.24*** (.008) [.027]	3.02*** (.050) [.033]
Black endogamy . . . . .	4.20*** (.073) [.294]	4.32*** (.073) [.184]	4.27*** (.073) [.136]	4.30*** (.074) [.132]	4.06*** (.075) [.082]

SOURCE — 1980 US census 5% microdata via IPUMS.org

NOTE — Support for status-caste exchange in *italic*. 324 cells.  $N = 578,994$ . White and black are non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black. Nos in parentheses are ordinary SEs; nos in square brackets are robust SEs.

+  $P < 0.1$ , two-tailed tests, significance pertains to robust, rather than ordinary SEs

\*  $P < .05$

\*\*  $P < .01$

\*\*\*  $P < .001$

fits well, it does not matter as much which kind of standard error one uses. In model 5 (the best-fitting model), the robust and the ordinary standard errors are different but not nearly as different as in model 1. Third, the worse the model fits, the more the ordinary standard errors tend to be underestimates, yielding inflated and potentially misleading  $T$  statistics and  $Z$ -scores (White 1981).

## Revisiting the Log-linear Models, Part 2: Negative Binomial Regression

The log-linear model, a form of Poisson regression, is the most restrictive member of a broad family of models that deal with count data (King 1989; Cameron and Trivedi 1986; Greene 2002; Hannan 1991). Poisson regression is the most restrictive of the count models because the Poisson model constrains the predicted variance to equal the predicted mean. In many situations, this restriction on the variance is unreasonable, and the data are overdispersed with respect to the Poisson distribution. Negative

binomial regression corrects for overdispersion by introducing an overdispersion parameter (Cameron and Trivedi 1986; Long 1997; Greene 2002; King 1989). The resulting model is a mix of Poisson and gamma distributions.<sup>25</sup> Log-linear models are a special case of negative binomial regression, when the overdispersion parameter is zero (Hannan 1991; King 1989). In the negative binomial model

$$\text{var}(u_i) = (1 + \alpha u_i)u_i, \quad (4)$$

where  $\alpha$  is the overdispersion parameter, and  $u_i$  are the predicted cell counts.<sup>26</sup>

Overdispersion is a common cause of poor fit in log-linear models. The worst overdispersion is usually found where the predicted values (and hence predicted variances) are small, that is, where the actual data are sparse (Long 1997; Greene 2002). Despite the large sample size of the data set as a whole (578,994 cases on 324 cells), the data contain fewer than 3,000 black-white intermarriages. These black-white intermarriages are concentrated on or near the educational endogamy diagonal. Because the educationally disparate black-white intermarriages are few, 29 out of the 72 black-white intermarriage cells have fewer than 10 cases. The cells that are of the most interest (the black-white intermarriages with disparate educational attainment) are the very cells whose small counts make the usual log-linear models suspect.

The top of table 5 presents the summary statistics and coefficients from the log-linear models with ordinary standard errors, repeated from tables 3 and 4. The bottom half of table 5 has the same set of coefficients, plus the overdispersion parameter, for the negative binomial version of each of the models (the negative binomial models in table 5 also have the ordinary, rather than the robust, SEs). The main difference between the log-linear coefficients on the top half and the negative binomial coefficients on the bottom half of the table is that while status-caste exchange is positive and significant in log-linear models 1 and 2, none of the negative binomial models support status-caste exchange. The negative binomial models can be tested against the log-linear models with an LRT. This LRT takes a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom (one degree of freedom because of the overdispersion parameter; see Cameron

<sup>25</sup> The gamma distribution is selected for convenience, not for prior theoretical reasons

<sup>26</sup> This what Cameron and Trivedi (1986) refer to as negative binomial II. Negative binomial I models yield the same substantive results.

TABLE 5

SUBJECTING THE COEFFICIENTS TO MORE SCRUTINY: LOG-LINEAR VS. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL MODELS

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Summary statistics for log-linear models <sup>a</sup>					
$L^2$ .....	277,491.9	2,372.3	1,569.7	948.8	130.96
$df$ .....	285	260	200	140	103
Black-white .....	-.55***	-.54***	-.56***	.56***	-.09***
Black-white status-caste exchange .....	.14***	.07***	.018	-.05	-.06
Educational homogeneity .....		1.74***	1.73***	1.71***	1.71***
General racial endogamy .....	2.29***	2.26***	2.26***	2.24***	3.02***
Black endogamy .....	4.20***	4.32***	4.27***	4.30***	4.06***
The same key model parameters, plus the overdispersion parameter					
alpha, from negative binomial regression					
Black-white .....	-.65***	-.61***	-.61***	-.60***	-.99***
Black-white status-caste exchange .....	.045	.015	.0034	-.059	-.06
	(.084)	(.025)	(.039)	(.037)	(.035)
Educational homogeneity .....		1.67***	1.71***	1.58***	1.71***
General racial endogamy .....	2.27***	2.20***	2.22***	2.22***	3.02***
Black endogamy .....	4.07***	4.16***	4.15***	4.19***	4.06***
Overdispersion parameter alpha .....	90***	.039***	.021***	.010***	0 <sup>a</sup>
Likelihood ratio $\chi^2$ test compared to log-linear model (one $df$ ) ..	275,721.1	1,451.7	776.1	279.2	0

SOURCE — 1980 U.S. Census 5% microdata via IPUMS.org

NOTE — Support for status-caste exchange in italic SEs in parentheses. 324 cells  $N = 578,994$  Log-linear and negative binomial models coincide exactly in model 5.

Hispanic black

<sup>a</sup> Actual value of alpha in model 5 is reported by Stata as 0.00000000179, i.e., a positive but small number. White and black are non-Hispanic white and non-\*  $P < .10$ , two-tailed tests\*\*  $P < .05$ \*\*\*  $P < .01$ \*\*\*\*  $P < .001$

and Trivedi 1986, p. 43).<sup>27</sup> The LRT significantly favors the negative binomial over the log-linear specification in models 1–4.

Model 5 is unaffected by the change in functional form from Poisson regression (i.e., log-linear models) to negative binomial regression since model 5 accounts for almost all the variation in the data to begin with. The overdispersion parameter is nearly exactly zero in model 5, and the negative binomial model converges to the log-linear form in such a case (see King 1989). The negative binomial models reproduce all the classic and very significant findings about educational homogamy, general endogamy, black endogamy, and black-white distance in the marriage market.<sup>28</sup> Only status-caste exchange is rejected by the negative binomial models.

What does the proliferation of models in tables 3–5 demonstrate? Varying the functional form and the method of estimating the errors may seem only to muddy the waters, since the chance of discrepant findings rises with the increasing variety of tests. My intention is not to endorse one model or test as “best” from this rather small subset of the infinite dimensional space of possible assumptions and models. Rather, my intention is to subject the key hypothesis to a broad enough range of tests to suggest that the status-caste exchange parameter is fragile with respect to changes in basic modeling assumptions.

#### REANALYSIS OF QIAN (1997) AND FU (2001)

Both Qian (1997) and Fu (2001) use data sets that rely on younger couples only, an approach that tends to magnify the apparent effects of status-caste exchange. In this section, I use the same data and measures of status-caste exchange that Qian and Fu each use. For simplicity and consistency with Qian and Fu, the models I introduce in this section will all be of the traditional variety—log-linear models with ordinary standard errors.

<sup>27</sup> Because the overdispersion parameter  $\alpha$  can only be positive, Gutierrez, Carter, and Drukker (2001) suggest a one-sided test which is equivalent to an even mixture of  $\chi^2_1$  and  $\chi^2_0$ .  $P$ -values are half of what they would be under the  $\chi^2_1$ . In this case because the negative binomial form is so strongly preferred to the Poisson form in models 1–4, two-sided and one-sided tests yield the same substantive results

<sup>28</sup> Note that the model parameters for educational homogamy, racial endogamy, black endogamy, and black-white intermarriage are not dramatically affected by the inclusion of the overdispersion parameter in any of the models, while the status-caste exchange parameter shrinks dramatically in models 1–3 when the overdispersion parameter is added. The special shrinkage of the status-caste exchange term in models 1–3 is a result of the fact that the status-caste exchange term is uniquely dependent on sparse cells (i.e., the black-white intermarriage cells with discrepant educational attainments) where overdispersion is especially problematic.

Status-caste exchange is inherently a four-way interaction between the race and status of both spouses. Qian measures status-caste exchange with the hypergamy index, calculated from the predicted values of the model. The hypergamy index is a four-way interaction, but Qian's model does not control for all the lower-order three-way interactions which may be necessary to get a true measure of the four-way interaction (Agresti 1990, p. 144). My models include the three-way interactions, improve the fit of the models relative to Qian's model, and find no support for status-caste exchange. The three-way interactions account for the different educational mating patterns of blacks and whites, without regard to the race of the spouse.

In table 6, the first column reports summary statistics from the model Qian used to test status-caste exchange and the hypergamy ratios that Qian (1997, p. 273) derived from the model.<sup>29</sup> Qian's model supports status-caste exchange theory. Model Q2 rejects status-caste exchange and outperforms Qian's model by both LRT and BIC standards. Model Q3 is the best fitting among these models by the BIC, and (like model Q2) model Q3 rejects status-caste exchange.

Table 7 revisits the analysis of Fu (2001). Fu attempts to measure status-caste exchange with three-way rather than four-way interactions. Fu's interactions capture the race of both partners but the educational attainment of only one partner. Fu's models show, for instance, that white women who marry black men have less education than white women who marry white men. This claim could be consistent with status-caste exchange, but it could also be consistent with educational homogamy in a context of racial inequality (see figures 1–3). Even though Fu's three-way interactions risk conflating status-caste exchange with status homogamy or with other forces, the inclusion of the full set of three-way interactions into the models reduces Fu's interactions to insignificance.

The first column of table 7 reports the summary statistics from Fu's model, which is consistent with status-caste exchange (Fu interprets his coefficients as supporting status-caste exchange when they are significantly negative). Model F2 allows blacks and whites to have different patterns of educational intermarriage, regardless of the race of the spouse.

<sup>29</sup> This model is not described in formal detail in Qian (1997), nor are summary statistics or parameters reported, so I appreciate Professor Qian's help in allowing me to reconstruct the model. The model is a quasi-symmetry model (Clogg and Shihadeh 1994) in education and race, with interactions formed by all the off-diagonal associations, and with interactions between the education and race parameters. Square tables have a unique quasi-symmetry solution. Multidimensional tables have many kinds of potential symmetry and therefore many possible quasi-symmetry models (cf. Clogg and Shihadeh 1994, p. 78; Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland 1975, pp. 303–6; Agresti 1990, p. 388).

TABLE 6  
REVISITING QIAN (1997). LOG-LINEAR MODELS WITH ORDINARY SES

Summary statistics.		Model Q1	Model Q2	Model Q3
$L^2$	...	1,954.4	278 13	632.8
$df$	...	354	251	372
$P$	...	0	115	0
BIC	...	-2,707.2	-3,027 1	-4,265.8
Key parameters:				
Coefficient for black endogamy				
Coefficient for black-white interaction				
Coefficient for black-white interaction				
Hypergammy ratios (a measure of status-caste exchange)				
Black men, white women 1980				
Black men, white women 1990				
White men, black women 1980				
White men, black women 1990				

NOTE — Support for status-caste exchange in italic.  $N = 523,542$ . Black and white are non-Hispanic black and non-Hispanic white. Racial endogamy (each) = 0 for racially nonendogamous marriage, and takes on a different nominal value for each of the four kinds of racial endogamy. Full specification of Qian's model:  $HRace \times HED \times year, WRace \times WED \times year, RaceQS \times edQS \times year$ .  $RaceQS$  is defined as all symmetric off-diagonal racial interactions, and  $edQS$  is defined as all symmetric off-diagonal educational interactions. Full specification of Q2:  $HRace \times HED \times year, WRace \times WED \times year, RaceEndogamy (each) \times Year$ .  $RaceEndogamy (each) \times HED$ ,  $RaceEndogamy (each) \times WED$ ,  $black \times white \times year, HBlack \times WWWhite, Hispanic \times white, HHHispanic \times WWWhite$ . Model Q2 converges with difficulty. Full specification of Q3:  $HRace \times HED \times year, WRace \times WED \times year, HED \times WED \times year, HBlack \times HED \times WED, WBlack \times HED \times WED, RaceEndogamy (each) \times year, RaceEndogamy (each) \times HED, RaceEndogamy (each) \times WED, black \times white \times year, HBlack \times WWWhite, Hispanic \times white$ .

<sup>a</sup> Differs from one by more than 10% in the direction consistent with status-caste exchange, in lieu of hypothesis testing

<sup>b</sup> Differs from Qian (1997, p. 273) because of typo in original

\*  $P < .10$ , two-tailed tests

\*\*  $P < .05$

\*\*\*  $P < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .001$



TABLE 7  
REVISITING THE MODELS OF FU (2001) LOG-LINEAR MODELS WITH ORDINARY SES

	Model F1	Model F2	Model F3	Model F4
Summary statistics:				
$L^2$	215.6	50.7	14 6	14.6
$df$	35	13	9	9
$P$	0	0	.10	.10
BIC	-241.9	-119.3	-103.1	-103.1
Key model parameters:				
Black-white interaction	-5.08***	-5 10***	-4.86***	-4 88***
Fu's interaction terms:				
Interaction 1	.021	.110	-.044	
Interaction 2	-.293***	-.194	-.070	
Interaction 3	-.105***	-.042	-.071	
Interaction 4	-.117*	-.079	-.008	
Black-white status-caste exchange				.14

NOTE.—Support for status-caste exchange in italic  $N = 476,718$  Fu's interactions are three-way interactions, subsets of HRace  $\times$  WRace  $\times$  HED or HRace  $\times$  WRace  $\times$  WED  
Model F1 HRace  $\times$  HED + WRace  $\times$  WED + HED  $\times$  WED + black  $\times$  white + Fu's interactions Model F2: HRace  $\times$  HED  $\times$  WED + WRace  $\times$  HED  $\times$  WED + black  $\times$  white  
+ Fu's interactions Model F3  
HRace  $\times$  HED  $\times$  WED + WRace  $\times$  HED  $\times$  WED + black  $\times$  white  $\times$  HED + black  $\times$  white  $\times$  WED + Fu's interactions Model F4: model F3 + black-white status-caste exchange

\*  $P < .05$ ,  
\*\*  $P < .01$ ,  
\*\*\*  $P < .001$

In model F2, all four of Fu's interactions are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Model F3 adds further interactions between racial intermarriage and educational intermarriage to achieve a good fit by the LRT (though Fu's model fits better by the BIC), and once again Fu's four interaction terms are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Model F4 measures status-caste exchange as a four-way interaction as in tables 3–5, with the presence of the full set of underlying three-way interactions.<sup>30</sup> In model F4, status-caste exchange is indistinguishable from zero.

Qian and Fu present their findings as evidence in favor of status-caste exchange theory. My point in this reanalysis is simply to show that a different choice of models (with an emphasis on goodness of fit and hierarchical model design) can lead to a different conclusion about status-caste exchange.

## CONCLUSION

Status-caste exchange theory has an exalted pedigree that comes from its introduction by sociological giants Kingsley Davis and Robert Merton. Davis's (1941) and Merton's (1941) articles were self-consciously theoretical and contained no data on racial intermarriages in the United States, so the empirical basis of status-caste exchange theory rests on a series of more recent articles by other authors. Some of these empirical studies have used simple tables to cast doubt on status-caste exchange theory, while other authors have used sophisticated models to defend status-caste exchange theory.

The simple tabular analyses have pointed out that racially intermarried individuals and their partners have always had similar levels of status, even in the first half of the 20th century, when racial barriers in the United States were nearly impermeable. The fact of status homogamy among interracial married couples contradicts status-caste exchange theory, but these simple tabular results have been marginalized precisely because of their simplicity.

The recent empirical literature that has endorsed status-caste exchange has relied on the population of young married couples. Whereas the all-ages married population shows no aggregate signs of status-caste exchange, the statistics for young couples show a small but distinct educational advantage for intermarried blacks compared to their white spouses. This educational difference among young couples has been interpreted as evidence for status-caste exchange, but it turns out to be a

<sup>30</sup> If one substitutes the simpler dichotomous status-caste exchange parameter in model F4, the substantive result is the same but the residual *df* of the model are reduced by one, to eight (further models and results available from the author)

function of the fact that some of these couples are still in school. Because husbands are about one year older than their wives, young husbands tend to be further along in school than their young wives. The gender imbalance (most black-white couples have black husbands) tips the educational scales to black spouses when the interracial couples are still in school, but eventually this artifact of youth and gender disappears.

The findings from complex models which have been used to endorse status-caste exchange theory are not robust. In my own analysis of recently married couples from the 1980 census and in my reanalysis of the samples of young couples studied by Qian (1997) and Fu (2001), I show that changes in the assumptions or the design of the models can reverse the results that were supposed to provide support for status-caste exchange. Apparent support for status-caste exchange in log-linear models can be overturned by choosing better-fitting models, by correcting problems of model nonhierarchy, by using robust standard errors, or by using negative binomial models to correct for problems of overdispersion. Unlike status-caste exchange, other key predictions of the literature such as racial endogamy and educational homogamy are robust and statistically significant across a wide variety of models.

A broad literature critical of quantitative social science has emerged in recent years (Berk 1991; Blalock 1989, 1991; Freedman 1983, 1987, 1991; Leamer 1978, 1983, 1985; Lieberman 1985). One of the preoccupations of this critical literature is that persuasive empirical findings must be robust with respect to a broad set of assumptions. As Leamer (1983, p. 38) puts it, "An inference is not believable if it is fragile, if it can be reversed by minor changes in assumptions."

One of the reasons that status-caste exchange theory has been so enduring and so influential in the theoretical and popular literature during the six decades since its introduction is that actual marriage patterns can easily be misconstrued to support the theory. As figures 2 and 3 show, the fundamental status inequality between blacks and whites ensures that the same level of status that is perceived as "low" among whites may be perceived as "high" when compared to other blacks. Given the fog of misinformation that has characterized race relations in the United States, and given the special social isolation imposed on interracial couples by both racial groups, it is not surprising that the actual status homogamy of interracial couples should have remained unacknowledged for so long.

Status-caste exchange theory as originally proposed by Davis (1941) and Merton (1941) predicts that black spouses would have to have higher status than their white partner to make the union worthwhile for the white partner. The ethnographic evidence (DuBois 1996; Porterfield 1978; Root 2001; Spickard 1989) indicates that interracial unions are formed

along a basis of solidarity and affection and personal choice, not a basis of exchanges.

Status-caste exchange is a venerable theory that has been influential for 60 years. The question is whether the empirical support for the theory is strong enough to justify the theory's continued use.

## APPENDIX

TABLE A1  
DATA USED IN TABLES 3-5: U.S.-BORN COUPLES MARRIED WITHIN 10 YEARS OF THE  
1980 CENSUS.

WIFE'S EDUCATION	HUSBAND'S EDUCATION					
	< 10	10, 11	High School	Some College	BA	> BA
Wife white, husband white:						
< 10 . . . . .	10,063	5,809	9,755	1,835	338	224
10, 11 . . . . .	6,649	9,265	18,337	4,074	592	274
High school . . . . .	12,893	17,880	123,886	46,357	15,312	6,944
Some college . . . . .	1,849	2,907	28,409	38,997	20,536	13,410
BA . . . . .	378	435	6,832	12,373	23,208	17,740
> BA . . . . .	168	199	2,367	4,517	7,120	17,315
Wife white, husband black:						
< 10 . . . . .	46	28	54	15	0	1
10, 11 . . . . .	33	65	103	29	9	1
High school . . . . .	50	127	457	209	47	22
Some college . . . . .	22	36	136	188	58	35
BA . . . . .	6	7	45	49	35	54
> BA . . . . .	3	2	16	45	23	52
Wife white, husband other:						
< 10 . . . . .	229	162	257	75	7	3
10, 11 . . . . .	169	341	537	155	16	9
High school . . . . .	309	521	2,240	999	203	122
Some college . . . . .	59	99	545	903	298	189
BA . . . . .	9	8	95	196	237	235
> BA . . . . .	9	2	44	99	76	265
Wife other, husband white:						
< 10 . . . . .	164	133	288	81	17	12
10, 11 . . . . .	122	219	488	160	27	9
High school . . . . .	211	369	2,200	1,006	268	171
Some college . . . . .	33	96	591	864	343	272
BA . . . . .	4	10	77	169	250	203
> BA . . . . .	5	3	28	84	108	284
Wife other, husband other:						
< 10 . . . . .	1,689	732	819	212	19	19
10, 11 . . . . .	635	863	1,190	330	23	15
High school . . . . .	791	1,019	3,959	1,432	249	118

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TABLE A1 (Continued)

WIFE'S EDUCATION	HUSBAND'S EDUCATION					
	< 10	10, 11	High School	Some College	BA	> BA
Some college . . . . .	134	187	825	1,209	292	185
BA . . . . .	13	17	99	213	226	165
> BA . . . . .	10	6	45	98	96	235
Wife black, husband white:						
< 10 . . . . .	12	7	9	2	0	1
10, 11 . . . . .	10	9	23	5	3	0
High school . . . . .	11	20	104	36	18	6
Some college . . . . .	7	3	33	46	20	25
BA . . . . .	0	1	8	7	13	17
> BA . . . . .	1	0	0	5	5	32
Wife black, husband black:						
< 10 . . . . .	2,064	996	1,172	266	41	29
10, 11 . . . . .	1,416	1,878	2,570	659	60	31
High school . . . . .	2,032	3,286	11,989	3,629	650	215
Some college . . . . .	551	951	3,640	3,920	921	497
BA . . . . .	94	140	775	1,093	1,059	459
> BA . . . . .	61	54	284	507	363	646
Wife black, husband other:						
< 10 . . . . .	8	6	4	2	1	0
10, 11 . . . . .	11	10	13	8	1	1
High school . . . . .	10	14	46	30	2	3
Some college . . . . .	4	6	25	27	5	4
BA . . . . .	0	0	3	5	4	3
> BA . . . . .	0	0	1	1	1	6
Wife other, husband black:						
< 10 . . . . .	16	19	19	13	0	1
10, 11 . . . . .	14	26	35	16	1	0
High school . . . . .	11	26	124	59	13	10
Some college . . . . .	6	12	44	57	23	10
BA . . . . .	0	4	10	12	7	10
> BA . . . . .	0	0	1	6	5	7

NOTE —324 cells,  $N = 578,994$

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# Toward Some Fundamentals of Fundamental Causality: Socioeconomic Status and Health in the Routine Clinic Visit for Diabetes<sup>1</sup>

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The concept of “fundamental causality” has gained increasing attention as a way of understanding the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and health outcomes. Using ethnographic data from a comparative study of two diabetes clinics, the authors further develop the fundamental cause concept in three ways. First, they provide an exposition of the constituent claims implied by an assertion of fundamental causality. Second, they show how ethnographic data can be used to explicate such claims by showing some of the mechanisms that might operate to preserve the fundamental relationship in diabetes treatment regimens. Finally, they offer elaborations and refinements of the fundamental cause concept.

Weber’s ([1921] 1968) concept of “life chances” highlights both the *diversity* of the biographical consequences of social standing and their *probabilistic* character. Most poignant among all the various kinds of life chances affected by socioeconomic standing may also be the most literal:

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the probabilities of actually staying alive or dying. Lower socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with worse health and higher mortality rates at virtually every point along the life course (Chapin 1924; Coombs 1941; Pappas et al. 1993; Feinstein 1993; Robert and House 1994). This association has been remarkably robust over time and across countries (National Research Council 2001), and SES effects on mortality have persisted across historical periods in which risk factors and disease profiles have changed radically (Link et al. 1998). In this article, we focus on the association between SES and adverse health outcomes among persons with diabetes. More specifically, we marshal ethnographic data to attempt to explicate some of the intervening mechanisms responsible for this quantitative association that are related to the design and implementation of diabetes treatment regimes.

Broadly speaking, this aim is hardly novel, as many have worked on specifying the mechanisms underlying this substantial and durable association between health and SES (see Mechanic 2000; Robert and House 2000; House et al. 1990; Williams 1990), as well as a diverse range of related topics. These efforts include, for example, studies of causal ordering between biological and social outcomes (Conley and Bennett 2000, 2001), population-level studies of income inequality and health (Ellison 2002; House 2001; Mellor and Milyo 2001), and studies of social psychological factors such as stress (Thoits 1995). Our goal is to contribute more specifically to how SES is understood as an explanatory variable accounting for health differentials. When identifying more proximate factors that affect health, SES is often conceptualized as a *placeholder* variable for real causes that have not yet been identified (Link and Phelan 1995). As part of a general criticism of sociology's alleged emphasis on "variables" at the expense of "mechanisms," Hedström and Swedberg (1998, p. 11) argue that this placeholder approach is ineffective because "a 'class' cannot be a causal agent. . . . A statistical 'effect' of a class variable in contexts like these is essentially an indicator of our inability to specify properly the underlying explanatory mechanisms." Similarly, Rothman (1986, p. 90) states that social class is "causally related to few if any diseases but is a correlate of many causes of disease."

Put more simply, these authors suggest that SES qua SES seems important only because the relevant science right now is far from mature. By contrast, Link and Phelan (1995) propose that SES should be thought of as a "fundamental cause" of health outcomes (see also Link and Phelan 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005). Their fundamental cause concept implies not a theory of the *specific proximate mechanisms* responsible for a persistent association, but rather that some *metamechanism(s)* is responsible for how specific and varied mechanisms are continuously generated over historical time in such a way that the direction of the enduring association is pre-

served—in their words, “factors that put people at risk of risk” (1995, p. 85). If an explanatory variable is a fundamental cause of an outcome, then the association cannot be successfully reduced to a set of more proximate, intervening causes because the association *persists* even while the relative influence of various proximate mechanisms *changes*.

Link and Phelan (1995, p. 81) conceive SES as a fundamental cause of health outcomes primarily because SES implies “access to resources . . . that help individuals avoid diseases and their negative consequences through a variety of mechanisms. Thus, even if one effectively modifies intervening mechanisms or eradicates some diseases, an association between a fundamental cause and disease will re-emerge. As such, fundamental causes can defy efforts to eliminate their effects when attempts to do so focus solely on the mechanisms that happen to link them to disease in a particular situation.” When knowledge exists of how to prevent, treat, or manage disease, then those with greater resources are better able to take advantage of this knowledge to attain lower likelihoods of adverse health outcomes.<sup>2</sup> Here Link and Phelan (1995) issue a call to consider the broader social contexts within which proximate risk factors are determined and to understand how resources and knowledge can preserve a persistent patterning of SES and health even amid dramatic changes in medical treatments and the prevalence rates of specific diseases. Their argument maintains an essential role for SES even while applauding the effort to elaborate the details of its causal potency for specific diseases in specific contexts. By asserting that social processes influence people’s health in ways that cannot be identified and contained by medical interventions, the fundamental cause concept claims an essential role for sociology in identifying pathways and mechanisms linking SES and health.

The idea of fundamental causality can be engaged empirically in a variety of ways. For example, Link et al. (1998) show how SES differences can be reproduced over time with changes in medical knowledge and the utilization of technology (e.g., Pap tests and mammography). Efforts to statistically decompose the SES-health relationship, however, indicate that there is no simple and proximate “magic bullet” that can explain away this association (see Robert and House 2000). We take an altogether different approach, using ethnographic data to identify and elaborate the multiplicity of mechanisms that may be responsible for the reproduction of a fundamental relationship within a particular domain at a particular

<sup>2</sup> Emphasizing resources and knowledge does not deny that additional factors are also responsible for an inverse association between SES and health, such as possibly stress and lower perceived control (see, e.g., Mirowsky, Ross, and Reynolds 2000; Thoits 1995). Cross-sectional associations between SES and health also partly reflect the consequences of health conditions for socioeconomic attainment (Mulatu and Schooler 2002)

time. That is, we use ethnographic materials to try to articulate concretely some of the ways that resources may be translated into health advantages and may thus be implicated in the reproduction of a pervasive, well-documented quantitative association.

We recognize that ours may seem a somewhat unconventional approach to ethnography insofar as we rely on exogenous information about the aggregate relationship between health and SES in order to examine what the in situ work of regimen design may tell us about the instantiation of risk for poor health outcomes. We also recognize the tension inherent in connecting particular ethnographic observations to quantitative evidence about risk, especially when the risks are of long-term consequences most likely to occur after the period of ethnographic observation. We posit that one can see in individual interactions evidence of more systematic disadvantages consistent with evidence both about what increases risk and who disproportionately suffers adverse outcomes, even if the very nature of risk means that some particular individuals observed might happen to escape these negative outcomes. While probabilistic reasoning compromises inference from qualitative data in some contexts (Lieberson 1991; Goldthorpe 2000), this kind of ethnographic investigation into fundamental causality is utterly dependent on it, as the focus of observation is not the *outcome* but the *instantiation of risk factors known to be probabilistically related to the outcome*.

We restrict our inquiry to a single disease, diabetes, and a single recurrent site within the illness career of those with this disease, the routine clinic visit. Within this *intentionally narrow* domain, our goal is to use ethnography to capture *in depth* the multiplicity, complexity, and particularity of pathways that, on balance and in the aggregate, may operate to sustain the fundamental relationship. We will attempt to specify in detail—drawing on observational and interview data—many of the possible ways that SES differences among diabetes patients can affect the design and successful implementation of treatment regimens. These regimens influence long-term average glucose levels, and glucose levels strongly affect the risk of long-term adverse health outcomes for those with diabetes. Our results are intended both as a specific contribution to the social epidemiology of diabetes and as a general contribution to how social scientists conceptualize the relationship between encompassing variables like SES and health. We can be seen as using ethnographic data to provide a “thick” illustration of what Link and Phelan’s idea of fundamental causality *looks like* in a site of naturalistic observation. At the same time, we seek to use insights from the data to elaborate and refine understanding of the fundamental cause concept.

We begin by trying to provide a more general articulation of the concept of fundamental causality than what now exists and delineating the con-

stituent claims that we take as implied by an assertion of a fundamental cause relationship. We then provide some necessary background on diabetes, its treatment, our data, and the conceptualization of the routine clinic visit that organizes our inquiry. Afterward, we set about providing a detailed description of many of the potential mechanisms preserving the inverse association between SES and health that are visible in the routine clinic visit data, and how these mechanisms are grounded in the constituent claims of fundamental causality. Finally, we discuss the contributions of the inquiry for refining our understanding of fundamental causality.

### FUNDAMENTAL CAUSALITY

As noted, the proposition that low SES can be thought of as a “fundamental cause” grants SES an essential relevance in sociological health scholarship instead of viewing it as merely a placeholder until the “real” mechanisms underlying its observed effects are known. While the concept is most closely associated with Link and Phelan (1995), earlier articulations of it can be seen elsewhere in medical sociology (e.g., House et al. 1990; Williams 1990), and, indeed, the concept was importantly presaged by the more general sociological discussion of causality by Lieberman (1985, pp. 185–95). That said, as the term “fundamental cause” becomes more prominent, we worry that it risks devolving into a nearly empty catchphrase or a way of rhetorically asserting the primacy of the social without supporting evidence. In contrast, we consider the assertion that “*X* is a fundamental cause of *Y*” to advance a specific set of claims about *X*, *Y*, and the relationship between them.<sup>3</sup> Toward strengthening the defenses against conceptual devolution, we briefly here recount what we take as the constituent claims of a proposition of fundamental causality, after which we proceed to engage the concept of fundamental causality further with our empirical materials.

To begin, *X* must be *multiply realized*, meaning that it has diffuse proximate consequences. For our purposes, SES is not only itself a diffuse variable encompassing a constellation of intimately related (but not fully collapsible) variables like education, income, and occupational prestige, but it is also understood to have proximate consequences for inter alia, attitudes, values, social support networks, workplace flexibility, and in-

<sup>3</sup> These are claims beyond the assertions of *covariation*, *temporal consistency*, and *nonspuriousness* that are regular fare in discussions of causality (e.g., Stinchcombe 1968; Maxim 1999). We should also note that *X* being a fundamental cause of *Y* does not rule out possible reciprocal relations in which *Y* also influences subsequent levels of *X*.

surance arrangements. Meanwhile,  $Y$  must be *multiply realizable*, in the sense that there are many different ways in which  $Y$  can occur. For health outcomes, it is obvious that there are many routes to poor health and death, and a central task of epidemiology has been to identify the risk factors associated with individual subclassifications of morbidity and mortality.

Putting these together, a fundamental relationship implies the potential for a *massive multiplicity of connections* between the realizations of  $X$  and the ways in which  $Y$  is realized. There must be a large number of ways in which the manifold implications of variations in  $X$  are potentially connected to manifold proximate causes of  $Y$ . Each actual connection comprises a *mechanism* contributing to the observed relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$ ; that is, we use the term *mechanism* to refer to a specific means by which  $X$  can affect the probabilities of different outcomes of  $Y$ . In fundamental relationships, no individual mechanism is so dominant that it alone is responsible for the bulk of the observed association between  $X$  and  $Y$ .<sup>4</sup> Instead, the association is the product of the accumulation of a large number of factors operating mostly in the same direction, and the relative importance of specific mechanisms varies in individual circumstances and can be expected to change for a population over historical time.

Fundamental relationships can be generally expected to be *holographic*. Just as each piece of a broken hologram retains a reasonable and whole replication of the original image, decomposing  $Y$  into subclasses will tend to reproduce the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  within each subclass. In other words, to the extent that  $Y$  can be divided into different domains, the effect of  $X$  should be observed within most or all of them. In the case of mortality, the SES gradient is observed within all 14 of the major cause-of-death categories of the International Classification of Diseases (Ilsley and Mullen 1985; Link and Phelan 1995). Exceptions to the general pattern are of course possible, but they are proposed to be anomalous and to imply particularistic explanation. Moreover, variation in the magnitude of the association within subclasses may provide important indications regarding how the fundamental relationship is preserved, as when Phelan et al. (2004) found the SES-mortality gradient to increase with the relative “preventability” of different causes of death.

Finally, fundamental relationships imply the *predictive claim* that

<sup>4</sup> More precisely, there may be specific cultural/historical moments in which an individual mechanism dominates the determination of the outcome, but, given the character of the mechanism-generating process, we would expect other mechanisms preserving the fundamental relationship to gain in importance if this singular mechanism is removed, but systematic variation in the outcome remains.

changes in the structure of realizability of  $Y$ , as long as they do not eliminate variation in  $Y$ , will have only modest effects on the observed relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$ . As new pathways to  $Y$  emerge, the standing conjecture is that these will, on balance, either work to preserve the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  immediately or at least come to do so over time. Disruption of a relationship of fundamental causality would thus seem to require a radical transformation of either the diffuse consequences of  $X$  or the ways in which  $Y$  is realized. The predictive claim is critical because it implies that the fundamental relationship is not itself explained by a complete accounting of the intervening mechanisms at a given cultural/historical moment: an assertion of fundamental causality is not just an assertion about the generation of  $Y$  but also about *the generation of the set of causes* of  $Y$ . That resources improve the capacity to defend one's health would thus seem to imply persistence in the relationship between SES and health even given large changes in the actual intervening mechanisms over time.

#### DIABETES

If fundamental relationships imply massively multiple mechanisms, then any concrete description of mechanisms must be confined to a sharply circumscribed domain. We focus on diabetes for several reasons. First, diabetes is a major cause of morbidity and mortality in the United States, shortening sufferers' life expectancies by 10–15 years—and its prevalence is increasing dramatically (from 4.9% in 1990 to 6.5% in 2003—an increase of 33%; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2004; Harris et al. 1998; Mokdad et al. 2000). According to leading experts, “diabetes has become a national public health crisis, in both human and economic terms” (American Diabetes Association 1998). Second, because diabetes is a long-term illness whose treatment depends heavily on patient self-management, it may offer insights into the implications of the more general increasing incidence of chronic illness (Glasgow and Eakin 1998). Third, the incidence of diabetes is already known to be related to SES, as documented in both national-level (Cowie and Eberhardt 1995; King and Rewers 1993; Blackwell, Collins, and Coles 1997) and state-level (Diamant et al. 2003; Hosler, Metivier, and Godley 1997) studies of the United States, as well as other developed countries (King and Rewers 1993; Tang, Chen, and Krewski 2003).<sup>5</sup> Fourth, mortality and complications outcomes for people with diabetes are also related to SES in the United States (Jacobson

<sup>5</sup> The incidence of diabetes in the United States has also been linked to other indicators which are closely associated with SES, such as obesity (Knowler et al. 2002), education, and race (Cowie and Eberhardt 1995, Kenny, Aubert, and Geiss 1995).



et al. 1997; Muhlhauser et al. 2000; Phelan et al. 2004; Smith et al. 1998; West et al. 2002) and other developed countries (Booth and Hux 2003; Forssas et al. 2003; Middlekoop et al. 2001; Nicolucci, Carinci, and Ciampi 1998).<sup>6</sup> Finally, because diabetes complications are known to be linked to average glucose levels (Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group 1993), the work of identifying potential mechanisms within an ethnographic inquiry is simplified. Conditions that probabilistically affect patients' capacities for controlling their glucose levels can be expected to likewise probabilistically affect their long-term health outcomes.

In diabetes, people either have insufficient insulin or are unable to use the insulin they have efficiently.<sup>7</sup> Because insulin is the hormone allowing glucose to enter cells and be used, untreated diabetes results in a relatively high amount of glucose remaining in the blood. Glucose (or "blood sugar") levels for persons without diabetes are generally in the range of 80–120 mg/dl, while uncontrolled diabetes can lead to glucose levels several times higher, even over 1,000 mg/dl. In the short run, high glucose levels can produce flu-like symptoms, weight loss, chronic thirst, and, at extremely high levels, hyperosmolar or "diabetic" comas. Meanwhile, *chronically* high glucose levels greatly increase the risk of complications such as blindness, kidney damage, amputations, heart disease, and stroke (Diabetes Control and Complication Trial 1993). It is important to note, however, that controlling diabetes is not simply a matter of *lowering* glucose levels. Because patients' bodies do not regulate insulin levels properly, they can also become *hypoglycemic*: if glucose levels fall too low, patients can become confused, disoriented, and shaky, and can even have seizures or become comatose.

Consultation with health care providers offers patients a treatment regimen—a plan for attempting to maintain glucose levels as close to "normal" as possible. For our purposes, treatment regimens for diabetes can be seen as having four primary components. The first is *medication*: our study examines only patients whose regimens include prescribed in-

<sup>6</sup> Similar to studies of incidence, complications and mortality resulting from diabetes have been linked to other indicators that are also closely associated with SES, such as race (Harris et al. 1999, Pastor et al. 2002) and education (Goldman and Smith 2002).

<sup>7</sup> Type 1 diabetes occurs when the body produces no insulin at all (5–10% of all cases), while type 2 diabetes results from inadequate amounts of insulin or resistance to the insulin that the body does produce (90–95% of all diabetes patients). Our data include patients with type 1 and type 2 diabetes, although, as noted in table 1, the subspecialty clinics in our study serve populations with higher proportions of type 1 patients than exist in the general population.

jections of insulin.<sup>8</sup> Second, patients must match the timing and content of their *food intake* with their insulin so that their glucose levels coincide with insulin peaks; different regimens offer patients varying levels of autonomy and flexibility with regard to their diet. Third, patients need to *monitor* their glucose levels, typically by placing a drop of blood into a small electronic meter.<sup>9</sup> Patients are instructed to record the results in a log, which they and physicians use as a tool for monitoring patterns and making changes in insulin dosages. Fourth, physicians often urge patients to make *lifestyle adjustments* known to improve long-term prospects, like exercising regularly, not smoking, and minimizing alcohol consumption.

Most simply, a diabetes regimen may consist of one injection of long-acting insulin taken in the morning, accompanied by avoiding foods with high levels of sugar or fat. Regimens become more complex with the addition of multiple injections, mixing long- and short-acting insulins in the same injection, more extensive monitoring and assessing of food content, adjusting dosages of insulin to match meals or lower existing glucose levels, and more glucose testing. "Intensive" management generally involves four or five daily injections of mixed insulins, glucose testing six to ten times per day, and extensive monitoring of interplay between glucose and insulin levels. The most sophisticated diabetes regimens involve insulin pumps; these allow the closest mimicking of healthy pancreatic activity by administering a continuous "basal" rate of insulin throughout the day and allowing the patient to inject an adjustable "bolus" of short-acting insulin to cover meals. While the majority of the patients in our data had basic or mid-level regimens, "tight" control of glucose levels is much more likely to occur in patients with more intensive management or insulin pumps.

Despite the ideal goal of emulating nondiabetic glucose levels, diabetes regimens vary considerably across patients and for the same patient over time, and the acknowledgement and production of this variation within

<sup>8</sup> Our exclusion of patients who are able to manage their diabetes *without* insulin also contributes to the high proportion of type 1 diabetes patients in our data, since, by definition, people with type 1 diabetes must use insulin.

<sup>9</sup> While diabetes patients typically continue to use these types of meters, recent technological developments in glucose monitoring provide patients with the option of collecting blood from areas of the body other than their fingers, which reduces the pain involved in testing glucose. Various noninvasive models are currently available or in development which allow people to wear watches or skin patches to check glucose painlessly. At the time we collected this data, such options were unavailable.

the routine clinic visit comprises a central consideration of this article.<sup>10</sup> Routine clinic visits are typically scheduled every three months.<sup>11</sup> During the routine clinic visit, the patients' ongoing management of diabetes is foregrounded, and practitioners attempt to identify and respond to patient needs, including by adjusting regimens. In our data, patients who were new to diabetes almost always began with a "basic" regimen, and then moved up, down, or stayed the same depending on what practitioners thought they had shown they could effectively manage. More aggressive regimens—increasing in complexity and potential glucose control—may be employed as a patient becomes more adept at managing diabetes, while concessionary regimens—decreasing in complexity and effectively resigning that the patient will have weaker glucose control and greater risk of long-term complications—may be deployed in an effort to accommodate any of several sources of resistance that emerge in efforts to implement a more effective regimen.

The routine clinic visit provides a site at which emergent resistances (from various sources) to treatment plans may become visible to clinicians, and accommodations can be developed in response to them, both in terms of treatment plans and the goals toward which they are directed (see Pickering 1993, 1995). As such, the clinic visit may be seen as a key point of collaboration in the efforts of patients and clinicians to generate a sustained control over glucose levels. The ethnographic data we present below will illustrate how SES can affect all of the following: (1) providers' assessments of problems patients face in diabetes management; (2) providers' acquisition of information about patients and their problems; (3) the identification of solutions that are available for patient problems; and (4) the assessed and actual likelihood that these solutions can and will be successfully implemented. As our observations suggest, if one thinks of low-SES patients simultaneously presenting—*on average*—more kinds of resistances, less available information to practitioners about these resistances, more restricted sets of strategies to accommodate them, and greater difficulties in actually implementing specific regimen changes intended as accommodations, then it is easy to imagine how these factors might combine to produce a persistently greater probability of negative outcomes. The treatment of high-status patients is not free from difficulties, and it

<sup>10</sup> Because diabetes complications generally develop over the course of 10–15 years, patients who are not likely to live long enough to develop such complications are often treated with the goal of avoiding hypoglycemia as opposed to tightly controlling hyperglycemia. We exclude these patients from our investigation.

<sup>11</sup> Unlike clinic visits for some other chronic health issues, it is difficult for even unmotivated diabetes patients who are insulin dependent to indefinitely postpone these appointments if for no other reason than that they needed to obtain prescriptions for insulin.

is certainly possible for low-SES patients to achieve good glucose control. However, our data elaborate many different ways in which lower SES is implicated in conditions that would be expected in sum to imply a greater risk of adverse diabetes-related outcomes for these patients relative to higher-SES patients, which corresponds to the observed probabilistic relationship between SES and diabetes outcomes. Given others' arguments and evidence that a fundamental relationship between SES and health exists, our goal here is not to "test" or "prove" the existence of a fundamental relationship, but to identify and elaborate mechanisms that may in part constitute it. In so doing, we call attention to the multiple, complex, and dynamic nature of the mechanisms mediating part of this gradient, and we explicate some of the more general principles underlying the fundamental cause argument.

#### DATA AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY

##### Data

The data are from a year-long ethnographic study conducted by the first author in 1997–98.<sup>12</sup> The fieldwork sites were two weekly, four-hour endocrinology clinics at two different hospitals that are both part of the same university-based medical center located in a large midwestern city. We caution that the patients seen in subspecialty clinics should not be mistaken for a representative sample of the general population of diabetes patients. Most diabetes patients are instead routinely treated by practitioners of internal or family medicine. For our purposes, a central attraction of studying subspecialty clinics was the expectation that such clinics would, as compared to generalist settings with lower volumes of diabetes patients and less-serious cases, provide a focused opportunity to observe substantial variation in prescribed regimens.<sup>13</sup>

The two clinics were selected to provide an optimal contrast of the socioeconomic diversity of persons with diabetes: Park Clinic serves a primarily white, upper- and middle-class population, while County Clinic

<sup>12</sup> The first author collected the data for this paper. We use the pronoun "we" to describe data collection activities to avoid the clumsiness of repeatedly saying "the first author."

<sup>13</sup> To be more precise, according to our physician interview data, the patients in Park and County Clinics have self-selected into subspecialty clinics for a variety of reasons: they may have relatively severe problems with their diabetes, they are high-SES patients who choose to be seen by specialists (using their private insurance) because they expect to receive better care that way, or they are low-SES patients who take advantage of the public services and Medicaid coverage at County.

has a largely minority, working-class, and underinsured clientele.<sup>14</sup> Survey data collected from patients and displayed in table 1 reveal that those at County Clinic are less likely to be white, are more likely to be uninsured, and have lower incomes and education than patients at Park Clinic. Moreover, County patients also have lower self-rated general health than Park patients, and attending physicians rate the County patients as having less control over their diabetes than Park patients. However, the two clinics are similar to one another in terms of the age of patients and the relative distribution of type 1 and type 2 diabetes patients.<sup>15</sup> We thus have indications that the general SES gradient on health is reproduced among the patients at the two clinics, while they are similar to one another in terms of the age of patients and the distribution of patients with type 1 versus type 2 diabetes.

We collected several different types of ethnographic data. First, we observed approximately 250 hours of activity at these clinics, including approximately 200 different consultations between diabetes patients and medical practitioners. Second, we videotaped over 20 hours of these consultations and transcribed them for more detailed examination. Third, we conducted semistructured qualitative interviews with 25 practitioners, including all of the physicians in the university medical center who treat diabetes, as well as nurses, dietitians, social workers, and diabetes educators. Fourth, we conducted brief telephone surveys with 170 diabetes patients (86% of all the diabetes patients seen at both clinics over a three-month period) to collect information about patients' demographic characteristics, beliefs about diabetes, and expenses related to the disease.

### Analytic Strategy

We pursue systematic connections between considerations of regimen design we observed in the clinics—resulting in differences in designs or their implementations that are known to affect the probabilities of different health outcomes—and the socioeconomic conditions of patients' lives. The thesis of fundamental causality implies that we should expect to observe a variety of mechanisms, and indeed this is what we find. However, their

<sup>14</sup> Park and County are pseudonyms.

<sup>15</sup> The percentages of patients with type 1 diabetes reported in table 1 may be questionable because they exclude the substantial number of patients who reported not knowing which type of diabetes they had (11% in Park and 53% in County, which itself might speak to differences in patient education between the two clinics). As an alternative, we coded observational data to determine the percentages of people with type 1 vs. type 2 diabetes, the results here suggest that 42–59% of the observed patients in our study from County Clinic had type 1 diabetes, as compared to 53–59% in Park Clinic.

TABLE 1  
COMPARISON OF PATIENTS BETWEEN PARK AND COUNTY CLINICS

	Park Clinic	County Clinic	P-Value for Difference
% black/Hispanic . . . . .	12	45	< .001
Mean family income . . . . .	\$56,000	\$12,000	< .001
% family income \$15,000 or less . . .	12	75	< .001
% without health insurance . . . . .	3	42	< .001
% college graduates . . . . .	41	9	< .001
% less than high school education . . .	11	36	< .001
Patients' self-assessments of health (0–10 scale, 10 is most healthy)	6.79	5.59	.0015
Physicians' assessments of diabetes control (0–10 scale, 10 is best con- trolled) . . . . .	6.63	4.91	< .001
Mean patient age . . . . .	51	54	NS
% type 1 diabetes . . . . .	44	46	NS
N . . . . .	137	33	

number and complexity poses a problem of exposition that we suspect would be endemic to any ethnographic analysis of fundamental causality, which is how best to order a description of a pervasively interconnected set of mechanisms. The decomposition we use in the exposition that follows is based on successive binary classifications derived from different senses of the "location" of the mechanism, including physical location of the clinic, factors inside and outside the clinic, and those internal and external to individual patients (see figure 1). The resulting decomposition of mechanisms is presented in four parts: those that can be seen as manifested in the differences between Park and County Clinics, those manifested as differences in external constraints on potential regimens, those manifested as differences in patient motivation, and those manifested in differences in patient cognitive capabilities.

Within each of the four parts, we draw on the ethnographic materials to describe some of the potential ways in which the fundamental relationship between SES and outcomes for diabetes patients is sustained. The point of our doing so is not to make some wild-eyed proclamation that "SES is everywhere," but instead to consider the potential pervasiveness of this causal relationship (that is, the potentially massive multiplicity of its mechanisms) and, in so doing, to give the budding concept of fundamental causality an empirically grounded thickness that ethnographic investigation is especially well suited to provide. Afterward, we will discuss our findings explicitly in terms of what they might add to our understanding of fundamental relationships.




FIG. 1

#### DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARK AND COUNTY CLINICS

Because Park Clinic serves a much higher-SES clientele on average than County Clinic, we begin by considering whether differences in the organization of the two clinics may affect the process of regimen design within the routine visit or the likelihood of treatment recommendations being carried out afterward. Any differences that place County Clinic patients at a systematic, probabilistic disadvantage relative to Park Clinic patients can be considered potential mechanisms by which differential access to health care may contribute to preserving the fundamental relationship among diabetes patients.

Park Clinic has two endocrinologists and two nurse practitioners; there is also sometimes a single resident participating in the clinic as part of a four-week rotation. The two endocrinologists see most of the patients, although one of the nurse practitioners also sees patients independently. Based on how full the physicians' schedules are, they may ask a resident or nurse practitioner to see a patient first to do a basic assessment, which is then followed up with the endocrinologist. An adjacent Diabetes Education Center includes two full-time and one part-time certified diabetes educators, two dietitians, a medical social worker, and a full-time secretary.

By contrast, County Clinic is usually supervised by four attending physicians, but, as we will describe, residents play a much larger role in

working with patients than in Park.<sup>16</sup> Two of the attending physicians participate in the clinic every week, while the other two are part of a pool of research physicians who also rotate through this particular clinic once every six weeks. All of the attending physicians in County are fully credentialed endocrinologists with extensive experience in their fields, but, compared to the physicians at Park, they are more diverse in their specializations, spend a smaller percentage of their time seeing patients, and do not maintain their own ongoing patient caseloads. There are also two endocrinology fellows (advanced residents) who are appointed to County Clinic for two years, and there are typically two to four residents attending the clinic in any given week as part of a four-week rotation. A certified diabetes educator attends the clinic weekly on a volunteer basis.

How might organizational differences between the two clinics affect the treatment of diabetes patients within them? We focus on some potential implications of three differences. First, Park Clinic offers patients much higher "continuity of care" than County Clinic, by which we mean that patients are seen by the same practitioners in successive visits. Second, Park Clinic offers superior resources for in-clinic diabetes education. Third, residents play a much more prominent role in care at County Clinic than at Park Clinic. For each, we will describe ways in which the differences between clinics might contribute to better average outcomes for the higher-SES patients at Park Clinic compared to the lower-SES patients at County Clinic.

### Differences in Continuity of Care

Classic work in medical sociology has long considered the importance of continuity of care for patients' ongoing utilization of medical services and adherence to medical recommendations (Freidson 1988; Parsons 1951; Waitzkin 1991). Park Clinic is similar to many private medical organizations in that the continuity of care is extremely high. In contrast, at County Clinic, even though patients are technically assigned to either an attending physician or fellow, in practice they spend a great deal of time with residents (and some students), who are never there for longer than a month. (In our observations, County patients often did not know who their assigned physician was, either by name or face.)

In our data, perhaps the most obvious benefits of high continuity of care concern the quality of information available to practitioners in making assessments and designing regimens. High continuity of care enables

<sup>16</sup> At Park, patients are offered free parking during their clinic visits if they are willing to be seen by a resident, while patients at County have no practical choice in the matter.



providers to become much more familiar with patients' medical histories and their familial and work situations, so that they tend to have more information about the patient available from the outset of any given visit. One physician complained that the low continuity of care at County Clinic required the physicians to rely too heavily on objective indicators that, while providing important data, are limited and even potentially deceiving when not considered within a broader array of patient information. This physician complained specifically about an overreliance at County Clinic on the hemoglobin A1c test (a means of estimating average glucose levels over the previous three months): "The outcome [should not be] based on a single test. Nor a single blood sugar, nor a single week, nor a single visit, nor a single anything. . . . The outcome [should be] based on the totality of the things that you assess over the period of time that you see the patient. The focus that you see in the clinic like we have [County] is that the totality of the assessment comes down to 'What's your last hemoglobin A1c?' Which doesn't mean jack." While most physicians would likely regard the last sentence as an overstatement, a hemoglobin A1c result can be potentially misleading insofar as it can produce results that look like the diabetes has been well controlled when actually the patient has undergone extreme highs and lows (that is, the same average can be produced by distributions of either low or high variance). In one example from our field notes, residents at County Clinic were pleased by one patient with a seemingly reasonable hemoglobin A1c, but additional probing by a suspicious attending physician revealed that this patient regularly had severe episodes of hypoglycemia because he drank a six-pack of beer every night. For physicians concerned with avoiding risks associated with hypoglycemia, then, this test may not provide all the information they need. High continuity of care may thus allow the physicians at Park Clinic to assemble a more complete "totality" of information that, in turn, allows them to provide more helpful treatment recommendations.

Continuity of care also facilitates patterns of open patient-provider communication, increasing the likelihood that useful information is obtained during the visit. Objective indicators may suffice to show that a patient plainly has not been following treatment recommendations, but they often provide no information about why. Continuity of care may give the doctor a greater sense of the patient from which to make better inferences about the sources of resistance to improved adherence. As one physician we interviewed said:

[Another physician] might say, "Well, you know, that patient's not very compliant." And that's their view. Maybe you have a different view. Or maybe [the patient] just hasn't been given the proper education. Or maybe they've been bounced around so much and they keep hearing different

things and they don't know what to think, so they're getting frustrated. The more you have continuity or follow up with that patient, the more you're going to get a more accurate picture of what they do and don't understand and how compliant they may or may not be.

For patients, continuity of care may lead to increased comfort in volunteering information useful for physicians in understanding nonadherence. One physician described potential benefits of long-term relationships with patients in this way: "[In a long-term treatment situation], a patient can say, 'I'm sorry, but I've just been totally freaked out the last three or four months and this is why. I realize things ought to be better, but they're not.' I think if patients have a level of trust and comfort that they might be more willing to share some things with you that might make it easier for you to understand what's either happening or not happening." The following example, excerpted from our videotaped data, illustrates how such candor can emerge when doctors and patients are familiar with each other:

*[Patient starts crying after an extended discussion of why her glucose levels are elevated.]*

DR: I apologize if I was too hard on you. My goal is not to be hard on you or to beat you up that was just—

PT: I came in already upset.

DR: Why are you upset?

PT: I've been upset all week I guess I've got some personal issues that are bothering me and [worrying about the stress raising my blood sugars] doesn't help it. I finally resigned myself to the fact that I need to call [my psychologist] and go in and see her.

DR: Why is that such a bad thing to do?

PT: I don't know, it just seems stupid to me. Maybe I don't want to deal with some things that are going on.

DR: Are there some new things though that have cropped up?

PT: I don't know if it's really anything new Part of it's depression, part of it's relationships, part of it's physical, part of it's [wondering], "Why can't I get back on this weight track thing and get the rest of it off?" Part of it's just feeling out of control.

*[Patient goes on to elaborate how her marital difficulties interfere with her diabetes care.]*

When we consider how high continuity of care might benefit patients at Park Clinic, then, part of the contribution may be *both* physicians' having better information about the patient before the medical interview begins (through having seen the patient multiple times before) and being able to obtain better information during the medical interview (because of the rapport that has developed over time).

In addition, high continuity of care also seems to put physicians in a better position to recommend aggressive regimens because the physicians

are assured, as long as patients return to the clinic, that they will be able to follow up personally on individual cases. For example, one patient at Park Clinic regularly sought to make various modifications to his regimen, and the physician usually agreed because, based on their shared history, he felt that the patient could be counted upon to closely follow the terms of the new regimen, and, if it was not working by the next visit, they would then revert to the physician's original suggestion. When this patient complained about the bad-tasting fish-oil pills prescribed to improve his lipid profile, the physician agreed to temporarily lower the dosage of the pills, at least long enough to measure the impact on his lipids.<sup>17</sup>

By contrast, providers in County are much less likely to have the opportunity to personally monitor or follow patients they treat. An attending physician we interviewed complained about having to make regimen decisions at County while knowing virtually nothing about how the patient would behave outside the clinic. His colleague elaborated this assessment by highlighting a first-order difficulty posed by low continuity of care: the acquisition of basic information about patients who have not been seen before by a given provider. He explained,

You have to glean everything from the chart. You don't get a nice letter written to you [about a patient's status], it's a note on a chart, and depending on how busy the [providers who saw the patient last] are in the clinic, they write a longer or shorter note, usually a shorter one because everybody's pretty busy. And that's sometimes a little bit of a struggle to really get a comprehensive picture of what [a patient's] complication status is and what other doctors who are taking care of them are thinking about how their medication[s] should be adjusted and these kinds of things.

Beyond the challenges of interpreting information from patients' charts, low continuity of care generates the additional problem of learning about a patient's habits and how those habits are connected to his or her diabetes management, as another County physician described:

I think that's where continuity of care is important, because the more you know somebody's habits—and there's so many different habits to learn about with diabetes, exercise, how much do each of those things vary, how

<sup>17</sup> Still another benefit of continuity of care may be that physicians have time outside the clinic visit to think about how "their" patients' regimens can be improved. A Park physician described a biochemist who "wanted to stay in his lab all the time" and not expend much effort on managing his diabetes. The physician said "I really like this guy a lot, and so it really came down to me spending a few nights lying in bed thinking" about how to best handle this patient. In addition, given that perceived similarity tends to increase liking (e.g., Byrne and Nelson 1965), one can speculate that similarity in status characteristics between physician and patient may increase the likelihood that a patient will be the object of this kind of nocturnal contemplation.

sensitive are they to exercise and to diet, how compliant are they with their diet, how much does their diet vary from day to day. If you've got somebody whose control is all over the map, it could be due to any one of those factors. . . . You can address that a lot more effectively with continuity or follow-up over a longer period of time than to try and just see a patient cold and do all that on one visit.

Furthermore, as other practitioners noted, all of their treatment decisions had to presume that the next doctor to see a patient would be likewise ignorant of his or her behavior and might also have different ideas about diabetes treatment. Under these circumstances, providers in County often favored conservative treatment regimens, which they regarded as the safest option in the absence of close follow-up. In the aggregate, these evaluations and treatment decisions may result in a relative bias among County physicians toward simpler, more hypoglycemia-averse regimens when compared to Park physicians. If so, because these regimens afford only weaker control over glucose levels, they would be expected to increase the risk of long-term complications and thus preserve the fundamental relationship.

#### Differences in In-Clinic Educational Resources

Because glucose control depends so heavily on patients' self-management, diabetes education is central to diabetes care, and Park and County Clinics differ considerably in their educational facilities. When Park patients or practitioners feel a patient needs continued diabetes education, the patient is referred to the formal Diabetes Education Center, usually for a session immediately following the clinic appointment. As an educator at Park Clinic describes the services the center provides: "You can't climb a mountain if you don't know where the mountain is or you don't have the right tools. So I see our job in helping them understand what diabetes is and what self-management is, because if 98% of diabetes is patient self-management then we need to provide them with the education and information relevant to them so that they can go home and be successful at that." The absence of such a center in County Clinic places more of a burden on residents and attending physicians to provide education while also trying to learn about patients whom they have often never seen before. As noted, County does have a diabetes educator who works at the clinic every week on a volunteer basis. While the personnel in the Park Diabetes Education Center each have their own office and extensive professional teaching materials, the volunteer in County has no office and works from a collection of index cards she keeps in her pocket, on which she has written the name and background information of patients she has seen in the clinic.

The superior educational infrastructure at Park may contribute to the fundamental relationship by providing Park Clinic patients with more resources for gaining information useful for managing the disease, as well as bringing them in contact with a wider array of providers, perhaps increasing the likelihood that education will be effectively tailored to patient needs. Furthermore, this disparity in in-clinic educational resources should be considered alongside evidence that middle-class patients are much more likely to pursue educating themselves about diabetes compared to poorer patients (e.g., Cockerham et al. 1986). If we think about in-clinic education as partly providing a potentially compensating resource for education that patients could pursue themselves outside the clinic, then the distribution of education between Park and County Clinics constitutes what we call a *compensatory inversion*: the same patients that are the most likely to educate themselves about diabetes outside the clinic also have the best resources for education inside the clinic.

In addition to teaching patients about the specifics of diabetes care, the center also benefits Park Clinic patients by providing moral support, various types of social support, and guidance as to the expectations patients should have of their physicians. These other purposes are evinced in the following excerpts from four different interviews with the center's diabetes educators and its social worker:

Q: Do you feel like patients tell you things that they might not be telling physicians?

Definitely, and the reason I think is because when they sit down here we take a few minutes to try to really get them comfortable, and I try to help them understand that we're a team and we're working together at this. So suddenly they feel a little bit more like they're on equal grounds.

We move to a little bit more of a personal level. . . . Even though I know the physicians do that, they don't have the kind of time we have

There are times when we need to inform the patient of what standards of care are expected so that they can work through their back door with their physician.

It's not appropriate for us to call a physician and say, "We don't think you're managing this patient appropriately—his [hemoglobin] A1c has been high for six months and his medication dose has never been changed." . . . What we can do is show a patient what standards of care are, and what the American Diabetes Association says is good control or adequate control.

For Park patients, then, the education center may not only provide educational benefits, but also improve patients' motivation for adhering to

treatment regimens and their ability to engage in self-advocacy in their own medical care. In County, by comparison, we observed fewer instances in which providers offered diabetes education that was tailored to specific patients, and more often heard what might be regarded as generically paternalistic comments such as, "You'll stop smoking when it becomes important to you," as a way of attempting to motivate patient adherence to a regimen.

### Differences in the Division of Labor among Physicians

As noted, most of the Park Clinic visits involved patients working primarily with their regular endocrinologist and support staff, while at County Clinic, residents on rotation (and/or fellows, who are advanced residents) are importantly involved in every patient's visit. Our ethnographic materials indicate that residents, interns, and students are responsible for at least 75% of the face-to-face contact with patients at County Clinic. Residents are fully credentialed to treat patients, but because this is a weekly clinic and rotations are only four weeks long, the residents who provide most of the actual face-to-face contact with patients during the clinic visit have *at most* three days' prior experience in the clinic.<sup>18</sup> The short rotations guarantee not only permanent inexperience within these specific clinics, but also that the patient will never see the same resident twice in routine visits.

Beyond the low continuity of care associated with rotating medical personnel, however, the nature of residents' work presents several additional challenges that affect regimen design. First, although County residents are responsible for only preliminary strategic decisions about regimens, attending physicians do not have the same time, resources, or information to contemplate decisions that they would have if dealing with "their own" patients like at Park Clinic. Second, the array of responsibilities residents have in their clinical rotations (e.g., working with unfamiliar patients and diseases in a new setting, dealing with attending

<sup>18</sup> Of course, there may be advantages to having a resident as one's primary point of care; perhaps some are more enthusiastic, caring, or attentive than some experienced specialists. We observed at least one case where a Park resident discovered an undiagnosed heart problem and was commended by the attending physician, but there were many more instances where residents needed assistance from attending physicians to collect basic information. On the whole, the possible superior performance of some residents over some experienced specialists for some patient visits seems unlikely to counterbalance the expected average benefit of having experienced physicians providing continuity of care over time. Likewise, we would expect the presence and prominence of residents to vary even among clinics that serve a similar-SES clientele; in terms of tendencies, however, medical education has a long history of relying on residents to treat patients from disadvantaged populations (see Light 1988).

physicians, and adhering to a schedule with required afternoon or lunch-hour activities) may well reduce their information-gathering or decision-making capacities. For example, one resident we observed was trying to rush through her last medical interview of the day in order to attend to other obligations firmly required as part of her residency, and she even rolled her eyes at us in exasperation a couple of times when the patient's problems understanding her questions required her to repeat several of them.

Beyond this, resident inexperience with medical interviewing—both generally and with regard to diabetes specifically—might result in residents often not eliciting relevant information as successfully as do experienced endocrinologists. Such a difference in interview quality, both in terms of collecting information from patients and imparting it to them, was both indicated by our own observations and asserted by several physicians we interviewed. Indeed, toward the end of the data collection, it was not uncommon for us to know more seemingly relevant details—problems with medications, living situations—about the lives and diabetes management of specific patients than did the County residents.

Residents use this information in making their preliminary treatment decisions, but attending physicians also rely importantly on it in evaluating these decisions and deciding how their own interaction with patients should proceed. We have space for only one example that illustrates how deficient information gathering by residents can affect the attending physician's own consultations. A patient's food diary reported that he was eating bacon sandwiches twice a week for breakfast and having gravy several times a week. The resident told the patient that he should avoid these foods, and, when presenting the case to the attending physician, she urged him to discuss dietary adherence with the patient. The attending physician then entered the examination room and began to lecture the patient about his diet—including an ominous warning that this would be his "last Christmas" if his diet did not dramatically change. However, he discovered through more detailed questioning that the patient had made significant improvements in his diet in previous months, and his diary reflected those efforts (in fact, it turned out that the patient used the term "gravy" to refer to low-fat tomato sauce). As a result, the attending physician softened his approach in an attempt to support and encourage the patient.<sup>19</sup> Later this physician told us:

<sup>19</sup> While such instances may point to disadvantages of having residents do the main interviewing of patients, they also may point to an aspect of the organization of County Clinic that may work in the patient's favor—namely, being seen by multiple doctors in a consultation may reduce erroneous information gathering by any one physician.

I did not get [that the patient had made these changes] until he started to say that, because I went in based on what the resident said. The resident said, "Look at his diet." . . . She didn't ask the right questions even about that, and that is, "What the hell does [the information in the diary] mean?" The answer was [what] he told me, and I had to back off because he said, "Look what I'm doing, I'm trying to do something better," and I had to back off and say, "Yeah, you are doing something better. Thank God, let's keep on going." But I was sandbagged in there.

Based on the resident's reports, the attending physician planned to be stern with the patient, but then he realized that affirmation or encouragement was more what the patient needed. In other instances, of course, such misalignments may not always be recognized by the physicians, and, in such instances, they may have the effect of alienating struggling patients further from the demands of their regimens.

#### EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON REGIMEN DESIGN

While our data are taken from two very different diabetes clinics, our inquiry should not be taken as suggesting that all mechanisms would be eliminated if the patients we observed were treated at the same clinic. To the contrary, we assert that a series of additional phenomena would continue to pattern health outcomes according to SES. Extensive research has considered the ways social factors such as environmental risk factors (Evans and Kantrowitz 2002) and life circumstances (Trostle, Hauser, and Susser 1983; Conrad 1985; Bissell, May, and Noyce 2004; Koenigsberg, Bartlett, and Cramer 2004) often impede patient adherence to medical recommendations. In the context of diabetes care, such impediments may preclude the implementation of regimens that would permit greater control over patient glucose levels. These constraints—as well as the putative psychological differences we discuss below—can operate to create SES differences among patients receiving care at the same clinic.<sup>20</sup> We focus on three sources of external constraint on regimen design, all of which our materials suggest disproportionately affect lower-SES patients: (1) constraints imposed by finances, (2) constraints imposed by the specific demands of one's occupation, and (3) constraints imposed by one's surrounding social network. Again, constraints that more often interfere with the regimen design of lower-SES patients comprise more mechanisms sustaining the fundamental relationship.

<sup>20</sup> Importantly, our focus on constraints as they make themselves visible during routine clinic visits obscures many possible mechanisms responsible for disparities, not the least of which are discussed in the growing literature on neighborhood SES and health (e.g., Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002)



## Financial Constraints

Physicians recognize that financial constraints stratify the futures of patients on socioeconomic lines. As one physician we interviewed described it:

It's like the legal profession. . . . If you have endless money, you can buy the best of lawyers and get out of the jam. Not that money buys you understanding in diabetes or allows you to negate your responsibility, but money can put you in a position where you either have more time to devote to it or you have more resources to devote to it. . . . How much difference does it make in patients? It varies from patient to patient, but I think there's no question. People that are financially strapped are going to be in trouble.

While only 3% of the patients at Park Clinic reported being uninsured, 42% of patients of County Clinic did. The hospital housing County Clinic maintained a state-funded program designed to subsidize the costs of health care for low-income patients. For eligible patients who completed the appropriate application materials, funds from this program could be used in combination with Medicare or Medicaid benefits to cover medications, clinic visits, and lab tests. To help surmount the paperwork barriers that might prevent utilization of these services, the hospital has implemented a system of "financial counselors." However, eligibility for these counselors requires patients to provide documentation of residence, earnings over the last three months, and other benefits, which can reduce the likelihood of patients' following through and using the system. To be sure, we observed patients at County Clinic not availing themselves of benefits to which they would have been entitled and reporting that they had failed to take prescribed medications as a result.

While various programs enabled County Clinic patients to have sufficient resources for basic medications and clinic visits, they were unable to invest additional monies that would be required to maintain tight control, like many patients in Park did. For example, at the time our data were collected, insulin pumps cost approximately \$5,000, and part of this start-up cost was usually incurred personally by patients, with subsequent equipment and education expenses reimbursed by insurance. In this case, direct financial constraints on regimens operate most strongly at the upper bounds of potential control, insofar as only higher-SES patients can obtain and maintain the equipment necessary for the regimens that allow for the best possible control presently available.

That said, however, existing government-based programs do not necessarily cover even the purchase of materials necessary for simpler, mid-range regimens. Daily glucose monitoring provides one example that we observed doctors and patients regularly negotiating. While glucometers

are often sold at very low cost or even given away for free as part of product promotions, the test strips used in the meter are more costly and are covered much less comprehensively by insurers; private insurance companies often limit the number of strips that are covered in a month, while public programs such as a Medicare and Medicaid did not cover them at all when these data were collected.<sup>21</sup> Each strip can be used only once and costs approximately \$.75. The more frequently patients test their glucose, the more data physicians have at their disposal in making decisions about how to modify treatment regimens. While testing glucose once or twice a day will generate enough data for physicians to provide a basic regimen design, patients able to maintain tight control with injection therapy or insulin pumps regularly test their glucose six to eight times per day. Importantly, when physicians do not have data on how glucose levels vary throughout the day, they regard it as safer to design concessionary regimens where glucose levels are chronically high rather than risk hypoglycemia. Additionally, financial limitations can also be manifested in the aspects of regimen design that are further removed from the immediate cost of service, such as purchasing appropriate food—as one physician told us, “A diabetic diet is certainly a more expensive way to eat than going to Wendy’s”—and exercising (as we will discuss more later).

### Occupational Constraints

Apart from having less money, low-SES patients might also be more likely to work at jobs that are less hospitable to implementing effective plans for managing glucose levels. Physicians noted that patients who work swing shifts have schedules that make it very difficult to design a regimen that gives them tight control. At County Clinic, one patient reported to a resident that he rarely administered his afternoon insulin, and when she asked why not, he suggested vaguely that he just never felt like it or that he forgot. When presenting the case to the attending physician, the resident conveyed that the patient was noncompliant with this part of his regimen. When the attending physician began asking about the patient’s daily schedule, however, he discovered that the patient often works nights and is usually *asleep* in the afternoon—a revelation that shifted

<sup>21</sup> Since 1998, new federal legislation has reduced some of these discrepancies by providing limited reimbursement to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries for some diabetes-related expenses. For example, Medicare beneficiaries are now allowed to receive up to 100 lancets and test strips per month (and more if a physician indicates it is necessary).

his interpretation from one of a noncompliant patient to that of a patient facing constraints that his treatment regimen needed to accommodate.

Patients working in manual labor jobs can also have additional challenges because they often use glucose somewhat intensely and irregularly when they are at work, and so they are prone to have problems with hypoglycemia. Even worse, they are more likely to be in physical danger if they do become hypoglycemic, especially in cases where people operate heavy machinery or are working alone. Along similar lines, truck drivers are often hesitant to risk hypoglycemia, as such an episode not only puts themselves and others in physical peril, but also may result in the loss of their operating license and thus their job. In order to accommodate these risks, regimens for these people appeared to usually favor higher glucose levels over time (and therefore higher risk of complications) in order to avoid hypoglycemia.

None of this is to suggest that the demands of high-status jobs do not pose their own sources of interference; indeed, we will discuss this specifically later. However, people in our study who were working at white-collar jobs in offices were seen as better able to maintain regular eating and exercising schedules, to be at lower risk of physical danger, and to be better candidates to receive assistance from nearby and knowledgeable co-workers in the event of hypoglycemia than people who work alone or with less-educated co-workers. Once again, we are talking about *relative probabilities*; white-collar jobs can certainly pose their own sources of resistance, especially for those who travel frequently, but, in our ethnographic materials, we observed many more cases in which occupation appeared to compromise regimen design for poorer patients than wealthier patients. The following statement by a physician also attests to this and provides an example of how having financial means may better situate patients for working around difficulties that are posed by their work conditions:

Some patients don't wanna have more than one or two shots a day. For example, if you have a truck driver . . . you may be able to convince them if they're local drivers to take a shot at bedtime, but they [are] hardly ever going to have more than two shots a day and they are not gonna adjust their insulin dose while they're on the road . . . [By contrast,] I've got patients that have a predictable lifestyle. . . . They go to the office and they come back and they have their lunch times. They can handle complex regimens much better in terms of adjusting their insulin.

The physician went on to say that some "smart executives" would "go on [an insulin] pump because they don't know how long they spend in court or how much time they spend with being on a plane without food."

### Constraints Imposed by a Lack of Social Support

In addition to perhaps more often having work conditions that hinder regimen design, lower-SES patients may also be more likely to have home lives that constrain the possible treatment recommendations. In the following examples, single motherhood and number of children are cited as factors compounding the difficulty of implementing effective diabetes management (the second with reference specifically to gestational diabetes):

You don't plan a regimen for instance with someone who has seven children, no help at home, so [that] they have to spend hours a day mixing, testing, dieting. You wanna do the simple things as opposed to someone who has tremendous amounts of time to consider options and take time to do [something] maybe more complex.

These are younger women, okay. They're not very well educated, dropped out of school, working at the seven-dollar-an-hour jobs. They have poor cars—they have all the issues of poverty. Okay, rarely the patients I work with are married and have a strong support system. Rarely do they have insurance. . . . So they've got all the issues of pregnancy, all the issues of diabetes, and all the issues of low income.

When other considerations are the same, patients with significant social support may thus be more likely to be prescribed regimens for tight control; we consider this point again later.

### (APPARENT?) MOTIVATION

We have so far considered possible mechanisms preserving the fundamental relationship that result from organizational differences between Park and County Clinics and from external constraints of various kinds. In the next two sections, we will consider SES and two *putative psychological differences* among patients that physicians cite as relevant to regimen differences affording stronger or weaker control over long-term glucose levels: patient motivation and cognitive ability.

Twenty of the 25 practitioners we interviewed mentioned patient motivation as a salient consideration in designing treatment regimens. As one doctor said, "The bottom line is that if they don't want to do it they're not going to do it no matter what they tell you." As already noted, many doctors like to start patients on relatively simple regimens, and then change to more aggressive regimen when patients demonstrate that they can and will execute the regimen prescribed. Some patients never move beyond the initial regimen, or they even move to simpler concessionary regimens. For instance, one doctor described a patient who consistently

skipped the second of his two daily prescribed insulin injections, significantly increasing his risk for dangerously high glucose: "He felt he was too busy. . . . He was always out with his friends, and he's had a lot of problems with alcohol and drugs. So taking this set shot of insulin was very low on his list of priorities to do for the day." Because the patient's glucose was very high as a result of not taking the second injection, the doctor changed his regimen so that he was taking only one injection of long-acting insulin during a day; while far inferior to the regimen using two injections of regular insulin, this concessionary approach resulted in better glucose levels given what the patient was actually doing. Consequently, to whatever extent increased risk of behaviors like substance abuse are consequences of SES and contribute to low evinced motivation, these would comprise additional mechanisms preserving the fundamental relationship.

We observed a wide range of SES-related reasons for patients behaving in ways that were perceived as low motivation and as warrants for concessionary regimens. As expected, motivation was more commonly cited as a problem with patients at County Clinic, an observation seemingly consistent with findings in the medical literature linking low SES and nonadherence in ways that conceive the problem at least in part as a failure of patient motivation (see Conrad [1987]; Svarstad [1986]; Roter et al. [1998]; and DiMatteo [2004] for reviews on nonadherence generally; see Brown et al. [1998]; Smith et al. [1997]; and Senécal, Nouwen, and White [2000] on diabetes). In the survey data we collected, doctors assessed the patients at Park Clinic as adhering more closely to different aspects of their regimen than patients at County Clinic, and we certainly observed more instances of what were interpreted as serious or life-threatening "adherence problems" at County Clinic.

There are many potential reasons high-SES patients may evince higher motivation than low-SES patients. There are the organizational features outlined above, such as continuity of care and diabetes education, which facilitate Park practitioners' motivating patients while simultaneously impeding such work at County. However, while Park Clinic provides a superior environment for motivating adherence, we also have good reasons to suspect that Park Clinic patients would evince higher levels of motivation than County Clinic patients anyway, by virtue of SES differences in health behaviors (Helmert et al. 1989; Shea et al. 1991; Midanik, Klatsky, and Armstrong 1990; Mirowsky and Ross 1998; Cockerham 2000; Swallen and Haas 2000). Even so, our observations indicate that these factors still comprise *only a portion* of SES differences in apparent motivation to adhere to more aggressive regimens, and for more, one must look at some of the specific criteria that doctors use in assessing the motivation of their patients.

More specifically, our data suggest that practitioner assessments of patient motivation are often based on phenomena that also have a strong socioeconomic character. For patients with low SES, we observed that *the relative costs of complying* with particular features of treatment regimens are often greater than for high-SES patients—leading us to expect SES differences in the probability of adherence among otherwise similar patients—yet these differences are often attributed by providers to psychological differences in patient motivation. The greater costs may thus both inhibit actual adherence and contribute to the physician's impression of the patient as willfully noncompliant. We will next provide some examples that illustrate how SES differences in costs of adherence were implicated in thinking about patient motivation, and how this may be implicated in regimen design. After this, we consider briefly how SES-linked differences in patients' lifestyles before they are diagnosed with diabetes might affect the lifestyle adjustments that patients with equal motivation achieve after being diagnosed.

#### Differences in the Costs of Adherence

Showing up for one's appointment might seem the simplest expectation of all. Practitioners regarded missed visits as strong indicators that patients were likely not following their treatment regimens well (see also Karter et al. 2004). For poorer patients, however, the personal costs of making a clinic visit may be often higher than they are for middle-class patients. In terms of time, County patients usually had to wait between 60–90 minutes for their appointments (and as long as three hours in one instance we observed), while Park patients usually waited less than 10 minutes. Because County Clinic patients were always seen by either a resident or fellow before the attending physician, their actual appointments were also longer than those from Park Clinic (even though, as noted, County patients spent less time consulting with attending physicians). In all, while the total length of an appointment at Park Clinic was approximately one hour, appointments at County Clinic tended to be twice as long and involved considerably more empty time of patients waiting to be seen. Not to discount that people of all social classes face demands on their time, but the conditions at County Clinic should be considered alongside potential differences among patients in flexibility for taking time off work for appointments, whether such time off is paid (and the personal need for such pay), and finding and being able to pay for child care, all of which are problems patients voiced at County (see also Eakin 1997). Furthermore, more patients at County Clinic than Park Clinic told us that they did not own cars or did not drive, and we heard more frequent

reports from County patients of transportation problems that made it difficult for them to make their scheduled appointments.

Second, patients were also often viewed as unmotivated if they allowed their prescriptions to lapse. The social program subsidizing medications for many County patients required them to fill their prescriptions at the hospital pharmacy; meanwhile, patients with private insurance could not only use their regular local pharmacies but also had the luxury of being able to call in refills beforehand and have them waiting for immediate pickup. As one County physician complained:

What a travesty If you gave a businessman a prescription that had to be refilled every month, and he had to stop what he was doing and go to the store and stand there in front of a pharmacist for 30 minutes, 40 minutes he'd say, "Either you give me something that's appropriate, or I'm firing you as my physician." And here [at County] we give patients their prescription and say, "Come back every month and stand here. Come back on the bus and get your prescriptions filled." Gimme a break. If that doesn't interfere with compliance, I don't know what does.

Third, patients' apparent motivation to comply with medical instructions may also be affected by the immediacy and transparency of *benefits* associated with producing compliant behavior. For example, patients' logs of their glucometer readings allowed doctors to observe glucose fluctuations, but they were also used as an indicator of how closely patients followed their regimens. As one doctor said, "If they're writing down their sugars, they're probably taking their insulin."<sup>22</sup> The more discretion a patient has over her or his insulin dosage (as in sophisticated regimens), the more incentive there is to maintain a log, because that information is critical for determining insulin dosages (in fact, instead of just handing their logs to physicians, patients with insulin pumps often sat side by side with Park physicians in order to make observations about patterns they had observed since their last visit and to make suggestions about potential changes). In contrast, patients with basic regimens were directed to check their glucose levels but do nothing with them other than write them down for the doctor (unless the reading indicated that they were hypoglycemic, in which case they were to eat something). Consequently, with the cost

<sup>22</sup> Patients who kept meticulous logs and showed evidence of understanding their utility were seen as candidates for more sophisticated regimens, while patients were more likely to be kept on basic regimens if they said they had "forgotten" their logs or if they had only a few values written in them. One Park Clinic patient, who was characterized by his longtime physician as doing a great job of managing his diabetes, later confessed to us that he had simply fabricated the numbers in his log book for his most recent visit, knowing that a completed log was important for having the doctor continue to perceive him as a diligent patient.

of glucose testing approaching \$2–3 a day, the point of keeping a log may be obscured for patients with simple regimens, especially since—unlike missing a shot of insulin—it has no immediately observable effect on their actual health and little effect on how they are to conduct other parts of their regimen (see also Campbell et al. 2003).

We would expect such differential incentives to be compounded further among those with little education about diabetes—again, disproportionately low-SES patients—as we certainly observed patients at County Clinic who did not appear to understand what the values produced by their glucometers meant or why the doctor needed the logs. For that matter, the task of assiduous record keeping may be more familiar to patients with middle-class occupations and lifestyles. Glucose readings can be uploaded into a patient's home computer and graphed with available software, which might make the task of regular monitoring more informative, interesting, and enjoyable, and thus more likely to be done among the disproportionately high-SES population of skilled computer owners and users.

Finally, financial resources may allow one to make purchases that make it easier to become and remain motivated to follow parts of one's regimen. Adherence to exercise recommendations provides an example. Many of the middle-class patients observed at Park Clinic either belonged to some gym or health club or had purchased new exercise equipment for their homes. Meanwhile, some of the poorer patients in our study were more resourceful: one reported purchasing a battered stationary bicycle at a garage sale for \$5, while another's regular regimen consisted of walking briskly back and forth through the rooms of his residence for a half hour. Conscientious patients who cannot afford expensive equipment or gym memberships can still follow their exercise regimens, and there are of course patients who buy costly exercise equipment but then do not use it. Even so, our observations suggested that being able to afford such amenities made adhering to the prescribed exercise regimen easier and more enjoyable for middle-class patients than for poorer patients. If such resources do contribute to greater aggregate adherence to exercise recommendations—and such adherence does contribute to better aggregate outcomes—then this would stand as yet another mechanism contributing to the fundamental cause relationship.

### Differences in the Relative Magnitude of Recommended Lifestyle Adjustments

In the United States, people from middle-class backgrounds are more likely to engage in lifestyles of healthy eating, not smoking, exercising, and avoiding problem drinking, as well as belonging to a social network



that supports such as lifestyle (see Cockerham 1997, 2000; Mirowsky et al. 2000). Among patients with equal motivation to make lifestyle changes once they are diagnosed with diabetes, higher-SES patients may have a “head start” in terms of their behaviors at the outset. If this implies SES differences in ultimate behaviors, then it can also imply differential success in postponing the long-term consequences of patients with diabetes.

For example, in one case we observed, the attending physician was critical of a patient for chronically avoiding his blood-pressure medications. The patient complained that he disliked taking the blood-pressure medication because, as a side effect, it caused him to be impotent. The doctor reasserted the role of the blood-pressure medication as a lifesaving measure, telling the patient, “You’re not going to be wanting to have sex if you’re on dialysis.” After the doctor left, the patient frustratedly told us that he had already given up smoking and drinking, and yet he was still having these problems and was now being asked to give up *more*. Then the patient told us that he would rather resume drinking heavily—even if it killed him—than live with kidney dialysis. In short, the social costs of “clean living” for this patient outweighed the costs of dialysis and potential kidney failure, a dilemma high-SES patients would be less likely to face. Because the doctor was not informed about relative changes the patient had made, his avoidance of medications was perceived as a lack of motivation. Indeed, he *was* evincing insufficient motivation to do more to take better control of his diabetes; however, if his “starting point” had been a healthier lifestyle, the motivation he did exhibit might have resulted in the change that the doctor was seeking.

#### (APPARENT?) COGNITIVE ABILITY

In addition to motivation, practitioners also frequently alluded to the importance of differences in patients’ cognitive ability for understanding variation in the regimens they designed. As two physicians told us: “Diabetes is a disease that only smart people, well-educated people, should have,” and “In the case of diabetes, it takes a fair amount of understanding, which means that it takes an IQ of more than 85 to be able to cope with [what can be done] physical activity or dietwise that’s going to keep them from having markedly elevated or low blood sugar.” There is a significant cognitive challenge in juggling multiple, contingent issues on a daily basis, and the skills required to be a successful insulin-pump user are greater than those required to sustain more basic regimens. The social factors that contribute to cognitive ability differences (variously measured) have been well covered by others (National Research Council 2000; Fischer et al. 1996; Devlin et al. 1997). Doctor’s interest in patient’s cognitive ability,

however, is thoroughly practical, centering on assessments of their capacity to acquire and implement the specific set of skills required to manage a regimen. We often observed that the practical manifestations of cognitive ability affected the complexity of successfully executed regimens, and to the extent that regimen complexity contributes probabilistically to better health outcomes, then all consequences of SES that produce differences in achieved cognition can be added to the list of mechanisms producing the fundamental relationship between SES and health.<sup>23</sup>

At County Clinic, we observed several sobering instances of both profound patient ignorance about diabetes and the ultimate consequences of such ignorance. To give just one example, a patient reported that on a day when he knew he was not feeling well, he not only failed to check his blood sugar or eat anything, but also instead decided to get in his car and drive home. He ended up making a wrong turn and then flipping his van. Afterward, he checked his glucose, and it was 31 mg/dl. The low end of a normal glucose range is 80 mg/dl, and practitioners are legally prohibited from allowing patients to leave clinics with glucose levels below 60. In relating this story to the physician, the patient made brutally clear his poor judgment and poor understanding of the gravity of his condition, which was interpreted by his physician as indicating low cognitive ability and as necessitating a regimen focused on avoiding hypoglycemia, with less attention to postponing long-term consequences.

More generally, we must recognize that cognitive ability as it pertains to something like regimen implementation should not be thought as simply something "in the head" but as a practical *achievement* of actors *in concert* with the compensating social, technological, and other resources of their environments. Following our earlier consideration of social support, many wives took an active role in managing their husband's diet (not just by cooking for them but also monitoring consumption), medication, and log books, as well as taking a lead role in communicating with practitioners.<sup>24</sup> As another example, a mildly developmentally disabled patient at County Clinic had excellent dietary adherence because her conscientious mother prepared her meals for her, and a nurse at the school where she is a

<sup>23</sup> In our formulation, causal pathways running *from* cognitive ability *to* SES are not mechanisms of a fundamental relationship between SES and health. For more on cognitive ability and diabetes self-management, see Goldman and Smith (2002), for more on the potential role of cognitive ability as underlying some of the apparent relationship between SES and health outcomes more generally, see debate between Gottfredson (2004) and Link et al. (2003).

<sup>24</sup> We use "wives" instead of "spouses" because we did not observe any instances of husbands providing this kind of comprehensive assistance. Indeed, some women complained during clinic visits that their husbands were not just unhelpful but were actually *impediments* to better management of the disease.

custodian also helps by mixing her insulin injections and monitoring the values stored in her meter. In this case, someone of low SES and a cognitive deficit had a solid compensatory environment. While such cases are laudatory, the literature on social networks would lead one to hypothesize a tendency for many features of network quality (as in, e.g., educational level of one's closest ties) to vary directly with SES. The man at County Clinic who had the van accident described above had actually told his brother he was feeling ill, and the brother apparently watched him get into his van and drive away. In relating this story to the physician, then, the man revealed that his own network contained patently unreliable monitors of possible problems, making a concessionary regimen all the more necessary. Understanding seemingly intrinsic capacities as practical achievements allows one to see how the effects of SES on one's social and technological environments can, in turn, affect the likelihood of successfully performing aspects of regimens whose performance is typically regarded as a matter of individual "cognitive ability."

Furthermore, as already noted, the interviewers who are likely the least skilled at eliciting pertinent information from diabetes patients (i.e., residents) conduct most of the interviews with the patients who tend to be the least articulate at answering them (i.e., those with low SES). More than this, if low-SES patients have received less education and have less knowledge about diabetes, then they are also likely to be the least equipped to compensate for any interviewer deficiencies by knowing what information about their lives and condition is most relevant to the doctor's work. To be sure, interviews at County Clinic seemed less effective than those at Park Clinic, a conclusion from our own observations that was supported by interviews with practitioners who had worked in both clinics. In explaining why, dispositional attributions of low patient cognitive ability may be easily placed in the foreground by practitioners, as opposed to the organizational features of the clinics.

#### DISPOSITIONAL ATTRIBUTIONS AND PRACTITIONERS' BIASES

As hindrances to regimen design, we observed attributions of low motivation and low cognitive ability to be more pervasive in routine clinic visits at County Clinic than at Park. We have noted ways that the social circumstances of County patients may contribute to their tendency to appear less motivated and able than Park patients. Even so, an obvious question is whether clinician bias might also contribute systematically to negative psychological assessments of low-SES patients, in ways that independently cause some to receive less-sophisticated regimen recommendations than what they actually could manage. The best means of de-

tecting such biases may be audit- or vignette-type studies in which key conditions of mock patients are as identical as possible while only the focal characteristic varies (McKinlay et al. 2002). Such studies have provided evidence of race, gender, and class biases in both diagnosis and treatment recommendations (e.g., Brown 1995; McKinlay and Marceau 2001; Loring and Powell 1988; see also observational studies such as van Ryn and Burke [2000]). Consequently, one would seem naïve not to grant the possibility that such biases could provide still another mechanism mediating the link between SES and health outcomes in the process of regimen design.

Our ethnographic data are inadequate to evaluate this possibility.<sup>25</sup> One kind of evidence for such a bias in our ethnographic materials would be an explicit “smoking gun” statement by a physician linking SES to a dispositional attribution and subsequent treatment decision. Not only was such an instance not observed, but, unless recurrent, it would be hard to sustain the claim that it alone exemplifies a systematic influence on the patient care as opposed to being something more idiosyncratic. Another kind of evidence would be blatant differences in the manner with which otherwise similar low- and high-SES patients were treated by the same physician; this was also not observed. While we certainly observed cases in which residents and physicians did not handle low-SES patients entirely as we would have liked, we were on the whole impressed with the compassion and dignity with which these professionals treated their poorest clients. That said, admiration for their overt behavior far from eliminates the possibility of conscious or unconscious biases operating in consequential ways without our recognizing them.

But what should be plain is that if such biases do influence clinician practice, they comprise only part of a much larger causal story. Moreover, even while doctors may often make attributions to client dispositions that would be more accurately attributed to their situations, this does not necessarily mean that the treatment decisions made as a result of the attributions are less appropriate. A propensity to miss appointments may be sometimes wrongly taken as indicating low motivation instead of

<sup>25</sup> A different approach we explored was to compare practitioner assessments of cognitive ability with the assessment provided by a short test of cognitive functioning. The patient telephone survey included items from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) similarities subtest (also used in several large-scale social surveys). For these same patients, physicians were asked to rate how cognitively capable they thought patients were of understanding and following a complex treatment regimen. As expected, Park Clinic patients did better than County patients on both the similarities test (7.9 vs. 5 on a 0–16 scale,  $P < .001$ ) and physician ratings (7.5 vs. 6.5 on a 0–10 scale,  $P < .05$ ). Across a variety of model specifications, we did not find any significant effects of either race or income on physician assessments once WAIS similarities score was controlled, although the low sample size means that these tests had low power.

greater difficulties in getting to the clinic, but doctors must ultimately be more cautious with the treatment regimens they give to patients if they cannot count on that patient's receiving care and checkups regularly in the future. Likewise, even if doctors are sometimes wrong in taking inattention to log books as implying low overall motivation, they still are constrained in the regimens they can recommend if they feel they cannot receive this information reliably. Improving physician awareness of the situational character of resistances may help by allowing better development of workable accommodations, but, beyond this, we would not expect improving attributional accuracy to have much further effect on the fundamental relationship.

## DISCUSSION

This article attempts to articulate some of the mechanisms by which the inverse relationship between SES and health outcomes might be produced among persons with diabetes. Specifically, it describes potential mechanisms as they become visible in the process of regimen design in routine clinic visits for diabetes patients. Comparing patients across two clinics that serve very different clienteles, our data identify numerous ways in which SES influences the design or successful implementation of a regimen, operating within the broad terms of the organizational features of clinics, external constraints on patients, and influences on (apparent) patient motivation and cognitive ability. Enacted regimens are known to influence long-term glucose levels, and long-term glucose levels are known to importantly affect the risk of long-term complications from diabetes. That we can specify such a large number of candidate mechanisms is consistent with the animating idea of fundamental causality: that durable relationships between encompassing variables like SES and health may represent an accumulation of many small, pervasive advantages that can be expected to be renewed as the particulars of disease treatment change over time.

As such, the foregoing represents an effort toward developing an approach through which ethnographic investigation might contribute to elaborating our understanding of fundamental cause relationships. Such an approach attempts to combine quantitative knowledge about the proximate risk factors that contribute to differential outcomes with qualitative observations and interviews that make the *realization of differentials in risk factors visible in real contexts*. The project is highly consonant with calls from various other quarters of sociology for more fine-grained attention to explanatory detail, whether in the microlevel study of social interaction or in the macrolevel study of comparative history. We propose

a similar attention to particularity in explicating the potentially massively multiple pathways of causation responsible for an association between an independent variable with multiple realizations and a dependent variable that is multiply realizable.

The compendium of potential mechanisms that our study presents comprises findings and hypotheses that we regard as contributions to the social epidemiology of diabetes in their own right, as well as providing a useful riposte to what we see as a regular tendency to underappreciate the multiple and intricate paths by which durable associations between encompassing concepts like SES and health can be produced. Link and Phelan (1995, 2005) suggest that such an underappreciation may be ubiquitous within the prevailing epidemiological approach of studying single risk factors with respect to single diseases, even while, to be sure, the accomplishments of epidemiology demonstrate the immense usefulness of such studies. What an ethnographic approach to a fundamental cause relationship proposes is that there is also value to inquiries that try to describe concrete causal pathways with a depth of observational detail. Apart from possibly generating proposals about specific causal pathways that might be tested using quantitative methods, ethnographic investigations like ours may also expand social epidemiology's understanding of the multiplicity of mechanisms that can underlie the causal potency of single variables like "continuity of care."

We have purposely limited the scope of our inquiry in order to capitalize on the analytic strengths of our data and ethnographic methods more generally—namely, to articulate the concrete experiences of people as they occur in the health care system, and to illuminate such processes in ways that elude large-scale statistical analyses. Obviously, as is common in ethnography, we reap these benefits of depth at the expense of generalizability. We should underscore some of the more important limitations to the generalizability of our work. To begin with, as noted, by restricting our study to patients whose regimens include insulin and who are treated in subspecialty clinics, the average case we observed is more serious than the average case among the general population of diabetes patients. For that matter, we say nothing about mechanisms that may be implicated in the onset of diabetes or in how specific diabetes complications are managed once they develop. A fuller treatment of diabetes would require much more variegated observations and a much larger exposition than a single journal article, and obviously, diabetes is only one kind of chronic disease, and chronic diseases are not the only health outcomes for which an inverse relationship between SES and health outcomes is observed. An eventual goal might be a comprehensive schematic that draws connections and contrasts across many conditions, but such a schematic is

far off and will require many additional studies of specific conditions by other investigators.

Even so, our study may provide a template for other efforts to use ethnographic observation to explore particular fundamental relationships or to better understand fundamental causality more generally. Sociological ethnography has increasingly emphasized its potential of particularistic investigations for reconstructing and strengthening existing and general theoretical ideas (e.g., Burawoy 1991, 1998). In this spirit, we further elaborate three aspects of the fundamental cause concept in the light of our ethnographic analyses.

### Compensatory Inversions

When distal factors cause one group to be disadvantaged relative to another with respect to  $Y$ , compensatory elements may exist that have the potential to yield greater benefits for the disadvantaged group (who have more to gain) than the advantaged group. However, in fundamental cause relationships, these compensatory elements may be distributed precisely *opposite* of what would have the greatest expected effect: the best compensatory resources are instead commonly made most available to those with the least need for them. Lower-SES patients may be the least skilled at articulating their problems to physicians and so would seem to gain the most from experienced medical interviewers, but instead, the bulk of the interviewing of low-SES patients was conducted by inexperienced residents; although the Park Clinic patients have vastly better in-clinic resources, County patients still might ultimately benefit more because their room for improvement is greater and their propensity for self-education outside the clinic is lower. We suspect that such compensatory inversions may exist regularly within fundamental relationships, and they may make the quantitative decomposition of the effects of mechanisms more difficult.

Furthermore, the fundamental cause concept proposes that as the pertinent mechanisms change over time, they will still tend to preserve the direction of the fundamental cause relationship, which raises questions of how particular compensatory inversions develop over time. One such set of mechanisms at work in the case of diabetes is scientific and technological advances, like the insulin pump we describe above, which often improve the potential for avoiding diseases or their adverse consequences. One could be content with simply formulating the expectation that those with resources will have the best access to such innovations as they are introduced, but we think that the serious study of the fundamental cause relationship can perhaps be theoretically elaborated much further, at least with regard to some diseases and innovations.

Specifically, we wonder if such investigations might benefit from the

development of a concept similar to that of *maximally maintained inequality* in the sociology of education (Raftery and Hout 1993). This notion suggests that the highest social strata have sufficient leverage in status-mediating mechanisms—like the educational system—that the odds of a child from a lower stratum achieving a given level of educational attainment relative to the odds of a higher-status child doing so will increase *only* once the higher stratum has effectively achieved saturation at that level. As a result, maximal levels of relative inequality are sustained even as the absolute level of education for the high-SES population also increases. Medical scientific advances are often depicted in public media as a savior that will ultimately minimize inequalities; in the case of diabetes, we can imagine that pharmaceutical developments in oral medications, which are simpler to manage than insulin, could eventually reduce some aspects of the SES gradient we observe. By contrast, a maximally maintained inequality-like thesis would suggest instead that continuing medical advances can provide a regular course of overall social benefit while simultaneously resulting in sustained inequality for a given disease unless or until the highest available level of therapeutic attainment saturates to the entire population (such as when a disease is eradicated).

#### Distribution and Role of “Knowledge”

Link et al. (1998, p. 379) posit that “the fundamental cause idea suggests that gradients favoring individuals of higher SES will emerge only when knowledge becomes available that allows persons of higher status to avoid disease and its consequences.” Using the examples of Pap smears and mammography, they treat the fundamental relationship as contingent upon the *existence* of knowledge about the disease and the potential for mastery it implies. We have considered many locations in which the existence of relevant knowledge might be consequential for SES differences in outcomes: knowledge is materially manifested in the development of treatment technologies, knowledge is possessed by practitioners capable of expertly assisting patients, patients may already possess or seek to further develop their specific knowledge about the disease, and knowledge relevant to treatment effectiveness may be possessed by members of patient social networks. Building on Link and Phelan, however, our ethnography also considers specific ways in which resources allow for the superior marshaling of knowledge. For example, as a consequence of greater continuity of care, better organization and practices of medical interviewing at Park Hospital, and better understanding of what comprises relevant information for physicians, physicians tended to have more available information when making regimen decisions for higher-SES patients. In thinking about the fundamental cause relationship, then, we



think it is important to recognize that resources can affect not only *access* to people with knowledge of how to fight the disease, but also the marshaling of this knowledge by facilitating the propagation of information about oneself to these people.

### Countervailing Mechanisms

Fundamental relationships do not require that all of the pathways between *X* and *Y* support the relationship. *Countervailing mechanisms* may work in the other direction; indeed, the only requirement is that the effects of such mechanisms are cumulatively smaller than the mechanisms producing the fundamental relationship. As the intentional search for deviant cases is a staple of ethnographic work (Becker 1998; Strauss and Corbin 1990), special attention to countervailing mechanisms should be part of an ethnography of a fundamental relationship. Instead of dismissing countervailing mechanisms as idiosyncratic or transient, one should look for ways in which at least some of these can be collected as systematically explicable. In our data, one such collection may be consequences of *status pursuit*. As in the case of one biochemist patient at Park Hospital whose adherence was undermined by his desire to spend all his time in his lab, professional occupations with extensive travel or entertainment obligations may reward behaviors that are costly in terms of diabetes care. Similarly, several practitioners became frustrated with white and middle-class teenage girls (and sometimes women), who capitalized on the side effect of weight loss by deliberately allowing their glucose levels to run high in order to stay thin. What these potential countervailing mechanisms share is the prospect that *some of the same behaviors that maintain or enhance social status may also undermine diabetes regimens*. When maintaining status conflicts with the optimal behaviors for the prevention and control of a disease, this might create some pathways that work against the fundamental relationship, even though the overall balance of mechanisms strongly sustains it.

### FUTURE DIRECTIONS

What value might there be in tying other inquiries in different specific domains to a general conceptualization of fundamental causality? We find the concept stimulating for thinking about robust relationships between basic social conditions and life outcomes, and we think there is likely much room for further elaboration and development through specific inquiries. In this paper, we sought to contribute to this development by first specifying the constituent claims that we take a hypothesis of fundamental

causality to imply, and then by presenting additional insights we believe we have gained from our own empirical inquiry. The generality of the fundamental cause concept may allow distinct empirical investigations to fruitfully inform one another (Williams 1997; Williams and Collins 2001; LaVeist 1996; Link and Phelan 2001; Krieger et al. 1993). Our observations about “compensatory inversions” or “countervailing mechanisms,” for example, might raise useful considerations for inquiries in other domains, just as thinking in the more abstract terms of fundamental relationships led us to consider whether an imported concept like “maximally maintained inequality” might be useful for understanding the preservation of the SES-health gradient as technological mastery over disease treatment increases.

How widely might the concept of fundamental causality be useful? The key issue here is how much it can add to inquiries that pursue the mechanisms underlying relationships in which the distal variable is not “SES” and the outcome is not some aspect of “health.” Toward this end, we can conclude this paper the same way it began, by calling attention to one of the most wide-ranging and inherently probabilistic ideas in sociology—Weber’s “life chances.” Other meanings of life chances and the distal variables observed to serve as durable predictors of them might provide ideal candidates for attempted applications or extensions of the ideas presented here. As perhaps the most obvious example, there already exist many efforts to recount the massively multiple ways that variables like gender or race might probabilistically affect attainments of various kinds (e.g., Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Benokraitis and Feagin 1995; McCall 2001). Do such relationships share the basic constituent properties of fundamental causality, especially the idea of metamechanisms that preserve the observed relationships both holographically and as the outcome’s structure of realizability changes? For those that do, the concept might provide a productive orienting resource for thinking about the analogies and disanalogies among different fundamental cause relationships, and it could serve as a locus for valuable new dialogues between medical sociology and other areas of the discipline that have yet to fully realize the potential benefits of talking more with one another.

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# Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises<sup>1</sup>

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The authors examine the impact of the international human rights regime on governments' human rights practices. They propose an explanation that highlights a "paradox of empty promises." Their core arguments are that the global institutionalization of human rights has created an international context in which (1) governments often ratify human rights treaties as a matter of window dressing, radically decoupling policy from practice and at times exacerbating negative human rights practices, but (2) the emergent global legitimacy of human rights exerts independent global civil society effects that improve states' actual human rights practices. The authors' statistical analyses on a comprehensive sample of government repression from 1976 to 1999 find support for their argument.

## INTRODUCTION

The protection of basic human rights is one of the most pressing and yet most elusive goals of the international community. Before World War II, international law protecting human rights was sparse. States limited their

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international legal obligations to declarations of intent and to a small number of treaties and conventions.<sup>2</sup> Adoption of the 1945 UN charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights three years later, however, provided a window of opportunity for states, international organizations, and civil society actors and organizations to place human rights on the international legal agenda. Today, these efforts have culminated in the creation and expansion of a worldwide system of international law designed to identify and protect a growing number of basic human rights.

For many scholars and activists alike, states' increasingly global legal commitments to protect human rights signal a fundamental shift in the structure of international society. The vast majority of states today bind themselves to an international regime designed to protect the fundamental rights of virtually every child, woman, and man through law. As a growing number of nations voluntarily join this regime, the regime itself is expanding to incorporate new core human rights (see table 1). These treaties supply various monitoring bodies that work to improve governments' practice in the specified areas of human rights by collecting and disseminating information, often with nongovernmental activists' cooperation.

Yet, government violation of human rights is epidemic. Figure 1 compares the percentage of available international human rights treaties that the average state has ratified and the percentage of states reported to be repressive, over time. It is clear that (1) the average state has ratified a steadily increasing percentage of available human rights treaties, creating a world space characterized by the rapid and nearly universal acceptance of international human rights law, while (2) the percentage of states reported to repress human rights has grown over time, although the increase has tapered off in recent years.

This rising gap between states' propensity to join the international human rights regime and to bring their human rights practice into compliance with that regime challenges the efficacy of international law and questions the authenticity of states' legal commitments to protect the lives of their citizens. There are many examples. Guatemala ratified its first global human rights treaty protecting women against discrimination in 1982, a period in which the government was reported to practice extensive political imprisonment, execution, and political murder and detention for political views. By 1992, the government had ratified all six of the most important human rights treaties (reviewed in table 1), extending its commitments to protect all citizens from violations of civil, political, economic,

<sup>2</sup> Examples include the formal prohibition of the slave trade by the Treaty of Vienna (1815) and the General Act of Brussels. Created in the aftermath of the destruction caused by World War II, the United Nations (UN) system and its member states laid the foundation for the first concerted efforts to protect the human rights of *all* people.

TABLE 1  
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES

Treaty	Name	Monitoring Body	Year Adopted	Year in Force	Party States*
CERD . . . . .	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination	1965	1969	157
ICESCR . . . . .	International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights	Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights	1966	1976	144
ICCPR . . . . .	International Convention on Civil and Political Rights	Human Rights Committee	1966	1976	147
CEDAW . . . . .	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women	1979	1981	167
CAT . . . . .	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	Committee against Torture	1984	1987	124
CRC . . . . .	Convention on the Rights of the Child	Committee on the Rights of the Child	1989	1990	191

SOURCE —Office of the United Nations 2001

\* As of 2001




FIG. 1.—Human rights treaty ratification versus human rights practice over time. *% treaties ratified* measures the percentage of available international human rights treaties the average state has ratified in a given year. The data on ratification are described in detail in the section on data. *% repressive* measures the percentage of states reported to repress human rights in a given year. We identify a repressor as any state that has scored a value of 1, 2, or 3 on our standards-based measure of repression, fully described in the section on data.

social, and cultural rights; to insure freedom from torture and protection for racial minorities and children. Human rights practices remained unchanged, as violations reached an extreme in 1994 and 1995. Iraq is another germane example. When the government ratified its first global treaty in 1970, committing to the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, human rights violations were common. By 1994, the government had ratified five of the six core treaties protecting human rights. In that same year, Amnesty International reported that repression had become extreme, systematic, and population-wide (Amnesty International 1994).<sup>3</sup> What good are international human rights treaties if they do not improve human rights practices?

Scholars of international relations, particularly within the realist and neoliberal traditions, expect this compliance gap between states' commitment to international law and states' practices. These mainstream international relations perspectives often regard the growing legalization of human rights principles as epiphenomenal (Mearsheimer 1994/1995); or, they assume that states only comply with the principles of international law when it is in their national interest and when international institutions are designed to enforce observance of law (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). In short, the rationalist tradition has led scholars to expect that the human rights regime has little impact on actual human rights practices. Treaties are simply not designed to make ratifying governments accountable for their commitments.

Many scholars of international law and constructivist scholars of international relations argue forcefully to the contrary: states generally try to comply with the principles of international law that they endorse (Henkin 1979). The international human rights regime is no exception. International organizations and nongovernmental actors can teach and socialize government leaders to adopt new practices (Finnemore 1996a). International pressures contributed to the decline in forced disappearances in Argentina (Keck and Sikkink 1998, pp. 103–10), ratification of international human rights treaties led to reduction of legal barriers for Koreans in Japan (Iwasawa 1986), and the CAT has changed the way the Israeli government interrogates suspected terrorists (Ron 1997). These stories abound in the literature (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Lutz and Sikkink 2000; Clark 2001), suggesting that institutionalization of global human rights can have a direct and positive impact on state practices.

The problem in the current research is clear: theoretical expectations point in both directions, and systematic empirical evidence to support either side is rare. Furthermore, the tendency to isolate the two core aspects of the compliance process has led scholars to overlook the larger

<sup>3</sup> Iraq has not yet ratified or signed the CAT

picture. Concern about the direct effects of formal treaty ratification has led to a pessimistic preoccupation with the apparent gap between ratification and domestic practices. Belief that international civil society advocates can encourage better practices has led to a more optimistic preoccupation with the nature of activism.

We draw on the insights of rational institutionalism in international relations and the world society approach in sociology to explain these seemingly contradictory findings and to reconcile the two competing predictions. Our core argument is that global institutionalization of human rights has been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, global human rights treaties supply weak institutional mechanisms to monitor and enforce regime norms, offering governments strong incentives to ratify human rights treaties as a matter of window dressing rather than a serious commitment to implement respect for human rights in practice. Moreover, these international agreements may at times provide governments with a shield for increasingly repressive behaviors after ratification, as treaty ratification confers on them human rights legitimacy and makes it difficult for others to pressure them for further action. As external pressures decrease, governments often spiral into worse repression after ratification, and the human rights legal regime remains powerless to stop this process. On the other hand, human rights advocates regularly mobilize around these treaties, leveraging the emergent legitimacy of human rights as a global norm of appropriate state behavior to pressure states to improve actual human rights practices.<sup>4</sup>

In effect, we explain the impact of human rights treaties as a “paradox of empty promises.” As nation-states make formal legal commitments to symbolize human rights compliance even while they are in violation, this process of “empty” institutional commitment to a weak regime paradoxically empowers nonstate advocates with the tools to pressure governments toward compliance. Our approach thus stands in sharp contrast to current theoretical views, none of which examine the two processes in the same model and therefore fail to explain the paradoxical impacts of global human rights institutions on local practices.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> In this study, we use the term “institution” to refer to broad normative expectations, rules, and practices built around international legal and organizational structures (March and Olsen 1998). Thus, “institution” includes, but is not limited to, international treaties.

<sup>5</sup> Daniel Thomas’s (2001) recent work is a notable exception and proposes a similar argument. It examines the effect of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 on subsequent political developments in socialist states using qualitative techniques and claims that governments’ participation in international human rights agreements tends to be an “empty” commitment, but that nonstate actors can take advantage of the pledge to pressure the government and produce political changes

In the following pages, we place our theoretical approach within the context of current perspectives explaining government repression of human rights. Then, we assess the empirical merits of our argument using time-series analyses of human rights practices covering a wider time frame than any existing work: from 1976 to 1999. Our data enable the first thorough investigation of the state of post-Cold War human rights politics and provide the foundations for a comparative analysis of government repression across eras.<sup>6</sup> Throughout, we focus on how global forces shape government repression of the most basic human rights: the rights to security of the person.<sup>7</sup>

### THEORIES

In this section, we consider competing theoretical perspectives on compliance with international law. We discuss how our approach better explains the double-edged compliance dynamic of international human rights treaties, and we review the contributions of existing cross-national empirical studies of human rights to identify appropriate control variables for our empirical analyses.

#### Theories on General Compliance in International Relations and International Law

The question of whether international human rights law affects government human rights practice implies a broader political question concerning state compliance. Most political scientists emphasize the role of state power, national interests, and domestic bargaining, arguing that governments comply with international law only when it is in their interest. For some, international law is epiphenomenal to state power: when states comply with their legal obligations to protect human rights, it is purely coincidence. States' behavior is motivated by self-interest, and this interest is determined by the structure of the international system of power (Waltz 1979). International human rights agreements are nothing more than tools

<sup>6</sup> We note that a few recent studies include data in the post-Cold War period. For example, Richards et al. (2001) examines the effects of foreign economic penetration on government repression using a sample of 43 nation-states from the period 1981–95. Similarly, Apodaca (2001) tests hypotheses about the impact of economic globalization during the period 1990–96. For an overview, see Hafner-Burton (2005).

<sup>7</sup> We focus on these rights because they are the cornerstone of human dignity—the rights to be free from murder, torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of the right to life and liberty of the person

created by powerful liberal states to further their own interests, and there is little reason to expect these agreements to change states' behavior, especially when they lack solid mechanisms of enforcement (Hafner-Burton in press).

For others, international legal regimes can influence state behavior in important ways: regimes facilitate cooperation among sovereign states by providing coordination and commitment mechanisms that identify state obligations and provide a means of enforcement. Nevertheless, states join and comply with regimes only when it is in their rational self-interest to do so (Keohane 1984; Downs et al. 1996). Thus, although the international human rights regime may encourage state cooperation and circumscribe government repression of human rights, the pool of states that commit to these institutions should be rather limited in the first place, and compliance will heavily depend on the design of the regime.

Still others suggest that state compliance with international law is a function of state preferences determined by domestic political bargaining: political institutions, interest groups, and state actors determine whether governments commit to international law and whether states comply with those commitments in the long term (Moravcsik 1997). International human rights agreements are institutions resulting from such collective bargaining games (Moravcsik 2000). Since the configuration of political interests and power within and around the state change over time, ratification of human rights treaties does not necessarily translate into compliance with them. Whether states actually comply with their commitments to these agreements depends on the domestic mobilization of actors supporting compliance and is therefore difficult to predict *ex ante*.

These mainstream approaches in international relations emphasize power and interest as the motivating factors for states and expect treaty ratification to have little consequence, direct or indirect, on local human rights practices. Although they have never been systematically tested, we expect that the rationalist arguments about the direct effects of treaty ratification have merit.<sup>8</sup> As we will argue below, the human rights regime is not designed to supply its members with strong institutional tools to enforce compliance. States are not ignorant of this flaw, and government leaders are aware that the regime's weak and various monitoring bodies have no means to enforce law (Cleveland 2001). We therefore expect to see a gap between ratification and behavior because governments have incentives to ratify human rights agreements they have neither the intention nor the capacity to implement (Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2004). However, we argue that a key problem with these approaches is that they are blind to the positive institutional effects of the international

<sup>8</sup> See Hafner-Burton in press.



human rights regime on local practices that operate not through the treaty system, but through nongovernmental actors. Indeed, they ignore nongovernmental actors entirely and produce overly cynical expectations about the effect of the human rights regime.

Other theoretical approaches in the relevant literature make different predictions. Constructivist scholars of international relations emphasize the ways in which international organizations can socialize or teach states to accept the goals and values embedded in international law. Drawing on their key assumption that state interests are defined in a context of internationally held norms—norms that are often embedded in international law and carried by governmental as well as nongovernmental actors—constructivists have argued that states comply with international law when government elites can learn to accept and incorporate shared norms and values that structure international political life (Finnemore 1996a; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). International organizations not only constrain states' behavior through legal sanctions applied to international law, they also socialize states to accept new norms and values, such as the human rights enshrined in international law today.

Scholars of international law often predict that states tend to comply with their commitments to international treaties. One of the most influential legal models today, presented by Chayes and Chayes (1995), suggests three reasons to expect state compliance. First, organizational inertia makes compliance a less costly and more attractive option in the absence of strong reasons for noncompliance. Second, international treaties result from extended negotiations that reflect the national interests of member states; and those, in turn, reflect domestic bargaining. Because governments only ratify treaties when their national interests are reflected, they are predisposed to comply with the treaties they choose to join. Finally, well-documented normative effects of law on individuals can be applied to behavior of national governments (Kratochwil 1989; Young 1979). Just as people tend to follow laws when there is no incentive to behave otherwise, states tend to comply with treaties when there is no significant obstacle to compliance.

Yet the global trend summarized in figure 1 contradicts these arguments insofar as they fail to disentangle two key dimensions of compliance dynamics—formal treaty systems and nongovernmental activism. Drawing from both rationalist and world society approaches, we propose for the first time a sociological argument that distinguishes between treaty systems and nongovernmental actors to explain the complex compliance dynamics surrounding human rights treaties.

### The World Society Approach

In the last decade or two, normative and cultural dimensions of international politics have attracted growing attention in the social sciences. A line of theory called neoinstitutionalism in sociology has had an unmistakable influence on this trend. Originally developed in organizational studies, neoinstitutionalism refers to a theoretical approach that pays special attention to cognitive, cultural, and normative dimensions of organizational reality (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer and Scott 1992; Scott 2000). It challenges the assumption of purposive rationality in organizational behavior and argues that organizations routinely follow taken-for-granted models and standards regardless of their functional utility. Legitimacy is a core element in this approach, as organizations are thought to enact scripts composed of standardized elements deemed legitimate in their environments. This institutionalization tends to reduce variety among organizations, as most of them conform to accepted standards.

As researchers have built on the initial effort by Meyer and Rowan (1977), this theoretical approach has influenced many areas of social scientific research (Thomas et al. 1987; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer et al. 1992; Soysal 1994; Finnemore 1996*b*; Katzenstein 1996; Jacobson 1998; Berkovitch 1999; Boli and Thomas 1999). Its application to the study of international political processes, often called the world society approach or the world polity perspective, has been particularly influential. Among the topics of such research are waves of decolonization, diffusion of female enfranchisement, promulgation of school curriculum (Meyer et al. 1992), and expansion of a world environmentalism regime (Meyer, Frank et al. 1997). This line of research explicates how global standards and taken-for-granted models circumscribe national politics. The core argument is that models and norms that are institutionalized at the world level acquire assumed status over time and influence policy makers at the national level. As many governments organize and restructure their national polities around global models and standards of appropriate behavior, a growing number of states share isomorphic (or convergent) political and social structures that are harmonious with the international model (McNeely 1995; Meyer, Boli et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999). This tendency for states to converge around similar domestic structures has only increased with the rising integration of states into international society.

While the prediction of isomorphic outcomes is often limited to organizational forms and policy adoption, the literature points out the likelihood of decoupling between policies and practices; that is, formal policy changes are often nominal and do not have the intended effects on the actual practice (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Brunsson 1989; Meyer, Boli et

al. 1997; Krasner 1999). In the case of ratification of international treaties, the world society approach predicts that the policy decision to ratify is often a symbolic gesture to signal that the government is not a deviant actor, and does not necessarily lead to compliant practices with the treaty. In other words, ruling elites might ratify a treaty to gain legitimation in international society, putting little effort into aligning their behavior with the treaty provisions. Thus, the act of treaty ratification is often loosely coupled with the relevant practice, especially when the treaty does not have an effective enforcement mechanism and national governments are left in charge of domestic implementation—this is the case with many international treaties. When the legitimacy of a treaty grows to the extent that nonratifying states look like deviants, governments are more likely to ratify without the willingness and capacity to comply with the provisions, thus increasing the likelihood of decoupling.

Like the national approach in international relations, research in the world society approach has tended to emphasize this decoupling process, highlighting the lack of effects of global models on actual practice. In an effort to explain the paradoxical compliance dynamics, we extend this approach to the study of human rights and make two core predictions.

### THE ARGUMENT

First, we extend the concept of decoupling to the institutional processes and historical contingencies around global human rights politics. These have created fertile grounds for what we call “radical decoupling,” wherein treaties have an effect opposite to what are intended. We argue that international human rights treaties lack the mechanisms of enforcement that provide governments with the incentives not to defect from their policy commitments (Hathaway 2002; Downs et al. 1996, Tsutsui and Wotipka 2001). This dual nature of the regime—state legitimation without enforcement—may at times lead governments to use global laws as a shield for increasingly violent domestic behaviors.

The human rights regime was principally constructed to identify and classify which rights are globally legitimate, to provide a forum for the exchange of information regarding violations, and to convince governments and violators that laws protecting human rights are appropriate constraints on the nation-state that should be respected. Over the years, the regime has proven increasingly competent in supplying the instruments necessary to collect and exchange information on human rights violations and to disseminate that information on a global scale.<sup>9</sup> Despite

<sup>9</sup> The major treaties furnish UN committees that provide a formal reporting and oversight function.

this informational capacity, the regime supplies no formal enforcement mechanisms to provide or disrupt valuable exchange with a target state (Cottier 2002; Goodman and Jinks in press). Treaties offer no material, legal, or political rewards in exchange for better practices, and they cannot directly punish violators by withholding valuable goods. At best, the legal instruments of the regime directly influence practices by supplying repressors with information and legitimating motivations to internalize new norms of appropriate behavior (Hafner-Burton in press). As we will show, this form of direct influence is weak and often ineffective.

This enforcement problem has only been aggravated by the historical fact that most of the core human rights treaties came into force during the Cold War, a time when many governments perceived ratification of these treaties as politically inconsequential under the umbrella of a superpower that was likely to defend or ignore their domestic policy choices regarding human rights. Thus, the international human rights regime long provided opportunities for governments to gain international legitimacy by endorsing human rights principles without actually implementing human rights practices at home (Müllerson 1997). Many governments had claimed their support of human rights ideas, either in denouncing the Axis powers in World War II or in fighting for independence from colonizers, and by their own rhetoric, were put in a position to endorse human rights treaties (Lauren 1998).

As a growing number of states gained the legitimating benefits of ratification and yet failed to comply with those commitments, this simple gap between policy and practice led to a more severe and radical decoupling. Treaty ratification led to the possibility of a negative relationship between policy and practices.<sup>10</sup> Governments, armed with growing information that commitment to the regime would not lead to serious enforcement but would grant them legitimacy in the eyes of other states, were now free to hide domestic human rights practices behind the veil of international law. Repressive practices could be exacerbated after ratification, while the treaty regime would be powerless to effect change.

This possibility of radical decoupling leads us to expect two observable implications: ratification of international human rights treaties will either have (1) no direct positive effect on domestic practices or (2) a negative effect, as repressive governments ratify more agreements and spiral into a greater degree of violence that the treaty regime is powerless to stop.

<sup>10</sup> Some empirical studies have presented supportive evidence for this argument. In cross-national data analyses, Camp Keith (1999) found no relationship between ratification of the ICCPR and human rights practices, while Hathaway (2002) reports a negative impact of treaty ratification on governments' human rights practices in some instances.

This negative effect may be direct—when governments purposively use commitment to the treaty regime as a means to shield their worsening human rights practices from external state scrutiny—or indirect—when the treaty regime has no capacity to stop a ratifying state from increasing repression, but the treaty regime is not itself a cause of the behavior.

Second, we contend that this empty promise is often paradoxical. In spite of the institutional gap between human rights treaties and governments' incentives to comply, states' rapid and widespread commitments to the global human rights regime have led to the simultaneous elevation of human rights principles that change governments' behavior by way of normative pressures. As a growing number of states have ratified human rights treaties, the ideas codified in these treaties have gained nearly taken-for-granted status in global politics. This process has been helped by the activities of nongovernmental actors, working through international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) who diffuse and promote human rights principles worldwide (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). This growing legitimacy of human rights principles has led to two consequences.

First, INGOs increasingly leverage global human rights norms as a lobbying tool to pressure national governments to improve their human rights practices (Ron 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tsutsui 2004). INGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have been particularly active in publicizing human rights violations to pressure repressive governments. Domestic groups also reach out to external actors to publicize violations in their state. For example, Chilean activists, with the help of Amnesty International and other groups, sought to publicize forced disappearances committed by their government (Clark 2001, pp. 73–74), and human rights groups in Indonesia exchanged information with the International Commission of Jurists and other international organizations to campaign for the release of political prisoners (Jetschke 1999, pp. 140–41).

Second, the legitimacy of human rights principles makes target governments vulnerable to potential embarrassment and loss of legitimacy in international society resulting from noncompliance with international human rights law. In the new global political environment characterized by growing awareness of human rights principles, it has become increasingly inappropriate, if not impossible, for national governments to dismiss accusations of human rights violations as interference in their domestic affairs. Although it is still difficult for international bodies to prosecute domestic violations legally, bad publicity generated by nongovernmental actors often compels governments to address their domestic human rights problems (Risse et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Thus, in effect, civil society provides the enforcement mechanism that international human rights treaties lack, and can often pressure increas-

ingly vulnerable governments toward compliance. Government ratification of international law does not improve human rights practices alone, but a country's linkage to international civil society (through INGO memberships) can and does influence governments to change their human rights practices for the better. If a state has a tight link to global civil society, international nongovernmental actors are more likely to recognize and report on violations in the state. Domestic actors in tightly linked states tend to have greater awareness of the rights they are entitled to and are more likely to find ways to publicize their problems and pressure the government to address them. Thus, states that are more embedded in international civil society (i.e., that have a greater number of memberships in INGOs) are more likely to respect the human rights of their people.<sup>11</sup>

In sum, we draw upon the insights of rational institutionalism in international relations and the world society approach in sociology. We argue that the expansion of the international human rights regime has created a global context in which (1) governments are likely to ratify human rights treaties even when they are not prepared to comply with the treaty provisions, thus generating radical decoupling between policy and practice, and often exacerbating human rights violations in the short term. However, (2) increasing legitimacy of human rights principles proffered by world civil society places pressure on governments to improve their human rights practices whether they have ratified the treaties or not. Hence, we expect that treaty ratification is likely to have either no significant effect or a negative significant effect on human rights practices, but that countries' links to international society have a paradoxical positive impact.

To be sure, we agree with mainstream international relations theory that treaties have weak institutional mechanisms of enforcement and are therefore not likely to have a direct positive effect on human rights behaviors. Our argument differs from these mainstream international relations theories as we predict that ratification will often be observed to have a negative relationship to human rights practices, exacerbating repression, but that practices are positively influenced by linkage to international society. We differ from the constructivist and international law arguments, as we sort out two dimensions of the international human rights regime that are confounded in this literature—the treaty system

<sup>11</sup> It is worth noting that the effect of international civil society reaches many countries whether the government has ratified human rights treaties or not. The core process is a main theme pursued by Durkheim ([1895] 1982, [1912] 1995). Collective rituals, ceremonies, and norms commonly penetrate the activity of people and groups whether or not they individually subscribe to the principles involved. The theme is picked up and given great emphasis in the work of Randall Collins (1992).

and INGO linkage—and predict the former to have no effect or a negative effect, and the latter a positive effect.

### Theories on Human Rights Practices

In the last few decades, several comparative studies have emerged that explore the many factors shaping local human rights practices. From the seminal studies of McKinlay and Cohan (1975) and Strouse and Claude (1976) to the sophisticated pooled time-series analysis of Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith (1999), these comparative studies specify a variety of factors necessary to explain government violation of human rights, factors that we include in our empirical analysis and describe in the following section.

*Economic factors.*—Many studies on human rights practices examine the effects of economic development. Mitchell and McCormick (1988, p. 478) proffer the “simple poverty thesis,” a commonly accepted view that lack of economic resources creates fertile ground for political conflict, in many cases prompting governments to resort to political repression. In an advanced economy where people are likely to have fewer grievances, political stability is often achieved more easily, reducing the likelihood of human rights violations (Henderson 1991). This hypothesis finds support in several additional studies (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Park 1987; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Pritchard 1989).

*Political factors.*—Various studies find that democracies are less likely to commit human rights violations than autocracies. Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979) argues that left-wing totalitarian regimes are most likely to commit human rights violations because they have almost complete control over their citizens’ lives, and Howard and Donnelly (1986) contend that the protection of human rights requires a liberal state regime that respects the “substantive conception of human dignity.” Henderson (1991) also claims that democratic governments are more responsive to their citizens than autocratic governments, and hence more likely to accommodate the demands of their citizens without violent conflict. Variations in reasoning notwithstanding, these scholars all argue that democratic states are less likely to repress human rights. A number of subsequent studies confirm variations of these predictions, pointing to the positive effects of democracy on human rights practices (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999).

Several studies also identify a relationship between involvement in warfare and human rights violations. Early research established a strong connection between state participation in international warfare and an increase in domestic political violence (Rasler 1986; Stohl 1975). In times of international warfare, governments are more likely to exert strong controls over citizens and therefore are often willing to use force to main-

tain their domestic power (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999). In times of civil war, governments also tend to be more coercive, defending their authority against internal challenges to the state.

*Demographic factors.*—Finally, Henderson (1993) argues that population pressure can lead to resource stress, increasing the likelihood of governments' use of repression. When a state experiences rapid population growth, lack of resources quickly becomes a serious problem, thus pressuring the government to head in an authoritarian direction. Subsequent studies report that population size also affects political repression; states with a larger population are more likely to violate human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999).

*Global factors.*—In addition to these domestic factors, scholars identify a small number of global factors that may influence government repression. Two notable sets of studies examine the impact of external economic factors on human rights.

Mitchell and McCormick (1988) introduce a Marxist argument drawing on Chomsky and Herman's contention that capitalist states, driven by economic interests, favor political stability in developing nations and thus fortify existing regimes even when government repression is endemic (Chomsky and Herman 1979). As developing Third World governments receive economic support from capitalist nations whose primary goal is to maintain favorable conditions for investment, the likelihood of human rights violations increases. Drawing on this analysis, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) hypothesize that economic ties with the United States and other advanced capitalist states encourage human rights violations in the periphery. In their exploratory data analysis, they find some support for this hypothesis—that is, a large number of governments with bad human rights records are economically dependent on capitalist states.

Meyer (1996), by contrast, examines the impact of multinational corporations (MNCs) on human rights practices. His regression analyses lend some support to "the engines of development thesis," which contends that MNCs promote both socioeconomic rights and civil and political rights. MNCs' effects on economic and social rights are direct, promoting development and hence improving quality of life. MNCs also indirectly improve political rights insofar as they promote the expansion of a politically stable urban middle class, thus enhancing stability and political tolerance in the larger society. Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito (1999) report contradictory findings, however, cautioning scholars that the optimistic outlook on the roles of MNCs may not be warranted.

We build on these valuable efforts to understand the domestic and global economic causes of government repression. In doing so, we seek to fill in a key aspect of global human rights politics missed by all of the



extant quantitative literature—namely, the influence of the global human rights regime and civil society.

#### EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Our basic aim in this section is to test our hypotheses:

**HYPOTHESIS 1.**—*Ratification of human rights treaties has had no direct positive effect on states' compliance in practice and may even have a significantly negative effect, corresponding to increasing repression.*

**HYPOTHESIS 2.**—*Linkage to international civil society has had a positive effect on states' human rights behavior, decreasing repression.*

To test these hypotheses we broaden a classic study by Poe, Tate, and Camp Keith (1999) seeking to explain state variation in government repression. Because both state ratification of human rights treaties and state repression of human rights vary across states and across time, the authors' comprehensive sample offers an ideal starting point for our empirical analysis. Additionally, an emerging and important body of quantitative literature relies heavily on the Poe et al. study. We therefore build upon their data in order to encourage the comparison of our findings on the impact of international treaties to previous explanations of government repression.

Although we borrow some data from Poe et al., we update these pooled cross-national time-series data to include the post-Cold War period, and we introduce new variables measuring state participation in international society across 153 states for the years 1976 to 1999. These data allow us to assess the impact of state ratification of human rights treaties across a greater range of space and time than previous studies, while simultaneously controlling for the possibility that state compliance with international law may vary a great deal across different types of states.

#### Analysis

In order to determine the impact of global legal and civil society institutions on states' human rights practice, we build a single model of the data-generating process which we estimate throughout the following analyses using ordered probit appropriate to the ordinal structure of our dependent variable (Long 1997):

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_Y Y_{it-1} + \beta_P Z_{it} + \beta_X X_{it} + \mu_{it}, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y$  is the observed level of government repression of human rights, the  $\beta$ s are matrices of parameter estimates,  $i$  and  $t$  are subscripts representing the state and the year of the observation,  $\alpha$  is the intercept term,

and  $\mu$  is the stochastic term. We consider two main groups of substantive variables to test our theory.  $Z$  is a matrix of international legal and civil society variables that we offer to test our paradox theory, while  $X$  is a matrix of all other control factors that scholars before us argue influence repression of human rights. We review these groups of variables in detail below. In words, equation 1 asserts that repression of human rights for every state in every observed year is some function of that state's past experience of repression, human rights treaty ratification, INGO memberships, a series of control variables, an intercept, and a stochastic term.

We begin by testing the two core propositions of our theory: (1) whether state ratification of international human rights treaties affects state compliance with human rights norms, and (2) whether state linkage to INGOs affects human rights behavior. Accordingly, in model 1, the  $Z$ -matrix includes state treaty ratification and INGO memberships, and the  $X$ -matrix includes the GDP(log), trade, democracy, and population(log):

Government repression of human rights<sub>*it*</sub> =

$$\begin{aligned} & \alpha + \beta_{y-1}(\text{past practice}_{it}) \\ & + \beta_{z1}(\text{state treaty ratification}_{it}) \\ & + \beta_{z2}(\text{INGO memberships}_{it}) \\ & + \beta_{x1}(\text{GDP}[\log]_{it}) \\ & + \beta_{x2}(\text{trade}[\log]_{it}) \\ & + \beta_{x3}(\text{democracy}_{it}) \\ & + \beta_{x4}(\text{pcpulation}[\log]_{it}) \\ & + \mu_{it}. \end{aligned}$$

Even though we offer directional hypotheses—specifically, that ratification of international human rights treaties will lead to no change or to worse human rights behavior, while linkage to international civil society will lead to better human rights behavior—we perform two-tailed tests for each proposition in order to consider the opposing hypotheses offered by many political scientists. We control for other factors most human rights scholars believe shape government repression in order to understand whether international human rights treaties, as well as international civil society, affect government repression *above and beyond* the explanations that prevail in today's literature.

In models 2–7 we look at the precise nature of state treaty ratification in more detail. In order to do so, we disaggregate our composite state

treaty ratification variable reported in model 1 into several new component variables and examine whether state ratification of six core UN treaties affects government compliance with human rights norms. In order to do so, we add several new variables into the *Z*-matrix, and we describe these data in the following section.

Finally, we consider a range of alternative arguments set forth by human rights scholars by modifying the *X*-matrix. In models 8 and 9, we test whether state occurrence of civil or international war may explain government compliance with human rights norms. In model 10, we examine potential effects of state age, testing whether older and more established nations are more likely to respect the rights of their citizens.<sup>12</sup> In model 11, we consider the possibility that our findings are an artifact of the ending of the Cold War, while in model 12, we estimate fixed effects for time in order to ensure that the effects of individual years in our sample do not account for our findings.<sup>13</sup> (We thus alter eq. [1] to incorporate time-varying intercepts:  $\alpha_i$ .) In all cases, we include a lagged dependent variable (except fixed effects), report Huber/White standard errors in place of the traditional calculations, and cluster on state in order to address problems posed by heteroscedasticity that are common to our data (Beck and Katz 1995).<sup>14</sup>

## Data

*Human rights (Y).*—In order to estimate our models, we measure government repression of the security of the person, and we do so as a composite of a state's level of murder, torture, forced disappearance, and political imprisonment every year.<sup>15</sup> Specifically, we follow other scholars of human rights in the use of a standards-based ordinal scale of repression drawn systematically from U.S. State Department (and, secondarily, from

<sup>12</sup> We would like to thank one of our *AJS* reviewers for bringing this variable to our attention.

<sup>13</sup> Several colleagues have aptly suggested that we include a world-level count measure of state ratification to all international human rights treaties over time in order to consider the effects of gaining human rights legitimacy over time. We do not include such a measure in our final table of findings because this variable performs the same structural function as fixed effects for time, which we do include as the standard control for world-level variance over time. However, we did compute and estimate the proposed world legitimacy variable in place of fixed time effects and find no significant differences in effects between the two measures.

<sup>14</sup> By clustering we assume that our observations are independent across different states (or clusters) but not necessarily within a state over time.

<sup>15</sup> Other scholars that have examined personal integrity rights include, among many, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), Stohl and Carleton (1985), McCormick and Mitchell (1988), Poe (1991), Gibney, Dalton, and Vockell (1992), and Hafner-Burton (in press).

Amnesty International) annual human rights reports using content analysis.<sup>16</sup> We code the following five ordinal values of the dependent variable as illustrated in figure 2 below and described in appendix A:

1.  $Y = 5$  (rare repression).—Where states are under secure rule of law, political imprisonment and torture are rare, and political murder is extremely rare.
2.  $Y = 4$  (limited repression).—Where imprisonment for nonviolent political activities is limited, torture and beating are exceptional, and political murder is rare.
3.  $Y = 3$  (widespread repression).—Where political imprisonment is extensive, execution and political murder may be common, and detention (with or without trial) for political views is acceptable.
4.  $Y = 2$  (extensive repression).—Where the practices of level 3 are expanded to a large segment of the population, murders and disappearance are common, but terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in political practice or ideas.
5.  $Y = 1$  (systematic repression).—Where levels of terror are populationwide and decision makers do not limit the means by which they pursue private or ideological goals.

Many of these data result from collaboration among a number of prominent human rights scholars. We have substantially updated existing data, where available, using methods of content analysis consistent with the collection of previous data.

*Paradox of empty promises (Z).*—We introduce eight new variables on state ratification of international human rights law and state membership in INGOs that we have collected from primary and secondary sources on international agreements and associations. These measures are summarized in table 2 below.

With respect to international human rights treaties, we consider the following six core treaties (detailed in table 1): the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CAT, the CRC, the CEDAW, and the CERD. We offer several different measures of state treaty ratification in order to test the proposed hypotheses.

We first calculate an ordinal count variable *treaty* measuring the total number of these treaties a state has ratified in a given year. We use this variable in our base model (model 1). A score of zero indicates that a

<sup>16</sup> In a recent study, Poe, Carey, and Vazquez (2001) analyze the differences in human rights reporting between the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International in order to determine whether there are any apparent biases between the two sources. The authors find that Amnesty International's tendency to report on human rights in nations with the most egregious records has declined over time, and that Amnesty and State Department reports have become increasingly similar over time




FIG 2—Dependent variable. repression of human rights (country-year observations). The solid bars represent the number of state-years observed in the pooled cross-sectional time-series data for each of the five measured levels of state respect for human rights.

state has ratified none of the core human rights treaties, while a score of six indicates that a state has ratified all of the core human rights treaties.<sup>17</sup>

We also disaggregate the *treaty* variable into its constituent components and code six separate indicators that capture the length of time since a state has ratified each of the six international human rights treaties.<sup>18</sup> We call these variables ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, CERD, CEDAW, and CRC, respectively.

Finally, we offer a count measure of country membership in INGOs in a given year (i.e., the number of INGOs citizens of a state have membership in).<sup>19</sup> These measures were collected from data available in the Yearbook of International Organizations, an annual publication of the Union of International Associations.

<sup>17</sup> We also measure and examine whether the average duration of state treaty ratification—the total number of years that a state has ratified an agreement—affects government compliance with human rights norms. The results are consistent in sign and significance with state ratification level of international human rights treaties (model 1)

<sup>18</sup> We also perform analyses using dummy variables to capture ratification as opposed to the length of membership.

<sup>19</sup> See Yearbook of International Organizations, <http://www.uia.org/website.htm> and <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.html>.

TABLE 2  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS. PARADOX OF EMPTY PROMISES

Variable	Content	Model	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Treaty .....	Count of ratification of all six treaties: ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, CERD, CEDAW, CRC	Model 1	1.88	0	6
ICCPR ....	Duration since ratification of ICCPR	Model 2	.34	0	33
ICESCR .	Duration since ratification of ICESCR	Model 3	.35	0	33
CAT .. ...	Duration since ratification of CAT	Model 4	.16	0	15
CERD .....	Duration since ratification of CERD	Model 5	.45	0	39
CEDAW .	Duration since ratification of CEDAW	Model 6	.27	0	27
CRC . ....	Duration since ratification of CRC	Model 7	.2	0	19
INGO ....	No. of INGOs in which citizens of a state hold membership	Models 1-7	495.17	0	3,127

*Control factors (X).*—We follow other human rights scholars in the use of World Bank measures of gross domestic product at market value and trade (as a percentage of GDP), and we log both accordingly. These measures are conventional data collected from the World Bank and require little comment. We also employ measures of democracy and past levels of government repression.<sup>20</sup> In particular, we cull data from the Polity IV project and operationalize democracy based on institutional characteristics. Most important for our purposes, five primary institutional features distinguish democracies from autocracies: the competitiveness of the process for chief executive selection, the openness of that process to social groups, the level of institutional constraints placed on the chief executive's decision-making authority, the competitiveness of political participation, and the degree to which binding rules govern political participation (Jagers and Gurr 1995). This measure ranges from  $-10$  (most autocratic) to  $10$  (most democratic).

Throughout the analysis, we consider a wide variety of additional variables that have been included in previous studies on government repression. These data include state involvement in civil or international war (Correlates of War project), state population in a given year (culled from the World Bank), as well as state age and additional data collected by Poe et al. (1999). Although we do not include all possible additional control variables into our model for theoretical reasons, we *do* report any significant effect these variables have on our model of government repression in the footnotes.

## Results

Table 3 below displays our major findings. Two outcomes are striking. First, *state commitment to the international human rights legal regime does not automatically translate into government respect for human rights*. States that ratify a greater number of human rights treaties are not more likely to protect human rights than states that ratify a small number of treaties. To the contrary, model 1 suggests that ratification is frequently coupled with noncompliance behavior and that state commitment to the

<sup>20</sup> Although both development and democracy are often claimed as a basic human right, we follow others in the important conceptual distinction between level of national development, systems of state governance, and state repression of basic rights to be free from murder, torture, forced disappearance, and arbitrary imprisonment. See in particular Apodaca (2001).

TABLE 3  
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONAL TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS ON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, 1978-99

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
GDP per capita (log) ..	.112** (.035)	.139*** (.033)	.138*** (.034)	.116** (.036)	.136*** (.033)	.109** (.037)	.117** (.036)
Democracy .. . . . .	.025*** (.006)	.022*** (.005)	.023*** (.005)	.022*** (.006)	.021*** (.005)	.024*** (.006)	.024*** (.006)
Population (log) . .	-.27*** (.047)	-.284*** (.045)	-.283*** (.045)	-.27*** (.047)	-.275*** (.044)	-.261*** (.049)	-.262*** (.049)
Past practice . . . . .	1.46*** (.063)	1.47*** (.064)	1.47*** (.064)	1.46*** (.064)	1.48*** (.064)	1.45*** (.063)	1.45*** (.063)
Trade (log) . . . . .	.02 (.072)	.024 (.069)	.026 (.07)	.038 (.068)	.01 (.067)	.045 (.072)	.049 (.069)
INGO . . . . .	.0003** (.0001)	.0002* (.0001)	.0002* (.0001)	.0004** (.0001)	.0002* (.0001)	.0003** (.0001)	.0002** (.0001)
Treaty . . . . .	-.069** (.02)						





international human rights legal regime at times leads to radical decoupling, exacerbating human rights abuse.<sup>21</sup>

This finding is remarkably consistent when we disaggregate overall commitment to the human rights regime and examine ratification of specific UN treaties (models 2–7). In no instance does state ratification of any of the six core UN human rights treaties predict the likelihood of government respect for human rights. Rather, state ratification of all six treaties has a *negative* effect on signatories' behavior: treaty members are more likely to repress their citizens than nonratifiers.<sup>22</sup> Together, these findings draw a troubling picture: *international human rights treaties do little to encourage better practices and cannot stop many governments from a spiral of increasing repressive behavior, and may even exacerbate poor practices.*<sup>23</sup> We use predicted probabilities to unpack these negative effects further in appendix B.

Second, state linkage to international civil society poses a strong counterforce to this radical decoupling: *states whose citizens belong to a greater number of INGOs are more likely to protect the rights of their citizens.* The consistency of this effect across models indicates that the general institutional effect of global civil society is quite stable. Although we find that institutionalization of global human rights has no systematically positive impact through the treaty system, we also find that global human rights norms, embedded in the treaties and proffered by international civil society, do contribute to real improvements in human rights practices.

Table 3 also confirms that our estimates are consistent with the general findings of the human rights literature on key variables. Democracies are better protectors of human rights—in keeping with a vast majority of human rights scholars (Henderson 1991; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999)—as are states with a higher level of

<sup>21</sup> It is possible that these findings may reflect that a number of the core treaties institutionalize norms that fall outside of the category of basic human rights examined here. However, both the CAT and the ICCPR explicitly recognize the core rights to life, liberty, and security of the person captured by our dependent variable, obligating ratifying states to protect these rights. Evidence presented in table 3 demonstrates that states that ratify these two treaties are significantly more likely to repress the rights of their citizens than nontreaty members. This finding is consistent with a previous study of CAT (Hathaway 2002), which also shows a negative effect of treaty ratification. A previous study of ICCPR shows a noneffect of treaty ratification (Camp Keith 1999), while our finding shows a negative effect. We also note that when we include fixed time effects, the effect remains negative but loses significance.

<sup>22</sup> When we add the post–Cold War dummy and fixed time effects in models 11 and 12, the effects of treaties become less significant but remain negative.

<sup>23</sup> We cannot, however, distinguish here between a direct negative effect—where ratification itself provides incentives for further repression—and an indirect negative effect—where ratification has no effect on state practices that are already spiralling toward greater violence.

openness to the international economy (Meyer 1996; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001) and with higher levels of economic development. Consistent with current research in the field, one of the most important predictors of repression is state history of repression (Apodaca 2001; Poe et al. 1999).

In table 4 we verify that our findings are robust across a number of alternative explanations for government repression of human rights.<sup>24</sup> Although civil war *does* strongly encourage state repression, this effect is over and above our findings that states ratifying international human rights law tend not to comply in practice. International war and state age, by contrast, have no effect on government repression whatsoever, leaving our results unchanged. Finally, historical era does seem to make a difference, although our substantive results are largely consistent when we include fixed effects for time. States in the post–Cold War world are less likely to comply with their commitments to the international human rights regime, a phenomenon possibly explained by the emergence of a great number of new and relatively weak states.<sup>25</sup>

Considered together, these findings offer strong support for our argument.<sup>26</sup> There is no evidence to suggest a systematically positive correlation between official governmental acceptance of an international law to protect human rights and the actual behavior of government elites to protect those rights. More disturbing is evidence to suggest that the ratification of human rights treaties may actually hide worsening state compliance with human rights norms enshrined in those treaties, at least in the short term. On the other hand, evidence also suggests that linkage to global civil society improves human rights practices. Even though treaties often do not directly contribute to improvement in practice, the norms codified in these treaties are spread through INGOs that strategically leverage the human rights legal regime to pressure governments to change their human rights behavior.

<sup>24</sup> We considered a number of additional control variables to test the robustness of these findings. They did not change our findings and are therefore not reported here. Moreover, we considered a number of alternative measures for the variables we have reported here.

<sup>25</sup> In order to consider the possibility of a selection effect, we lagged all independent variables by one year and reran the model. We found that the lagged model is substantively identical to the model we report in table 3. We repeat this lag over several years to ensure robustness. In order to consider the possibility that the Cold War effect was produced by a bias against human rights practices by leftist governments (Poe et al. 2001), we included a dummy variable measuring whether a government was ruled by a leftist regime. The new variable was insignificant and did not change our substantive results.

<sup>26</sup> The findings are not an artifact of multicollinearity, and the correlation matrix is available from the authors upon request

TABLE 4  
 POOLED CROSS-SECTIONAL TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS ON STATE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE  
 WITH ADDITIONAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, 1978-99

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12 <sup>a</sup>
GDP per capita (log) .....	.092* (.037)	.1** (.035)	121** (.036)	.092* (.038)	.074 <sup>+</sup> (.041)
Democracy .....	.028*** (.007)	.022*** (.006)	.026*** (.006)	.027*** (.006)	.027 <sup>f</sup> (.006)
Population (log) .....	-.262*** (.047)	-.267*** (.05)	-.279*** (.048)	-.256*** (.049)	-.257*** (.052)
Past practice .....	1.4*** (.067)	1.45*** (.048)	1.46*** (.064)	1.44*** (.065)	
Trade (log) .....	-.002 (.083)	.024 (.079)	-.003 (.072)	.077 (.075)	.082 (.077)
INGO .....	.0004** (.0001)	.0005** (.0001)	.0004** (.0001)	.0004** (.0001)	.0005*** (.0001)
Treaty .....	-.065** (.025)	-.071** (.022)	-.069** (.021)	-.043 <sup>+</sup> (.023)	-.034 (.024)
Civil war <sup>b</sup> .....	-.913*** (.16)				
International war <sup>b</sup> .....		-.16 (.135)			
State age .....			-.0006 (.0005)		
Post-Cold War dummy .....				-.279*** (.080)	
Fixed time effects (1976-99) <sup>c</sup> .....					
N observations .....	1,815	1,819	2,058	2,058	2,058
Log likelihood .....	-1,328.4	-1,356.2	-1,542.8	-1,535.7	-1,524.5

<sup>a</sup> Note that model 12 including fixed time effects appropriately excludes the lagged dependent variable.

<sup>b</sup> Civil and international war measures are limited to the 1976-93 time period.

<sup>c</sup> By convention, the coefficients on fixed time effects are not individually reported to save space.

<sup>+</sup>  $P < .10$

\*  $P < .05$

\*\*  $P < .01$

\*\*\*  $P < .001$ .

Finally, a number of scholars have identified the very real possibility that our findings are influenced by an "information effect"; that our reporting sources from which we collect data on repression of human rights pay more attention to states that are more open to information exchange or that have recently signed on to an international human rights treaty. We take this possibility very seriously and have thus gone some lengths to investigate its merits. Although we cannot offer a definitive answer to the question, we can offer preliminary evidence to suggest that our findings are not simply a result of rising media attention to human rights violations after treaty ratification.

This evidence was collected through a small experiment. We first took a random sample of 15 state cases from our larger sample of 153 nations. We analyzed U.S. State Department human rights annual reports for each of our cases that had ratified the CAT. We examined three time points for each case: three years prior to ratification of the CAT, the year of CAT ratification, and three years after CAT ratification. For each case, we compared the contents of the source reports over time in terms of the number of words dedicated to the issue of torture, as well as the kind of information supplied by the reports—extensive, intermediate, or limited information. Our findings, presented in appendix C, suggest that there is no identifiable systematic bias toward increased reporting in word count or in kind of information after treaty ratification, although source reports on human rights abuse do vary over time. The nature of the reports does not appear to change appreciably after ratification, thus suggesting that our findings are not likely to be a unique result of increased reporting brought on by the act of ratification.

### CONCLUSIONS

We motivated our analysis by discussing two competing sets of expectations and evidence about the impact of the expanding international human rights regime. While mainstream international relations scholars argue that the regime does not improve human rights practices, constructivists and international legal scholars point to some evidence that it does have a positive impact on local practices. We tease out the two aspects of the international human rights regime that are confounded in most of the existing literature: the international human rights treaty system and international civil society. Our theoretical framework, motivated by rational institutional and world society approaches, predicts that the legal regime has no effect or a negative effect on practice, but that global civil society has a positive impact on practice. Our empirical analyses confirm this paradox of empty promises thesis. There is no systematic evidence to suggest that ratification of human rights treaties in the UN system itself improves human rights practices, but the growing legitimacy of human rights ideas in international society, which the legal regime helped establish, provides much leverage for nongovernmental actors to pressure rights-violating governments to change their behavior.

Our first key findings about the impact of human rights treaties echo findings in recent studies on similar topics but move beyond them in terms of the coverage of time period and the number of treaties. Thus, we found that the negative effects of ratification of human rights treaties on the rights to security of the person apply to the six core treaties, and that this

trend has continued into the late 1990s. These findings cast some serious doubts on more optimistic arguments advocated by scholars of international law and by constructivists. Because of the strong pressures to ratify international human rights treaties and the relatively low cost of ratification, many governments ratify without the will or capability to align their domestic behavior with the provisions of the treaties. The act of ratification puts a legitimate face on the government; combined with an institutional lack of enforcement mechanisms, the act of ratification can also give governments a cover to violate citizens' rights.

Our second key finding about the positive impact of linkage to global society is an important contribution both to empirical studies of human rights politics and, from a theoretical standpoint, to the world society approach. Although many case studies have documented the effects of global human rights principles and international actors who enact these principles on local practices, few have systematically studied the impact of these international activities outside the treaty system. Our statistical analyses provide strong support for the scholars and observers who argue that global human rights activities have contributed to improvement in local practices.

Both findings demonstrate the importance of sorting out different mechanisms through which global forces operate to impact local action. By examining linkage to international civil society separately from linkage to the global human rights regime, we highlight the disparate effects these two types of linkage have on local human rights practices. Scholars and activists often decry lack of effective enforcement mechanisms to international human rights treaties. However, our findings suggest that despite weak institutions, international civil society has been using the legitimacy of human rights norms as defined and codified in the treaties to pressure governments to improve human rights practices. Civil society actors are essentially serving the function of much-needed enforcement mechanisms, although they are not a replacement for stronger institutions protecting human rights. Growing in number and strength, these civil society actors can often turn the "empty promises" by national governments on their heads to produce a global "paradox": improvement in human rights practices.

## APPENDIX A

### Data Collection on Human Rights (Y)

We have substantially updated existing data on repression of human rights collected by a number of scholars before us and generously offered by Steven Poe, 1976–93. Following the guidelines for coding specified in Poe

and Tate (1994), we applied methods of content analysis to the U.S. State Department annual human rights reports. For all available state cases from 1994 to 1999, we assigned a human rights value on a five-point scale, originally set forth in Gastil (1980) and described in the section on data. In order to ensure consistency with previous methods of coding, we employed two coders to analyze the content of each source and assign a numerical value. Intercoder reliability was recorded at roughly 90%, and we employed a third party to solve any discrepancies between coders. Since that time, Mark Gibney was kind enough to share his data (1980–2000) with us, and we have used those as a third check on our codings.<sup>27</sup>

## APPENDIX B

### Predicted Probabilities

In order to further unpack our major empirical findings, we calculate predicted probabilities from the estimates presented in model 1 (of table 3 above). These predictions are a useful tool to examine whether our argument is consistent across the categories of the dependent variable for different types of states. This analysis is valuable because a number of scholars have suggested quite rightly that treaty ratification and linkage to international civil society may have a much greater impact on certain types of human rights violations—for example, rare repressors ( $Y = 5$ )—than they do on other types—such as widespread repressors ( $Y = 3$ ). We recognize that our institutional argument may also offer more explanatory leverage for certain types of state polities—for example, autocracies—than others—such as democracies. If so, our findings may not be of equal significance to all states and, driven by the experiences of a certain type of state, may not be usefully generalizable. We thus seek to understand whether the effects we have identified in the time-series analyses apply consistently across different states.

In order to do so, we use the statistical procedure discussed in detail in Long (1997) to calculate the predicted probability that an average state is observed to employ rare repression [ $\text{prob}(Y = 5|X)$ ] and widespread repression [ $\text{prob}(Y = 3|X)$ ].<sup>28</sup>

Table B1 reports the predicted probabilities (given our model and our data) that we observe an average democratic state employing rare or widespread repression, while at the same time taking into consideration

<sup>27</sup> We would like to thank both Steven Poe and Mark Gibney for generously sharing their data.

<sup>28</sup> Although we calculated predicted probabilities on all five categories of the dependent variable, we report on only two such categories in order to demonstrate our argument as simply as possible.

TABLE B1  
PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY DEMOCRATIC STATE TREATY  
RATIFICATION AND LINKAGE TO INGOs, 1978-99

STATE LEVEL OF LINKAGE TO INGOs*	STATE NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES RATIFIED				STATE LEVEL OF REPRESSION†
	0	2	4	6	
None . . . . .	.21	.25	.29	.33	Widespread
	.12	.10	.08	.06	Rare
Weak . . . . .	.19	.23	.27	.32	Widespread
	.13	.11	.08	.06	Rare
Average . . . . .	.18	.21	.25	.30	Widespread
	.15	.12	.09	.07	Rare
Strong . . . . .	.14	.18	.21	.26	Widespread
	.18	.15	.12	.09	Rare

\* INGO is a count variable ranging 0-3,127 observed memberships. For the purposes of calculation, None = 0, Weak = twenty-fifth percentile, Average = fiftieth percentile, and Strong = seventy-fifth percentile of membership

† Level of repression is the dependent variable,  $Y$ . We calculate widespread repression,  $\text{prob}(Y = 3|X)$ , and rare repression,  $\text{prob}(Y = 5|X)$

variation across that state's level of human rights treaty ratification and linkage to INGOs.<sup>29</sup> We interpret the table as follows. The first row and column suggest that a democratic state that has ratified no human rights treaties (0) and is not linked to international civil society (none) is 21% likely to practice widespread repression and only 12% likely to practice rare repression. As this state ratifies an increasing number of human rights treaties (represented in the table by a horizontal movement from left to right), it is progressively more likely to practice widespread repression and less likely to practice rare repression. As this state increasingly links to international civil society (represented in the table by a vertical movement from top to bottom), it is progressively less likely to practice widespread repression and more likely to practice rare repression. The probabilities allow us to examine the magnitude of these shifts.

Table B2 reports similar predicted probabilities for an average autocratic state. We interpret the table in the same way as the previous one: an average autocratic state drawn from our sample that has ratified no human rights treaties (0) and is not linked to INGOs (none) is 32% likely to practice widespread repression and only 6% likely to practice rare repression. As we move horizontally across the table rows, we see that this state is increasingly likely to have worse human rights practice as it ratifies a growing number of treaties. As we move vertically down the

<sup>29</sup> For the purposes of calculation, we define an "average" state as a state with mean values of GDP, trade, population, and past practice



# Human Rights in a Globalizing World

TABLE B2  
PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY AUTOCRATIC STATE TREATY  
RATIFICATION AND LINKAGE TO INGOs, 1978-99

STATE LEVEL OF LINKAGE TO INGOs*	STATE NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES RATIFIED				STATE LEVEL OF REPRESSION <sup>†</sup>
	0	2	4	6	
None .....	32	.36	.41	.46	Widespread
	06	.05	04	03	Rare
Weak .....	30	.35	.39	.44	Widespread
	.07	.05	.04	.03	Rare
Average .....	.28	.33	.37	.42	Widespread
	08	.06	.05	.03	Rare
Strong .....	24	.28	.33	.37	Widespread
	.10	08	06	.05	Rare

\* INGO is a count variable ranging 0-3,127 observed memberships. For the purposes of calculation, None = 0, Weak = twenty-fifth percentile, Average = fiftieth percentile, and Strong = seventy-fifth percentile of membership.

<sup>†</sup> Level of repression is the dependent variable,  $Y$ . We calculate widespread repression,  $\text{prob}(Y = 3|X)$ , and rare repression,  $\text{prob}(Y = 5|X)$ .

table columns, we see that this state's human rights practice gets better as it increasingly links to global civil society.

These results clarify our findings that ratification of international human rights treaties are radically decoupled from state compliance with human rights norms but that linkage to international civil society improves human rights practices. Tables B1 and B2 draw attention to three aspects of the paradox.

First, the negative impact of international human rights treaties is greater on those states that employ widespread repression than on states that rarely employ repression. Repressive states that join the human rights regime become substantially more repressive as they ratify more treaties. In fact, in all cases, these tables show that states are greater than 10% more likely to employ widespread repression when they have ratified six human rights treaties than when they have ratified no treaties. The negative impact on nonrepressive regimes, shown as a decrease in predicted probabilities for the rare repressor category, ranges from three to nine percentage point changes. Such a finding is useful to verify that the effect we have identified is substantial in magnitude.

Second, the positive effect of state linkage to international civil society is greater on the human rights behavior of those states that employ widespread repression than on rare repressors. As repressive states open up their borders and allow their citizens to join a growing number of INGOs, these states are less likely to employ repression. The impact on repressive

regimes is seven to nine percentage points, while the impact on nonrepressive states ranges from two to six percentage points.

Third, these results are astonishingly consistent across democracies and autocracies (tables B1 and B2). Even though democratic governments are a great deal more likely to respect human rights than autocratic governments (and thus, to be rare repressors), both types of governments experience the paradox of empty promises. This finding may be surprising to many who believe that democratic governments are more responsive to international human rights law than autocratic governments, and it lends further support to the idea that the paradox is a truly global phenomenon.

## APPENDIX C

### The Information Effect

In table C1, we provide the data we collected in order to explore the possibility that our findings are influenced by an information effect. We randomly selected 15 states from our sample and examined U.S. State Department reports from which we cull our data for three time points: three years prior to ratification, the year of ratification, and three years after ratification. For each time point, we report the total *length* in words of the human rights report *Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (Amnesty International various years), as well as the *kind* of information provided by the report. We consider three categories: (1) *extensive reporting*, which offers detailed information about individuals tortured, specific individuals or governmental units charged with torture, or specific events of torture such as demonstrations and riots, as well as the enactment and implementation of specific national human rights legislation, commissions, policies, and other programs; (2) *intermediate reporting*, which offers some brief detail about individuals tortured or accused of torture, as well as the enactment and implementation of national human rights legislation; and (3) *limited reporting*, which offers information concerning the general occurrence of torture but very little detail about specific individuals tortured, specific individuals or governmental units charged with torture, or the enactment and implementation of specific national human rights legislation, commissions, policies, and other programs. We also report the values of our dependent variable *scores* for each case.

The results show that there is no observable systematic relationship between state ratification of the CAT and the length or kind of information reported by the U.S. State Department annual human rights sources that we use to code our dependent variable, although states often are reported

TABLE C1  
THE INFORMATION EFFECT: DATA ON THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORTS											
STATE	YEAR OF RATIFICATION	Three Years Prior to Ratification			Year of Ratification			Three Years after Ratification			
		Kind	Length	Score	Kind	Length	Score	Kind	Length	Score	
Algeria . . . . .	1987	3	162	4	1	401	4	2	284	4	
Botswana . . . . .	2000	2	250	5	2	868	5	2*	754	5	
Benin . . . . .	1992	1	272	3	3	110	5	3	80	4	
Bulgaria . . . . .	1986	2	130	3	2	308	3	1	329	3	
Chad . . . . .	1995	2	192	2	1	373	2	2	308	2	
Czech Republic . . . . .	1993	2	112	5	3	8	5	2	216	5	
Ghana . . . . .	2000	1	845	4	1	2,736	4	2	754	3	
Japan . . . . .	1999	2	382	5	2	651	5	2	894	5	
Kuwait . . . . .	1996	1	557	3	2	277	4	2	427	4	
Mali . . . . .	1999	3	166	5	2	465	4	1	245	4	
Niger . . . . .	1998	2	106	4	3	138	4	2	457	3	
Tajikistan . . . . .	1995	2	112	2	2	120	3	2	387	2	
Tanzania† . . . . .											
Venezuela . . . . .	1991	2	155	4	1	385	3	1	1,014	2	
Zambia . . . . .	1998	2	144	3	1	839	3	1	1,566	3	

\* Sample taken in 2002 because 2003 report was not yet available

† CAT not ratified

to increase repression after ratification, as we predict. Both the length and kind of information correlate more with the level of repression than with state ratification of the CAT: when state violation of human rights is substantial, the report tends to be longer and more detailed. When the government does not practice repression, the report becomes brief, and the kind of information naturally becomes limited. This experiment demonstrates that the changes in human rights practice scores cannot be attributed to increasing or declining attention as a result of treaty ratification and further underscores the importance of the paradox we found in our data analysis.

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# Destination-Language Proficiency in Cross-National Perspective: A Study of Immigrant Groups in Nine Western Countries<sup>1</sup>

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Immigrants' destination-language proficiency has been typically studied from a microperspective in a single country. In this article, the authors examine the role of macrofactors in a cross-national perspective. They argue that three groups of macrolevel factors are important: the country immigrants settle in ("destination" effect), the sending nation ("origin" effect), and the combination between origin and destination ("setting" or "community" effect). The authors propose a design that simultaneously observes multiple origin groups in multiple destinations. They present substantive hypotheses about language proficiency and use them to develop a series of macrolevel indicators. The authors collected and standardized 19 existing immigrant surveys for nine Western countries. Using multilevel techniques, their analyses show that origins, destinations, and settings play a significant role in immigrants' language proficiency.

## INTRODUCTION

Because of the growing proportion of immigrants in many Western societies, there has been increasing concern for the degree to which immigrants acquire the language that is spoken in the destination country. The reasons for this concern are clear: language skills are a form of human capital that positively affect immigrant earnings and labor market op-

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portunities (Kossoudji 1988), and language fluency of immigrants is associated with better interethnic relations in a society (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Gordon 1964).

Immigrants' second-language proficiency has been studied from a micro- and a macroperspective. Effects of individual characteristics on language proficiency, such as age of migration, duration of residence, and educational level, have been widely documented (Carliner 2000; Espenshade and Fu 1997; Espinosa and Massey 1997; Solé 1990; Stevens 1999). Persons migrating at a young age, who have been resident in the destination country for a considerable amount of time, and persons with a higher education generally have better language proficiency. Systematic differences in second-language fluency have also been observed by marital status, gender, and migration motive (Chiswick and Miller 1996; Stevens 1986). These microlevel effects are substantial and have been observed in different countries (Chiswick and Miller 1995).

From a macroperspective, it has been suggested that language proficiency differs among immigrant groups, even after individual characteristics of immigrants are taken into account. Studies of language proficiency among immigrants in the United States, for example, found that Mexicans have lower English proficiency than other groups (Carliner 2000; Veltman 1983; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Similarly, Dustmann (1994, 1997) observed that after controlling for individual characteristics, Spaniards and Turks in Germany have lower proficiency rates than Yugoslavs. Group differences in destination-language proficiency have also been observed in Australia (Chiswick and Miller 1996; Evans 1986), Canada (Lieberson 1970), France (Tribalat 1995), Israel (Beenstock 1996), the Netherlands (Tesser, Van Dugteren, and Van Praag 1998), Norway (Hayfron 2001), and the United Kingdom (Modood et al. 1997).

In this study, we extend the macrolevel perspective on destination-language fluency and argue that three groups of contextual factors should be considered. First of all, we examine the role of receiving countries. The study of immigrants' language proficiency has been a single-country phenomenon, and little is known about the role of host societies (Portes 1999). We study immigrants' language proficiency cross-nationally and examine the role of political regimes and anti-immigrant sentiments. We call these factors "destination" effects.

Furthermore, group differences found in previous research could indicate two different macrolevel effects. One possibility is that differences between groups found in a certain country refer to characteristics of their home country, and that similar differences between these groups are also observed in other destination countries. An example of such an effect is the role of economic conditions in the sending country. Those factors we

refer to as "origin" effects, and they reflect the general impact of the country the immigrants come from.

Another possibility is that group differences are destination specific and hence do not "travel" across nations. It could be that a group shows higher language skills than other groups in one destination, but relatively few language skills in another country. In such cases, language proficiency may depend on properties of the specific combination of an origin and destination category, such as the size of an immigrant group relative to the destination population. These and other characteristics reflect the specific experience of a group in a destination country, and we refer to these as "setting" or "community" effects.

To examine these three groups of macrolevel effects, we develop and apply a "double" comparative design, in which we compare a set of origin groups in several destination countries simultaneously. This design provides the opportunity to disentangle the impact of the country of destination, the country of origin, and the combination thereof (i.e., setting) on immigrants' language proficiency. This implies that origin effects reflect the impact of the country immigrants come from, irrespective of their country of destination. Similarly, destination effects are effects of the host society that pertain to all immigrants, their origins notwithstanding. Setting effects, finally, refer exclusively to the combination of origins and destinations.

The double comparative design also provides a more representative view of origin effects and setting effects than the designs that have been used in previous research. After all, earlier research relied on a single destination country only, and conclusions about origin effects and setting effects are therefore not generalizable to other destination countries. Similarly, the double comparative design yields a representative view of destination effects, for it examines differences across destinations for multiple groups.

Although applications of the double comparative design have not yet been done, some studies have moved in this direction. Evans (1986), for example, compared her findings on second-language proficiency among origin groups in Australia to published findings from other studies in Germany and the United States and thereby explored the issue of generalizability. A step closer to the double comparative design was taken by Chiswick and Miller (1995), who conducted separate analyses of census data on language fluency in Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United States. Although they compared the results of these analyses, they did not develop macrolevel hypotheses, nor did they incorporate origin, destination, and setting variables in the model to test such hypotheses.

We collected and standardized 19 surveys conducted in nine Western countries during the 1980s and 1990s in which immigrants' destination-

language proficiency was assessed. A well-known problem with cross-national research lies in the comparability of surveys that are done in different countries, under different circumstances, and with different designs. One solution has been to develop multinational surveys in which procedures and measures are made comparable beforehand. Although this solution is attractive, it is of little use for us because such surveys do not exist in the area of language proficiency. An alternative solution, applied here, is to include measures of survey differences in the analyses, which is a way to control for incomparability in a statistical fashion (Treiman and Ganzeboom 1990). Another solution we use in this article is to make alternative categorizations of central variables and to assess how sensitive the regression results are to such changes.

With the cross-national data set, we analyze more than 186,000 immigrants from 182 origin groups, in nine destinations: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States. Some origin groups, such as the Chinese, Indians, Moroccans, Pakistani, and Turks can be found in multiple destination countries, whereas other origin groups are observed in a single destination. Although we do not observe all origin groups in each destination country, we have information on 360 combinations of origin by destination, and this allows us to assess origin, destination, and setting effects simultaneously. Our design also covers Western immigrant groups, such as persons from Germany and France. From a theoretical point of view, such groups have the same importance as non-Western groups, but they have typically not been included in the literature on ethnic minorities in Europe.

In this contribution, we apply the double comparative design to provide a descriptive and theoretical account of the impact of the country of origin, the country of destination, and the immigrant setting on immigrants' language proficiency. We first assess how much immigrants' language proficiency varies between origins, destinations, and settings. Subsequently, we develop and test a series of hypotheses to explain these groups of contextual effects. Taking relevant individual characteristics into account, we apply cross-classified multilevel techniques to test macrolevel hypotheses. By including individual-level factors, composition effects are taken into account as well, which implies that the effects of our macrolevel indicators can be interpreted as contextual effects.

### THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Both sociologists and economists have studied immigrants' language proficiency (Chiswick and Miller 1995; Espenshade and Fu 1997). Sociologists have mainly focused on the impact of immigrants' exposure to the lan-

guage and social opportunities for language learning (Stevens 1992, 1999). Economists, on the other hand, have noted the importance of immigrants' self-selection and the difficulty of learning a language. Both disciplines have paid attention to the role of economic incentives in learning a new language. In a recent contribution to the literature on immigrants' language proficiency, Chiswick and Miller (2001) summarize the various theoretical notions with three general concepts: "exposure," "efficiency," and "incentives." Below, we first review how these concepts were used in previous research to explain individual-level determinants of immigrants' language proficiency. Subsequently, we use these ideas to formulate contextual hypotheses that pertain to the role of origins, destinations, and settings.

First of all, immigrants' proficiency in the destination language is considered a function of the amount of exposure to that language. Immigrants learn a new language through opportunities to hear, study, and use the language (Stevens 1999). Such opportunities typically depend on the language skills and usage of the people with whom immigrants interact, such as the partner, colleagues, neighbors, and friends.

Next to the amount of exposure, language proficiency is an outcome of immigrants' efficiency in learning a new language. Efficiency is defined as the degree to which immigrants improve their language proficiency given a certain amount of exposure. It is assumed that difficulties in learning a new language are greater for people who are less favorably selected in terms of observed and unobserved human capital, as well as for people who have to learn a language that is linguistically distant from their mother tongue (Chiswick and Miller 2001).

Economic incentives also determine the language proficiency of immigrants. Language skills are a form of human capital that may improve one's economic position, as illustrated by the strong effect of language fluency on earnings (Chiswick and Miller 1995; Espinosa and Massey 1997; Kossoudji 1988). As with all forms of human capital, language skills are embodied in a person, and immigrants are assumed to invest deliberately in learning the second language after arrival, depending on the expected costs of language investments and the benefits in terms of employment chances and earnings.

The notions of exposure, efficiency, and incentives have been used with considerable success to explain a number of individual-level effects on immigrants' language proficiency. In line with the ideas on exposure, it is found that the longer immigrants stay in the country of destination—and hence the more exposed they are to the official language—the better they speak that language (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). In a similar way, researchers have studied immigrants' language proficiency as an outcome of language exposure in the family, including the impact of the language

of the partner (Espenshade and Fu 1997; Stevens 1985). The notion of efficiency is often used to explain why people who migrated at a younger age speak the language better. Young people are more capable of learning a new language than older people (Stevens 1999). The concept of investments, finally, has often been used as an explanation for the positive relationship between school attainment and language proficiency. Immigrants with little education can find employment in ethnic enclaves and would therefore have few incentives to invest in language learning (Carliner 2000).

Although these notions have mainly been applied to individual effects, they can also be used to understand contextual effects. The notion of exposure is, perhaps, the most obvious example. Because a language is learned and used in interaction with other persons, it is an inherently social phenomenon, and exposure to the language will therefore depend on macrolevel characteristics. The notions of efficiency and incentives, however, have contextual implications as well. The difficulties of learning a second language can be group specific, depending, for instance, on the "linguistic distance" between the mother tongue of the group and the official language of the receiving nation. Similarly, the economic incentives of investing in a second language can be uniformly higher or lower for persons in the same social context. Below, we use the notions of exposure, efficiency, and incentives to systematically develop contextual hypotheses about the effects of origins, destinations, and settings on immigrants' language proficiency. The contextual characteristics we consider are substantively important. While some have been suggested before in the literature (e.g., group size, geographic distance), we also introduce a number of new factors (e.g., religious origin, globalization, anti-immigrant attitudes).

### Hypotheses on Destination Effects

Receiving nations can affect immigrants' exposure to the destination language and the incentives of acquiring that language. One such destination factor is the role of political parties in the government. Although the influence of political parties has not been examined before in research on immigrants' language proficiency, we suggest that this could be an important factor. This idea is informed by the literature on social inequality, where it has been found that the election of left-wing parties in the government (in contrast to liberal, conservative, and Christian-Democratic parties) decreases the social inequality in a country (Hewitt 1977; Lenski 1966; Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1998). In this article, we adopt the distinction between left-wing and other parties, and we explore its meaning in the field of language. One idea is that when left-wing parties make

up a sizable part of the government, the political climate is more tolerant toward immigrants. This, in turn, would lead to fewer incentives among immigrants to learn the destination language. Another, related, idea is that left-wing parties are in favor of a more linguistic-pluralism model of integration, while parties at the center or to the right of the political spectrum are more inclined to laissez-faire or assimilation language policies. In a linguistic-pluralism model of integration, immigrants and their children are offered opportunities to speak and learn their mother tongue (Vermeulen 2000). These opportunities include, for example, the usage and instruction of the mother tongue at school and translation of official documents into minority languages. In view of both arguments, the election of left-wing parties could (unintentionally) reduce immigrants' exposure to the second language and the incentives of acquiring that language. Hence, we expect that immigrants in countries with a stronger presence of left-wing parties in the government have a lesser command of the destination language.

Language learning not only depends on how the government of the receiving society approaches the immigrant population, it also depends on how the members of the receiving society treat immigrants. An important factor in this respect is anti-immigrant prejudice. Attitudes of native citizens toward immigrants might affect immigrants' exposure to the official language. If natives have strong anti-immigrant sentiments, it is more difficult for immigrants from all origins to interact with members of the receiving society. Previous research found that prejudice toward immigrants differs considerably among Western countries, due to such country-specific factors as the percentage of immigrants, immigration flows, and (change of) unemployment levels (Coenders 2001; Fetzer 2000; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). Thus, we predict that anti-immigrant attitudes in destination countries negatively affect immigrants' destination-language proficiency. Note that anti-immigrant sentiments may also be the result of lower linguistic assimilation. It is difficult to rule out this causal feedback conclusively, but we use measures of anti-immigrant prejudice at an earlier point in time than immigrants' language proficiency.

### Hypotheses on Origin Effects

We propose a number of characteristics of the origin country that can play a role in immigrants' proficiency in the destination language. First of all, we study the extent to which an immigrant's origin country participated in the economic globalization of the world. The greater integration in the organization of production, distribution, and consumption of commodities in the world economy inevitably resulted in more exposure

to foreign goods and media, and also in a growing emphasis on foreign-language learning at schools in countries throughout the world (Massey et al. 1993). This emphasis on foreign-language learning primarily includes learning the world language (English), but also other languages that are spoken in many countries (e.g., French, Spanish), or languages that are important for conducting (trade) relations with other countries. The level of globalization, however, is unequally distributed among countries. While some countries have highly open economies (e.g., Singapore), other countries have remained very closed (e.g., China). We expect that the more open the economy of an immigrant's origin country, the more exposure to the destination language before migration, and the better the language skills of that immigrant.

Religious characteristics of the origin country may also be relevant for the process of language acquisition, although this factor has not been studied before in relation to immigrants' language proficiency. One reason to believe that religion plays a role is that the frequency of daily interactions between natives and immigrants depends on social distance—that is, the willingness to be associated with other groups (Bogardus 1959). Research in Canada and the United States showed that natives' social distance toward ethnic groups partly overlaps with a distinction in religion, ranking Islamic, Buddhist, and other non-Christian groups at the top of the social distance scale (Owen, Eisner, and McFaul 1981; Pineo 1977). Because all host societies we examine are predominantly Christian, it can be argued that immigrants from predominantly non-Christian societies are less likely to develop close personal ties with members of the host society than immigrants from Christian societies. Because infrequent interaction with natives makes it more difficult to learn the language, we expect that immigrants from a predominantly non-Christian origin country are less proficient in the destination language than immigrants from Christian origins.

The social and political conditions under which immigrants migrate can also be important, primarily because they determine the efficiency with which immigrants learn a new language. Some emigration flows are predominantly grounded on economic decisions, mostly followed by chain migration and family reunions (Castles and Miller 2003). Other groups, typically referred to as "refugees," leave their country mainly because of war, discrimination, oppression, or other violations of political rights and civil liberties. For two reasons, the efficiency with which refugees will learn the destination language is lower than it is for the group of mainly economic immigrants. One reason is that refugees are less well prepared and therefore less well selected for the labor market than economic migrants, which includes having a lesser ability to learn the language of the destination country (Chiswick and Miller 2001). Moreover, refugees have

more often experienced traumatic events and have more stress than economic migrants (Marsella et al. 1994), which will hamper their efficiency in language learning. For both reasons, we expect that the stronger the suppression in the country of origin, the lower the language proficiency of immigrants.

The fourth characteristic of the country of origin we consider is the level of modernization. Several authors have argued that economic incentives to invest in the destination language depend on the likelihood of return migration (Chiswick and Miller 2001; Espenshade and Fu 1997). In this reasoning, it is assumed that longer expected duration in the receiving country makes it more beneficial for immigrants to invest in second-language learning. One measure of long-term commitments to living in the destination country is the degree of modernization in the country of origin (Espenshade and Fu 1997). If economic opportunities in the origin country are less favorable, it is argued, all emigrants from that country have a uniformly greater expected reward of learning the language in the destination country. The shadow of a shared future might then be longer, and economic incentives to invest in learning the language will correspondingly be higher. In view of this argument, one would expect that immigrants from more developed nations have lower language skills than immigrants from less advanced economies.

### Hypotheses on Setting Effects

The third group of contextual effects stems from settings (or communities)—that is, the combination of origin with destination. One characteristic of the setting that may account for immigrants' language proficiency is a premigration relationship with the host society. Several Western countries had colonies for extended periods of time. In most colonies, the native citizens were assimilated to the culture of the mother country, and an integral part of this learning process was acquiring the language of the mother country. Even after decolonization, these languages sometimes have the status of an official language (i.e., a language used in schools and formal settings), or even of a primary or dominant language (i.e., a language also widely used in informal contexts—at home, on the street). Immigrants for whom the dominant language in the origin country resembles that of the country they settle in naturally speak the destination language perfectly before arrival. Because these groups are uninteresting to examine, they are excluded from our study. Nevertheless, important differences in premigration exposure remain. Our hypothesis is that groups for which the language of the country of destination was official (but not dominant) in the home country have a higher level of language proficiency than groups for which this was not the case.



A second and related setting effect is suggested by the notion of "linguistic distance," the resemblance between the languages spoken in the origin and destination countries (Finegan 1999; Grimes 2000). An important assumption in the literature is that if the linguistic distance between two languages is small, the efficiency in learning the other language is higher (Beenstock, Chiswick, and Repetto 2001; Carliner 2000; Chiswick and Miller 2001; Espenshade and Fu 1997). When it is less difficult for immigrants to learn the destination language, exposure to that language will yield higher levels of improvement. In all the destination countries we examine, the official languages belong to two branches of the Indo-European language family: the Romance branch (e.g., French, Italian, Spanish) or the Germanic branch (e.g., English, Dutch, German). Linguistic distance is generally assumed highest when languages belong to different families (e.g., Afro-Asiatic vis-à-vis Indo-European or Uralic vis-à-vis Indo-European). When two languages belong to the Indo-European language family, they are considered more distant when they belong to different branches of that family (e.g., French vis-à-vis English is more distant than French vis-à-vis Italian). We therefore expect that second-language proficiency is highest when the origin and destination languages belong to the same language branch of the same family, lower when they belong to different branches of the same family, and lowest when they belong to different families.

Another frequently examined setting characteristic is the size of the immigrant group relative to the total population. For two reasons, group size may be important for language learning. First and foremost, the larger the immigrant group, the more likely day-to-day interactions will happen within the group, and the less likely day-to-day interactions will happen with the receiving group (Blau 1977). Immigrants from larger groups are therefore less exposed to the destination language and will be less likely to learn the second language (Clyne 1991; Dustmann 1994; Evans 1986; Lopez 1996; Stevens 1992; Veltman 1983). A second mechanism has to do with incentives. Language learning might be less attractive if immigrants find themselves in an ethnic enclave that provides labor market opportunities for which destination-language skills are not required (Evans 1989; Portes and Bach 1985). A precondition to the formation of such ethnic enclaves or economies is the presence of a sizable group of country fellows. Thus, in addition to the argument that group size decreases the exposure to the destination language, we argue that group size also lowers the economic incentives of learning the destination language. On these grounds, we expect that the relative size of an immigrant group in a particular destination negatively affects the destination-language fluency of the members of that group in that destination.

A final characteristic of settings we consider in this study is the geo-

graphic distance between origin and destination countries. Economists have argued that geographic distance between origin and destination increases the costs of migration, which, in turn, affects immigrants' self-selection (Borjas 1987; Chiswick 1999). Those who migrated over longer distance will be more favorably self-selected, which implies higher cognitive skills in general, including the ability to learn a new language. In addition, it is argued in the literature that immigrants who have traveled over greater distances are less likely to return in view of the higher costs of migration (Chiswick and Miller 2001). The higher cost of return migration would increase the economic incentives to invest in learning the host language. Thus, for reasons of both efficiency and incentives, one would expect that greater geographic distance between origin and destination countries is associated with better second-language fluency.

## DATA AND METHODS

### Data

As part of a larger research project, we collected and standardized existing surveys containing individual-level information on immigrants' language proficiency. The surveys were combined into one cross-national data set: the International File of Immigration Surveys (IFIS; van Tubergen 2004). To obtain data that were both high quality and comparable across countries, the surveys included in the metafile had to fulfill four criteria. First, surveys had to be translated in the mother tongue of immigrants and/or bilingual interviewers had to be used in the field. Second, surveys had to contain a sufficiently large number of immigrants to provide detailed analyses, and the survey sample should (approximately) be nationally representative. Third, surveys had to have been conducted face-to-face using standard questionnaires with fixed response categories. Fourth, surveys had to contain cross-national comparable independent and dependent variables.

We were able to find 19 surveys that met these criteria for a total of nine Western countries: two classic immigrant societies (Australia and the United States) and seven new immigrant societies (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway).<sup>2</sup> Table 1

<sup>2</sup> We also considered the 1991 and 1995 census of Canada. Because the Canadian census question on language proficiency is ambiguous, we did not include Canada in our final analyses. Chiswick and Miller (1995), e.g., equate those who speak French or English well enough to conduct a conversation with those who speak the language "not well," "well," or "very well." On the other hand, Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo (2003), Chiswick and Miller (1992), and Duleep and Regets (1992) classify those able to conduct a conversation as those who speak the language "well" or "very well." In

# Immigrant Groups and Destination-Language Proficiency

TABLE 1  
OVERVIEW OF SURVEYS INCLUDED IN THE INTERNATIONAL FILE OF IMMIGRATION  
SURVEYS

Country/Year	N	Groups	Survey Design	Reference
Australia:				
1981 . . . .	47,494	34	Census	AUS81
1988 . . . .	2,246	69	Immigrant survey	AUS88
Belgium:				
1993 . . . .	1,237	2	Immigrant survey	BEL93
1996 . . . . .	2,386	3	Immigrant survey	BEL96
Denmark:				
1988 . . . .	805	3	Immigrant survey	DEN88
1999 . . . . .	664	3	Immigrant survey	DEN99
Germany:				
1988 . . . .	1,773	5	Immigrant survey	GER88
1991 . . . .	1,692	5	Immigrant survey	GER91
1994 . . . . .	1,661	5	Immigrant survey	GER94
1999 . . . . .	1,551	5	Immigrant survey	GER99
Great Britain:				
1994 . . . . .	3,624	13	Immigrant survey	GB94
Italy:				
1994 . . . . .	2,910	69	Immigrant survey	ITA94
1998 . . . . .	1,894	7	Immigrant survey	ITA98
Netherlands:				
1991 . . . . .	2,178	3	Immigrant survey	NET91
1994 . . . . .	2,028	3	Immigrant survey	NET94
Norway:				
1983 . . . . .	791	5	Immigrant survey	NOR83
1996 . . . . .	2,389	8	Immigrant survey	NOR96
United States:				
1980 . . . . .	42,202	164	Census	USA80
1990 . . . . .	66,566	163	Census	USA90

presents an overview of the surveys included in the metafile, and the supplementary bibliography gives the detailed references. The surveys were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s. Two sorts of surveys were included: census data and specific immigrant surveys. The public-use files of the census data in the traditional immigrant countries contain surveys of large numbers of immigrants on which to perform meaningful analyses, and they have detailed information on immigration history and second-language proficiency. In classic immigrant countries, the census has therefore been a reliable source for researchers analyzing immigrants' language fluency (Carliner 2000; Stevens 1999). Because European census data do

our preliminary analysis, we tried both classifications, but the logit estimates deviated too much from comparative analysis, excluding Canada. Note also that the survey conducted in Great Britain covers England and Wales but not Scotland.

not contain information on language proficiency, we relied on specific immigrant surveys for European countries. These surveys have a sufficient number of immigrants to perform detailed analyses and provide extensive information on immigration and integration issues, including length of stay and language fluency. It is generally acknowledged that these surveys are especially suitable for studying immigrants' language fluency (Chiswick and Miller 1996). A limitation is that they are often limited to three or four main groups and sometimes exclude (well-integrated) smaller groups.<sup>3</sup>

To make the analyses more balanced, we reduced the number of observations in the census data. Because census data contain more respondents than the immigrant surveys, the number of observations in the classic immigrant countries is much higher than it is in the European countries. For that reason we took a random sample of the larger immigrant groups in the census of Australia and the United States. Those groups, such as the Mexicans in the United States, were set at a maximum of 2,000 respondents per survey. Although the number of origin groups and respondents is still higher in traditional immigrant countries than in European countries, we think this imbalance is justified when taking into account the multilevel design and the size of the native and immigrant populations.

Our analyses refer to immigrants, defined as those born outside the country of residence. We selected the population above the age of 18 and included both men and women. We divided Belgium into a French-speaking part, a Dutch-speaking part, and a region where both languages are official and dominant. Our analysis therefore includes 11 destinations.

### Measurement of Destination-Language Proficiency

The dependent variable is destination-language fluency—that is, the extent to which respondents are able to speak the destination language. We constructed a variable containing four categories and classified all surveys according to the same metric:

1. not at all (5.7%);

<sup>3</sup> The surveys collected for Germany only sampled immigrants with a foreign nationality. Because naturalization could be associated with language proficiency, this could bias our analyses. However, the surveys we use were conducted in the period 1988–99, and the German citizenship regime had been very restrictive until 2000 (Joppke 1999, Tucci 2004), resulting in very few naturalizations of immigrants. The naturalization rates of the immigrant groups in Germany examined in this study were below 3% in 1998 (FGCFI 2000). In addition, we include variables in our models that are associated with the acquisition of citizenship, such as length of stay in the host country and education

2. not well (19.9%);
3. well (26.1%);
4. very well (48.2%).

Table 2 shows how we classified the answering categories. Because the surveys were mostly done independently, there are several potential survey differences that may bias our estimates. We discuss three important differences: in questioning, in coding, and in reporting.

The first and most obvious cause of measurement error could be associated with the wording and number of the response categories. Although the surveys were done independently, the labeling of the answering options is in fact quite similar across surveys (see table 2). The lowest category appears to be quite similar in the different countries (e.g., none, can't speak it, not at all, very bad). The highest category is also comparable (fluently, English only, very well, perfect). Note that the sometimes-added category "English only" is unproblematic. More doubts may arise about the middle categories. In some countries, a distinction is made between two middle categories; in other countries, there are three middle categories. Moreover, the wording of the lower-middle category varies among surveys. We tried to solve this problem using additional logit models where the four-point scale is replaced by a two-point variable that combines categories 1, 2, and 3:

1. not at all, not well, well (51.8%);
2. very well (48.2%).

An additional advantage of this variable is that the distribution becomes more homogeneous (48% fluent and 52% less well). We assess to what extent the regression results change when using the two-point scale instead of the four-point scale.

A second potential source of bias is associated with the wording of the questions rather than with the wording of the answers. The surveys conducted in Australia, Belgium, and the United States use a two-step procedure to measure language proficiency. In Australia and the United States, respondents are asked if they speak a language other than English at home, and only those who answer yes are asked to report their English-speaking abilities. In Belgium, people are asked which languages they speak, and only then do they report on their language proficiency. Because direct or indirect questioning can affect the assessment of language proficiency, we include a dummy variable in our analysis representing this difference. Note that earlier research did not find support for this suggestion (Espenshade and Fu 1997).

A third survey characteristic that may bias cross-national analyses is the source of report. In most surveys, respondents themselves were asked

TABLE 2  
MEASUREMENT OF DESTINATION-LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

REFERENCE	QUESTION	CATEGORY			
		1	2	3	4
AUS81	Do you ever speak a language other than English at home now? If not, how well do you think you speak English?	Not at all	Not well	Well	Very well English only
AUS88	Is English first language spoken at home? If not, how well do you think you speak English?	Very poor	Poor fair	Good	Very good English only
BEL93	Which languages do you speak? Could you tell me how well you speak them?	None	Little	Well	Very well
BEL96	Which languages do you speak? Could you tell me how well you speak them?	None	Reasonable Little	Well	Very well
DEN88	How do you assess respondent's proficiency in Danish?	Not at all	Poor Reasonable	Good	Perfect
DEN99	How do you assess respondent's proficiency in Danish?	Not at all	Poor Reasonable	Good	Perfect
GER88	Knowledge of German language? (speaking)	None	Little Sufficient	Well	Perfect
GER91	Knowledge of German language? (speaking)	None	Little Sufficient	Well	Perfect
GER94	Knowledge of German language? (speaking)	None	Little Sufficient	Well	Perfect
GER99	Knowledge of German language? (speaking)	None	Little Sufficient	Well	Perfect
GB94	Assess respondent's English ability.	Not at all	Sufficient	Fairly well	Fluently
ITA94	How is your actual knowledge of Italian? (speaking)	None	Slightly Little	Well	Very well

ITA98	How is your actual knowledge of Italian? (speaking)	None	Little	Well	Very well
NET91	When you speak Dutch, do you have difficulties with that language?	Can't speak it	Always	Sometimes	Never
NET94	When you speak Dutch, do you have difficulties with that language?	Can't speak it	Always	Sometimes	Never
NOR83	How well do you speak Norwegian?	Not at all	Poor	Well	Very well
NOR96	How well do you speak Norwegian?	Very bad	Moderate Poor	Well	Very well
USA80	Do you speak a language other than English at home? If yes, how well does this person speak English?	Not at all	Moderate Not well	Well	Very well English only
USA90	Do you speak a language other than English at home? If yes, how well does this person speak English?	Not at all	Not well	Well	Very well English only

to report their proficiency in speaking the second language. By contrast, in surveys collected for Denmark, Germany, and Great Britain, destination-language proficiency was assessed by the interviewer.<sup>4</sup> To examine whether these survey differences might obscure true differences in language proficiency, we include a dummy in the analysis representing this difference. We also analyzed a Danish survey conducted in 1986 that included both respondent and interviewer reports. This survey allowed us to assess the implications of such differences directly. Our findings, presented in appendix table A1, show that there is a strong correlation between the two measures ( $r = .71$ ). More important, when we code both variables on an interval scale ranging from one to three, we find virtually the same means: 2.13 for both respondent and interviewer assessment. A  $t$ -test for paired variables turns out to be not statistically significant ( $t = -.08$ ). Hence, we can conclude from this particular case where measures can directly be compared, that levels of language proficiency do not differ between sources of report.

### Measurement of Independent Variables

The data set contains independent variables at the destination, origin, setting, and individual level. We discuss all variables one by one below.

*Presence of left-wing parties in the government.*—We rated the presence of left-wing parties in the government as “1” when they form a single party, “0.5” when they join a coalition, and “0” when they are absent from the government. Because coalitions change over time, and policy measures need some time to become effective, we scored the presence of left-wing parties in the government in the 1980s. Information on the presence of left-wing parties in the government was obtained from Internet sources of the national governments and more general Internet sites for a number of countries (e.g., De Zárte 2003; Derksen 2003).

*Anti-immigrant attitudes.*—Data on prejudice toward immigrants were obtained from the first wave of the European Values Studies (Barker, Halman, and Vloet 1992) and World Values Studies (Inglehart et al. 2000), which took place in the period 1981–84. We used the question, Who do you not want to have as neighbors? and computed the proportions responding “immigrants” for each country.

*Economic development.*—We use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per

<sup>4</sup> Objective assessment of language skills would be desirable, but self-reported or interviewer-assessed language skills have become standard practice in studies on language skills. Little is known to what extent and in which direction bias in self-assessed measurements occurs. However, Carliner (2000) discusses this issue and concludes that self-report and test-based measures highly correlate.



capita in constant U.S. dollars in 1980 as a measure of the economic situation in the origin country (World Bank 2001).

*Globalization.*—We focus on trade globalization as a measure of the more general process of economic globalization. Trade globalization refers to the extent to which the long-distance and global exchange of commodities has increased (or decreased) relative to the exchange of commodities within national societies (Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000). Following Chase-Dunn et al. (2000), we use the ratio of the value of national imports to GDP, in percentages, as an indicator of the level of trade globalization in the world-system. Information was obtained from the World Bank (2001).

*Political suppression.*—A rating of political and civil rights, based on information collected by Freedom House (Karatnycky and Piano 2002). Political rights vary from “1” (e.g., free and fair elections, power for opposition) to “7” (e.g., oppressive regime, civil war). Civil liberties vary from “1” (e.g., freedom of expression and religion, free economic activity) to “7” (e.g., no religious freedom, political terror, and no free association). We used the sum score for each country (2–14) for the 1980–90 period.

*Religious origin.*—Because the destination countries we examine are predominantly Christian, we include a dummy for origin countries that have a predominant non-Christian population and use predominantly Christian countries as a reference. Those countries with more than 50% Christian adherents in the 1960–80 period were assumed to be predominantly Christian. Information is obtained from Brierley (1997).

*Relative group size.*—We used this variable for the number of immigrants relative to the total population, expressed as a percentage. Information on this dimension is not widely available for earlier times and for smaller groups. However, using several sources (e.g., census of Australia and the United States; Eurostat 2000; OECD 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999a, 2000, 2001), we managed to estimate averages for all groups in the 1980–90 period.

*Official language.*—To construct this variable, we use information on official language (i.e., language used at school and in formal settings) and dominant language (i.e., language actively spoken by at least 40% of the population; Grimes 2000). When the destination language was the official and dominant language in the origin country, settings were excluded from analysis. This includes, for example, British immigrants in Australia, who are assumed to speak the destination language perfectly before migration. We constructed a dummy variable indicating that the destination language is the official (but not dominant) language in the origin country. Note that there are no origin countries in our analyses in which the destination language was dominant but not official.

*Linguistic distance.*—For those immigrant groups of which the desti-

nation language was not official in their country of origin (81%), we computed the linguistic distance between the origin and destination language. Using the well-known classification of language families (Finegan 1999; Grimes 2000), we constructed three dummy variables: same language family and same language branch (8%), same family but different branch (44%), and different family and different branch (29%). As the reference category, we used same language branch and those not exposed to the destination language prior to migration. Because a dummy for prior language exposure is included, deviations from the reference category reflect the role of linguistic distance only.

*Geographic distance.*—This variable is computed by the so-called “great circle distance method,” taking the capital cities as reference points (Byers 2002). The distance, measured in kilometers, is computed for every origin by destination combination, and in case the capital city is ambiguous for a certain country (e.g., former Yugoslavia), we use the main city in that region as a reference.<sup>5</sup> While for some of the 360 groups we analyze this measure will overestimate their actual travel distance, and for other groups the distance will be underestimated, the overall result will indicate the general impact of travel distance. More important, it should be emphasized that distance is an indicator of travel costs, and that a substantial proportion of immigrants probably travel by plane. The price of airplane tickets generally does not vary much within destinations, so that it matters little that only the capital city is used as a reference point. Nevertheless, we will also estimate our models with modifications for two groups for which our measure clearly overestimates the travel distance (Cubans and Mexicans in the United States).

*Survey characteristics.*—We include two measures of surveys: (a) whether the second-language ability of the respondent was assessed by the interviewer or by the respondent, and (b) whether the question on language ability was direct or indirect (i.e., after an initial question about the languages the respondent speaks). These characteristics vary among surveys within destination countries.

Before proceeding, it is important to explore the correlations among the various macrolevel characteristics. We calculated bivariate Pearson's correlations at the setting level.<sup>6</sup> The results are presented in table 3. The

<sup>5</sup> One kilometer is about .622 miles.

<sup>6</sup> Because some variables are of nominal level, Pearson's  $r$  is less adequate. However, using other measures of association, such as Cramer's  $V$ , we obtained similar results. For the dummy variables on language differences, we used multiple correlations. That is, we regressed each variable on the set of language dummy variables and calculated the multiple  $R$ . Note further that correlations among origin variables and destination variables are very similar when measured at the origin and destination level, respectively.

TABLE 3  
BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MACROLEVEL VARIABLES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Left-wing parties ....	1												
Prejudice .....	1												
National imports/GDP ...	-.57	1											
GDP origin .....	-.13	-.02	1										
Political suppression ....	-.04	-.04	.06	1									
Non-Christian origin ....	.05	-.10	-.11	-.46	1								
Relative group size .....	-.02	.07	-.06	-.23	.51	1							
Official language ....	10	.35	-.15	.09	-.03	1							
Language distance 1 .....	-.21	.14	.33	-.16	-.15	-.08	1						
Language distance 2 .....	26	-.35	-.06	.22	-.14	-.24	-.04	1					
Language distance 3 .....	-.03	.02	-.23	-.07	.02	-.18	.02	-.39	1				
Set of dummies*	.00	.14	-.01	.04	.23	.47	.08	-.32	-.27	1			
Geographic distance .....	.30	.37	.35	.25	.27	.49	.10	..	..	..	1		
	.02	-.10	.00	.12	.01	.01	-.01	.05	-.06	.00	.01	.23	1

NOTE — Correlations computed at setting level ( $N = 360$ )

\* Multiple correlation between the set of language dummies (9–11) and the respective other variable.

highest correlation is between the presence of left-wing parties in the government and anti-immigrant prejudice ( $r = -.57$ ). Other moderately strong correlations are between non-Christian origin, on the one hand, and political suppression in the origin country ( $r = .51$ ), the set of language variables ( $r = .49$ ), and highest linguistic distance ( $r = .47$ ) on the other. Furthermore, the correlation between GDP origin and political suppression in the origin country is  $r = -.46$ . Although some of the correlations at the macrolevel are substantial, they are not so high that there are concerns for multicollinearity.

In order to take compositional differences into account we include the following individual variables:

*Age at migration.*—Measured in years or estimated midpoints for surveys using categories. For the census data of Australia and the United States, the older immigrant cohorts had to be excluded from our analysis, because the exact date of their arrival is unknown.

*Duration of residence.*—This variable is well documented and is measured in years.

*Schooling.*—Schooling is a variable that records the total years of full-time education. In those surveys for which no direct measure of years of schooling was included, we relied on educational level. We then computed the average years needed to obtain that level using the International Standard Classification of Education, 1997 (ISCED-97; OECD 1999b).

*Sex.*—We also included sex in our analysis, because origins, destinations, and settings might differ in sex ratio, and research has found gender differences in language fluency (Stevens 1986).

Table 4 presents descriptive information of the variables included in our analyses.

### Analyses and Models

We employ linear- and logit-regression techniques to estimate destination-language fluency. Because the dependent variables in the analyses are of ordinal level, ordered-logit or multinomial-logit estimates are more suited. However, several authors remark that with destination-language fluency as a four-point dependent variable, the coefficients from ordered-logit and linear regression have the same sign, relative size, and statistical significance (Carliner 2000; Chiswick 1991). Also, linear and logit regression are somewhat easier to interpret and can be used more easily in a multilevel framework (see below).

Previous research on destination-language proficiency has estimated individual and contextual effects without taking into account the multilevel structure of the data. The impact of contextual variables on destination-language proficiency is then estimated using regression analysis at

# Immigrant Groups and Destination-Language Proficiency

TABLE 4  
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES

	Range	Mean	SD
Language proficiency.			
Four-point scale ...	1-4	3.17	.94
Two-point scale ...	0/1	.48	.50
Destination variables:			
Left-wing parties ...	0-6	2.55	2.22
Anti-immigrant prejudice ...	3.10-19.80	11.77	5.00
Origin variables:			
National imports/GDP (%) ...	6-224	45.52	26.90
Non-Christian origin ...	0/1	.45	.50
Political suppression ...	2-14	8.30	3.96
GDP per capita (in 1,000s USD) ...	.1-32.4	5.03	6.49
Setting variables:			
Official language ...	0/1	.22	.41
Language distance:			
Same language branch ...	0/1	.17	.37
Indo-European, other branch ...	0/1	.35	.48
Non-Indo-European ...	0/1	.26	.44
Relative group size (%) ...	.00-2.48	.09	.24
Geographic distance (in 1,000s km) ...	.5-18.0	8.13	4.40
Individual variables:			
Male ...	0/1	.52	.50
Age at migration ...	0-88	25.08	12.94
Years since migration ...	0-77	13.26	9.34
Years of schooling ...	0-24	10.96	4.71

NOTE — Statistics are computed at corresponding level.

the individual level. In this way, the error terms at the contextual level are neglected and the standard errors of the parameters are underestimated (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999). As a result, empirical support for contextual hypotheses can be unjustified.

Instead of employing simple regression analysis, we make use of multilevel models with random intercepts. These models allow us to assess the variance at different levels and to explain this variance by including individual and contextual variables. At the lowest level, destination-language proficiency is affected by individual characteristics, such as duration of residence and age at the time of migration. This can be designated as the individual or microlevel. Immigrants are then nested in both their country of origin and their country of destination. Because these macro-level components affect language proficiency at the same level, the multilevel structure is nonhierarchical. Instead, immigrants are contained within a cross-classification of their country of origin and country of

destination, and the multilevel structure is therefore most appropriately treated with "cross-classified" models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999).

Using these models, we include a random main effect of country of origin, a random main effect of country of destination, and a random "immigrant effect" at the individual level (i.e., the deviation of immigrants' score from the setting mean). It is important to emphasize that we do not include a random interaction effect of settings (i.e., the origin by destination combination). The reason is that, as observed elsewhere as well (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, p. 378), the sample sizes at the setting level are not sufficient to distinguish the variance attributable to the random interaction effect of settings from the within-setting variance. The variance of settings is therefore tapped by the variance of origins and the variance of destinations and is not independently assessed. However, setting effects are estimated at the appropriate origin-by-destination level. We make use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques provided in the software program *Multilevel Modeling in Windows* (MLwiN) to estimate our models (Browne 2002). Note that we also estimate additional models in which destinations are measured per survey, resulting in a total of 22 destination-survey cases. These models enable us to assess the role of survey effects.

Important to emphasize is that we compare immigrants with respect to their language proficiency at the time of the survey. Although we control for the duration of stay in the destination, it should be recognized that the acquisition of a second language is a dynamic process. Immigrant groups enter their destination with a certain number of skills in the second language, they gradually learn the language, and they ultimately reach a certain level of proficiency. Differences between groups—or more precisely, between combinations of origin and destination—can then arise in three ways: groups may have different initial language levels, they may differ in the speed with which they learn the language, and they may differ in the level they ultimately have after a substantial number of years in the destination (i.e., reach different plateaus). If Indian immigrants in the United States, for example, on average have better second-language skills than Chinese immigrants, is this because they assimilated better or because they were already more proficient in English to begin with? With a cross-sectional design, it is impossible to separate these components very well. As a solution, some researchers have used a synthetic cohort approach, but this design is potentially biased without a separation of immigrant cohort effects and duration of stay effects (Borjas 1985; Carliner 2000). Although we include duration of stay in our models as well, we cannot separate duration effects from immigrant cohort effects because

the surveys we consider are generally not far apart in time. This makes a synthetic cohort design less feasible.

However, we followed an alternative approach to solve this problem. First, we excluded by design all groups in our data set that spoke the language fluently already upon arrival. These are groups for which the dominant language in their origin resembles that of their destination, such as Canadian or British immigrants in the United States. Second, for the remaining (nonfluent-speaking) groups, we developed hypotheses about the degree to which they were exposed to the destination language in the country of origin. More specifically, we developed two measures for prior language exposure (i.e., degree of globalization and similarity of official languages), and we include these in the multivariate models. By examining these prior exposure measures, we think we take into account the larger part of the contextual variation in initial language ability.<sup>7</sup> Hence, the (other) hypotheses we test refer to the speed of language acquisition and to the level that immigrants ultimately reach. Both of these will be reflected in the level of language proficiency at the time of the survey.

## RESULTS

The analytical part of our discussion consists of three sections. First, we present descriptive information on language proficiency by origin, destination, and setting. We show which origin groups have relatively good or bad command of the destination language, in which host societies immigrants speak the language best or worst, and which specific combinations perform well. Second, we examine the amount of variation that exists at different levels. We decompose the total variation by individual, origin, and destination, and examine to what extent inclusion of theoretically informed variables reduces the unexplained variance. Third, we test our hypotheses using multilevel techniques.

### Descriptive Analyses

For an initial assessment of the impact of the social context on immigrants' language proficiency, table 5 presents immigrants' observed mean language score on a four-point scale by origin, destination, and setting. Because it is not possible to present the findings on all 182 origin groups included in our data set (and the 360 observed combinations of origins

<sup>7</sup> Studies measuring change in language ability in a prospective fashion are still in their infancy (Jasso et al. 2003) and do not consider more than one destination. In addition, there are no studies that do contain direct measures of prior ability at the contextual level; all studies use (at best) proxies for ability at arrival, and this is also our approach.

TABLE 5  
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY BY DESTINATION AND ORIGIN COUNTRY: MEANS FOR 12 SELECTED ORIGIN GROUPS

ORIGIN	BELGIUM						ALL ADJ.
	AUS	Dutch	French	Mixed	DEN	GB	
China .....	2.77	..	...	...	.	2.40	2.68
Greece .....	2.81	...	.	.	.	2.69	2.96
India ....	3.91	..	...	...	...	2.94	3.58
Italy ..	3.06	...	...	...	.	2.75	3.02
Morocco ...	.	2.53	3.03	2.94	...	...	2.90
Pakistan .....	...	..	...	.	3.60	2.60	3.09
Philippines .	3.71	...	.	...	.	2.94	3.64
Poland .....	3.13	...	...	...	...	2.88	3.10
Spain ....	3.00	...	...	...	...	2.74	3.02
Turkey .....	2.59	2.23	2.56	2.37	3.14	2.57	3.20
Yugoslavia .	2.98	...	.	...	3.61	2.66	3.25
Vietnam .....	2.35	..	...	...	...	2.52	2.79
All .....	3.27	2.32	2.71	2.76	3.43	3.07	3.21
All adj ...	2.89	1.93	2.25	2.30	2.64	2.50	2.84

NOTE.—Adjusted total computed with models including age at migration, duration, duration squared, schooling, and sex (male=1) The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very well)



and destinations), we selected for our descriptive purposes 12 well-known immigrant groups that are observed in at least three destinations. The observed language scores are presented for settings and for origins and destinations (total).

Such a description does not take into account the role of composition effects, nor does it estimate the role of each contextual factor independent of the other contextual factors. Table 5 therefore also presents the results of a multivariate cross-classified multilevel model with dummy variables for origins and destinations, in which we controlled for the individual-level variables age at migration, duration of residence, duration of residence squared, schooling, and sex. The 170 other origin groups were combined in one category in this model. The adjusted means present the predicted level of language ability for each destination country and for each origin country, with all individual factors centered around the mean and males as the reference category. Predictions for origin countries are evaluated holding constant destination. Similarly, predictions for destination countries are evaluated holding constant origin (set to the value of the "other" groups). The results suggest that origins, destinations, and settings all play an important role in the language skills of immigrants.

Consider, first, the results from the perspective of immigrants' origins. The average language score of all immigrants in our data set is 3.17, slightly more than speaking the language "well" (score 3). Of the 12 selected groups, immigrants from the Philippines (3.64) and India (3.58) have particularly good language skills, while those from China (2.68), Turkey (2.64), and especially Vietnam (2.58) have little proficiency of the destination language. The total adjusted estimates show that the differences between these origin groups remain after taking relevant individual characteristics into account. The difference between an average male immigrant from India, who has a language score of 3.53, and a comparable immigrant from Vietnam (2.10) is almost 1.5 points. This suggests that characteristics of the country of origin have a contextual effect, above and beyond the composition of individual traits.

Differences in immigrants' language skills are also pronounced between destination countries. Host societies in which few immigrants speak the language well are the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium (2.32) and Norway (2.51). Controlling for composition effects, these countries remain at the bottom of the receiving regions, accompanied by the French-speaking part of Belgium, which ranks second lowest. Immigrants in the United States (3.21), Australia (3.27), and Denmark (3.43) clearly have better proficiency of the destination language. The good performance of immigrants in Denmark is due to composition effects and should not be exaggerated, for it ranks only fourth best in the list of adjusted totals.

The top ranking of immigrants in the United States and Australia remains the same, however.

Along with differences between origins and destinations, table 5 also provides some information about the role of setting effects. Compare, for instance, the language skills of Pakistanis in Great Britain and the United States. In Britain, Pakistanis have an average language score of 2.60, which is below the average score of Pakistanis in all destinations (3.09) and also below the mean language score of all immigrants in Great Britain (3.07). By contrast, in the United States, the average language skills of Pakistanis (3.53) are far above their general score (3.09) and also above the average of immigrants in the United States (3.21). Apparently, then, the specific situation of Pakistanis in Great Britain and the United States determines their deviance from the general pattern expected by origin and destination effects.

Although these initial descriptive figures are interesting, they primarily serve as an illustration that the country of origin, the country of destination, and the combination of the two are important for immigrants' language proficiency. To assess and interpret such differences in a more systematic way, however, it is important to examine all 182 origin groups and all origin-by-destination combinations, and to take survey effects into account. We now turn to such an analysis.

### Decomposition of Variance

How much does immigrants' language proficiency vary between individuals, origins, destinations, and settings? And to what extent do the micro- and macrovariables included in our analyses explain the variance at each level? To answer these questions, table 6 presents the variance at different levels with and without the inclusion of macrolevel variables. It should be remarked that no separate random variance component is included for settings.

To begin, we estimated an empty model, defined as a model with random intercepts only, without the inclusion of explanatory variables. Our analyses report a variation of 0.101 between destinations, 0.177 between origins, and 0.667 between individuals. The fraction of the total variance due to the macrolevel is  $(0.101 + 0.177)/(0.101 + 0.177 + 0.667) = 0.294$ . Hence, more than a quarter of the individual differences in second-language proficiency of immigrants can be attributed to origin and destination effects. This suggests that macrolevel factors play an important role in immigrants' language proficiency.

Decomposing the macrolevel variance into variance among origins and variance among destinations yields the following results. The fraction of the total variability that is due to differences among destinations is 0.107.

# Immigrant Groups and Destination-Language Proficiency

TABLE 6  
DECOMPOSITION OF VARIANCE CROSS-CLASSIFIED MODELS

	Null Model	Individual Variables	Individual + Destination Variables	Individual + Origin Variables	Individual + Setting Variables	All Variables
Destination ..	.101 (.053)	.090 (.048)	.076 (.042)	.092 (.051)	.093 (.048)	.073 (.042)
Origin . . . . .	.177 (.021)	.104 (.012)	.104 (.012)	.083 (.010)	.065 (.008)	.051 (.006)
Individual ..	.667 (.002)	.476 (.002)	.476 (.002)	.476 (.002)	.475 (.002)	.475 (.002)
Total . . . . .	.945	.670	.656	.651	.633	.599

NOTE —Nos in parentheses are SEs

The fraction due to the origin level is 0.187. Hence, origin plays a more important role than destination, which is probably related to the larger number of origin than destination cases, which, in addition, are all Western. Nevertheless, both immigrants' country of origin and country of destination are associated with language skills.

To assess the role of composition effects, we examine to what extent individual variables can explain macrolevel variations.<sup>8</sup> When only individual variables are added, the explained variance for destinations is 11%, or  $(0.101 - 0.090)/0.101$ . For origins it is 41%. This indicates that differences between origins and destinations can partially be explained by differences in individual characteristics. More than half of the variance remains, however, suggesting that contextual effects are involved as well.

If the contextual approach advanced in this article is correct, the amount of variation of a certain component should diminish when context variables of that component are added to the model. This turns out to be the case. For example, the percentage reduction in error variance among destinations is  $([0.090 - 0.076]/0.090)$  16 when destination variables are added to the model with only individual variables. Similarly, the proportional reduction in variance is 20% among origins when origin variables are included. When setting variables are introduced in models with only individual variables, the total macrolevel variance is reduced by 19%.

## Testing the Hypotheses

The results of the cross-classified multilevel analyses of immigrants' destination-language proficiency are presented in table 7 (linear regression)

<sup>8</sup> See, however, Kreft and De Leeuw (1998) and Snijders and Bosker (1999) for drawbacks of explained proportion of variance in multilevel models.

TABLE 7

CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRANTS' DESTINATION-LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY ON INDIVIDUAL AND CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS IN NINE WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1980-99

	COUNTRIES AS ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS		COUNTRIES AS ORIGINS AND SURVEYS AS DESTINATIONS	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant . . . . .	2.887 (.133)	3.090 (.145)	2.774 (.092)	3.074 (.170)
Destination effects:				
Left-wing parties . . . . .	-.078** (.017)	-.063** (.015)	-.062** (.021)	-.055** (.013)
Prejudice . . . . .	-.025 (.014)	-.047** (.010)	-.020** (.006)	-.035** (.009)
Origin effects:				
National imports/GDP (%) . . . . .	.003** (.001)	.003** (.001)	.003** (.001)	.003** (.001)
Non-Christian origin . . . . .	.116* (.048)	.106* (.046)	.074 (.043)	.077* (.039)
Political suppression . . . . .	-.010 (.006)	-.013* (.006)	-.011* (.005)	-.011* (.005)
GDP per capita (in 1,000s USD) . . . . .	.006 (.004)	-.013 (.010)	-.012 (.009)	-.016* (.008)
GDP per capita squared . . . . .		.001 (.000)	.001 (.000)	.001* (.000)
Setting effects:				
Official language . . . . .	.247** (.028)	.245** (.027)	.211** (.028)	.211** (.030)
Language distance:				
Same language branch . . . . .	.000	.000	.000	.000
Indo-European, other branch . . . . .	-.049* (.020)	-.047* (.019)	-.067** (.019)	-.068** (.020)
Non-Indo-European . . . . .	-.158* (.063)	-.134* (.055)	-.016** (.052)	-.168** (.048)
Relative group size (%) . . . . .	-.108** (.008)	-.316** (.021)	-.318** (.022)	-.316** (.022)
Relative group size squared . . . . .		.098** (.009)	.103** (.009)	.102** (.009)
Geographic distance (1,000s km) . . . . .	-.004** (.001)	.017** (.005)	.024** (.005)	.025** (.005)
Geographic distance squared . . . . .		-.001** (.000)	-.001** (.000)	-.001** (.000)
Individual variables:				
Male . . . . .	.043** (.003)	.044** (.003)	.043** (.003)	.043** (.003)

Age at migration	.....	-.019**	(.000)	-.019**	(.000)	-.019**	(.000)
Years since migration	.....	.042**	(.001)	.042**	(.001)	.042**	(.001)
Years since migration squared	.....	-.001**	(.000)	-.001**	(.000)	-.001**	(.000)
Years of schooling	.....	.062**	(.000)	.062**	(.000)	.062**	(.000)
Survey variables							
Respondent assessment (vs. interviewer)	.....					-.086	(.128)
Indirect questioning (vs direct)	.....					-.008	(.102)
N of observations							
Destination	.....	11		11		22	
Origin	.....	182		182		182	
Setting	.....	360		360		360	
Individual	.....	186,091		186,091		186,091	

Note.—Nos in parentheses are SEs

\*  $P < .05$

\*\*  $P < .01$

and table 8 (logit regression). Model 1 includes all microlevel and macrolevel variables. Because earlier studies have found some curve-linear macrolevel effects (Espenshade and Fu 1997), model 2 adds quadratic specifications. In general, the linear and logit models yield similar results, but the logit estimates are more often statistically significant. Models 3 and 4 are estimated for sensitivity analyses and will be discussed below.

*Destination effects.*—Starting with destination effects, our analyses support the idea that the political climate is linked to immigrants' language skills. Both linear and logit estimates in model 1 show that the more strongly left-wing parties are represented in the government in the 1980s, the less well immigrants speak the destination language. In model 2 of table 8 (logit estimates), the relationship becomes just below significance levels when quadratic specifications are added. All in all, however, our findings show a clear negative impact of the presence of left-wing parties in the government on immigrants' language skills. The United States plays an important role in this result, since this is considered a country with no left-wing parties in the government, and second-language proficiency there is relatively high. In linear and logit models without the United States (not presented), the effect is reduced and becomes insignificant.

We also find support for the idea that anti-immigrant attitudes play a role in second-language learning. In societies where attitudes toward immigrants are more negative, immigrants have poorer language skills than in destinations where attitudes are more positive toward immigrants. The effect is statistically significant in the logit models. The magnitude of the effect is  $-.112$  in logit model 1, showing that for a one percentage point increase in negative attitudes of the native population, the expected odds of speaking the language very well declines by 11% for all immigrants (i.e.,  $1 - e^{-.112}$ ). Anti-immigrant sentiments vary from 3% to almost 20% of the population, which suggests that this is an important factor that accounts for differences between receiving countries. However, an alternative interpretation of our finding could be that anti-immigrant sentiments are the result of immigrants' having few language skills. We tried to deal with this issue by measuring anti-immigrant sentiments prior to measures of language proficiency, but we cannot rule out this possibility conclusively.

*Origin effects.*—With respect to the role of immigrants' country of origin, we included factors that relate to the level of globalization, as well as to the political, economic, and religious conditions in the sending country. The results of both the linear and logit models indicate that the degree of globalization in immigrants' origin country is important for their language proficiency. As predicted, people who migrated from countries with a higher level of economic globalization have better language skills. Logit model 1 shows that the effect of globalization is substantial. A one stan-

dard deviation increase in the globalization measure (i.e., 26.9, table 4) is associated with a 42% increase in language fluency, which is a substantial effect (i.e.,  $1 - e^{26.9 \times .013}$ ). This clearly confirms the notion that prior exposure to other languages is an important factor in the contextual differences in language fluency.

Another origin factor is religion. Because all destination countries are predominantly Christian, we used predominantly (non-)Christian origin as a contrast. We find no support for the idea that immigrants from non-Christian origin speak the destination language less well than those from mainly Christian societies. On the contrary, our cross-classified multilevel analyses show that immigrants from non-Christian origins have significantly better language skills. According to logit model 1, the odds that immigrants from non-Christian societies speak the language very well is 47% higher than the comparable odds for immigrants from Christian societies.

Political suppression in the origin country appears to have the expected negative impact on destination-language skills. The effect is significant in the logit models. People who move from countries with politically oppressive regimes have a lesser command of the language of the receiving society. This finding is in line with earlier research done by Chiswick and Miller (2001), who found that refugees in Canada are less likely than economic immigrants to speak the destination language well.

We further expected a negative effect of modernization in the country of origin on language proficiency. However, model 1 of the logit and linear estimates finds no significant effects of GDP per capita. Logit model 2 (table 8) shows that the main effect of GDP per capita is negative and the quadratic term is positive. Both effects are significant. The turning point of the effect in logit model 2 is located at about \$11,500 GDP per capita (i.e.,  $1,000 \times .0855 / [2 \times .0037]$ ). Language fluency declines with GDP before that point and increases with GDP after that point. A graphical examination of these effects, however, shows that the initial declines are very small (not shown). The increases after the minimum point are more substantial in size, but there are relatively few cases in that part of the data (i.e., 13%). Hence, we conclude that the level of modernization in the origin country has no important general effect on language proficiency. Note that earlier research conducted in the United States found a positive association between the per capita GNP in the home country and immigrants' language proficiency (Espenshade and Fu 1997; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990).

*Setting effects.*—We now turn to our discussion of setting effects. A first setting factor is whether the official language of the destination country resembles that of immigrants' origin. Both linear and logit analyses show that those originating from a country in which the destination language

TABLE 8

CROSS-CLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRANTS' DESTINATION-LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY ON  
INDIVIDUAL AND CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS IN NINE WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1980-99

	COUNTRIES AS ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS		COUNTRIES AS ORIGINS AND SUR- VEYS AS DESTINATIONS	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Constant . . . . .	166 (.177)	239 (.001)	865 (.172)	.569 (.121)
Destination effects:				
Left-wing parties . . . . .	-.154** (.032)	-.094 (.054)	-.207** (.030)	-.203** (.022)
Prejudice . . . . .	-.112** (.010)	-.106** (.009)	-.101** (.009)	-.095** (.017)
Origin effects				
National imports/GDP (%) . . . . .	013** (.002)	015** (.003)	013** (.002)	016** (.002)
Non-Christian origin . . . . .	.386** (.119)	.407** (.090)	.305 (.176)	.529** (.164)
Political suppression . . . . .	-.050** (.009)	-.039** (.011)	-.076** (.007)	-.108** (.011)
GDP per capita (in 1,000s USD) . . . . .	-.009 (.016)	-.085** (.020)	-.120** (.035)	-.042** (.010)
GDP per capita squared . . . . .		.004** (.001)	.005** (.002)	.001* (.001)
Setting effects				
Official language . . . . .	.616** (.094)	.375** (.114)	.297* (.129)	.305** (.093)
Language distance:				
Same branch . . . . .	.000	.000	.000	.000
Indo-European, other branch . . . . .	-.190** (.066)	-.359** (.069)	-.373** (.058)	-.370** (.066)
Non-Indo-European . . . . .	-.983** (.141)	-.1216** (.204)	-.850** (.105)	-.1015** (.017)
Relative group size (%) . . . . .	-.297** (.030)	-.925** (.069)	-.943** (.073)	-.953** (.084)
Relative group size squared . . . . .		.275** (.028)	.288** (.031)	.291** (.035)
Geographic distance (1,000s km) . . . . .	-.041** (.002)	-.122** (.014)	-.078** (.011)	-.104** (.011)
Geographic distance squared . . . . .		.004** (.001)	.002** (.000)	.003** (.000)
Individual variables:				
Male . . . . .	.000 (.012)	.000 (.012)	.003 (.012)	.003 (.012)



Age at migration . . . . .	-.054**	(.001)	-.054**	(.001)	-.054**	(.001)
Years since migration . . . . .	.113**	(.003)	.114**	(.002)	.114**	(.002)
Years since migration squared . . . . .	-.002**	(.000)	-.002**	(.000)	-.002**	(.000)
Years of schooling . . . . .	.162**	(.002)	.162**	(.002)	.162**	(.002)
Survey variables.						
Respondent assessment (vs. interviewer) . . . . .						
Indirect questioning (vs direct) . . . . .						
<i>N</i> of observations:						
Destination . . . . .	11		11		22	
Origin . . . . .	182		182		182	
Setting . . . . .	360		360		360	
Individual . . . . .	186,091		186,091		186,091	

NOTE — Nos in parentheses are SEs

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$

is official have better language skills than those born in a country in which the destination language is not official. Model 1 in table 7 shows that, measured on a four-point scale, the difference between these groups is .247. This difference supports the idea that these immigrants were exposed to the destination language prior to migration, and therefore had higher language skills upon arrival. This finding also concurs with research done by Chiswick and Miller (2001) in Canada, who found that immigrants from a former British, French, or American colony have better command of the destination language.

Linguistic distance also plays an important role in language proficiency. We predicted that, for immigrants whose destination language was not official in the origin country, linguistic distance diminishes language proficiency. As expected, tables 7 and 8 show that people who moved from countries having an official language which does not belong to the Indo-European family have the lowest destination-language skills. Those who moved from an Indo-European language speaking country, but not of the same Germanic or Romance branch as the destination country, rank second lowest. The best destination-language skills are observed among language combinations that are linguistically most similar: Indo-European languages within the same Germanic or Romance language group. The odds of speaking the language very well for these groups is 2.67 times as great as it is for immigrants from non-Indo-European language speaking countries. Earlier research on linguistic distance found confirmations for immigrants in Canada (Chiswick and Miller 2001) and Israel (Beenstock et al. 2001). Espenshade and Fu (1997), however, found that in the United States, immigrants from Arabic-speaking countries have better English skills than those from linguistically closer Spanish-speaking countries.

Another setting factor that may play a role in language proficiency is the relative size of the immigrant group. Both linear and logit analyses show that relative group size has the predicted negative impact on immigrants' language proficiency. Thus, the larger the immigrant group in a particular country, the poorer the language skills of that group. The effect is statistically significant in both the linear and the logit model. The magnitude of the effect is  $-.297$  in the logit model, showing that for a one percentage point increase in relative group size (which is a considerable range for minority groups), the expected odds of speaking the language very well declines by 26%. We also find that a quadratic specification of the group size effect is statistically significant (model 2). Using a four-point scale, the turning point is located at 1.6%, which is at the high end of the scale (the mean relative group size is .09). Increases in relative size up to 1.6% are associated with a decline in language skills, but after that point, there is an increase in language skills associated with increases in size. Because there is only one group that is more than 1.6%

of the population, this means that language skills decrease with group size, but that it declines faster at smaller sizes than at larger sizes.

A final setting factor considered is the geographic distance between the country of origin and the country of destination. Model 1 of both linear and logit estimates shows that the relationship between distance and language proficiency is negative instead, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis.<sup>9</sup> Adding a quadratic term in model 2 yields significant results as well. In the linear regression model, the main effect is positive and the quadratic term is negative (table 7). Further graphical inspection, however, shows that the magnitude of the effect is negligible (the maximum predicted level is 3.16 while the minimum predicted level is 3.09). In the logit model, the main effect is negative and the quadratic term is positive (table 8). The extreme is located at about 16,000 kilometers, which is also the maximum of the scale. Hence, this model suggests that language ability generally declines with distance, although it declines faster at small distances than at large distances. The magnitude of the effect is more substantial here: immigrants coming from a place about 500 kilometers away have a 2.5 times greater chance of speaking the language fluently compared to immigrants who needed to travel 16,000 kilometers. Note that, using linear functions, earlier studies found a slightly positive relationship between geographic distance and immigrants' language skills in Canada (Chiswick and Miller 2001) and a negative relationship in the United States (Espenshade and Fu 1997; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990).

*Sensitivity analyses.*—Because a cross-national analysis of different surveys raises questions about comparability, we performed sensitivity analyses. We estimated the linear and logit models 3 and 4 again, using surveys as destinations. This results in 22 destination-survey cases. Model 4 includes two survey characteristics that could bias cross-national analyses. The findings in table 7, using linear regression, do not suggest that the assessment of immigrants' language proficiency differs by source of report, nor do we find that direct versus indirect questioning affects the assessment of language skills. Logit analyses presented in table 8, however, suggest that direct versus indirect questioning affects the assessment of language skills. We find that surveys using indirect questioning yield higher language scores than surveys using direct questioning. More important, though, is that the macrolevel effects in tables 7 and 8 remain

<sup>9</sup> We reanalyzed our models with modifications for two groups for which our measure of the distance between the capital cities overestimates the actual travel distance (i.e., Cubans and Mexicans in the United States set to the value of 250 kilometers). This resulted in the same results at four digits (e.g., linear estimate, model 1,  $b = -.00371$ ;  $SE = .00068$ ). We therefore use distance between capital cities as a measure of geographic distance between origin and destination.

the same after controlling for these survey characteristics. This result suggests that our findings are quite robust.

## CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

In this article, we contributed to earlier contextual approaches to immigrants' destination-language proficiency in three ways. First, we addressed a previously overlooked factor: the role receiving societies have in the language proficiency of their immigrants (what we called destination effects). Second, we disentangled the role of the immigrant group, a factor that previous research has found to be of importance, into two contextual parts: group differences that persist across nations (origin effects) and group differences that change between destinations (setting or community effects). Third, we developed and applied a double-comparative research design, in which multiple origin groups are studied in multiple destinations simultaneously. This design provides the opportunity to disentangle and test these three groups of contextual effects in a convincing way. We collected and standardized 19 existing surveys on immigrants in nine Western societies (and 11 language regions), yielding a total of about 180,000 immigrants belonging to 182 different origin groups, observed in 360 settings.

We applied cross-classified multilevel techniques and found, in accordance with the macrolevel perspective pursued here, that immigrants' language proficiency varies between origins, destinations, and settings. About a quarter of the total variability in language skills can be attributed to the country of origin and country of destination. Controlling for individual-level correlates of language proficiency, more than half of these macrolevel differences between macrounits remain. This result implies that, besides composition effects, contextual effects play an important role in the second-language proficiency of immigrants.

In order to understand these contextual effects, we relied on three theoretical ideas about immigrants' language proficiency that have been suggested in the literature. According to these ideas, immigrants' destination-language skills are a function of exposure to that language (both prior to and after migration), of the difficulties of learning a new language, and of the economic incentives to invest in learning a new language. We used these ideas to develop hypotheses on the role of contextual factors that pertain to origins, destinations, and settings. Including these theoretically informed macrolevel variables, we were able to explain a substantial part of the variation among origins, destinations, and settings. While most of the results concur with our hypotheses, we also needed to reject some

influential hypotheses from the literature. In addition, some findings were unanticipated and ask for new explanations.

What explains the role of receiving nations? We find two important factors. First, in societies with a left-wing legacy, immigrants have poorer command of the destination language. Possibly, the political climate in these countries is more tolerant toward immigrants, resulting in fewer incentives to learn the host language. Another, though related, idea is that these societies more often adopt a linguistic-pluralism policy of integration, in which immigrants and their children are offered opportunities to speak and learn their mother tongue, and which (unintentionally) reduces immigrants' exposure to the second language. As a result, the linguistic-pluralism policy of integrating immigrants is associated with fewer destination-language skills compared to societies adopting a *laissez-faire* or assimilation language policy. Because we have not measured the political climate or integration policies directly, it is up to further research to examine how the relationship between political parties and immigrants' language proficiency should be interpreted.

We also found that a high degree of prejudice toward immigrants in the destination country negatively affects immigrants' language skills. This confirms the suggestion that anti-immigrant sentiments diminish the social interaction between natives and immigrants, which in turn decreases immigrants' exposure to the official language and hampers their process of language learning.

How are differences among origin groups to be interpreted? This study finds that, whatever their destination, immigrants from countries with more globalized economies speak the language better. This finding underscores our idea that immigrants from more economically globalized societies are more strongly exposed to the foreign language before immigrating, through such things as business relations, the media, or foreign-language learning at school. Furthermore, differences among origin groups are due to the social and political conditions at the time of migration. We find that those who moved from politically suppressed societies have a poorer command of the destination language. This finding concurs with the suggestion that political migrants are less efficient at learning a new language, due to their less favorable cognitive selection in general, and the higher amount of stress they experience than other immigrants.

Origin differences have less to do with the degree of modernization, although our study also shows that the effect of GDP is complex. In the logit models, we find that in most of the GDP range, differences in language proficiency are small. Effects are more substantial when looking at the small number of very wealthy origin countries: immigrants from these countries tend to have greater language ability than immigrants from other countries. We expected that the degree of modernization would

be inversely related to language proficiency, but this hypothesis needs to be rejected. One possible explanation for why the few wealthier origin groups do better is that immigrants from these countries received higher-quality schooling, which increased their efficiency in learning a new language.

We find no evidence for our hypothesis that non-Christian origin is associated with poorer language skills. We argued that immigrants from predominantly non-Christian countries would be more discriminated against, which in turn would reduce daily opportunities for learning the language. Our findings instead suggest that immigrants from non-Christian origins have better language skills. One explanation for this unanticipated finding is that the distance between the cultures of the home and host societies involves migration costs, hence selecting the more favorable immigrants from distant cultures. That explanation would concur with the efficiency approach to language learning and needs to be further researched. Another way to proceed would be to compare the language proficiency of different non-Christian groups. One possibility that needs to be researched is if Muslims speak the destination language less well than other groups, since the social distance between Muslims and natives is presumably greater than between natives and other non-Christian groups (e.g., Buddhists, Hindus).

Our third group of hypotheses referred to the combination of origin and destination. Several setting factors turned out to be important here. We find that immigrants who traveled to a destination with the same official language as their origin have better command of that language than groups without such resemblance. These groups were exposed to the destination language prior to migration, and their language proficiency upon arrival naturally surpassed that of other groups. Once in the country, immigrants' language proficiency is lower if the host language is more distant. This finding underscores the notion of efficiency because it is more difficult to learn languages that are linguistically distant from people's mother tongue. Furthermore, we find a negative relationship between the size of the immigrant group in the destination country and immigrants' language skills. This finding supports the exposure approach because opportunities to learn the new language from conversations with natives are more limited if the immigrant group is larger. The size effect may also point to the role of incentives because immigrants in larger groups can use their mother tongue in ethnic enclaves.

We found negative evidence for one hypothesis on the role of settings. Geographic distance has a negative rather than the expected positive effect, suggesting that immigrants whose origin country is close to the destination country have better command of the destination language. A large distance between origin and destination, it was argued, not only

positively selects the cognitive abilities of immigrants, but it also diminishes the likelihood of return migration, hence increasing economic incentives of learning the destination language. Perhaps this anomaly may be explained by migration and remigration patterns. When distances are small, groups can more easily travel between home and host locations. Because length of residence in the receiving nation is measured since the last entry, this would imply that geographically nearer groups have resided longer in the destination country than groups from larger distances. Hence, these groups have been more strongly exposed to the destination language than we were able to control for in our models.

We also examined the robustness of our findings. First of all, we used two different classifications of language proficiency. Our analyses, using a four-point scale and a two-point scale, generally yield similar results. Overall, the logit estimates show stronger effects than the linear estimates. Second, we analyzed additional models in which survey characteristics were taken into account. We found no difference between interviewer or respondent assessment of language skills. The logit analyses showed that indirect questioning yields somewhat higher scores of language skills than direct questioning. More important, however, the contextual effects we found remain the same after these survey characteristics are taken into account. All in all, the sensitivity analyses suggest that our findings are robust.

Finally, we need to emphasize that spoken language is just one aspect of general language proficiency. Although reading and writing proficiency have been examined before, it has been done with a single comparative design (Chiswick and Miller 1996; Dustmann 1994, 1997; Gonzalez 2000; Hayfron 2001). Subsequent research can use our multiple origin–multiple destination design to examine and explain contextual variations in writing and reading skills as well. More generally, the double comparative approach developed in this study can be applied to other dimensions of immigrant integration, such as intermarriage, segregation, and socioeconomic attainment.

## APPENDIX

TABLE A1  
CROSS-TABULATION OF INTERVIEWER BY RESPONDENT ASSESSMENT OF DESTINATION-  
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN DENMARK, 1986 ( $N = 562$ )

RESPONDENT ASSESSMENT	INTERVIEWER ASSESSMENT			Total
	Good	Reasonable	Poor/Not at All	
Good . . . . .	78	29	3	110
Reasonable . . . . .	45	176	48	269
Poor/not at all . . . . .	2	33	148	183
Total . . . . .	125	238	199	562

SOURCE —Danish National Institute of Social Research (1986)

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# First Grade and Educational Attainment by Age 22: A New Story<sup>1</sup>

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Studies of the persistence of social stratification rely heavily on students' experience in secondary schools. In this study, outcomes for a randomly selected panel of Baltimore children, followed from age 6 to age 22, demonstrate that first graders' social contexts and personal resources explain educational attainment levels in early adulthood about as well as do similar resources measured in adolescence. Years of schooling and the highest level of school attempted respond most strongly to family SES, but parental psychological support and the child's own temperament/disposition had substantial effects on first-grade academic outcomes. The predictive power of race, gender, SES, and neighborhood quality measured in first grade on educational status at age 22 supports Lucas's "effectively maintained inequality."

In seeking to understand why social stratification persists, so far, analysts have focused much more intently on secondary schooling than on young children's school experience. There are reasons to suppose, however, that children's social contexts early in life matter as much or more for their ultimate attainment than do the social contexts they experience later. Indeed, the literature suggests that children are launched into achievement trajectories when they start formal schooling or even before, and the patterns of these early trajectories are highly stable over childhood and

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adolescence (see Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber 1994, 2003; Dauber, Alexander, and Entwisle 1996).

No doubt the reasons for this stability are multiple. First, the socioeconomic (SES) of the school where children begin is probably not much different from the SES of the school where they finish. Second, parents' plans for their children's education are in place long before high school, and these plans—or lack of them—affect how they treat their children and how they interact with school personnel (Entwisle and Hayduk 1981; Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 1997). All these factors have implications for reproduction across social lines because parents' ideas about their children's future tend to reflect their social structural location—for example, Bourdieu's *habitus* notion (1977, 1990). In addition, the basic curriculum is cumulative, especially in the early years. Starting in first grade, reading and math skills are built up step by step; doing well one year helps children do better the next year. Noting this persistence almost four decades ago, Bloom (1964, p. 110) said: "All subsequent learning in the school is affected and in large part determined by what the child has learned . . . by the end of grade 3" (see also Husèn 1969; Kraus 1973).

The best evidence of long-term effects of early schooling probably comes from randomized experiments evaluating preschools (see e.g., Barnett 1995; Darlington et al. 1980; Lazar and Darlington 1982) and by long-term follow-ups of participants in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID; see Garces, Thomas, and Currie 2002). For example, compared to their control group counterparts who did not attend preschool, low-income children who attended the Perry Preschool in the 1960s were less likely to be retained in grade or placed in special education as they progressed up through the grades, and they had higher achievement scores at age 14. Their advantage continued into adulthood: they had higher literacy scores at age 19, and by age 27 more of them had high school degrees or a GED (71% vs. 54%); more earned \$2,000 or more per month (29% vs. 7%), more owned their own homes (36% vs. 13%), and more had stayed off welfare (41% vs. 20%; Schweinhart, Barnes, and Weikart 1993).

No national study in the United States has yet directly linked school experience in the primary grades to educational outcomes in young adulthood, although Kerckhoff (1993) shows such long-term ties in the United Kingdom. Even so, the idea that long-term trajectories are key to understanding educational outcomes is a dominant theme in school-attainment research in the United States (Oakes 1985; Stevenson, Schiller, and Schneider 1994), with a number of shorter panel studies finding that early economic deprivation exacts a heavy toll on children's schooling: adolescents more often fail a grade if their mothers are on welfare early in the child's life (Furstenberg, Brooks-Gunn, and Morgan 1987), and children who are economically disadvantaged in first grade are more likely to drop

out of school in adolescence (Alexander et al. 2004; Ensminger and Slusarcick 1992; Reynolds 1992). Also, the long-term impact of family income on schooling is known to be greater for poor than for better-off children (Duncan et al. 1998).

Still, the precise links between resources possessed by first-grade children and their life chances as adults are not clear. What are the key resources that support children's schooling when they start first grade, and how important are they in terms of ultimate educational attainment? Some of the predictability of adult status obviously comes from the relative stability of students' own characteristics, like their cognitive abilities, but some of it also must stem from stability in children's social environments. Parents employ their social and economic capital on the child's behalf starting in grade 1 and before (Mayer 1997), and even when these resources are not steady, most children rely upon family support all along the line. Because the two tend to be strongly correlated, however, in practice, it is difficult to separate influences of children's own characteristics from influences of their social contexts. When children start kindergarten (Lee and Burkam 2002) or first grade (Entwisle et al. 1997), their standardized test scores follow an SES gradient, for example.

One purpose of this article is to separate and identify the major personal and social resources that support children's schooling in first grade. A second purpose is to propose a model that distinguishes between contextual and personal resources in predicting children's educational attainment later in life. This article is novel in that it seeks to determine the extent to which *early* resources of both kinds enhance or inhibit life chances. To address this question we use information about children who started first grade in Baltimore in 1982, and who were then followed for 16 years to age 22.

## BACKGROUND

The social stratification of children's educational trajectories has long been clear (Walters 2001). The Coleman report (Coleman et al. 1966) and many other large studies since then (see e.g., Jencks and Phillips 1998; Lee 2002) show gaps in achievement favoring richer children over their poorer counterparts, or whites over blacks. These gaps, visible even for children in the earliest grades, get larger with age, so even a slight edge in test scores during the early years can predict long-term advantage (Alexander et al. 1994, 2003; Consortium for Longitudinal Studies 1983; Ensminger and Slusarcick 1992; Entwisle and Hayduk 1982, 1988; Harnqvist 1977; Husén and Tuijnman 1991; Kerckhoff 1993; Kraus 1973; Luster and McAdoo 1996).



Many questions about social and personal resources in relation to attainment have been intensively studied for secondary school students, and parents' resources figure prominently in all these models (see e.g., Alexander and Eckland 1975; Sewell and Hauser 1975). Still, formative experiences involving parents during elementary and middle school, which have been studied much less, establish the conditions under which parents' influence comes into play at the secondary level (Haveman and Wolfe 1994). For example, parents who expect their first graders to go to college are more likely than other parents to make sure their children take algebra and a foreign language in middle school (Dauber et al. 1996).

SES is often taken to represent mainly parents' economic resources, but it reflects much more, including their tastes (e.g., Mayer 1997). For instance, middle-class parents more often advocate for their children at school than do working-class parents (Baker and Stevenson 1986; Hess 1970; Lareau 1987, 1992, 2002; Useem 1991). Middle-class parents give their children a sense of entitlement, and they also tend to have the kinds of interpersonal skills that foster children's development (Hess and Shipman 1965). For example, they tend to avoid negative feedback with their children (saying "no" all the time). They also tend to use relatively complex language to structure everyday experience (Hart and Risley 1995). Pointing to a picture of a lion in a storybook, for instance, they do not say to a child simply "That is a lion," but say in addition "Lions are animals, they eat other animals, not just grass," thus identifying lions as one of a *class* of animals and then differentiating lions from herbivorous animals.

The imprint of parents' status and class standing runs much deeper than economic and linguistic patterns. Related worldview differences constrain the horizons of some children but expand the horizons of others—a "sociology of the probable" (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Lamont and Lareau 1988). Parents' expectations for primary school children predict the specific actions they take to help children learn. Compared to parents with lower expectations, those who expect their first- and second-grade children to get high marks read to their children more, see the child's school records more often, ensure that their children borrow books from the library in the summer, and take their children on more summer trips (see Entwisle et al. 1997). All these examples of processes differ across social class boundaries (see Lareau 2002). Moreover, parents who have high expectations for their children encourage them to have high expectations for themselves (Entwisle and Hayduk 1982), and, among other things, these expectations lead children to participate more actively in class (Entwisle and Webster 1972).

The overlap of parents' expectations with their treatment of their children and the persistence of parents' early expectations produce consistency in children's social contexts. For example, parents' expectations for their

children's marks (teacher-assessed grades) at the beginning of first grade correlate with the number of school years they expect their six-year-old to complete ( $r = .28$ ). Moreover, parental expectations for their children's educational attainment measured in first grade correlate strongly with their educational expectations measured later (at age 13,  $r = .49$ ; at age 16,  $r = .44$ ).

Parents' expectations probably account for some of the long-term effects of preschool as well, although parent influence has been mostly overlooked in experimental evaluations of preschool programs (see Heckman 2000). Nevertheless, early preschool programs affect parents' expectations and aspirations (see Lazar and Darlington 1982) in that mothers of preschool children later have higher aspirations for their children and report more satisfaction with their children's schoolwork over the long term than do control group parents.

Other research bears out the influence of parents' expectations less directly. Hess et al. (1984) found that preschoolers whose mothers held high expectations did better in grade 6 than other children with similar ability in mathematics and vocabulary. Likewise, Stevenson and Newman (1986) found that mothers' ratings in grades 2, 3, and 5 predicted the self-concepts and academic attitudes their children evinced in grade 10. In sum, the literature suggests that parents (especially mothers) play an important role in children's schooling throughout childhood and adolescence, and they do so even though children change schools and neighborhoods (Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 2002).

It also seems reasonable that children who do well early in school possess more and perhaps different noncognitive skills that help them profit more from schooling than do children with fewer of those skills. And, as with cognitive skill differences, relevant noncognitive differences are patterned across social lines early in school. In the national Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS) kindergarten data, compared to other children, kindergarten teachers rate minority and low-income children as having more problem behaviors (arguing, fighting with others, getting angry easily) and in some cases as having greater difficulty in peer relationships (West, Denton, and Germino-Hausken 2000).

Children whose noncognitive skills help them do well initially could have a long-lasting advantage because, like cognitive skills, these skills also tend to persist. Doing well in first grade also helps children do better in later grades (Alexander and Entwisle 1988; Pallas et al. 1990). In a very real sense, children "produce" their own development. That is, their *own* actions, attitudes, and other personal qualities lead children to interact with others in ways that enhance or undercut their development. The child who is enthusiastic and ready to take part will do better in first grade than the child who is less engaged. Clearly, cognitive abilities

predict success in school—some children are quick to learn—but other personal attributes help too. Good work habits, a sunny disposition, personal attractiveness, enthusiasm, and similar qualities make children easier to teach and more pleasant to interact with. The child who is enthusiastic and ready to try new things will do better than the child who is less engaged (see Finn 1993; Finn and Rock 1997). Moreover, all else equal, first graders who responded more to feedback from their teachers tended to do better than other students in school four to eight years later (Entwisle and Hayduk 1988). On the other hand, children given to disruptive externalizing behaviors are harder to teach. Woodhead (1988), in fact, develops this scenario to explain long-term benefits of Head Start.

The ability to “fit in” and to employ personal resources in a positive way is increasingly recognized as a kind of human capital among high school students (see Cameron and Heckman 1993) and as a factor in promoting life success more generally (Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 2001a; Duncan and Dunifon 1998; Heckman 2000; Moss and Tilly 2001). Likewise, Rosenbaum’s (2001) research with the High School and Beyond (HSB) sample establishes the relevance of noncognitive behaviors for promoting success in secondary school. He found that “noncognitive skills,” like work habits, leadership qualities, and interest in school explained a sizeable proportion of variance in high school grades not explained by cognitive skills. Similarly, in explaining success at work, research shows that employers value dependability, a positive attitude, and other “soft skills” in making hiring decisions (Moss and Tilly 2001).

Some helpful clues about the nature of noncognitive skills in relation to early schooling come from recent research with preschoolers. In 28 diverse samples of three-, four-, five-, and six-year-olds, Hart, Atkins, and Fegley (2003) show that personality type predicts young children’s cognitive development. Children of a personality type described as “not shy,” “laughs/smiles easily” give evidence of more rapid cognitive development than children of other personality types. Likewise, our earlier research shows feedback loops between teachers’ ratings of deportment in first grade and children’s subsequent achievement in reading and math (Entwisle and Hayduk 1982; Entwisle et al. 1986). In related work, a cluster of traits that included “enthusiasm” and “cheerfulness” predicted higher achievement in reading and math over the first two years of school (Alexander and Entwisle 1988), and these relationships persisted through at least fifth grade (Alexander et al. 2003). In fact, after controlling for standardized test scores (October, fall term), parents’ psychological support, and demographics, this cluster of behaviors predicts first-quarter marks (November, fall term) in reading and math for first graders (Alexander and Entwisle 1988, table 1). The cluster of behaviors also predicts year-end marks in reading and math, gains over the first-grade year on stan-

standardized tests of both verbal comprehension and math reasoning, and promotion or retention decisions. Considerable evidence, then, points toward the role of noncognitive skills in early schooling and to the likelihood that such skills have been developed by the time formal schooling begins.

#### A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

This article investigates the long-term impact of first graders' personal resources and the resources present in their social contexts, like family SES or parent support, on educational attainment at age 22. Our focus on early schooling—first grade, specifically—is strategically advantageous for several reasons. For one, studying transitions has been fruitful in prior studies of human development (see Elder 1998). When students are challenged, as they are at the time of the first-grade transition, it is easier to tell who is ahead and who is behind (see Entwisle et al. 2002, 2003*b*). For another, causal priorities are less ambiguous at the point of school entry—endogeneity is less of a problem. Parents' expectations, for example, are well formed when children start first grade, before parents have received any formal feedback from the school. Also, compulsory schooling begins with first grade, and the curriculum covers the skills in basic literacy and numeracy.

This section proposes two multivariate models that use information about children in first grade to forecast educational attainment at age 22. In both style and content, the models draw upon traditional status-attainment models (see e.g., Sewell and Hauser 1975; Sewell, Hauser, and Featherman 1976) and also upon structural models we developed earlier that explain the process of educational achievement over the first and second years of school (Alexander and Entwisle 1988; Entwisle et al. 1986; Entwisle et al. 1997; Entwisle and Hayduk 1982).

Educational attainment at age 22 is measured in two ways: *completed years of schooling* (model 1), and *level of schooling attempted* (dropout, high school graduate, postsecondary enrollment other than four-year college, enrolled in four-year college [model 2]). Most studies of educational attainment assume that individuals progress through the school system in a unilinear, sequential mode (Breen and Jonsson 2000). This assumption underlies our model 1, which tallies years of schooling as a continuous variable. Level of schooling attempted (model 2), on the other hand, distinguishes qualitatively different and possibly incomplete branches or paths, some of which hold particular relevance for those who are not college bound. A high school diploma, for example, certifies not only completion of 12 years of school but also that the individual is not a dropout (a sheepskin effect; see Jaeger and Page 1996). This certification

opens the door to many entry-level jobs not open to dropouts, even those with almost 12 years of school. Enrollment in a variety of noncollege programs past high school also has labor market value (Kerckhoff 1995; Kerckhoff and Glennie 1999), especially for individuals who are economically disadvantaged and not college bound. These programs can help young people obtain licenses or certificates (beauticians, computer technicians, bookkeepers, electricians, auto mechanics, paralegals, emergency medical personnel, veterinary assistants, and the like) that determine eligibility for specific jobs apart from "years of schooling." Recent evidence also points to the long-term economic value of two-year college enrollments (Arum and Hout 1998). In short, a classification in terms of enrollment level provides a way to measure where students are at age 22 (when many are still in school), accommodates many kinds of off-the-job training, and separates enrollment in two-year programs from enrollment in four-year colleges.

Demographics and parents' expectations are social resources available to children in varying degrees at the start of their school careers. Demographics here include race, gender, family SES, and neighborhood poverty level. Another independent variable in both models 1 and 2 is the child's temperament/disposition (noncognitive skill; see table 1 and app. A for full definition). Temperament/disposition is measured at the end of the year, but on the basis of theory and considerable empirical justification, we use it to predict test scores and marks also measured at the end of the year. Both models also include two measures of cognitive skill, the first represented by a composite of standardized achievement scores in reading and math (California Achievement Test 1979), the second by the average of the child's marks in reading and math at the end of first grade.

The explanatory variables are the same in both models, but model structure and methods of estimation differ: Model 1 predicts years of schooling completed using ordinary least squares (OLS). Model 2 predicts school level attempted using multinomial logistic regression. Also, model 1 takes the cognitive portion of the child's personal resources (standardized test scores and marks in first grade) as endogenous, while model 2 takes them as independent variables (see figs. 1 and 2).

The rationale behind the ordering in model 1 is as follows. First, children's earliest test scores are known to vary by race, gender, family SES, neighborhood poverty level, parents' support, and student's personality type (Duncan et al. 1998; Entwisle et al. 1997; Furstenberg et al. 1999; Hart et al. 2003; Sampson 2000; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002; Wilson 1996). Second, cognitive skill differences are implicated in report card marks, in that marks partly assess the mastery of relevant skills and competencies. Treating the two cognitive measures in first grade as endogenous allows us to separate the influence of the social background

TABLE 1  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, MEANS, AND SDs OF MEASURES

Variable	Mean (SD)	N	Description
Dependent variables <sup>a</sup>			
Level of education . . . . .	1.53 (1.06)	632	Highest level of education completed or enrolled in by age 22: 0 = high school dropout; 1 = completed high school; 2 = enrolled in license/certificate/associate's degree program; 3 = enrolled in bachelor's degree program
Years of education . . . . .	12.68 (2.24)	632	Educational attainment at age 22 (years of school completed) last grade completed plus years of postsecondary education
Background characteristics:			
Student gender . . . . .	.53 (.50)	632	1 = female; 0 = male
Student race . . . . .	.57 (.50)	632	1 = African-American, 0 = white
Family SES . . . . .	-.01 (.82)	631	Average of both parents' education and occupational status and participation in federal meal subsidy program (all measures are z-scores)
Poor neighborhood . . . . .	.60 (.49)	632	Location of school attended in grade 1 (measure of social organization and income level of neighborhood) 0 = nonpoor neighborhood; 1 = poor neighborhood
Parental support:			
Psychological support index . . . . .	.04 (.76)	605	Composite is mean of z-scores for parents' expectations for student's reading and math marks and educational attainment
Reading mark expectations . . . . .	2.72 (.74)	600	Parents' predictions for student's reading and math marks, beginning of grade 1: 1 = unsatisfactory; 2 = satisfactory, 3 = good; 4 = excellent
Math mark expectations . . . . .	2.75 (.70)	600	

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Variable	Mean (SD)	N	Description
Educational expectations . . . .	3.14 (1.14)	602	Parents' predictions for student's educational attainment: 1 = not finish high school, 2 = finish high school, 3 = 1-2 years college; 4 = finish college; 5 = > 4 years college
Cognitive skill:			
Composite CAT score . . . . .	.027 (.93)	603	Composite of spring 1983 reading and math CAT scores: reading and math CAT scores converted to z-scores, then the mean of the z-scores is calculated
CAT reading score . . . . .	342 (46.17)	597	California Achievement Test, form C, spring 1983 (end of grade 1) scale scores: reading comprehension and math concepts and applications
CAT math score . . . . .	342 (37.59)	591	
Composite grade 1 marks . . . .	2.43 (.88)	568	Composite mark is the mean of the reading and math marks, spring 1983
Reading mark, quarter 4 . . . . .	2.30 (.93)	568	Reading and math marks of students in grade 1, quarter 4 (spring 1983): 1 = unsatisfactory; 2 = satisfactory; 3 = good; 4 = excellent
Math mark, quarter 4 . . . . .	2.56 (.94)	564	
Noncognitive skill:			
Temperament/disposition . . . .	21.92 (5.51)	597	Grade 1 teachers rated students on five items, from 1 to 6, with high scores reflecting positive assessments: very enthusiastic, interested in a lot of different things; likes to express ideas, usually in a happy mood, very cheerful; is creative or imaginative; keeps to himself or herself, spends a lot of time alone, very timid, afraid of new things or new situations. The scale score is the sum of ratings on the 5 items.

\* Dependent variables are measured when subject is 22 years old




FIG 1.—Conceptual model of grade 1 predictors of educational attainment at age 22

variables into two portions: one portion, as just described, helps explain the first-grade transition; the other portion, not transmitted through cognitive skills in first grade, directly affects outcomes at age 22 (fig. 1).

The version of the model that predicts highest level of enrollment (fig. 2) takes all predictors as exogenous (the social background and parent variables and all three measures of the child's personal resources). Thus model 2, which predicts level of schooling attempted, estimates coefficients of all predictor variables by one multinomial logistic regression (fig. 2). This model can pinpoint the impact of the first-grade predictors on different levels of schooling that involve discrete educational paths. For example, gender could play more of a role in predicting high school dropout than in predicting college attendance.

Parents' support being an independent variable in both models 1 and 2 is consistent with earlier research showing that test scores and marks respond to parents' expectations at the start of first grade (Entwisle et al. 1997). Students' noncognitive resources, measured by teachers' ratings of children's temperament/disposition, are also taken as causally prior to test scores and marks in model 1 because these personal qualities are present to a substantial degree at the time formal schooling begins. This placement in the model is also strongly supported by evidence showing temperament/disposition predicts BSS children's standardized test scores early in first grade. Marks could reflect teacher bias, but test scores are objective and so ought to be immune from such bias.<sup>2</sup> Students who are outgoing and ready to try new things would be expected to learn more over the first-

<sup>2</sup> When standardized tests are given in October of first grade, temperament/disposition significantly predicts test scores, and its coefficient (.31) is larger than the family SES coefficient (.27) or the parent psychological support coefficient (.21). Furthermore, the temperament/disposition coefficient predicting cognitive test scores at the end of the year (see table 5 below) is larger (.41) than it was in the fall of the year (.31), which is intuitively reasonable.



## First Grade and Educational Attainment




FIG. 2—Conceptual model of grade 1 predictors of level of educational enrollment at age 22.

grade year. Also worth noting is that, unlike cognitive skills (test scores, marks), in these data, the dispositional ratings are almost independent of children's social backgrounds. For example, race and SES do not predict temperament/disposition ratings in first grade, but they do predict cognitive outcomes.

The models here differ in several key ways from other models of educational attainment. The first way is the interval over which predictions are being made and the life stage being pinpointed. Many attainment studies use measures obtained in adolescence to predict educational attainment in adulthood (see e.g., Haveman and Wolfe 1994), but here, effects of predictors measured at age six are assessed 16 years later. Measuring students' personal and parental resources before they could have been much affected by the experience of schooling separates resources present when schooling starts from those produced or enhanced by the school. In elementary school, for example, parents' expectations predict children's early marks; children's marks in turn predict later parents' expectations. By measuring parents' expectations *before* first grade, we avoid this circularity and better determine the importance of parents' expectations as a basic social resource. Also, estimating separate effects for SES and parents' support before school begins reveals the extent to which the psychological capital of parents is a distinct resource (see Entwisle and Alexander 1996).

Finally, the noncognitive skill measure (temperament/disposition) used here has no close parallels in status-attainment research known to us except for Jencks (1972), Jencks et al. (1979), and Finn and Cox (1992),

although recently, labor economists have drawn upon similar evidence to predict earnings (Bowles et al. 2001a; Duncan and Dunifon 1998). Our temperament/disposition construct probably overlaps variables like "leadership" (Jencks et al. 1979) and a measure called "involvement" developed by Finn and Cox (1992). Students characterized as "involved," for example, are also likely to be "enthusiastic" or "adaptable," elements of our temperament/disposition rating. Finn and Cox found that "involvement" predicted standardized achievement scores in reading and math for students in grades 1, 2, and 3. In a study of at-risk high school students, Finn and Rock (1997) found that their "involvement" variable identified students who did reasonably well in school and graduated on time (see also Finn, Folger, and Cox 1991). Finn's group finds, as have we, that other noncognitive skills like academic self-concept or performance expectations used with secondary school students do not predict outcomes for children in primary grades (see Entwisle and Hayduk 1982; Alexander and Entwisle 1988), probably because these notions are not well crystallized in very young children.

The order of variables in the model conforms with the timing of life-course events. When children start first grade, their race, gender, family SES, and neighborhood quality are predetermined. Parents' initial expectations for their children's school performance crystallize around entry into first grade (see Entwisle et al. 1997; Entwisle and Hayduk 1982; Finn and Cox 1992). Demographics and family resources are known to influence children's development before first grade and to influence children's earliest standardized test scores and marks. Under the assumption that temperament/disposition affects children's cognitive status by first grade, the first two equations in figure 1 can be seen as a model of the first-grade transition.

The purpose of these models is to estimate the contribution of the social and personal resources children possess when they start school to their educational attainment and level of schooling 16 years later (age 22). Children arrive at school with certain demographic and family resources, plus relevant cognitive and noncognitive capabilities built up over the preschool years. To what extent do these initial resources forecast children's ability to negotiate both the first-grade transition and schooling outcomes at age 22? What is the relative impact of social (ascriptive) as compared to personal (achievement) resources?

By age 22, many students in the BSS had either dropped out or obtained a high school degree. Close to half had gone on to some kind of post-secondary schooling, either proprietary school or college. By age 22, then, we have a complete picture of the paths taken upon finishing compulsory education and of educational transitions over the years immediately after high school.

## DATA AND SETTING

The BSS randomly sampled 790 public school children in Baltimore in 1982 when they were starting first grade. To date the study has followed them to young adulthood (age 22). The project is rich in information for children at age six and so offers a strategic opportunity to investigate later educational attainments in relation to their "baseline" social and personal resources when they started school.

BSS sampling and research design have some major strengths. For one, the timing of measurements mitigates many issues of endogeneity. Parents' initial expectations for the child's school success, for example, are ascertained before the first report card was issued in first grade. Another advantage is that the measures of noncognitive and cognitive skills are psychometrically sturdy. Also, parents, teachers, and students were questioned directly, so no proxy measures were used. Sample attrition is reasonably low. At age 22, 80% of the original sample provided data on their educational histories. By the same token, the sample of students is representative only of the Baltimore city public school population in 1982, although in broad terms it ought to inform the experiences of similar school populations in other large cities with high poverty rates.

## Sample

BSS sampling proceeded in two stages. First, in 1982, a random sample of 20 Baltimore city public elementary schools, stratified by racial mix (six predominantly African-American, six predominantly white, eight integrated) and by SES (fourteen inner city or working class and six middle class), was selected. The proportion of African-American students averaged 99.5% in the African-American schools, 6% in the white schools, and 48% in the integrated schools (ranging from 17% to 87% among the integrated schools). Second, within each school, about a dozen students were randomly sampled from each first-grade classroom (at least two, usually three classrooms per school) using kindergarten lists from the previous spring supplemented by class rosters after school began in fall 1982. Ninety-seven percent of the parents of the randomly chosen children consented to participate in the project.

In the fall of 1982, the city public school system enrolled about 77% African-Americans (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983), but in order to sustain black/white comparisons, the BSS oversampled whites. As a result, the final sample was 55% African-American. Parents' educational levels ranged from less than eighth grade to graduate and professional school degrees, averaging just under 12 years (mean = 11.9; SD = 2.59). More white than African-American parents had completed four or more years

of college (14.7% vs. 10.3%), but whites are also represented much more heavily among those with the least education: over a third (35.3%) of white parents had completed 10 or fewer years of school compared to less than a fifth of African-American parents (17.2%). As a result, African-American parents had a slightly higher mean level of education than whites (12.1 vs. 11.7 years). School records indicated that 67% of BSS children qualified for free or reduced-price meals at school (77% of the African-American students and 53% of the white students). Overall, about 56% of BSS students resided in two-parent households at the beginning of first grade (70% of the white students and 44% of the African-American students).

### Procedures

When children started first grade, their race, gender, and eligibility for subsidized meals (indicative of low family income) were determined from school records. Parents' education, occupations, and expectations for their children's marks in reading and math as well as their expectations for how far children would go in school were ascertained in interviews either prior to or concurrent with the child's enrollment in first grade (see Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 1997). California Achievement Tests were given by the school in October and again in May near the end of the first grade. In May, teachers rated children's temperament/disposition on a five-item scale and at the end of the year assigned marks in reading and mathematics.

Data on educational attainment come from the Young Adult Survey of the BSS panel in 1998–99, 16 years after the students had entered first grade and four to five years after on-time students had graduated from high school. When the students were 22, we conducted the survey by telephone when possible; otherwise we met the subjects in face-to-face interviews.

### Attrition

In 1998–99, the Young Adult Survey was completed by 632 (80%) of the 790 members of the BSS students. Means and standard deviations of most variables in the 1998–99 sample are close to those we collected in 1982 (see app. A, table A1) but those lost through attrition are, by small margins, disproportionately white, male, and of low-SES backgrounds. To adjust for this attrition, all model estimates are weighted to reflect the likelihood of cases being missing in terms of race, gender, SES, family composition, cognitive status, and school attended in first grade. This weighting is

designed to produce unbiased estimators and appropriately adjusted standard errors and significance levels.

Table 1 lists variable definitions, sample coverage, coding conventions, means, and standard deviations of variables. Appendix A provides more detailed descriptions of composite variables. Short definitions are given in what follows.

### Implementation of the Models

Independent variables include demographics (race, gender, family SES, and neighborhood), all dichotomous except for SES which is a composite of parents' education, occupation, and low-income status. *Neighborhood* is a dichotomous measure of poverty, measured mainly by neighborhood income level (see app. A). Parents' psychological support is a composite of parents' expectations for children's first marks in reading and math, plus their estimate of how far the child will go in school. The child's temperament/disposition is measured by first-grade teachers' ratings in response to a scale containing five socioemotional items. Cognitive skills are measured by (1) a composite of standardized test scores in reading comprehension and math concepts (California Achievement Test 1979) obtained near the end of first grade and (2) a composite of the child's final marks in reading and math in first grade.

The outcome variables in the models come from the Young Adult Survey. The BSS panel members reported whether they had completed a high school diploma or GED, the date of that event, or, if they did not graduate, the last grade completed and the year and month they dropped out. Those with any postsecondary schooling completed an "education calendar," listing for *each quarter* after leaving high school the school attended, the type of school, the type of license, certification, or degree program they were enrolled in, and whether they had completed the program. At age 22 many panel members were still enrolled in some kind of postsecondary schooling (20%) or had withdrawn with plans to return (13%). Of those still in school, 9% were in certificate/licensure programs, 30% were in associate's degree/two-year programs, 59% were pursuing bachelor's degrees, and 2% were working on master's degrees. The educational careers of panel members are complex—many repeated grades, many tried one thing and then another. The two outcome measures are designed to capture some of this complexity.

To measure "years of schooling," those who had neither a high school diploma nor a GED are assigned the grade level of the last grade completed (e.g., "began eleventh grade but didn't finish it" is coded "10"). Those with a high school diploma or GED are coded "12." About half the sample had been enrolled in some kind of postsecondary schooling,

and they are assigned scores equivalent to  $12 + (\text{quarters of enrollment in postsecondary education} / 4)$ . *Enrollment* includes part-time as well as full-time schooling, so among those credited with 16 “years” of schooling (four years beyond high school), for example, only 36% had completed a bachelor’s degree. Among those attending licensure or two-year institutions, only 25% had obtained a credential, 27% were still enrolled in school, and 48% had withdrawn (34% with plans to reenroll; 13% with no plans to return).

To measure enrollment level we determined the highest level of school the student had ever attempted, whether or not the program had been completed and whether or not the student had previously obtained a high school degree. Enrollment level has four categories: high school dropout (coded “1”), high school graduate, including GED (coded “2”), ever enrolled in a certification or licensure program or two-year college program (coded “3”), ever enrolled in a four-year college program (coded “4”).<sup>3</sup>

## RESULTS

The BSS is a sample of typical urban youths, most from low-income families, who today find themselves navigating a path into adulthood under conditions of hardship. For many of the BSS students, the risk of high school dropout remains high, and the “college for all” success ethos (e.g., Rosenbaum 2001) is for many not a realistic promise. In what follows, we begin to examine how the BSS panel has weathered the first major educational transition along the path to adulthood—their mode of high school exit (with a degree or not) and their postsecondary placements. There is much uncertainty, with paths often interrupted and redirected.

### Descriptive Analysis

Educational attainment at age 22 ranged from completion of seventh grade to enrollment in postgraduate training. One-fifth of panel members (20%) failed to obtain high school certification, and another 29% received either a high school diploma or a GED and went no further;<sup>4</sup> half (50%) had enrolled in some kind of postsecondary education, including propri-

<sup>3</sup> Eleven students who had neither a high school diploma nor a GED but who were enrolled in some type of postsecondary training were classified as enrolled in a certificate/licensure/two-year college program. However, in computing “years of education,” they were all coded as high school dropouts and assigned the last grade in school they had completed.

<sup>4</sup> Of the 186 who did not go on after high school, 78% had a diploma and 28% had earned a GED. Of all those with high school certification, 85% had earned a diploma.

etary trade and business schools, two-year colleges, and four-year colleges (see tables 2 and 3). By age 22 around a fourth of those who had enrolled in two-year and four-year programs had completed their certificate/license or degree, and another 35% were still enrolled, but students at two-year colleges were much more likely than their counterparts at four-year colleges to have left without degrees—48% versus 22%.

Young women were significantly more likely than young men to enroll in postsecondary schools (60% vs. 39%), and African-Americans were slightly more likely than whites (52% vs. 48%). Women completed 13.0 years of schooling compared with 12.4 years for men ( $P < .05$ ), a gender discrepancy resembling that seen nationally (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001, table 217). African-Americans and whites both completed 12.7 years of school, a parity not seen in national data, where 84.9% of whites and 78.5% of African-Americans are high school graduates or more (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001, table 215). This parity is evident in other urban samples (McDonald and LaVeist 2001). Among race-sex groups (not shown), white men were the least likely to continue past high school (37%); African-American women, the most likely (61%). These trends, departing from national patterns, probably reflect the level of economic disadvantage of whites who attend public schools in poor cities like Baltimore.

Almost one-quarter (23%) of the sample enrolled in a four-year college, with white women most likely to enroll (32%) and both white and African-American men least likely (19%). African-American women were the most likely to enroll in certificate/licensing or two-year associate's degree programs (38%). By age 22 about 6% of the sample had already completed a bachelor's degree, and another 12% were still enrolled in bachelor's degree programs. At that age (four years beyond high school graduation for on-time students), 20% of the sample was still enrolled in postsecondary training, and, of these, 59% were in bachelor's degree programs, 2% in master's degree programs, 29% in associate's degree/two-year programs, and 9% in certificate/licensing programs. Women were somewhat more likely than men to be currently attending school (23% vs. 17%), and they were also more likely to have completed a degree or certification program (16% vs. 9%).

Dropouts on average had completed 9.6 years of school. Those ever enrolled in licensure or two-year college programs had completed 13.3 years of school, and those ever enrolled in four-year institutions had completed 15.5 years (see table 3). Students who enrolled in four-year institutions finished high school at an earlier age (18.0) than students who did not go on after high school (18.9) or those who enrolled in less-than-four-year postsecondary institutions (18.4), trends that reflect the retention histories of these students. Among dropouts, for example, 89% were held back in school at least once, as were 58% of those with only a high school

etary trade and business schools, two-year colleges, and four-year colleges (see tables 2 and 3). By age 22 around a fourth of those who had enrolled in two-year and four-year programs had completed their certificate/license or degree, and another 35% were still enrolled, but students at two-year colleges were much more likely than their counterparts at four-year colleges to have left without degrees—48% versus 22%.

Young women were significantly more likely than young men to enroll in postsecondary schools (60% vs. 39%), and African-Americans were slightly more likely than whites (52% vs. 48%). Women completed 13.0 years of schooling compared with 12.4 years for men ( $P < .05$ ), a gender discrepancy resembling that seen nationally (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001, table 217). African-Americans and whites both completed 12.7 years of school, a parity not seen in national data, where 84.9% of whites and 78.5% of African-Americans are high school graduates or more (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001, table 215). This parity is evident in other urban samples (McDonald and LaVeist 2001). Among race-sex groups (not shown), white men were the least likely to continue past high school (37%); African-American women, the most likely (61%). These trends, departing from national patterns, probably reflect the level of economic disadvantage of whites who attend public schools in poor cities like Baltimore.

Almost one-quarter (23%) of the sample enrolled in a four-year college, with white women most likely to enroll (32%) and both white and African-American men least likely (19%). African-American women were the most likely to enroll in certificate/licensing or two-year associate's degree programs (38%). By age 22 about 6% of the sample had already completed a bachelor's degree, and another 12% were still enrolled in bachelor's degree programs. At that age (four years beyond high school graduation for on-time students), 20% of the sample was still enrolled in postsecondary training, and, of these, 59% were in bachelor's degree programs, 2% in master's degree programs, 29% in associate's degree/two-year programs, and 9% in certificate/licensing programs. Women were somewhat more likely than men to be currently attending school (23% vs. 17%), and they were also more likely to have completed a degree or certification program (16% vs. 9%).

Dropouts on average had completed 9.6 years of school. Those ever enrolled in licensure or two-year college programs had completed 13.3 years of school, and those ever enrolled in four-year institutions had completed 15.5 years (see table 3). Students who enrolled in four-year institutions finished high school at an earlier age (18.0) than students who did not go on after high school (18.9) or those who enrolled in less-than-four-year postsecondary institutions (18.4), trends that reflect the retention histories of these students. Among dropouts, for example, 89% were held back in school at least once, as were 58% of those with only a high school



TABLE 2  
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AT AGE 22 BY GENDER AND RACE

	<i>t</i> -			<i>t</i> -		African-	Total
	Men	Test	Women	Whites	Test	Americans	Sample
Educational attainment at age 22							
Mean years of education . . . . .	12.4	*	13.0	12.7		12.7	12.7
% with postsecondary schooling . . . . .	39.4	*	59.7	48.0		51.8	50.2
% completed degree/certification . . . . .	9.1	*	15.8	15.2	+	10.7	12.7
% currently attending school . . . . .	17.1	+	23.0	18.6		21.5	20.2
Highest level education attended (%). <sup>a</sup>							
High school dropout . . .	23.6		17.6	20.8		20.1	20.4
High school graduate . . .	37.0		22.7	31.2		28.1	29.4
Proprietary/two-year college <sup>b</sup> . . . . .	20.2		33.4	22.3		30.9	27.2
Four-year college . . .	19.2		26.3	25.7		20.9	22.9

NOTE.—*t*-tests (two-tailed) compare adjacent groups (men vs. women and whites vs. African-Americans).

<sup>a</sup> Highest level of postsecondary program enrolled in through age 22. Some students had left without completing the program or obtaining a credential, while others were still enrolled at the time of the Young Adult Survey (age 22). Sample sizes for the several level distinctions are: high school dropout, 129; high school graduate, 186; proprietary/two-year college, 172; four-year college, 145.

<sup>b</sup> This category contains 11 students who had neither completed high school nor obtained a GED, but who did enroll in some type of postsecondary training. In computing their years of education, all are coded as "other dropouts," i.e., they were credited with the last grade they had completed.

\*  $P \leq .10$

\*  $P \leq .05$

education, while among four-year college attendees, only 10% were ever held back. Additionally, four-year college enrollees waited on average only 1.5 quarters before enrolling in postsecondary school, while the others waited 3.9 quarters ( $P < .01$ ).

In comparison, patterns of schooling are less orderly and less continuous for the noncollege group. Decisions to enroll in certificate or licensure programs may be the result of work experience obtained in the years following high school—for these students there may be a strong interchange between work and school. The less orderly nature of their postsecondary paths is also evident in the much lower rate of persistence in or completion of these programs—at age 22, 48% of the non-four-year-college group had withdrawn without completion, compared with an attrition rate of only 22% among four-year-college attendees.

The means of the grade 1 variables mostly rise (or fall) as we anticipated (see table 4) in relation to age 22 outcomes. For example, composite marks

TABLE 4

DEMOGRAPHICS, PARENTAL SUPPORT, TEMPERAMENT/DISPOSITION, AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT MEASURED IN GRADE 1 BY HIGHEST ENROLLMENT LEVEL AT AGE 22 AND CORRELATIONS WITH YEARS OF EDUCATION

GRADE 1 MEASURES	MEANS OF GRADE 1 PREDICTOR VARIABLES BY ENROLLMENT LEVEL AT AGE 22					CORRELATIONS WITH YEARS OF EDUCATION	
	Non-High School Graduates	High School Graduates	Business/Trade or Two-Year College	Four-Year College	t-Test <sup>a</sup>	Zero-Order Correlations <sup>b</sup>	Partial Correlations <sup>c</sup>
	Graduates	t-Test <sup>a</sup>	College	College	t-Test <sup>a</sup>	r	r
Proportion female ...	.46	.41	.65	.61		.13**	
Proportion African-American .....	.57	.55	.65	.52	*	-.02	
Family SES index .....	-.57	-.28	.01	.82	**	.57**	
Proportion in poor neighborhood .....	.84	.70	.60	.25	**	-.41**	
Parent psychological support index .....	-.39	-.14	.07	.62	**	.45**	.25**
Composite CAT scores, spring 1983 ....	-.50	-.11	.01	.68	+	.37**	.23**
Composite marks, end grade 1 ...	1.97	2.21	2.37	3.15	**	.43**	.28**
Temperament/disposition .....	19.06	21.37	21.63	25.40	**	.35**	.26**
Sample size <sup>d</sup> .....	129	186	172	145		632	

<sup>a</sup> t-tests (two-tailed) compare adjacent groups

<sup>b</sup> Zero-order correlations are between grade 1 measures and years of education

<sup>c</sup> Partial correlations control on gender, race, family SES, and neighborhood

<sup>d</sup> Sample sizes represent maximum for each group

\*  $P \leq .10$ .

\*\*  $P \leq .05$ .

\*\*  $P \leq .01$ .

## First Grade and Educational Attainment

TABLE 3  
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AT AGE 22

	MEAN YEARS OF EDUCATION	EDUCATIONAL STATUS AT AGE 22 (%)		
		Completed Degree/License/ Certificate	Still Enrolled in School	Withdrawn from Postsecondary Program
Highest level education at- tended: <sup>a</sup>				
High school dropout . . .	9.6	.		. . .
High school graduate . . .	12.0		.	. . .
Proprietary/two-year col- lege <sup>b</sup> . . . . .	13.3	25 0	27.3	47 7
Four-year college . . .	15.5	24 8	53 1	22.1
Total sample <sup>c</sup> . . . . .	12 7	12 7	19 9	17 6

<sup>a</sup> Highest level of postsecondary program enrolled in through age 22. Some students had left without completing the program or obtaining a credential, while others were still enrolled at the time of the Young Adult Survey (age 22). Sample sizes for the several level distinctions are: high school dropout, 129; high school graduate, 186; proprietary/two-year college, 172; four-year college, 145.

<sup>b</sup> This category contains 11 students who had neither completed high school nor obtained a GED, but who did enroll in some type of postsecondary training. In computing their years of education, all are coded as "other dropouts," i.e., they were credited with the last grade they had completed.

<sup>c</sup> For the "total sample," the percentages for "educational status at age 22" only total to 50.2%, which is the portion of the sample that obtained some postsecondary education. 19.9% "still enrolled in school" differs from figure in table 2 (20.2%), because two cases had completed the bachelor's degree but were currently enrolled in school to obtain additional degrees. In table 2 they are coded both as completing degree and as still enrolled in school.

rise with enrollment level from 1.97 (just below a "C") for high school dropouts to 3.15 (above a "B") for four-year-college attendees. Also, family SES correlates (.57) more strongly with years of enrollment than any other predictor, and the family SES gradient across certification levels and school-type distinctions is especially sharp.<sup>5</sup> The child's temperament/disposition in grade 1 is significantly correlated (.35) with years of education at age 22, as are CAT scores and teachers' marks from near the end of first grade (.37 vs. .43) and parents' psychological support (.45). With demographic controls, correlations with years of education involving the four other measures remain significant beyond the 1% level (see table 4).

### OLS Regression Model Predicting Years of Schooling

To determine the power of the variables measured during or before first grade to predict years of completed education at age 22, we estimated by

<sup>5</sup> The components of the SES composite, the parents' psychological support index, and the achievement score composite all were standardized before averaging. Accordingly, each averages close to zero, with standard deviations ranging from .76 to .93.

OLS the three-outcome model depicted in figure 1.<sup>6</sup> First, the demographic and parent variables, plus the child's temperament/disposition, predict children's scores on standardized achievement tests (May, grade 1). Second, all the prior independent variables, plus standardized test scores, predict marks at the end of first grade. Last, all previous predictors, plus the child's composite marks in first grade, predict years of schooling completed by age 22. The results of these estimations are reported in table 5. For convenience in assessing total, direct, and indirect effects, predictors are entered stepwise in conformity with figure 1.

The first two equations characterize children's success at negotiating the first-grade transition as reflected in academic outcomes. Race, SES, parents' psychological support, and the child's temperament/disposition have significant effects on composite CAT scores. These same four variables also significantly predict marks at the end of grade 1, with CAT-achievement level the strongest predictor ( $\beta = .44$ ). Temperament/disposition has a strong direct effect on the composite CAT score (.41), and, even with standardized achievement controlled, on the composite for marks (.20).

Demographic factors predict cognitive outcomes in first grade, with family SES the strongest predictor. Race differences also are significant, with African-Americans averaging below whites on both CAT scores and marks. The damping effect (standardized coefficient of  $-.14$ ) of race on year-end marks and CAT scores can be seen as one manifestation of ethnic disability (see also Alexander and Entwisle 1988).

The full model accounts for 42% of the variance in attainment at age 22. All the variables except the CAT composite *directly* predict years of school completed (table 5), and numerous indirect effects of background and especially the parent variables are mediated through first-grade test scores and marks. Women have higher educational attainment than men, and despite the damping effect of race on test scores and marks in first grade, by age 22, African-Americans have significantly higher educational attainment than whites (direct effect of .10). Combining this positive direct effect of race at age 22 with the negative indirect effects through the cognitive outcomes in grade 1, the total effect of race on attainment is still positive (.08), with African-Americans doing better.

In the full model, the direct effect of temperament/disposition on attainment is significant (.13); when combined with indirect paths through

<sup>6</sup> Two alternative models were also estimated. One (HLM) allowed for nesting of students in neighborhoods, the other (LISREL) incorporated measurement information. When parameters estimated by either of these methods are compared with OLS estimates, the patterns of significance of predictor variables and their magnitudes are stable across the different estimation procedures. We therefore report only OLS results for the model in fig. 1 (see table 5).

TABLE 5  
EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC, PARENTAL, AND PERSONAL PREDICTORS ON GRADE 1  
PERFORMANCE AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

	Composite CAT Score, Spring 1983		Composite Marks, End Grade 1			Years of Education at Age 22			
Gender . . . .	-.02	-.02	-.00	.00	.01	.10*	10*	10*	.10*
Race (African-American, white) . .	-.18*	-.14*	-.23*	-.20*	-.14*	.06 <sup>+</sup>	.08*	.09*	.10*
Family SES index . . . . .	.15*	.14*	.15*	.14*	.08*	.42*	.42 <sup>+</sup>	.41*	.40*
Poor/nonpoor neighborhood . . . . .	.06	.06	-.02	-.02	-.05	-.11*	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*
Parent psychological support index . . . .	.45*	.28*	.47*	.31*	.19*	.21*	.14*	.12*	.11*
Temperament/disposition . . . . .		.41*		.38*	.20*		.17*	.15*	.13*
Composite CAT score, spring 1983 . . . . .					.44*		.06	.02	
Composite marks, end grade 1 . . . .									.09 <sup>+</sup>
R <sup>2</sup> . . . . .	.28	.42	.36	.48	.59	.39	.42	.42	.42

NOTE.—*N* = 521. Estimates are weighted to account for attrition (20%) in the sample between grade 1 and age 22. This analysis uses OLS regressions; table contains standardized regression coefficients.

<sup>+</sup> *P* ≤ .10

\* *P* ≤ .05

CAT scores and marks, the total effect of temperament/disposition on attainment at age 22 is .17. Finally, test scores do not significantly affect educational attainment (the sum of the indirect and direct effects is .06), but marks have a marginally significant direct effect (.09). The marks students earn in grade 1 thus play some role in launching students on achievement trajectories, but the role of marks or cognitive skill measured at this early age is not as great as the role of students' temperament/disposition.<sup>7</sup>

The parsimonious model depicted in figure 1 predicts educational attainment over a 16-year period surprisingly well. Eight predictors explain 42% of the variance. Several other models (not shown) with additional predictors inserted (first-quarter marks, first-quarter test scores, and several other noncognitive variables) increased the explained variance somewhat (45%), but none of the "extra" variables was significant. The analysis thus identifies a set of important foundational influences on long-term

<sup>7</sup> Both would be significant, though, were children's temperament/disposition not controlled, with total effects of .13 and .17, respectively.

school outcomes that extend all the way back to first grade. These resources are social (demographics and parents' support) and personal (temperament/disposition, first-grade test scores, and marks). Whether later experiences redirect or reinforce the paths forecast by these early developmental markers and social influences is a topic for later study. However, certainly the first-grade influences play a continuing role.

Test scores and marks are highly correlated with family SES, but temperament/disposition overlaps demographic measures much less.<sup>8</sup> Even so, family SES has by far the largest direct effect (.40) on attainment at age 22 and so stands out as a powerful constraint on children's subsequent schooling. We say this because table 5 shows family SES influences on first-grade test scores and marks, but also the last equation shows a large effect of family SES on age 22 educational attainment with these early academic measures controlled. Family resources thus affect the first-grade transition, but many SES effects also must be mediated by later school and home experiences.<sup>9</sup>

Living in a poor neighborhood does not depress test scores and marks in the first grade, but it does undercut schooling in the long run (−.11). Its effect is comparable in size to that of every other variable except family SES.

#### Multinomial Logistic Model Predicting Level of School

To predict enrollment levels (model 2) a multinomial logistic model employed the same independent variables as the third equation of model 1. The baseline category for the logistic comparison is "high school graduate," with the exception of the last column in table 6, which gives odds of enrolling in a four-college college compared with a proprietary school or two-year college.

The odds of being a dropout rather than a high school graduate do not differ by gender, race, or neighborhood (table 6), but are significantly

<sup>8</sup> In first grade, demographic predictors explain only 4% of the variance in temperament/disposition compared with 12% of the variance in the composite CAT score and 19% of the variance in the mark composite.

<sup>9</sup> The total and direct effects predicting age 22 schooling in table 5 are almost identical, indicating minimal mediation through these particular mechanisms. However, this is due in part to how we have elected to treat the measure of parents' psychological support, controlling it along with family background and neighborhood poverty. When it is excluded, the family SES coefficient increases to .50. Additionally, when it and the subsequent endogenous predictors from fig. 1 are added to the background controls *individually*, the estimates for family SES range from .46 to .42, signifying more mediation than in table 5. Also, the coefficients associated with the endogenous predictors when evaluated serially in this way range from .19 to .23, revealing a non-negligible association for each with age 22 schooling, net of background.

TABLE 6  
DEMOGRAPHIC AND GRADE 1 PREDICTORS OF ENROLLMENT LEVEL AT AGE 22

	ENROLLMENT LEVEL COMPARED WITH			
	High School Graduate <sup>a</sup>		Two-Year College <sup>b</sup>	
	Dropout	Proprietary or Two-Year College	Four-Year College	Four-Year College
Gender . . . . .	83	2.71*	2.12*	.78
Race (African-American, white) . . . . .	1.06	1.74*	5.65*	3.25*
Family SES index . . . . .	.26*	1.74*	4.91*	2.82*
Poor/nonpoor neighborhood . .	1.67	1.02	.54 <sup>+</sup>	.52 <sup>+</sup>
Parent psychological support index . . . . .	.84	1.22	1.26	1.03
Temperament/disposition . .	.64*	.95	1.68*	1.77*
Composite CAT score, spring 1983 . . . . .	.88	.94	1.51	1.60 <sup>+</sup>
Composite marks, end grade 1 . . . . .	1.20	1.18	2.57*	2.18*
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> . . . . .			.26	.26

NOTE.—N = 521. Estimates are weighted to account for attrition in the sample between grade 1 and age 22 (sample attrition is 20%). This analysis employs multinomial logistic regression; coefficients are odds ratios.

<sup>a</sup> Baseline category is *high school graduate*. Entries in the table represent the effect of a unit change in the independent variable on the odds of being a *dropout*, attending a *proprietary or two-year college*, or attending a *four-year college* compared with being a *high school graduate*. Odds ratios for the family SES index, composite CAT score, and temperament/disposition represent the change in relative odds brought about by a one SD increase in the independent variables measured from their means.

<sup>b</sup> Baseline category is *two-year college*. Odds ratios in this column represent multinomial contrast between *four-year college* and *proprietary/two-year college*.

<sup>+</sup>  $P \leq .10$

\*  $P \leq .05$

higher (.26) for students one standard deviation below the SES average. Dropout odds do not respond to test scores or marks but are higher, net of other considerations, for students with a less positive temperament/disposition (.64).

Background factors come into play more forcefully at higher levels of schooling. The odds of being enrolled in either a two-year or four-year college program as compared to having only a high school degree are significantly better for women, African-Americans, and students of higher family SES. Residence in a nonpoor neighborhood in first grade (marginally) improves the odds of attending a four-year college, as compared to stopping with a high school degree (.54,  $P < .10$ ) or attending a two-year or proprietary program (.52,  $P < .10$ ). Being African-American or coming from a higher-SES family or a nonpoor neighborhood also are advantageous in terms of attending a four-year college rather than a two-year program.

A major advantage of the enrollment-level model is that it points to disjunctures in educational effects. Relatively high marks in first grade, for example, more than double the odds of students' attending a four-year rather than a two-year postsecondary program (2.18) or stopping at high school (2.57). Thus, academic credentials from first grade have currency for the most academically selective postsecondary options. Credentialing effects at this point probably are to be expected, but seeing links back to the early primary grades might not have been anticipated. The logistic model suggests that the effect of marks, which was muted as a predictor of years of schooling, has an impact on the *upper* end of the educational-attainment continuum. They come into play more forcefully for four-year college attendance. The temperament/disposition predictor, on the other hand, has effects at both ends of the educational spectrum. The child's temperament/disposition in first grade distinguishes between four-year college attendees and either two-year college attendees (1.77) or high school graduates (1.68), and it also predicts dropout compared with high school graduation (.64). The enrollment-level model thus suggests separate but substantial effects of traits so far not traced out in traditional status-attainment models. They are more fully discussed in the next section.

### Years of Schooling versus Enrollment Level

Comparisons across the two representations of educational attainment—years of schooling versus level or type attempted—lead to some critical insights. *Years of attainment* allows direct comparison with many other studies but tacitly assumes an orderly path through the educational system in a unilinear, sequential mode. This assumption fits the life pattern of college-bound youths much better than it fits the life pattern of other youths.

College-bound youths begin the journey with superior cognitive skills and greater socioeconomic resources. Their qualities of temperament enable them to accommodate to school routines more readily than those with fewer resources. They later move through the system (K–12) more smoothly (e.g., with lower rates of grade retention) and are more likely to graduate on time (e.g., 12 years after first grade). They immediately enter college following high school graduation and are more likely to stay on continuously once there. There is the “fast track” to higher-education certification. But this scenario is relatively rare for BSS panel members. Just one-fifth enrolled in four-year colleges; the other 80% were distributed across many different kinds and levels of educational institutions.

Some important differences between findings are brought to light by the two models:



*Gender.*—In model 1 women have an advantage over men in years of attainment. Model 2 predicts a female advantage in attendance at both two-year and four-year institutions.

*Race.*—Model 1 shows that African-Americans are disadvantaged in terms of first-grade academic outcomes, but by age 22, this pattern reverses. Model 2 shows a modest advantage (odds 1:74) for African-Americans in two-year postsecondary programs but a huge advantage in four-year college enrollment (odds almost 6:1).

The logit analysis emphasizes the tendency of both women and African-Americans—those with relative “status disabilities”—to use licensing and similar postgraduate strategies to get ahead. Other things equal, white men are the least likely to enroll in postsecondary education (esp. four-year colleges), which may reflect their better access to relatively well-paying jobs with only a high school degree. At age 22, white men in this panel with full-time jobs made \$9.92 per hour, compared to \$7.93 for white women, \$9.38 for African-American men, and \$8.11 for African-American women.

*Family SES.*—Both models point to the primacy of family SES as a resource promoting children's educational chances. The logit analysis, however, shows its critical influence for enrolling in a four-year college (odds 4.91). Not much research deals with the ways in which family SES supports youths' getting postsecondary licensure or certificate training, but model 2 shows a modest SES advantage for two-year and other programs as well.

*Neighborhood.*—Model 1 shows that living in a poor neighborhood early in life does not undercut the first-grade transition but is a significant disadvantage over the long run. Model 2 adds some critical details. First, the neighborhood parameter is not significant for dropping out (1.67), but at the other end of the spectrum, neighborhood quality differentiates between four-year and two-year college enrollments. The effect of living in a poor neighborhood is thus mainly at the high end, not, as the attainment analysis suggests, a damper all along the way.

*Parent support.*—This parameter is *never* significant in the model 2 analysis, so parent psychological support does not play a distinctive role in determining the specific educational path followed through and after high school. Model 1, however, shows parents' support to be *very* influential in predicting academic outcomes over the first-grade transition. In model 1, parent support also is a significant predictor of years of completed schooling through age 22. Keep in mind that, at age 22, many members of the panel were still enrolled or withdrawn from school but intending to return—their stories are still unfolding. With more schooling a certainty for some (those currently enrolled at the time of the survey) and likely

for others, it is possible that parental support in the early years may yet matter.

*Temperament/disposition.*—Model 1 shows that temperament/disposition is a key resource supporting the first-grade transition and is a fully significant (standardized coefficient = .13) predictor of attainment at age 22. Most striking is its (net) impact relative to first-grade test scores, .13 ( $P < .05$ ), as compared to .02 (not significant). Model 2 implicates temperament/disposition as a risk for dropout and as a significant resource for enrolling in a four-year college as compared to a two-year college. However, temperament/disposition does not distinguish between high school graduates and those who opt for proprietary or two-year college programs. In fact, none of the personal resource variables predicts the pursuit of proprietary or two-year programs compared to a high school degree. These postsecondary options are essentially “open door” programs with minimum academic requirements, and we see here that the likelihood of attending is more a function of social resources than personal or academic resources.

*Cognitive ability.*—In model 1 the effect of first-grade marks on years of education is marginal (.09,  $P < .10$ ), but model 2 shows that marks are fully significant predictors of enrolling in a four-year college. Students’ cognitive attributes most clearly distinguish those who enroll in four-year college programs from those who enroll elsewhere. Model 2 also shows that temperament/disposition mitigates against dropout while cognitive skills (test scores, marks) and parent support do not.

## DISCUSSION

Key differences between research reported in this article and other research on educational attainment are the early point in life from which panel members are followed and the span of time covered. Some national studies of education currently underway start even earlier in life (ECLS) but so far extend only into early elementary school. A significant benefit from an early start, as this discussion makes clear, is that the impact of life circumstances known to be important for ultimate attainment, like low family SES and the early impact of parental influence, can be evaluated more accurately.

The model specification is also distinctive, including the choice of exogenous variables. For example, neighborhood (poor vs. nonpoor) is included because recent research shows that growing up in a poor city neighborhood has consequences for values and behaviors in adulthood (see Ensminger, Lamkin, and Jacobson 1996; Mayer and Jencks 1989; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, and Aber 1997). Other recent research also shows

that social background early in life is a critical resource for negotiating the adult transition (Caspi et al. 1998; Duncan et al. 1998; Miech and Shanahan 2000; Ross and Wu 1996).

In interpreting the findings it helps to consider the state of developmental theory when the BSS began in 1982. In 1980 Jerome Kagan had written a provocative chapter about continuity and change in development over the life cycle. Up to that time, developmental theory had emphasized continuity: how events or circumstances in childhood together with the child's genetic endowment govern development over the long term. Several stage theories (Piaget, Freud, and others) prompted the search for continuities in attitudes, behavior, or attainments from childhood to adulthood. This search proved frustrating because the technology for penetrating large data sets was not up to the task. Probably more critical, however, was that except for Elder's (1974) study of children of the Great Depression, children's social contexts were largely ignored, as was the role of personal agency in directing young persons' own development (e.g., Clausen 1991, 1993; Erickson 1963; Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel 1981).

In this general climate, the BSS in 1982 began to look closely at the course of young children's development from a life-course perspective and to map changes in children's cognitive and affective status repeatedly over short intervals. Schools were conceptualized as complex social structures in which children made transitions from grade to grade and school to school. Retention and other administrative groupings of children, like special education, were analyzed as potential causes of disorderly or delayed transitions. Families, nested within schools and neighborhoods (see Bronfenbrenner 1979), were seen as sources of economic resources and psychological support. Earlier than most research on child development, the BSS also paid close attention to poverty and minority status as forces affecting young children's development.

This article represents a kind of research much more practical today than it was when the BSS started, and it supports a conjecture widely held: children's socioeconomic and personal resources at an early age matter a great deal for their school careers and cognitive development. Even in a sample like the BSS, with a majority disadvantaged early in life, relative economic and social resources matter. But we also show that parents' psychological support and children's temperament/disposition help anchor later trajectories.

### Socioeconomic Status

The secondary school literature compares students' sociodemographic characteristics with their achievement scores as sources of influence on

attainment, and the analysis in this article invokes this same dichotomy. For first graders, we see demographics as characteristics that trigger reactions from others. The negative impact of race on first-grade marks is a good example. Elsewhere (Entwisle and Alexander 1988) we show that in first grade, the race bias in BSS children's marks amounts to .20 of a grade point on a four-unit scale. In that analysis, conduct marks of African-American students in first grade are positively related to their marks in reading and math but negatively related to their gains on standardized tests, while conduct marks of white children are positively related to *both* marks and test scores. This pattern suggests that teachers rewarded African-American children for good behavior, but that these children were not learning as much as their counterparts who were less well behaved. Clearly, a dearth of social resources undercuts the first-grade transition because demographics are strong predictors of students' earliest test scores and marks, but that is not the whole story, because even with SES controlled, African-American students received lower test scores and marks than white students.

Generally children of higher SES have more preschool experience, and some earlier research (Entwisle et al. 1986) shows that BSS children with more prekindergarten and kindergarten experience (full-day vs. half-day or no kindergarten) did slightly better on achievement tests and marks in first grade with family SES controlled. Such experience did not predict ratings related to noncognitive outcomes like conduct marks, self-image, or children's expectations, however, nor does it predict age 22 outcomes. In fact, preschool experience, when added to the independent variables of table 5, does not predict temperament/disposition in first grade or outcomes at age 22.

Importantly, parents' psychological support matters more than family SES for success in first grade. Children's temperament/disposition can also help smooth the first-grade transition: its effects on test scores and marks in first grade (standardized coefficients of .41 and .20) are consequential.<sup>10</sup> In the long run, temperament/disposition is more influential than cognitive skill measured in grade 1 for determining educational attainment.

SES counts heavily in forecasting attainment at age 22, we believe, mainly because social background predicts children's out-of-school learning. During the elementary period, ethnicity and social class do *not* predict children's gains in achievement over the school year (Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 1997, 2003a). Rather, they predict *differences* in children's gains on achievement tests when children are out of school in summer (see also

<sup>10</sup> Recall that we assume that temperament/disposition is treated as causally prior to test scores and marks, although all were assessed at the end of grade 1.

Cooper et al. 2000; Hammond and Frechtling 1979; Hayes and Grether 1969; Heyns 1978; Murnane 1975; Pelavin and David 1977). The correlations between social class and children's marks or test scores are a product of life experiences *outside* the classroom and, for this reason, strongly reflect SES differences. The summer activities and psychological support that higher-SES parents provide their children are substantially different from what is provided by low-SES parents (Entwisle et al. 2003a). Higher-SES parents take their children on more trips in the summer, more often visit the library, take out books more often, visit more cultural centers like museums and science centers, and have more learning materials like books and computers in the home (see Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 1997, 2000, 2003a). Status-attainment research generally, and long-term studies of school achievement in particular (see e.g., Krueger 1998), tend to gloss over the episodic patterns of children's achievement growth from winter to summer, but when schools are in session, Baltimore children of all SES levels made similar gains on achievement tests (see Entwisle et al. 1997, chapt. 3).

#### Noncognitive Traits and Social Stratification

Why are direct effects of temperament/disposition on attainment *bigger* than direct effects of either test scores or marks? For one thing, temperament/disposition is relatively independent of demographics. In addition, just as temperament/disposition has large effects on attainment through CAT scores and marks in first grade, this personal resource no doubt confers benefits as the student moves up through the school system.

Often traits like temperament/disposition are expected to be measured less reliably than cognitive skill (e.g., Heckman and Rubinstein 2001), but the measure used here has an alpha reliability of .82, larger than the test-retest reliability of CAT tests for children age six (California Achievement Test 1979). To check whether differential reliability is biasing parameter estimates, we compared several LISREL models over a range of reliabilities (.7 to 1.0; see app. B) and found the temperament/disposition parameter to be significant at every reliability level. While later schooling could shape temperament/disposition (see Jencks et al. 1979, p. 132), ample evidence shows that differences in temperament/disposition also predate first grade. For instance, preschool children cooperate with others and are sensitive to other children's distress (see Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, and Chapman 1983, table 1). Children between two and six years of age, in fact, can be exquisitely perceptive and respond in a prosocial way to a wide variety of needs expressed by other children. Hart et al. (2003) also show that personality type shapes early cognitive development.

Some commentators forecast moderate declines in social stratification

over the 21st century (Gamoran 2001). Perhaps this will be so, but the likelihood of that reduction, we think, depends on mitigating stratification forces early in life, that is, attenuating the early influence of SES on children's development. This rationale, of course, has led to Head Start and other preschool programs. These evaluations have generally not examined the role of children's noncognitive resources, however. We suspect that enhancing noncognitive skills or resources could further reduce SES barriers because these skills are largely independent of SES, at least as shown here.

The idea that human capital is composed of noncognitive as well as cognitive skills is not new. Heckman (2000) observes that in "real life," qualities like dependability and industriousness are widely perceived as valuable human traits. Likewise, qualitative studies related to labor market segmentation point to "soft skills" as a kind of human capital that employers seek (Moss and Tilly 2001). Conventional economic theory, however, is of little help in identifying which noncognitive attributes should be most influential in determining life outcomes (Bowles et al. 2001a).

Jencks et al. (1979) nevertheless demonstrated more than two decades ago that traits involving temperament/disposition predict long-term educational attainment, and that effects of industriousness and perseverance on labor market success of secondary students were as large as effects of schooling and family background. More recent studies (Bowles et al. 2001a, 2001b; Duncan and Dunifon 1998; Heckman 2000; and Heckman and Rubinstein 2001) find that noncognitive skills affect earnings and other important life outcomes. Osborne (2003) extended this line of work by showing interactions between noncognitive skills and job type: aggressiveness may be an asset for men in high-level jobs but a liability for men in low-level jobs, for instance.

Noncognitive qualities of BSS students have played a strong role in their educational attainment. The measure used here is psychometrically robust: it has high face validity and reliability. What about its predictive validity, however? First, a positive emotional state in a child—"usually happy"—has clear connections to learning because it signals a lack of anxiety. Also, students who are enthusiastic tend to be engaged and will learn more than the less engaged, and, probably, as Cameron and Heckman (1993) say, universally valued behaviors lead to more success in school at every level. Traits like enthusiasm, generally positive affect, a tendency to get involved with others, and the ability to deal with new things and new situations—the bundle of qualities here labeled temperament/disposition—are generalized assets and likely have value in *any* walk of life.

The ratings of these children are filtered through their teachers' perceptions of them, however. Teachers no doubt view children through a

different lens than do parents, for example. For parents, different behaviors may be salient, and parents may hold different standards than teachers for the same behaviors. Moreover, with low-income and/or minority children, who are the majority of the BSS panel, the risk of bias or favoritism is always present.<sup>11</sup> At later grades when both parent and teacher ratings are available, parents' assessments of their children tend to be more favorable than teachers', with correlations across years for teacher-teacher ratings and for parent-parent ratings larger than correlations for teacher-parent ratings (Alexander, Entwisle, and Herman 1999), a pattern seen in the literature generally (Achenbach, McConaughy, and Howell 1987). Assessments of children's behavior thus are better aligned when observers occupy a similar role vis-à-vis the child being rated (parent-to-parent, teacher-to-teacher) than when raters occupy dissimilar roles (parent-to-teacher).

None of this is necessarily indicative of bias, but it does remind us that different actors often perceive the same reality differently, and in this instance, perceptions matter. Teachers' views of their pupils have consequences for children's classroom success. No doubt actual student behavior and perceptions of student behavior both matter, but the two are hard to separate. Our measure of temperament/disposition as assessed by teachers is probably a blend of the two. Much work needs to be done to clarify the essential meaning of these and like data, but here, these measures capture differences which have real consequences in both the short term and the longer term.

### Comparison with High School Models

A natural question at this point is whether the models estimated for first-grade students differ from those estimated for high school students, and if so, in what respects. Many of the best-known secondary school models (e.g., Sewell and Hauser 1975; Sewell et al. 1976) focus only on men for relatively short time periods after high school. The Explorations in Equality of Opportunity (EEO) model estimated by Alexander and Eckland (1975), however, includes gender as a predictor and measures attainment of high school sophomores 15 years later. Their model employed an SES measure much like the SES composite used with the first-grade sample here, and the measures of standardized test scores in the two studies are almost exactly parallel. The variable called temperament/disposition in

<sup>11</sup> An extensive literature documents race and class differences in teacher assessments of children and expectations for their future performance (see e.g., Alexander, Entwisle, and Thompson 1987; Downey and Pribesh 2004).

the BSS model has no counterpart in the Alexander and Eckland model, however.<sup>12</sup>

Even with the differences in model structure and the large difference in age of panel members, the first-grade model explains 42% of the variance in educational attainment 16 years later using eight predictors, while the Alexander and Eckland model explains 44% of the variance in attainment of high school sophomores 15 years later using 10 predictors. This equivalence is the more surprising because high school sophomores are approaching the end of compulsory schooling and so ought to have a clearer sense of their educational prospects. One would assume that age 22 outcomes would be harder to predict from age six than from age 15.

Although the proportion of variance explained is similar, the magnitude of the direct effect of SES on attainment differs strikingly between the two models (a standardized coefficient of .40 in first grade versus .14 in the Alexander and Eckland model). In the high school model, SES has *smaller* direct effects on test scores than do any of the school-related variables like aptitude, educational expectations, or class standing. This difference addresses directly questions of model specification raised by Haveman and Wolfe (1994) as well as by Alexander and Cook (1982)—namely that measuring parents' influence in high school greatly underestimates their influence, because much of it has already been "converted" into school outcomes. For example, SES predicts children's test scores in first grade, which predict first marks, so cognitive skills in first grade already have absorbed some of the variance associated with SES.

Such SES-linked "deflections" no doubt operate through many different kinds of school-related resources, magnify over time, and operate both between and within schools (e.g., Kerckhoff 1993). Even in this sample, which has a restricted range on SES, almost half (48%) of the variance in SES is *between* schools rather than within. The rank-order correlations between the percentage of BSS children on meal subsidy in a school and the average reading and math CAT test scores in these schools are .68 in reading and .72 in math. The average SES level of a school also predicts children's marks. Marks of children in low-SES schools are lower than marks of BSS children in high-SES schools with test scores and other relevant variables controlled (Entwisle et al. 1997). In addition, administrative actions or interventions strongly reflect SES differences between

<sup>12</sup> Alexander and Eckland (1975) defined educational expectations by asking students whether or not they expected to go to college, while first-grade parents were asked how far they expected children to go in school. They also measure the student's track placement and self-reported grades. The first-grade model here has no counterpart to "track," but grade 1 marks parallel self-reported grades. Alexander and Eckland measure academic self-concept, a noncognitive variable, but its standardized effect (.009) was so small it was excluded (Alexander and Eckland 1975, table A2).



schools. For example, only 47% of BSS children who attended first grade in a school where 90% of students were on meal subsidy reached the fifth grade five years later—most had been held back or assigned to special education.

In high school models, social background no doubt trumps cognitive skills because SES has many *indirect* effects through school-related variables like curriculum and class standing (see Alexander and Eckland 1975, table 9.3), so its *total* effect in high school models is comparable to that evaluated at age six. Even so, to trace all the indirect effects of SES on schooling from first grade up to the sophomore year in high school is possible in principle, but not useful in practice. A better strategy for understanding how SES effects are transmitted is to draw upon insights provided by prior research.

School transitions are good leverage points for gaining perspective because they are times when SES produces key deflections in achievement trajectories. Some specific examples of SES deflections drawn from other BSS research include transitions involving the school calendar (winter to summer), which account for virtually all the test-score gap between BSS students of high as compared to low SES (see Entwisle et al. 1997, table 3.1). School discontinuation, another kind of transition, also responds more strongly to SES than to any other influence. Compared to children of “average” SES, dropout is four times as likely for BSS children whose families were one standard deviation below the SES mean when children started first grade (Alexander et al. 2004). A final example is the middle school transition, at which time the odds of high placements in English and mathematics are significantly better for children whose parents have more education and/or higher incomes (Dauber et al. 1996). These examples, as well as the logistic analysis of enrollment level in this article, establish for several relevant points of comparison that the odds of making upward or advantageous educational transitions are significantly better when SES resources are more plentiful.

#### For the Future

Among developmentalists, a persistent question over the years has been the extent to which “initial conditions” constrain or enhance development. A growing literature testifies to the long-term benefits for disadvantaged children of attending high-quality preschools. Much less research, however, contrasts the early school trajectories of youths who differ in ethnicity, gender, and/or social class. This article lays bare substantial effects of race, gender, and SES measured in first grade on age 22 attainment, revealing the beginnings of a process Lucas (2001) calls “effectively maintained inequality.” Still, parents’ support and children’s own resources,

especially their noncognitive skills, affect the first-grade transition in ways that can mitigate influences of social structure. Much more research is needed on the processes early in life that affect stratification, especially on the ways in which children's noncognitive resources affect their schooling.

## APPENDIX A

### Attrition Analysis and Construction of Indices

*Attrition analysis* is presented in table A1. *Definitions of variables* are presented in table 1 in the main text. Composites are further described below.

*Family SES composite* is based on the average of five indicators in standard form: both parents' education levels and their occupational levels (obtained from parent questionnaires), and whether the student qualified for federal meal subsidy in 1982, which is indicative of low income and was obtained from school records. On average, mother's education (95% of students) is 11.7 years; father's education (67% of students) is 12.2 years. Mother's occupation (77% of students) and father's occupation (66% of students) are coded in the TSEI2 metric (Featherman and Stevens 1982). For missing data, the mean of the available variables was used. All but 0.5% of students had data for at least one of the five indicators. Alpha reliability based on five items is .86 ( $N = 386$ ); for three items (over 95% of the sample) .74.

*Neighborhood* designation (poor, nonpoor) for each of the 20 schools sampled in year 1 was derived from information on 26 regional planning council districts (Regional Planning Council 1983) in Baltimore. For "poor" neighborhoods, mean household income was \$10,900 (coded "1"); "nonpoor" average income was \$17,840 (coded "0"). Qualitative judgments about social climate, neighborhood resources, and isolation of the neighborhood were also taken into account in assigning neighborhood categories as poor or nonpoor. For schools in poor neighborhoods, the average meal subsidy rate was 85%; in nonpoor neighborhoods, it was 35%.

*Temperament/disposition* of students was assessed by teachers using five items adapted from Zill (National Survey of Children 1976). Teachers rated each of their students using six categories ranging from "exactly like" to "not at all like." Factor analyses identified a subscale (see table 1 in main text for exact wording of items), which consists of teachers' assessments of students' enthusiasm, cheerfulness, creativity, social involvement, and openness to "new things and new situations and experiences" (see Alexander, Entwisle, and Dauber [1993] for more information). Assessments by grade 1 teachers are available for 85% ( $N = 538$ )

TABLE A1  
ATTRITION ANALYSIS: COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL BSS SAMPLE AND YAS SAMPLE

	BSS SAMPLE		YAS SAMPLE		<i>t</i> - Test	NOT IN YAS SAMPLE	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		Mean	SD
Proportion female ....	.51	.50	.53	.50	*	.42	.50
Proportion African-							
American . . . . .	.55	.50	.57	.50	*	.43	.50
Family SES index . .	-.04	.80	-.01	.82	*	-.18	.69
Proportion two-parent							
family .. . . .	.56	.50	.57	.50		.54	.50
Reading CAT, fall							
1982 . . . . .	281	40.8	282	42.2		276	33.9
Math CAT, fall							
1982 .....	292	31.9	294	32.8	*	287	27.1

NOTE — The Young Adult Survey (YAS) sample contains 632 cases, 80% of the original BSS ( $N = 790$ ). *t*-tests compare the YAS sample with those who were not in the YAS sample ( $N = 158$ ).

\*  $P \leq .05$

of the panel. Year 2 assessments were used to backfill missing data ( $N = 58$ ), boosting coverage to 94%. The alpha reliability is .82.

In order to assess *parent psychological support*, we asked parents before the first report card was issued in grade 1 to guess their child's marks in reading and math and to predict how far he or she would go in school. The parent psychological support index is the mean of *z*-scores for the three items. Reliability of .90 was assumed, based on estimates from previous BSS studies (see Entwistle et al. 1988).

*Cognitive skill* was based on school records that furnished scale scores on the CAT Reading Comprehension and Math Concepts and Applications subtests, administered in early fall and again in May of first grade. The Kuder-Richardson 20 (homogeneity) reliabilities for the standardization sample are .69 and .83, respectively, for reading and math in the fall of grade 1, and .84 and .87 in the spring of grade 1 (California Achievement Test 1979). The test composite is the mean of the normalized CAT scores for reading and math in the spring of grade 1. The mark composite, also derived from school records, is the average of the fourth-quarter marks in reading and math (coded from "1" low to "4" high).

## APPENDIX B

### Sensitivity Analysis: Models Estimated by LISREL

Unreliability in indicators can produce downward bias in the estimates of effects, so following the logic of figure 1 above, a set of LISREL models

with both measurement and structural components was estimated. Using the observed alpha reliability of the temperament/disposition (.82), measurement error is fixed at .18 times its error variance. Error variances for other variables were based on estimates derived from previous BSS studies.<sup>13</sup> The model in figure 1 was then estimated, with the reliability estimate for temperament/disposition allowed to vary, but holding measurement error for other variables constant.

In table B1, the first column in each panel summarizes parameters for a model with no measurement error and so is identical to the OLS model in table 5, except that the LISREL model is not weighted. The middle column in each panel summarizes parameters for a model with the reliability set at its observed value (.82) and other reliabilities as noted above. For other columns, the reliability of temperament/disposition is set at .90, .70, and .60.

There are only minor differences between the first and third columns in the standardized coefficients. Significance levels of most coefficients remain unchanged, but the explained variance increases substantially. Over the whole range of reliabilities (.90, .82, .70, .60), temperament/disposition has strong direct effects on CAT scores, marks, and educational attainment at age 22. As its reliability decreases, its coefficient increases, but patterns of significance remain unchanged. Other parameters do not appear sensitive to measurement error in temperament/disposition. Most important, the significance patterns in the first (OLS) and third (LISREL with observed reliabilities included) columns are comparable.

<sup>13</sup> We assumed unit reliability (1.0) for race, gender, and neighborhood; 86% reliability for the family SES index; 90% reliability for the parental psychological support index; 85% reliability for CAT scores; 90% reliability for marks and educational attainment at age 22 (see Entwisle et al. 1988).

TABLE B1  
EFFECT OF VARYING RELIABILITY ESTIMATE OF TEMPERAMENT/DISPOSITION SCALE

	COMPOSITE CAT SCORE, Spring 1983 <sup>a</sup>					COMPOSITE MARKS, END GRADE 1 <sup>a</sup>					YEARS OF EDUCATION AT AGE 22 <sup>a</sup>				
	1.00	.90	.82	.70	.60	1.00	.90	.82	.70	.60	1.00	.90	.82	.70	.60
Gender . . . . .	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.01	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01	.10*	.11*	.11*	.11*	.11*
Race . . . . .	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.13*	-.11*	-.14*	-.13*	-.13*	-.13*	-.13*	.10*	.12*	.12*	.12*	.11*
Family SES index . . . . .	.14*	.16*	.16*	.16*	.16*	.08*	.07	.07	.08	.08 <sup>+</sup>	.40*	.52*	.52*	.53*	.54*
Poor neighborhood . . . . .	.06	.09 <sup>+</sup>	.09 <sup>+</sup>	.08 <sup>+</sup>	.08	-.07 <sup>+</sup>	-.07 <sup>+</sup>	-.07 <sup>+</sup>	-.07 <sup>+</sup>	-.06	-.12*	-.06	-.06	-.06	-.06
Parent psychological support index . . . . .	.29*	.31*	.28*	.22*	.15*	.19*	.16*	.16*	.15*	.13*	.09*	.07	.07	.06	.04
Temperament/disposition . . . . .	.41*	.46*	.49*	.56*	.65*	.20*	.16*	.18*	.22*	.30*	.12*	.14*	.16*	.21*	.30*
Composite CAT score, spring 1983 . . . . .						.44*	.54*	.53*	.49*	.42*	.03	-.01	-.02	-.05	-.09
Composite mark, end grade 1 . . . . .												.11*	.10	.08	.05
R <sup>2</sup> . . . . .	.43	.54	.56	.60	.66	.60	.72	.72	.72	.73	.43	.52	.52	.52	.53

NOTE.—This analysis employed LISREL models; table contains standardized coefficients

<sup>a</sup> In the first column of each panel, there is no measurement error (1.00) in any variable, in the second through fifth columns of each panel, the temperament/disposition scale reliability varies as noted (.90, .82, .70, .60), and the reliabilities for the predictors are as noted in appendix B

<sup>+</sup>  $P \leq .10$

\*  $P \leq .05$

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## First Grade and Educational Attainment

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## Book Reviews

*Representing Men: Cultural Production and Producers in the Men's Magazine Market.* By Ben Crewe. Oxford: Berg, 2003. Distributed by New York University, 2004. Pp. ix+230. \$75.00 (cloth); \$26.00 (paper).

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*Representing Men* is a study of what goes on inside the publishing world of men's magazines in the United Kingdom during the launch of a new magazine. The author, Ben Crewe, received a three-year funding award from the Economic and Social Research Council in the United Kingdom. His research was conducted under the auspices of the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex. Crewe took good advantage of this research opportunity. He lists over 30 interviews with editors, publishers, and others involved in producing such magazines as *Men's Health*, *loaded*, *ZM*, *Arena*, *Maxim*, *Front*, *Esquire*, *FHM*, *GQActive*, and *GQ*. While some of these magazine titles may be unfamiliar to the American audience, the general content and focus of men's magazines in the United Kingdom seem similar to those in the United States, and the dynamics of the publishing world are probably driven by many of the same forces.

*Representing Men* makes a valuable contribution to the literature on masculinity and men's lifestyle magazines. While Crewe does not provide a content analysis of the magazines he studied, he does describe in detail the roles of editors and publishers and variations in masculinities as seen by producers of culture for this market. Particularly important are the theoretical issues involved in editors' trying to ascertain the "imagined audiences" of their magazines. According to Crewe, while surveys and focus groups provide some data, editors develop and rely on intuitive feelings to track their reader's interest. There is a belief within the industry that some editors are especially good at this. High salaries and many perks are granted to those editors who are believed to have such insight. Crewe points out, however, that editorial dominance declines as markets become well established and readers become easier to identify. Under these conditions, publishers assume more authority. On average, magazine editors have shorter tenures than publishers and are highly disposable.

While editors downplay the role that publishers play in launching a magazine, publishers do play an essential role. They underwrite the costs associated with nurturing a new magazine until it finds a niche. Publishers also socialize with advertisers to advance the reputations of their magazines. The publishers make strategic calculations in determining com-

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mercial opportunities in a changing marketplace—and then let the editors try to create the content that will attract the readers.

Crewe's research indicates that neither editors nor publishers are in the magazine business to improve the lives of their readers. Rather, the interests of the publishers, editors, and advertisers overlap to such an extent that corporate interests prevail. Readers are important only to the extent that their interests are understood well enough to create a sustainable market.

The strength of this work is the author's careful construction of the life histories of the editors and his attempt to relate this history to the choices they make in developing their magazines. Crewe demonstrates that the interests and expertise of editors have a significant impact upon their publications. He conveys through rich descriptions the idea that the personal and professional lives of editors are a seamless blend of activity. As in other professions, their work merges with their selves. An implication of this role-person merger is that as editors of magazines aimed at young men age, they need to move on professionally.

The weakness of the monograph for a U.S. audience stems from its focus on the United Kingdom. The author is writing to a British audience and uses examples that will not be familiar to Americans. In addition, the author writes precisely, but uses words and phrases that are unfamiliar to American readers, such as "productivist," "whilst," and "imbrications of the cultural and economic."

In terms of its research scope, the monograph leaves the reader wanting more. Particularly needed is a chapter on the role that advertisers play in the launch of a new magazine and how advertisers decide to support a new magazine. Crewe interviewed only one advertising director, so the influence of advertisers in general is perhaps understated. He did include a few fascinating pages on the role advertisers play in limiting or constraining objectionable content in magazines. These few pages indicate that the influence advertisers exert is profound and subtle.

I recommend *Representing Men* as an important work of research in the expanding fields of men's studies and mass communication. It fills in some of the gaps in our knowledge about the relationship between editors and publishers in the magazine industry. It suggests directions for future research and is suggestive of trends that might be observable in the United States.

*Latex and Lingerie: Shopping for Pleasure at Ann Summers Parties.* By Merl Storr. Oxford: Berg, 2003. Pp. 224. \$70.00 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

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Merl Storr explores the world of at-home lingerie and sex toy parties in *Latex and Lingerie: Shopping for Pleasure at Ann Summers Parties*. A

gender studies analysis of Ann Summers (AS) parties in the United Kingdom, the book is primarily an analysis of homosociality—single-sex friendship interactions—of the women involved as organizers and party attendees. Throughout the book Storr touches on related topics such as the framing of female bodies, the role of the phallus, and the dynamics of class, work, and gender. Data come from interviews with 15 party organizers and through participant observation at parties, though it is unclear exactly how many Storr attended.

AS parties are at-home demonstration parties, similar to parties in which people sell food storage containers, candles, or cookware. Parties are run by a party organizer who leads games, explains the items, and acts as saleswoman. Party organizers work as independent contractors within a commission hierarchy. Organizers work closely with women who host a party in their homes (hostesses) and invite guests (customers). Parties are organized and attended exclusively by women. AS parties offer women the chance to discuss sex, purchase goods with sexual meaning and uses, and engage in an evening away from partners and children. The women to whom Storr speaks emphasize that the opportunity for a “girls’ night out” and the general ability to “have a laugh” are the primary draws for partygoers, more so than the sexual nature of the products for sale. (Although Storr does not mention it, there are several companies in the United States that offer similar parties.)

Storr finds that the homosociality practiced at AS parties emphasizes “being one of the girls.” Teasing and the display of sexual knowledge are used to assert power and reinforce group identity. Storr acknowledges that her findings on female homosociality may be limited in scope, as the organizers and clientele are fairly similar in their racial, familial, and economic characteristics. Women are generally heterosexual, nonethnic white, and working to lower-middle class. For these women, to be “one of the girls” is explicitly to desire men and be desired by men. Storr asserts that the highly sexualized nature of the parties also begets a “lesbophobic” (p. 50) atmosphere in which women reinforce their own sexuality by disparaging lesbian proclivities or behavior.

Although women freely discuss sexual experiences and desires at AS parties, Storr maintains that the setting emphasizes women’s sexuality while still placing them in a gender regime in which they lack real power. There is a fundamental contradiction within AS parties, where women are portrayed as sexually aggressive, but their bodies are portrayed as generally passive. Storr contests such attitudes as valid indicators of feminist power and freedom. She terms AS parties as a “postfeminist” phenomenon.

Building on the discussion of homosociality, Storr offers an interesting analysis of the female erogenous body that shadows the homosocial body at AS parties. Here, the erogenous female body is imminently penetrable and acted upon. Items such as dildos and acts such as intercourse and fellatio all emphasize the receptivity of the female body. Topics such as

cunnilingus or vaginal strength are referenced rarely. Storr notes that women generally see orgasm as deserved but reliant on male technique and work performed on the female body (p. 135).

Storr also analyzes the role and function of the phallus at AS parties. The product line, party games, and common topics of conversation rely on multiple representations of male genitalia, but they differentiate the representational phallus from the real penis. Here, Storr relies on psychological and anthropologic theory while the analysis tends toward the Freudian.

Last, Storr addresses the complex interplay of women, work, and class dynamics at AS parties. I found the discussion to be incredibly interesting but too brief. The author aptly encapsulates the financial difficulties that party organizers face, including limited earnings, poor job security, and secondary-earner status within the household. Party organizers tend to be mothers, ages 25–35, from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Working as a party organizer may grant one earning potential, scheduling flexibility, and a generally enjoyable work environment, but Storr asserts that it does not offer a long-term career, stable pay, or prestige. The high-level interpersonal skills required by organizers are rarely acknowledged by others, and the sexual content of the work is often viewed negatively. Storr asserts that the sexually explicit dialogue in which organizers engage is a specialized, unrewarded form of emotional labor. However, she does not fully develop these aspects of the study.

Overall, the book is an unusual, interesting case study, but its scope and applicability are limited. Those who study the interaction of gender and class, marketing, or sexuality may find it most useful.

*Motherhood Lost: A Feminist Account of Pregnancy Loss in America.* By Linda L. Layne. New York: Routledge, 2002. Pp. vii+354. \$95.95 (cloth); \$26.95 (paper).

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Anthropologist Linda Layne has written an excellent, necessary, heartfelt account of the social and cultural experience of pregnancy loss in the United States, a topic that has been largely ignored by scholars (even by those of us who study reproduction) despite its importance to women and to families. The social significance of pregnancy loss, stemming in part from pregnant women's pervasive fears of miscarriage, cannot be overestimated. Indeed, when I began reading Layne's book in the summer of 2003 in preparation for this review, I was in the queasy and uncertain first trimester of pregnancy. I found the subject matter of the book disturbing enough—it so perfectly captured my own anxieties about losing

my much-wanted second child—that I begged off completing the review until after I had given birth to my daughter.

The strength of Layne's book lies both in the elegance of her wide-reaching, perceptive analysis and in the ethnographic depth and breadth of her research. She reviews a range of literature, including historical accounts, documents such as newsletters from the pregnancy loss movement, autobiographical works, and scientific and biomedical scholarship on miscarriage. She spent several years participating in and witnessing activities surrounding the pregnancy loss movement and interpreting its many cultural artifacts. Throughout, Layne invests her analysis with compassion and insight grounded in her own painful experiences of multiple pregnancy loss. In her able hands, the long-neglected topic of miscarriage is redeemed for scholarly interest, and she offers a welcome invitation to feminists and others to take seriously pregnancy loss as a sociocultural phenomenon and a political project. This is anthropological scholarship at its best, and Layne is a perfect example of Ruth Behar's "vulnerable observer," doing anthropology that breaks your heart.

What is of particular interest to sociologists is that Layne presents an exceptional portrait of the pregnancy loss movement in the United States—a movement often hidden from view by those who have no need for it. For not only is pregnancy loss viewed as a women's issue, and a deeply private one at that, but it also invokes death and dying—topics that make most of us extremely uncomfortable. She profiles the movement's key players and organizations and offers a sharp analysis of its many products. While she alludes to the "pro-life" sentiments attaching to the movement and its participants, she does not pursue this analytical angle, leaving unanswered important questions about exactly which women are most likely to experience miscarriage as a profound loss and to what degree. Missing here is the kind of comparative analysis present in, for example, Kristin Luker's account of diverse women's views of abortion.

Layne does an excellent job of setting the stage for the emergence of shifting conceptions of pregnancy loss in the late 20th century up to the present, including the increasing visibility and importance of fetuses arising from advances in medical technology and themes stressed in conservative politics; the persistent desirability of babies, especially one's "own" (i.e., genetically related) baby; and expectations of control (of nature, of reproduction, of life) by middle- to upper-class white people in America. She points, too, to a series of challenges posed by pregnancy loss in this context: to narratives of linear progress, to faith in technology, to religious beliefs, and to reproductive success. Peering at these phenomena through the lens of miscarriage offers a fresh look, illuminating both context and content in new ways.

She also discusses the significance of liminality, of both unborn (and never-born) babies and of ruptured motherhood, that plagues women who miscarry, making it difficult for society to recognize lost babies as socially



valid. As Layne rightly emphasizes, there are few rituals in the United States to support pregnancy loss, nor are institutions such as hospitals and birthing centers equipped to help women cope with such losses. I found especially poignant and notable Layne's focus on the material culture of pregnancy loss and on the technologies of remembering used by those who miscarry. Her account of loss, in which grieving parents cling to the material and symbolic reminders of their unknown yet cherished offspring, supports the argument that personhood is socially constructed through rituals, language, clothing, technologies, and the various *things* that shape our notions and practices of humanity.

Layne presents a challenge to feminists and other scholars to include pregnancy loss in a broader agenda of reproductive rights, highlighting the fact that even scholars of pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion have ignored or minimized miscarriage as a topic. Recognizing many feminists' fears of granting fetuses too much agency (and thus acceding to the claims and objectives of the Right), Layne asserts that miscarriage need not be incompatible with a "pro-choice" agenda. An anthropological or sociological approach to personhood emphasizing relationships and cultural construction leaves room for validating and understanding a range of women's responses to the unborn, from the difficult choice to abort an untimely or unwanted fetus to the deep and cutting edge of grief associated with miscarriage. Once miscarriage is acknowledged as a legitimate social problem, she argues, institutions can and should be modified to better serve the needs of women (and men) who lose desired babies.

Layne's analysis is not without problems, particularly the absence of alternative perspectives on pregnancy loss. In her account, miscarriage is presented exclusively in terms of regret and loss. While this seems intuitive, it may also be a reflection of Layne's subject population: women with pro-life tendencies who inhabit social movements organized around loss. But what of other women who miscarry, those for whom the loss of a fetus may not represent the worst life has to offer and who recover reasonably quickly? Surely there must be women who miscarry but who do not dedicate their lives to remembering their dead babies. Also, what of women who deliberately terminate a pregnancy because they are unable to birth a wanted baby, because of socioeconomic circumstances or some other reason? How do these women's experiences compare to those of women who spontaneously abort?

I also have a small quibble with Layne's title, which implies the loss of motherhood alone. While this is indeed many women's experience, as profiled in her account, her rich ethnographic data seems largely about the loss of embryos and fetuses as both material and social objects. While motherhood is clearly and cruelly stopped short by miscarriage, the women and men in Layne's story organize their grief more around dead babies than around the loss of social identities. This seems to support Layne's contention that social context—in this case, an increased collective sense of fetal personhood—matters. But I wish that she had more

fully explored this issue (perhaps by diversifying her study population), and thus complicated our understanding of identities in relation to the unborn rather than relying on a simple equation of embryos/fetuses equal motherhood. Just as there is no one definition of the unborn, there is surely no one definition of motherhood.

These criticisms aside, Layne's book is a superb addition to the social science literature on human reproduction. It would be useful in courses on sex and reproduction, gender, bodies, family, social movements, technology, and cultural studies. It should also be required reading for obstetricians, midwives, and others who attend to pregnant women.

*The Starting Gate: Birth Weight and Life Chances.* By Dalton Conley, Kate W. Strully, and Neil G. Bennett. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. x+258. \$21.95 (paper).

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This engaging book tackles two weighty and intricate issues about low birth weight. The authors explore the causes and consequences of low birth weight as an index of biological viability at the starting gate in life. Moreover, using low birth weight as a heuristic case, the authors address how biological status (nature) and society/environment (nurture) dynamically interact to affect individuals' well-being.

The book is coherently organized into five chapters, with the first chapter providing background information, followed by three empirical chapters (based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or PSID), and concluding with evidence-based policy recommendations. The authors start off by deftly illustrating that low birth weight, determined by a host of genetic/biological and social factors, provides an ideal lens to examine biological and social inheritance which reproduces socioeconomic inequalities and perpetuates the status quo.

The second chapter focuses on racial disparities in health. The authors carry out a study to adjudicate between social and biological/genetic explanations in understanding this phenomenon. Using standard statistical techniques, they find that parents' low birth weight or biological legacy more than socioeconomic status or the social environment explains black-nonblack differences in the likelihood of filial low birth weight. The authors further employ fixed-effects models of cousin comparison to identify a "purer" nonenvironmental effect of low birth weight. The results lead them to conclude that genetics, biology, and society each make a unique contribution to birth weight. Holding constant the characteristics of maternal grandparents, this approach helps reduce unobserved environmental variance and offers a further step toward disentangling social and biological causation of low birth weight. On the other hand, the power

of this within-family comparison technique in sorting out causation has its limits. To the extent that parental low birth weight may be complexly linked to life circumstances, the observed effects of parental low birth weight should not be viewed as entirely devoid of environmental factors even among cousins.

Using a similar analytical strategy, the third and fourth chapters aim to unfold the intergenerational transmission of low birth weight and low SES. The major finding of chapter 3 is that increased income is not necessarily helpful in reducing the likelihood of low birth weight whereas parental low birth weight status has a huge effect between families and within families (as confirmed by fixed-effects models of sibling comparisons). In other words, biological legacy appears to be a more salient predictor of low birth weight than income. This conclusion seems to be convincing and thought provoking. One useful elaboration would be to examine a threshold income effect and test whether the findings also hold for very low birth weight.

The fourth chapter emphasizes the sequelae of low birth weight. Using low birth weight to predict future educational attainment in a longitudinal setting affords a good opportunity to evaluate causality in the health-class relationship. The major conclusion is that low birth weight exerts biological effects on one's prospects, net of environmental influences. The validity of this claim, however, is susceptible to the efficiency of the fixed-effects models in reducing environmental variation. Sibling comparisons, albeit a strict test, cannot wholly account for unobserved environmental variation. For instance, as recognized by the authors, low birth weight babies may be raised and treated differently than their siblings and consequently develop different personal profiles in terms of personality, psychological stability, and behavioral predisposition, contributing to differential life chances. It is thus debatable whether the observed effect of low birth weight on educational outcomes solely represents biological risks. Another limitation applicable to all three empirical chapters concerns the use of SES as an overarching index of the environment. This provides an opportunity for future researchers to incorporate additional measures of social contexts into the analytical framework. Further investigations are also warranted to address pathways linking low birth weight to developmental outcomes. While this point is explicitly noted by the authors, the discussion is too hasty.

Evident throughout the analyses are biosocial interactions. According to results from chapter 3, income's effects on low birth weight are significant only for those born to low birth weight mothers. Results from chapter 4 also indicate that higher incomes may offset the deleterious effects of low birth weight on developmental outcomes. These findings, combined with the reported long-term effects of low birth weight on prospects, constitute the underpinning of the policy suggestions made in chapter 5. The authors make it clear that both social and biological risks

should be used to allocate resources targeting the disadvantaged, and attention to the intersection of biology and society must be long term.

*The Starting Gate* is introduced as filling a gap in the current literature on the interaction between biology and society. A take-home message is that both nature and nurture are important in determining life chances, and they work together across individual lives and generations. The authors illustrate their critical points persuasively with theoretical discussions supported by existing and new evidence. Despite aforementioned limitations, the book generates important insights into the causes and consequences of low birth weight and showcases how academic research can be useful in guiding policy decisions. The book should be interesting to researchers and policy makers who endeavor to understand the role of society and biology in producing social inequalities in health.

*Education, Social Status, and Health.* By John Mirowsky and Catherine E. Ross. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003. Pp. vii+242. \$51.95 (cloth); \$25.95 (paper).

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In this book, John Mirowsky and Catherine E. Ross argue that the association between social status and health is attributable largely to education. They conclude that education is a "root cause" of health that enhances personal effectiveness; advantages individuals economically, occupationally, and socially; and encourages healthy lifestyles. They also assert that the positive effect of education on health has a cumulative effect over the life course. After setting out their understanding of the relationship between education and health, Mirowsky and Ross then rebut alternative perspectives on the relationship between education and health.

These major conclusions are supported by summaries of a host of complex analyses from Mirowsky and Ross's previously published work on these issues. This work is based largely on data from their 1995 national telephone survey (Aging and the Sense of Control) of almost 2,600 persons ranging from 18 to 95 years of age. A follow-up survey interviewed slightly less than 55% of the initial sample three years later. The other study on which they focus is a telephone survey (Community, Crime and Health) of almost 2,500 residents of Illinois in 1995.

There are many commendable aspects of this book. It is a systematic and comprehensive summary of empirical research from two very productive sociologists who study health. It demonstrates that a rich array of scientific findings can be mined from survey research. Most important, it convincingly demonstrates the dividend that education pays in terms of good health and provides a comprehensive explanation of this rela-

tionship. By the conclusion of the book, Mirowsky and Ross have made a compelling argument for the value of education for health.

There are some particularly interesting processes that Mirowsky and Ross highlight. For example, they describe how education bolsters learned effectiveness and how this enhances the capacity for resource substitution. They also provide an understanding of how disadvantages associated with low levels of education "cascade" and further contribute to poor health.

Unfortunately, there are aspects of this book that are disappointing. Although Mirowsky and Ross provide a detailed discussion of the measurement of health, they seem to treat the measurement of education as unproblematic, often estimating it (as do most researchers) either in terms of the number of years of schooling or in terms of highest diploma earned. However, Mirowsky and Ross do not indicate why they use one measure in some analyses but the alternative in other analyses, or whether both measures generated identical conclusions.

Theoretically, this monograph seems underdeveloped. Although Mirowsky and Ross develop the links between education, learned effectiveness, human capital, and health in chapter 1 and again in chapter 3, this theoretical framework is spare. It makes relatively few references to other social scientific formulations concerning education, social attainment, and personal efficacy and their relationships with health.

There is also very little attention paid to any understanding of why there are variations in educational attainment. Issues of racial and ethnic disparities are absent from this book as are any substantial considerations of the social determinants of early school leaving or the structural barriers to postsecondary education. Indeed, there is a sense in which Mirowsky and Ross depict the effects of education on health in a social environment in which the potential modifying effects of social variables such as gender, family structure, and race or ethnicity are largely absent. These issues are important because these factors may limit the efficacy of social policies that recommend more education as a solution to disparities in health.

It is difficult to identify the audience for whom this book was written. The nontechnical nature of the presentation suggests that it was prepared for a senior undergraduate readership. However, there are several instances in which the detailed nuances that Mirowsky and Ross present are unlikely to be appreciated by students at this level.

Mirowsky and Ross have produced a book that will leave some readers unsettled. In striving so hard to sustain their argument that education is a root cause, Mirowsky and Ross convert strong empirical evidence (that is nonetheless probabilistic) into dead certainties. The lack of any equivocation associated with their conclusions and their characterization of alternative perspectives as "specious," "malicious," or engaging in a sampling "trick" provide strong debating points for advocates of education. In the end, the unsettling aspect of this book may be that somewhere in its narrative, the authors have shifted from science to advocacy. The difficulty is that the policies advocated by Mirowsky and Ross do not

appear to have been subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny that characterizes their scientific approach. Not every reader will be comfortable with this approach.

*Conceiving Risk, Bearing Responsibility: Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and the Diagnosis of Moral Disorder.* By Elizabeth M. Armstrong. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Pp. xiii+277.

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In this well-written book, Elizabeth Armstrong provides an in-depth analysis of fetal alcohol syndrome as a social problem. This case study serves as a striking example of two theoretical propositions familiar to historians and sociologists of medicine: (1) that the production of medical knowledge is socially situated and can rarely, if ever, be reduced to the accumulation of empirical evidence, and (2) that the somatic body can function as a site for contestation, diagnosis, and treatment of disorder in the social body. The author charts a distinctively nonmonotonic path from 19th-century claims on the hereditary effects of parental alcohol use to the modern-day "discovery" of fetal alcohol syndrome in 1973. This course was punctuated mid-20th century by a period of virtual retreat, when the link between drinking and birth outcomes was not only denied, but alcohol was thought to offer therapeutic benefits during pregnancy.

A major strength of the book is Armstrong's superb analysis of the social and historical context surrounding, and presumably contributing to, shifts in orthodox medical knowledge and clinical and policy prescriptions to pregnant women. Within the United States, early configurations of alcohol and heredity were subtended by the temperance and eugenics movements and a preoccupation with notions such as "race suicide." As these movements waned and drinking returned to fashion as a socially acceptable activity in the 1930s, alcohol lost its pathological potential within the medical canon. The subsequent emergence or recognition of fetal alcohol syndrome as an object of knowledge is, most notably, embedded within a reproductive revolution that gave women unprecedented control over fertility with the dissemination of oral contraception in the 1960s and the legalization of abortion in 1973. At the same time, new medical technologies such as ultrasonography and fetal monitoring rendered pregnancy increasingly "transparent" to both doctors and the public at large. Most important, this newfound transparency bestowed enhanced personhood as well as patient status on the fetus and contributed to a new paradigm of maternal-fetal conflict.

As Armstrong effectively illustrates, both periods of social control and surveillance over drinking mothers-to-be were characterized by a con-

comitant rise in women's independence from men and widespread cultural anxiety over the status of gender and motherhood. In the 19th century, women struggled for rights such as suffrage and education, while in the 20th century, women increasingly moved into the paid workforce while traditional family structures started to erode. At each moment when women were achieving social and political gains, they were simultaneously charged with greater responsibility for ensuring successful societal reproduction, both socially and physically, through vigilance over individual behaviors. Success in the public sphere was countered with a state of renewed focus on maternal functions in the private sphere and an imperative to mother the social body. Reflecting both a tendency within medicine to attribute various disease states to lifestyle behaviors and a tendency within American political ideology to individualize social problems, the policing of female drinking and the emphasis on women's individual accountability for fetal alcohol syndrome obscures the structured reality of everyday lives where a lack of opportunity and resources contributes to alcohol dependency.

Another strength of Armstrong's book is the variation in methods and source material. A thorough review of the medical literature is complemented by 30 interviews with physicians representing three different specialties (chap. 4). Results from the physician interviews, however, would seem to challenge, or at least complicate, the author's broader claims on the medicalization of alcohol and pregnancy. Contrary to Armstrong's depiction of modern medicine (in other chapters) as a near-monolithic entity advancing the diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome under the authority of "science" and pathologizing women's drinking behaviors, many of the doctors she interviewed seemed well aware of substantial ambiguity surrounding the diagnosis, pathophysiology, and epidemiology of fetal alcohol syndrome. Many also seemed to understand that placing blame squarely on the shoulders of individual women would be a misguided and futile approach to the problem. Hence, the study would have benefited from a discussion of such inconsistency and a more nuanced representation of how specific agents in the domains of medicine and health policy advance specific claims and intentions. The project is also strengthened by the inclusion of quantitative data from the 1988 National Maternal and Infant Health Survey (chap. 5), allowing Armstrong to substantiate some of her claims (e.g., only a small percentage of women actually drink during pregnancy). The presentation of results, however, is somewhat atypical. For example, estimates are lacking confidence intervals (including those for levels of drinking), regression results (figs. 6 and 7) do not list covariates, and we do not know if estimates were adjusted for oversampling and other elements of the survey design.

Overall, this book is a splendid work, written with much clarity, grace, and precision. Though relying for the most part on existing theoretical work, overarching claims are powerfully argued and illustrated using fetal alcohol syndrome as a case example. This book should certainly interest

practicing physicians, as well as a diverse audience of scholars from fields such as gender studies, history of science, and sociology of medicine.

*Hooked on Heroin: Drugs and Drifters in a Globalized World.* By Philip Lalander. Oxford: Berg, 2003. Pp. xi+201. \$75.00 (cloth); \$25.00 (paper).

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Philip Lalander tells us that the initial publication of his book in Sweden spurred controversy in the press, basically because he had hung around a network of young, heavy heroin users in Norrköping (pop. 122,000) for more than a year and failed to intervene. His preface to the English translation professes unease at having done research where he felt a public duty to turn his informants in to the police (p. x). American readers will not be so scandalized. The research fits in the longstanding American tradition of fieldwork in legally and morally marginal subcultures. This book will be of interest to students of heroin use as a point of comparison with other samples, especially cross-national.

Lalander presents a broad-ranging, descriptive portrait of the culture of at least 40 young heroin users (the exact sample size is unclear; p. 173). Chapter 3 provides an innovative explanation of heroin consumption practices, an important subject usually overlooked. Social rituals both “dedramatize” heroin and create a “cozy” sense of ease. Vignettes throughout the book convey the emotional and physical feel of the world of heavy heroin use. Chapters 3–8 give a convincing explanation of the coherence among varied aspects of culture. Consumption practices, identity, respectability, and street economy niches are organized around the logic of insulating the group from outsiders while maintaining a respectability that both honors and resists antidrug ideology.

Close study of addiction sets this book up to be read alongside important American writing on heroin by Alfred Lindesmith, Norman Zinberg, Philippe Bourgois, and others (though many relevant publications are not engaged directly). The coverage of heroin life is compelling and broad. Yet the kind of careful causal explanation found in those authors’ works is missing, largely because Lalander did not compare different kinds of users.

In a field with so little firsthand observation, the data collection itself is an important contribution for two reasons. First, the respondents are white. Although more than 70% of Americans who report having used heroin are white (National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2002 [Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2004]), they are almost never studied. Second, Lalander goes out and follows his in-



formants around, unlike researchers more inclined to invite users into their offices than to visit users on their own turf.

One disappointment is that the description is mostly limited to experiences immediately related to heroin. Routine demographic information would have been useful. The methodological index provides rough age and gender distributions. "The majority of the interviewees are of Swedish origin," we are told (p. 173). Outside of their heroin circles, it is hard to figure out who these people are. Had they grown up poor, middle class, or rich? What kinds of relationships did they have outside the heroin-using community? What did they do besides use heroin? The second chapter, "Before Heroin," attempts to answer those questions, but fails for the reason that life goes on during and after—not just before—heroin. There is little insight into how social circumstances, life experiences, and heroin use interact. Such issues bear on the central theoretical, political, and societal questions surrounding heroin.

This leads to explanatory shortcomings. Lalander provides sketches of a natural history of heroin using, from smoking it as a leisure object, to injecting it in a spirit of thrill seeking, to a daily preoccupation. Yet he rarely documents what else is going on at these moments or whether there are some who do not pass from one stage to the next. Addicts, for Lalander, are born directly out of casual use. Nonaddicts are phantom figures. Lalander implies that things going on in the heroin world fully explain becoming addicted.

Non-Swedish readers will be disadvantaged by the absence of contextual information. Much of what readers take for granted about national conditions has not been explained. For example, Sweden developed an American-style war on drugs during the early 1990s (L. Lenke and B. Olsson, 2002, "Swedish Drug Policy in the Twenty-First Century: A Policy Model Gone Astray," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 582:64–79). Knowing that, readers may experience the book differently. Lalander boldly states—treating his respondents' claims as fact, as he sometimes does—that in 1994 in Norrköping "there were . . . only four or five regular users" (p. ix). However one interprets that claim, it is hard not to wonder about the relationship between the drug policy and the discovery of the drug epidemic around that time. Used comparatively—good description lends itself to such unanticipated purposes—Lalander's book in combination with others from elsewhere in Europe and the United States may help address such topics.

*The Price of Poverty: Money, Work and Culture in the Mexican-American Barrio.* By Daniel Dohan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. xix+295. \$24.95 (paper).

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Contemporary research and existing theories on urban poverty have primarily focused on the experiences of African-Americans and contrasted black poverty to white poverty. The traditional emphasis on black-white comparisons has meant that insightful and innovative research on Latino poverty is severely limited in number and scope. As a result, analyses of "new" immigrant versus "old" nonimmigrant Latino poverty are even more limited in the social science literature. *The Price of Poverty* fills a major void in the literature and provides an important extension beyond studies of extreme disadvantage by placing the study of Latino poverty, foreign-born and native-born alike, squarely in the center of sociological research. The book's central argument is that the role of immigration matters in shaping our understanding of Latino poverty, and that a comparative approach at the neighborhood level is necessary to understand fully the factors influencing Latino impoverishment. Daniel Dohan examines two large Mexican-dominant communities (Guadalupe in Los Angeles and Chávez in San Jose) that vary in immigrant status; he contributes to the literature by emphasizing the neighborhood factors motivating how residents navigate the world of work, welfare, and crime on a routine basis.

There is, of course, debate on what factors might contribute to Latino impoverishment. Dohan describes three models that offer explanations: (1) the underclass hypothesis, (2) the labor market disadvantage hypothesis, and (3) the immigration hypothesis. *The Price of Poverty* theoretically engages all three of these models, paying close attention to differences between Latinos and the community processes surrounding the urban problem at hand, whether it be intermittent employment, participating in public assistance programs, or hustling in the illicit economy. Dohan threads together various strands of insights into an explanation of how community residents navigate the world of low-skill work, resources (money), and their particular "imbeddedness" in their neighborhood, while offering a novel discussion of intergenerational and immigrant Latino poverty. He also helps address speculative and heavily impressionistic evidence that immigrant-rich neighborhoods provide a buffer of sorts to poor communities (immigrants bring with them traditional family values, are more religious, and have greater tolerance for long hours of work at low pay). Moreover, this book tests the assumption that immigrant neighborhoods are better places to live (compared to older barrios) and escape the ravages of economic deprivation while improving prospects for work and thwarting crime. To a certain extent, these are stereotypes or im-

pressions provided by other scholars on various ends of the Latino poverty continuum. He argues that in the end, "hustling" and "overwork," which were used by residents in some instances in reaction to low-wage labor markets, rarely enabled residents to overcome structural barriers to mobility.

This is an intriguing argument, but at times I grappled with how his insights would vary in the same communities across time. The author's fieldwork was conducted between 1993 and 1995. He probably encountered situations that might be very different than those at the time his book was published. For example, chapters 6 and 7 focus on crime, criminal victimization, and offending, and how they varied in the two barrios. The drug peddling described in the Chavez barrio occurred as the youth violence crack epidemic waned and violence declined. Policing styles changed (in fact, the author describes one personal encounter with authorities) and probably became even more aggressive to some barrio residents than others shortly after his fieldwork ended. How would local reactions to the illicit drug economy, corresponding violence, and police encounters shape his experience at a different time point? Moreover, did engaging in drug crimes result in the imprisonment of large numbers of young males? Were there crackdowns on drug peddlers plaguing the barrio, and if so, were they removed, or did the "hustlers" engage in other types of illicit activities or perhaps even take a different tact and become "overworkers" once the streets became too dangerous?

Comments aside, this book is far superior to recent publications on Latino poverty. Few others have produced a comprehensive study that addresses Latino poverty as innovatively and rigorously as Dohan does, and his book will be the benchmark for future scholars. His methods are excellent, highly original, and very impressive in scope given the combination of some quantitative data with detailed qualitative information. As noted earlier, his work moves beyond racial dichotomies and into a West Coast context, an underexplored region relative to the Midwest and the East Coast. The book also undertakes a neighborhood approach, placing it within a larger "underclass" context, but more important, bringing in the role of neighborhood institutions (churches, schools, community-based organizations) and friends. Finally, this is essential reading for several audiences, including sociology, urban studies, ethnic/Chicano studies, and specialists in poverty research and qualitative research methods.

*Working in a 24/7 Economy: Challenges for American Families.* By Harriet B. Presser. New York: Russell Sage, 2003. Pp. xiii+267. \$39.95.

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People coordinate paid work and family through the use of services that allow them to complete personal business on the weekends or at night. Longer banking hours, 24-hour grocery stores, and expanded weekend shopping hours help people work and still manage their families and personal lives. The fact that those who work the night shift at the local grocery store or the longer Sunday hours at the mall also must manage their work schedules and their family responsibilities, but on relatively low earnings and at odd times, has received scant attention. The reality that 46% of workers work weekends, evenings, nights, or some combination of the three requires that this oversight be remedied. In *Working in a 24/7 Economy*, we get a detailed picture of who works nonstandard schedules and the impact such schedules have on marital quality, family functioning, and child care.

Harriet Presser reports that those who work nonstandard hours often are employed in the service sector in jobs including cashiers, truck drivers, and nurses. In addition, most of those who work nonstandard schedules do so because the jobs require it, rather than because of personal choice, making it especially important to understand the impact of these schedules on those who work them.

Four chapters focus on the impact of nonstandard work schedules on families. Presser reports that, at least when children are present, working nights or weekends has a negative effect on marital quality and makes divorce more likely. Given the public concern about marital quality and stability, especially among couples with children, it is ironic that working the nonstandard schedules necessitated by a 24/7 economy most negatively affects families with children.

Nonstandard work schedules also affect housework time. Both women and men who are at home when their spouse works at a nonstandard time spend more time on traditionally female household tasks. This finding mirrors what Francine Deutsch reported in *Halving It All* (Harvard University Press, 1999) as well as what other scholars who study the division of household labor have reported, with few new insights provided here.

Presser provides interesting data on the impact of parents' nonstandard work schedules on the time they spend with their children. Parents working nonstandard schedules and their children eat dinner together less often, breakfast together more often, and interact somewhat differently than other parents and children. If, as Presser argues, family dinners are the single most important family ritual, working nonstandard hours has a negative effect on families. If, however, breakfast can be as important as dinner, it is less clear that families suffer when parents work nonstan-

dard hours. Nevertheless, the impact is undeniable and in need of additional attention.

The most compelling chapters in the book deal with the impact of nonstandard work schedules on child care arrangements. Parents on nonstandard shifts are more likely to rely on relatives for child care as well as to use several caregivers. This is especially problematic for single parents. On the other hand, Presser reports that couples may coordinate their schedules so that outside child care is unnecessary. This type of scheduling, where spouses have little time off together, often has a negative impact on marriages, making it a less-than-ideal child care solution.

Presser spends an entire chapter addressing the child care needs of mothers with a high school education or less who work nonstandard shifts. In addition to having low education levels, these mothers also have relatively low earnings, making many evening and night child care arrangements out of their reach. Instead, these women rely on a patchwork of relative care or other paid care, with few high-quality options. Just as expanded services and retail hours help some workers manage their personal lives, they make it more difficult for others to do so.

Presser's final chapter cites the need for additional data on work schedules, hours, and days, as well as longitudinal data on workers' movements among different work schedules. She also urges more research on the reasons people work nonstandard schedules and their impact on child outcomes. Presser calls for more public dialogue regarding the hidden costs of consumer convenience and advocates helping families manage work/family conflict through more family friendly employer policies. Although *Working in a 24/7 Economy* raises more questions than it answers, it does suggest some of the problems a 24/7 economy may create for families. Certainly, Presser's call for more attention to the potentially negative effects of the 24/7 economy is welcome and overdue.

*Buying Time and Getting By: The Voluntary Simplicity Movement.* By Mary Grigsby. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. Pp. 224. \$19.95 (paper).

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Recent surveys and news reports indicate that more U.S. citizens are entrenched in jobs that are dissatisfying, working under increasingly stressful conditions, spending less time with families and friends, and, ironically, earning less income and wages. Combined with those trends are the rise in the amount of debt the average U.S. resident is taking on, the rise in the per capita volume of garbage we produce, and continued environmental harm associated with a consumerist-capitalist system that

binges as a matter of course and has no end in sight. Given these deeply troubling dynamics, it is surprising that more people have not joined support groups and cultural movements that encourage “downshifting” and voluntary simplicity. But many people have done so for a number of reasons, including those mentioned above.

Mary Grigsby’s *Buying Time and Getting By* is one of the first close examinations of individuals who have joined the voluntary simplicity movement. Most of the research on voluntary simplicity focuses on the broad political, economic, and cultural shifts that have occurred in this nation over the last several decades, which presumably drive people to make these choices (e.g., recent writings by Amitai Etzioni and Juliet Schor). But few scholars have actually made the effort to ask the movement participants themselves why they have chosen such a path and what the collective capacity of this movement might be. Grigsby does exactly that, with an exceptional eye for detail, a captivating prose, and a sociological framework that makes important contributions to a number of scholarly debates.

Drawing on a range of literatures—including studies of new social movements, feminist theory, and the work of scholars integrating race, class, and gender into models of societal power and resistance—Grigsby deftly engages a host of sociological conversations. For example, she makes it clear that the distinction between new (cultural) identity movements and old (social) materialist movements must be reevaluated because the latter deemphasizes the role of power, which *all* movements seek, utilize, and require. She argues convincingly that even the voluntary simplicity movement reveals a deep relationship between its participants and political power in society, particularly when one considers how participants accrued the resources to “downshift” or “drop out” in the first place, as well as how and whether the movement might grow and influence greater segments of society. Rejecting simple dichotomies others use to distinguish “new” from “old” movements, Grigsby reveals that the voluntary simplicity movement is characterized by quests for personal freedom *and* power, through actions that are both expressive *and* strategic.

A number of observers have criticized voluntary simplicity as an inward-oriented, individualist effort by affluent persons who make the decision to get out of the corporate rat race only after they have made their fortune and can live off their accumulated wealth. Grigsby concurs with much of this critique, but actually pays attention to the simple lives themselves and hears their stories firsthand. In that way, she allows their voices, histories, and ways of knowing to emerge and illuminate why and how voluntary simplicity works for so many people. Grigsby also pulls no punches and is quite critical of movement participants, while being sensitive to—and even admiring of—their particular standpoints and biographies. She demonstrates that many simple lives are not tuned in to their race and class privilege and tend to avoid discussion of the fact that these factors shape who they are and their capacity to make the changes

they have initiated. Race and class are also often erased in considerations of why the movement is so severely lacking in demographic diversity. Yet some participants are aware of the disadvantages that people of color and working-class populations endure, and they demonstrate sensitivity toward these issues. Unfortunately, they generally fail to link the disadvantages that burden many people of color and the poor with the advantages that simple lovers themselves enjoy.

A major sociological discussion that most scholars have overlooked vis-à-vis this movement is the role of gender in voluntary simplicity circles. Through careful ethnographic observation and probing interviews, Grigsby finds a complex dynamic wherein simple lovers consciously challenge prevailing gender roles (women as shoppers/consumers and homemakers; men as competitive and domineering) while also uncritically accepting cultural definitions of masculinity and femininity as rooted in biological distinctions. These nuances emerge from numerous conversations, interviews, and observations that paint a portrait of movement participants that we have not had access to until now.

*Buying Time and Getting By* is a beautifully written book. It will be held in the highest regard by scholars and students of movements, social inequality/privilege, and ethnographic methods.

*Bouncers: Violence and Governance in the Night-time Economy.* By Dick Hobbs, Philip Hadfield, Stuart Lister, and Simon Winlow. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 323.

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*Bouncers* is at once a fascinating and repellent study of the underbelly of the nighttime economy in contemporary U.K. cities. The etymology of the term bouncer is not explained here, but one presumes it refers to the practice of ejecting or "bouncing" unwanted or unruly clients from evening and late night venues. At the heart of this book is the story of the private security operatives whose job it is to act as gatekeepers to late night consumption and leisure facilities in major urban centers. Their stories, however, are approached from a number of critical sociological perspectives which include the political economy of urban regeneration, the changing nature of urban governance, and the literature on deviance and criminology.

Bouncers are familiar to anyone who has visited the British Isles, but they are not generally a feature of the nighttime urban landscape in mainland Europe. Why this is the case is a question that regrettably is not pursued in the current study. The key argument advanced is that while the state has encouraged nighttime economic activities as a means

of making deindustrialized cities marketable and profitable, it has simultaneously surrendered its traditional monopoly on violence (control of the police force) to the commercial sector. This, the authors argue, has resulted in the proliferation of illicit commercial activity within the private security sector and higher levels of violence. The impetus for the study came from a concern to understand the dynamics of interpersonal violence and to explore relationships between the occupation of bouncing, deindustrialization, and the transformation of masculine identities. However, the focus of this book extends to encompass the nighttime economy within which bouncers operate. Fieldwork was carried out over a period of several years in all the major U.K. cities. It is regrettable that the authors do not provide more details about the exact nature, scope, and breadth of this fieldwork, particularly in relation to the ethics underlying the research and issues of access and trust.

In chapter 1, the authors review a range of both theoretical and empirical studies that have sought to explain the genesis and contours of the nighttime economy. In particular, they argue that the nighttime economy is in essence a by-product of the forces of deindustrialization working themselves out on the urban economy. Consumption and its range of ancillary services have come to characterize contemporary British cities much in the way that production defined their 19th-century antecedents. The authors argue that the nighttime economy “not only floats on alcohol, but it is a largely unregulated zone of venture capitalism” (p. 28).

There are two chapters on the city of Manchester, which is seen as the prototypical case of nighttime leisure/culture capital because of its rich heritage of popular music, media, and football. The business of pleasure has seen a turnaround in Manchester’s fortunes, but not without the nighttime economy becoming both the target of repression and incorporation by the city’s municipality.

The eponymous bouncers finally get their say almost halfway through the book. Tommy Smith, a bouncer for 30 years, reflects on his chosen occupation. He comments on the declining civility and rising rate of violence in the nighttime economy. The everyday customs and practices of bouncers are explored through detailed ethnographic observation in chapter 6. The final chapters of the book investigate the discourses of professionalism and safety within the occupation, and the manner in which the occupational culture of bouncers is informed by contemporary masculine working-class habitus. This habitus legitimates violence as a frame of action.

The portrait of early 21st-century Britain portrayed here is not a pleasant one. Young people, seemingly driven by nihilism rather than hedonism, surge into the bars, pubs, and clubs of U.K. cities to drink to excess and/or to take drugs. This behavior is “policed” by bouncers, who have no compunction about using violence to deal with difficult clients and to break up fights. Furthermore, because organized crime has infiltrated the security sector, many bouncers also control and monitor access to drugs



within bars and clubs. So some bouncers not only control access to the clubs but also access to drugs. The private security sector has benefited hugely from the deregulation that has resulted in the proliferation of clubs and pubs, but at the expense of control over the means of violence and the democratic norms of transparency and accountability. This book presents us with a particularly dystopian vision of nightlife practices in the United Kingdom, raising many pertinent questions about the changing nature of British social norms and values and adding to the growing literature on the nighttime economy.

*Communities of Work: Rural Restructuring in Local and Global Contexts.* Edited by William W. Falk, Michael D. Schulman, and Ann R. Tickamyer. Athens: Ohio University Press. Pp. 429. \$35.00 (paper).

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In recent decades, a profound economic transformation has resulted in major changes in the lives and communities of the 55 million residents of the nonmetropolitan United States. *Communities of Work* is a timely and very readable edited book that describes this transformation and its implications. The book consists of 17 chapters, each comprising a sociological study of a rural community experiencing economic restructuring and attempting to deal with the consequences. A wide range of communities and issues are studied, and it is apparent that the changes overtaking rural America have global causes but very local consequences. Taken together, the 17 chapters provide a relatively thorough overview of this important issue.

The major sources of economic sustenance in the nonmetropolitan United States have historically been natural resource-based extractive industries (including agriculture), manufacturing, and the service sector. The editors note that each sector has experienced extensive restructuring in recent years. At one time, the natural resource industries, especially agriculture, were the major employers of rural Americans. Technological developments and other changes have greatly reduced employment in these industries. MaryBe McMillan and Michael Schulman describe how the family farm has been largely replaced by massive, industrial corporate enterprises. Their study specifically explores the hog industry in North Carolina, where millions of hogs are produced in large, confined buildings with slats to channel the waste. Longtime residents are not only concerned about the smell and the environmental problems of dealing with tons of hog waste but also with the changing power structure of their community. Other excellent chapters dealing with the restructuring of extractive industries include studies of Appalachian coal mining by Melissa Latimer

and F. Carson Mencken, the Louisiana oyster industry by Forrest Deseran and Carl Riden, and the implications of fish farms for independent fisherman in the Mississippi Delta by Ralph Brown.

The manufacturing sector has also undergone massive changes. Studies of the restructuring of manufacturing include discussions of communities dealing with the closing of high-wage, durable manufacturing plants. Plant closings have become an issue in numerous rural communities because many of the plants are moving out of the United States. Another article explores changes in the southern textile industry. Of special interest is the restructuring of the food-processing industry, in general, and the meat-processing industry, in particular. In recent decades, many meat-packing plants have moved from the central city to rural areas to be closer to the animals. This move also allows plant owners to pay lower wages and avoid unionization. Jeff Crump describes how a large pork-packing plant became the primary employer in a Midwestern community several decades ago. The plant paid wages sufficient to allow workers to enjoy a typical middle-class lifestyle. In 1990, the plant closed. Soon, however, the plant reopened under new ownership. When the plant reopened, the assembly line had been redone, and the wages offered were about half of what had been paid previously. Many local residents were reluctant to return to work under these conditions, and so the plant subsequently hired hundreds of Hispanic workers. Consequently, a community that had once been nearly all white is struggling with racial diversity, and these issues are compounded by the fact that many longtime residents blame the new Hispanic residents for their lost jobs.

In recent decades, many rural communities have experienced a substantial increase in service sector employment. Several chapters explore this issue. W. Richard Goe, Sean Noonan, and Sherry Thurston describe a Montana community that was historically dependent on the timber industry. Recently, employment in the timber industry has decreased dramatically. There has, however, been rapid growth in the low-wage service sector as a result of high-income residents moving into the community and thousands of tourists being attracted to the area. Both the new residents and the tourists are seeking the beauty of the Montana mountains and a quiet rural setting. Increased inequality between the new residents and the service workers is one of the consequences. Similarly, Susan Webb describes how African-American women ride buses, sometimes over 100 miles each way, from their rural South Carolina communities to work at low-wage, seasonal jobs in the hotels lining Myrtle Beach. A chapter by William Falk describes how poor black residents retain a sense of community and place as development results in new residents, most of them white and wealthy, moving into their amenity-rich community.

As with all edited books, the quality of the chapters is not uniform, and some chapters have only a limited tie with the overall theme of the book. For the most part, however, the chapters are well written and together convey the magnitude of the implications of economic restruc-

turing for rural communities and their residents. Although the focus is on rural communities, the book will be of interest to anyone attempting to understand global trends in economic restructuring. Many of the issues described here are also meaningful for urban areas. The book is essential for anyone interested in the rural aspects of these processes.

*Community-Driven Regulation: Balancing Development and Environment in Vietnam.* By Dara O'Rourke. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. Pp. xviii+300. \$25.00 (paper).

Paul K. Gellert  
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How is effective environmental regulation produced? With state socialism and, since 1986, *doi moi* policies tying Vietnam's economy to the global capitalist economy, one might expect that factories would be "completely unregulatable" (p. 3). In his fascinating new book on community-driven regulation in Vietnam, Dara O'Rourke argues that neither command-and-control state agency strategies nor market-based solutions lead to effective implementation of environmental regulations. Instead, even in a rapidly industrializing country like Vietnam, unified and persistent community pressures are the most important social forces.

From an empirically rich examination of air and water pollution from six industrial factories and based on 12 months of fieldwork in Vietnam over a period of six years, O'Rourke builds an analysis of the state-society synergies that lead to successful "coproduction" of environmental regulation. The six cases include different kinds of firms (foreign owned or state, central, and local) and governmental jurisdictions (two provinces and Hanoi). Rather than a series of case studies, the book is organized around each of the key sets of actors O'Rourke emphasizes: communities, firms, governmental agencies, and extralocal actors. (Unfortunately, this organization leads to occasional reader confusion about community and factory names and some repetitive text.) From these sets of actors, their internal relations, and the relations among them, he builds a model of community-driven regulation (CDR). The central CDR hypothesis is that *interactions* between state actions, firm dynamics, and community demands are what explain the variations in environmental regulation across many cases in Vietnam. By showing the importance of community demands to state capacity and autonomy, O'Rourke adds importantly to the "embedded autonomy" perspective of his dissertation advisor, Peter Evans.

The richness of field interviews shines especially well in the chapters on communities and governmental agencies. Compared to the case of an insulated and recalcitrant state-owned paper mill with obsolete technol-

ogy, O'Rourke highlights the remarkable achievements of several communities that do not acquiesce. In one example, a "tight-knit" Catholic urban community faced a textile factory whose pollution blew directly into their church and homes. Letter writing and complaints to the provincial Department of Science, Technology, and Environment (DOSTE); the media; and the factory escalated to throwing bricks at the factory and photographing the pollution. The company relented and installed a higher smokestack and better filters but did not spend \$3 million needed for a wastewater treatment plant officially required by the government. What exactly produces a tight-knit community—that is, social solidarity—other than demographic similarities and residential stability, is less clear. He also uses the case of a transnational campaign against Nike and its Korean subcontractor (in which he played an important researcher/activist role) to provide a comparative window to the community-driven regulation of less visible companies that is his focus.

O'Rourke links community action and incipient social movement activity to a "conflicted environmental state." He provides great insights into DOSTE—an agency that is understaffed, underfunded, and under-trained, and yet, in some cases acts against polluting industries. An inspection division head reveals, "If the complaints of a community are very strong, that factory will be inspected first. We have too many factories to inspect, so we prioritize based on complaints" (p. 173). In a process he dubs "negotiated regulation," communities have received thousands of dollars in compensation. Simultaneously, in a subtle analysis of Vietnam's government structure too complex to relate here, he shows how the weak position of DOSTE within the government is strengthened by the community.

Let me briefly state two critical notes. First, the notion of "successes" in community-driven regulation needs to be tempered. Although communities struggle long and hard, these "successes" are partial, NIMBY-based, negotiated compensations. O'Rourke admits this, and thus it is not clear why he dismisses critical macrosociological theoretical perspectives, such as Schnaiberg's treadmill of production, so perfunctorily. Surprisingly, he also does not draw linkages to ecological modernization, which his research might support. Second, the lack of historical and cultural depth is disappointing. Left unexplored is the source of the "surprising amount of local autonomy" (p. 180) that exists in Vietnam. The social and historical lineages of the literacy and active "culture of complaint" behind the ubiquitous letter writing might have been explored rather than accepted as starting points of community "capacity" or "social capital."

Overall, this is a provocative sociological exploration of the potential for persistent community activism to drive regulation, as well as the limits of state-based environmental regulation. The readability, the hopeful message, and the lively case material of *Community-Driven Regulation* make this book an excellent choice for upper-division undergraduate courses. This book will be of keen interest to students and scholars of environ-

mental sociology, urban and community sociology, social movements, and globalization.

*Structure, Agency, and the Internal Conversation.* By Margaret S. Archer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 370. \$24.00.

Norbert Wiley  
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Margaret Archer's book both creates a new theory and tests it—an uncommon feat among theorists. First we get a model of the internal conversation or inner speech, showing how it can monitor our experience of social structure and shape our social pathways. Then we get an empirical study of how inner speech styles differ among 20 subjects, and how this variation is related to their styles of social mobility. The data are less fine grained than the theory, but they do test it rather squarely. The result is a significant clarification and expansion of inner speech theory, particularly as it can be drawn from the classical pragmatists. And the research, which tends to confirm the theory, is also well crafted and convincing.

Archer couches this book within a larger perspective, best known in Britain, called "critical realism." This is a humanistic kind of theory, and the idea that the individual has agentic causal powers, which Archer argues, is one of its major assertions. But the theory and data both seem somewhat independent of critical realism, and they could therefore be incorporated into other perspectives.

The offering of a new argument on how agency and structure are related is a welcome contribution. Both the theoretical and empirical aspects are complex, and each generates several new concepts—possibly more than were needed. Nevertheless the core argument is simple and clear. The relation between structure and agency is formed by the person's thinking about his or her situation and relating it to what they want. It is that thinking or inner conversation that gives cognitive and emotional shape to the point where the person articulates with the social surroundings. The influence is not overwhelming; it is normally modest. But the fact that, as Archer sees it, there is a steady stream of processing between the person and the social environment explains how agency mingles with structure.

The theory is philosophically sophisticated, as it defends the idea of a first-person, reflexive self against the prevailing computer metaphor in philosophy. Archer also wends her way through the pragmatists, especially William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and George Herbert Mead, to form her unique theory of inner speech. The common denominator of the pragmatists may be more a matter of their theory of self, particularly the internal conversation, than, as usually claimed, their theory of truth and

meaning. In any case, Archer lays bare the pragmatist theory of inner speech much more clearly and elaborately than anyone has done before. A key idea is the list of internal activities, which include budgeting, imaginary conversations, clarifying, imagining, prioritizing, reliving, deciding, mulling over, rehearsing, and planning. Given that inner speech is now a theme in several disciplines—including philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, linguistics, education, sports studies, speech communication, literary criticism, and film studies—her tracing of this idea back to its complex origins in the pragmatists may have wide ripple effects.

Archer's notion of agency, however, sometimes seemed unclear to me. We can exert our agency to produce causes that might lead to what we want—for example, as education might lead to social mobility. And, to make a quite different point, these causes might actually lead to what we want—for example, the mobility might be realized. But there is no guarantee that our efforts will be successful. I thought Archer sometimes had an indistinct boundary between these two aspects of agency, conflating effort with successful effort. The poor might beat at the door, but it might not open for them. However, the theory could easily be adjusted to clarify this point.

Another bone is Archer's concentration on Charles Sanders Peirce and her rejection of William James's and George Herbert Mead's theories of inner speech. I think James is more useful than Archer believes, and I do not think Mead's theory is as oversocialized and constricted as she thinks. In Mead there is usually a lot of room for interpretation, including which manuscripts to credit. And Peirce's fascinating idea that we can adopt new habits by first modeling them in our inner speech may have been overstated by him. This idea certainly did not work on him, since he was plagued by his bad habits all his life.

But these criticisms do not really dent this neat piece of scholarship. Archer has put together a brilliant theory of the internal conversation, leapfrogging everyone else working on the topic. And she has given it a substantial empirical test. The theory is likely to have a significant influence on sociology as well as on several other disciplines. The test is rather successful, and the ideas seem to fit into a variety of theoretical perspectives.

*Indeterminacy and Society.* By Russell Hardin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. 166.

Steven Rytina  
McGill University

This book achieves an unusual feat of balance—conveying both the profundity and the limitations of attempts to use rational choice tools to

address grand questions about ideal social organization. Under the rubric of utilitarianism, Russell Hardin addresses streams of argument that reach back several centuries and conveys the excitement of cumulative progress that he likens to scientific advancement. Yet that excitement is not diminished by Hardin's insistence that all proposals face cogent, unmet objections and that the grand projects remain open and incomplete.

Hardin's prose is wonderfully direct: "The simplest definition of rationality, which fits simple problems of choice, is that one should choose more rather than less value" (p. 16). Indeterminacy holds when rational choice theory is unable to single out a best choice. Hardin argues that indeterminacy is effectively ubiquitous in all situations complex enough to be of any real interest.

Two distinct analytic problems are linked under the master term, *indeterminacy*, but each signals roadblocks to potential analytic solutions. First, indeterminacy inheres in strategic interaction illustrated by iterated prisoner's dilemma. (Hardin characterizes this as exchange, unfortunately but irrevocably obscured by the established tale of interrogation.) An intractable problem is exposed by backward induction. Many strategists argue that the antisocial move of defection is the best choice on any iteration known to be the last. But since one's partner/opponent will reason identically, the logic extends to the last move but one, and then to the last move but two, and so forth. Thus cooperation should be refused in any sequence of finite length, even if millions of turns long. Some game theorists and lots of ordinary people reject this "logic," and it is thus almost certain (in a contested and indefinite sense) that better outcomes may be obtained by rejecting it—unless one has the singular misfortune of partnering with a dogmatic game theorist rather than another naïf.

Second, except for a select few, problems of collective choice raise intractable indeterminacy. Hardin lumps two potentially distinct sources. Many collective choice problems founder on the open dilemma posed by interpersonal comparison of utility. And Hardin is equally skeptical of attributing coherent comparison by individuals among complex states of affairs—often joint strategic outcomes among many players. Either problem inserts indeterminacy into the center of any effort to address the "society" referred to in Hardin's title—debates about whether alternative social arrangements can be evaluated or ranked by appeals to rational standards for collective choice.

Since putative solutions need to somehow neutralize indeterminacy, Hardin's conceptual focus helps locate key turns in earlier arguments. He reviews various attempts by authors, beginning with Thomas Hobbes, to justify (or criticize) institutional arrangements relative to what rational individuals would choose. Of course, since institutions already exist and the exercise is purely theoretical, it involves the delicate step of accommodating choice by all with convergence toward a common outcome. Accordingly, Hobbes can be credited with rigorous logic yet as having "resolved this indeterminacy with a trick" (p. 43), attributing abstract

ignorance to all and thereby ruling out preference among alternative forms of states. This confined the choice by a universal aversion to the costs of the single alternative that was analytically left—civil war.

This illustrates how Hardin often gets double duty from indeterminacy. First, the concept helps him to identify junctures, for example, where collective choices or strategic interdependencies are central, engendering analytic moves likely to be acknowledged by authors as difficult or critical. Second, indeterminacy in one or another guise is often the substance of a problem that impedes problem solution. Thus, creative triumph and analytic narrowing often emerge together as counterparts, as just illustrated. Of course, considerable creativity by Hardin, leavened by delightful wit, is required to bring off such illustrations.

For many, the cleverness, clarity, and infectious enthusiasm of this work will offer sufficient rewards. Opinion might reasonably divide on the central device of indeterminacy. As a strategic move, it has two great virtues. The absence of solutions is a fecund premise for critique of a diverse collection of important positions. In turn, this has great appeal as a graduate assignment, because it advertises the appeal of some grand proposals while underscoring that these are sources of debate and not bases for conclusions.

That same supple ease of critique may be less satisfying wherever the target is higher in the reader's private estimation. There is an asymmetry of negation—theoretical indeterminacy requires failed or absent argument, and this is less demanding or less informative than attempts to lay out a positive case such as those by John Rawls (a central foil for Hardin). This is a book for readers who enjoy the game of working at open puzzles. It is stimulating and provocative, and if at the end the recipe for "society" is not definite but indeterminate, that is exactly what the title promises.

*Interaction Ritual Chains.* By Randall Collins. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xxii+439. \$45.00.

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This book tries to provide a microfoundation of sociology that draws on an intellectual tradition focusing on interaction rituals (IRs) as sociological unit act. Chapter 1 recalls the intellectual tradition of studying rituals from Émile Durkheim to social anthropology and to Erving Goffman. In chapter 2, the theoretical model of IR chains is presented. The model distinguishes ritual ingredients and ritual outcomes. The ritual ingredients are group assembly (bodily copresence), barrier to outsiders, mutual focus of attention based on common action or events including stereotyped formalities, and shared mood based on transient emotional stimulus. Mu-



tual focus of attention and shared mood are reinforced by feedback intensification through rhythmic entrainment. The outcomes of ritual action are group solidarity, emotional energy in the individual, symbols of social relationship (sacred objects), and standards of morality stimulating and legitimating righteous anger for violations (p. 48, fig. 2.1).

This basic model is elaborated in the following three chapters. The first elaboration deals with the individual's production of emotional energy in rituals. Depending on the extent and kind of involvement in celebrating ritual action, the individual becomes more or less pumped up with emotional energy, which forms the very basis of his or her ability to achieve in social interaction and build up his or her personal identity and strength. The second elaboration relates interaction markets and material markets. Introducing the term "interaction markets," Randall Collins establishes a link between IR theory and rational choice theory without giving up his basic choice for a noneconomic foundation of microsociology. He conceives of social life as a market of IRs and assumes that, in the short run, the individual is involved in such rituals according to emotional attraction; in the long run, involvement will turn toward such rituals that create stronger solidarity, stronger symbols, and greater emotional energy of the individual. This trend does not result from conscious rational choice on the microlevel, but from unconscious preference for greater emotional surplus on the mesolevel, and from a kind of natural selection of rituals succeeding in producing solidarity, group symbols, and emotional energy. This ongoing production of solidarity, symbolic representation, and emotional energy is the very basis of material markets. A third elaboration of IR theory turns to thinking as a social process in the tradition of George Herbert Mead. Thinking is situated in intellectual networks, it is anticipated and reverberated talk. It is organized in thought chains and situational chains and involves internal rituals and self-solidarity.

In the four chapters of the second part of the book, Collins demonstrates the explanatory power of IR theory with detailed investigations into the social production of sexual interaction, situational stratification, and the history of tobacco use, as well as individualism and inwardness. The social construction of social phenomena of this kind is conceived in terms of IRs.

Collins's book is a major contribution to contemporary sociological theory. His approach—a genuinely sociological microfoundation of sociology—is well chosen and carefully carried out. This does not mean, however, that IR theory explains everything. Like any focused approach, it sheds some light on a specific feature of social interaction, social organization, social institutions, and society—namely, the production of solidarity, shared symbols, and socially infused emotional energy. This focus implies that everything outside its range becomes assimilated and is thus stripped of its own nature. Representative symbols of an epoch are surely produced in IR chains, for example; their rise and decline cannot, however, be explained by the change of networks and rituals alone, but also begs

the question of why previously powerful ideas are losing credibility, while new ideas are gaining credibility in the face of changed situations and new problems to be solved. There is a logic of discourse that is not completely in the hands of actors organizing discourse rituals. The reproduction of social stratification—as another example—depends indeed on rituals. It is, however, also shaped by the accumulation of capital of all sorts according to the Matthew principle of “who has, will be given,” which works independently of rituals. The same goes for the shaping of social stratification by basic institutions of welfare regimes and their underlying cultural code. Every type of welfare regime relies on rituals to be reproduced. However, the type of social stratification they produce has to be explained by their economic performance, their specific distributional institutions, and their underlying paradigm of social integration. In as much as we climb up the ladder from microfoundations to macrophenomena, we need further theoretical tools that are beyond the reach of IR theory. Independently of such limits—which are unavoidable for any focused approach—IR theory helps to enrich our knowledge about a core process of social life. *Interaction Ritual Chains* is a book offering rich insights into this core process.

*Unhastening Science: Autonomy and Reflexivity in the Social Theory of Knowledge.* By Dick Pels. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003. Pp. x+274.

Axel van den Berg  
McGill University

Rejecting both the complete constructivist/postmodernist leveling of difference as well as the outdated “traditional foundational principles” (p. 1) of “positivism,” in this book, Dick Pels joins the swelling ranks of those seeking a third way that somehow validates science as a distinct endeavor without claiming any undue “epistemological privilege” for it. But he does this in a novel way, as the title of the book indicates, by arguing that the feature that both characterizes science best and should serve as its ultimate justification is the “*absence of haste*, or a systematic and critical deceleration of thought and action” as compared to the domains of politics and the economy (p. 45). But this insulation from the latter’s more pressing concerns is only relative, Pels maintains, since the three domains are always connected by a continuum more or less densely populated by entities and practices that mix elements of the three, such as consulting firms, commercial research, marketing and polling agencies, and so on. Far from threatening to “contaminate” the autonomy of science, Pels argues, these serve as a buffer that protects science against inappropriate pressures from economics and politics. Moreover, within this buffer, the

"right" mixture of the different domains' tempos itself constitutes a constantly renegotiable "impure and interest-ridden compromise" (p. 195). Consequently, the best we can do is commit ourselves to a frank and self-conscious "chronopolitics" to defend scientists' "corporate" interests in keeping the worst incursions of the much faster-paced outside world at bay.

Pels seems almost anxious to register his fundamental agreement with the constructivist sociologists of science and knowledge who are obviously his main interlocutors. He repeatedly asserts as self-evident "that science is social, political, and interest-committed through and through" (pp. 146-47), and that reliance on the "force" of reason amounts to a form of (symbolic) violence. Nevertheless, he does think his fellow constructivists have taken their game of "epistemological chicken" too far, leading to a "value-free relativism" that leaves them unable to defend the validity of their own accounts or of any "alternative normative sensibility" (p. 82).

The longest chapter in the book is devoted to making the case for the "natural proximity of facts and values," arguing in essence that, since the two are inextricably entwined anyway, it is better cheerfully to mix the two and acknowledge as much than to do so under the false cover of a sham "value-freedom." Thus, in the end, Pels not only seeks to lay the basis for claiming a special epistemological status for social science, however chastened by constructivist caveats, he also wishes to recoup some sort of moral and political authority for it. But not wishing to reassert some kind of absolute factual-cum-moral authority for social scientists, Pels ends with a plea for a "weak social theory" which celebrates its own "epistemological weakness" and is committed to "a radical absence of compulsion and obligation; it makes no appeal to listeners that they should adopt any of these views. . . . You can take it or leave it" (p. 220).

These are the main lines of Pels's argument. While interesting in a quirky sort of way, much of it strikes me as fundamentally questionable. First, for all the hard-nosed talk about the ubiquity of politics, Pels's arguments are oddly devoid of any sense of real politics. For one thing, his utter contempt for outdated positivist notions like "value neutrality" seems to render him incapable of recognizing that this principle was meant precisely to counter any blatantly political power grab by academics trying to usurp the factual-cum-moral authority once claimed by the church. More curiously, however, there is a remarkable absence of any plausible political opponent, or even interlocutor, in Pels's chronopolitics. Who exactly does he expect to persuade of the desirability of cultivating these oases of tranquility and deliberation for us academics? And why exactly does he think that we stand a chance if we try to make our case purely in the name of our own corporate self-interest?

But he doesn't really believe we do. For his actual argument for the cultivation of the slow pace of academia is not that it serves the interests of us academics or that it is a good in itself, but that it brings greater benefits to all, benefits that begin to look suspiciously like the "greater

reliability" of long-dead positivism. These include "the legitimacy and value of the special perspective and particular skills generated by a systematic deceleration of thought and action" (p. 110) and the "institutional capacity for slow, systematic, and methodical gathering of knowledge" (p. 111), which alone enables laboratories "to generate the fresh cognitive and technical forces that turn them into such powerful levers to raise the world" (p. 152), as it "is this deceleration of discourse and the clearance of a protective zone for its unfolding that enable scientists to learn from their mistakes" (p. 153). Is this really very different from the good old positivist objectivism that Pels dismisses so contemptuously as antiquated dogma?

Last, but not least, Pels's celebration of theoretical "weakness" is, in the end, well, rather weak. Worse, it seems fundamentally disingenuous to me. Either you want to persuade or you do not. This goes back to the postmodern prudishness about "reason" or even abstraction and classification as, in some sense, forms of symbolic violence. No doubt they involve conceptual inclusions and exclusions, which, in a very fuzzy sense of the term, means "doing violence" to the real world and its infinite complexities. Fine. But for most of us, this is a pretty harmless form of violence compared to the other forms we are also exposed to on a daily basis. It may be an interesting exercise to reflect upon the similarities between different forms of "violence" in this very rubbery sense of the term, but most of us most of the time—and this includes pretty much all of the humanities and social sciences and even a fairly hefty chunk of philosophy—are quite happy to be able to trade on the difference between persuading or shooting each other. And that is ultimately a political (and moral, and personal) choice. Take it or leave it.

*Science in the Modern World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization.* By Gili Drori, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and Evan Schofer. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. Pp. xii+377.

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The authors, all associated with Stanford University's Comparative Sociology Workshop, seek to understand the extent, nature, and effects of the authority of science in the contemporary world. Their thesis is that "the entire modern system, with its notions of empowered and rationalistic individuals, organizational and nation-state actors, rests on and elaborates basic cultural assumptions linked to science" (p. 10). These assumptions are (1) that the visible natural (including human) world reflects basic principles that are universal, integrated, consistent, and rational; and (2)

that humans can, through rational procedures, discover, know, learn, and use these principles. Science is conceived and discussed at this very high level of generality, which, while almost heretical in many areas of science studies, enables the authors to take the global view they espouse. It also enables them to understand science as institutionalized, that is, as a "system that is accepted as legitimate and valuable and that structures reality and activity for individuals and groups in society" (p. 3).

The authority of science, the authors argue, is primarily cultural rather than functional, deriving from its role as a vector of modernity. This is the West's modernity, subscription to which is the price of participating in the West's global institutions. Characteristically modernist values, policies, and organizations are built around a general concept of science rather than built up from specific bodies of knowledge and practice. While local practices and institutions are only "loosely coupled" to this general concept, the presumed universality of the principles of natural order and of the human capacity to grasp and use those principles creates a common denominator permitting intercultural, international communication and policy setting in the world's varying global associations.

The volume's audacious scope requires quasi-heroic measures. While four individuals are attributed overall authorship, four more contribute individual chapters or portions of chapters: Elizabeth McEneaney on the institutionalist methodology and on education, Yong Suk Jang on national science and technology ministries, Christine Min Wotipka on women in science, and Ann Hironaka on the environment. The arguments of the book employ both quantitative analysis and content analysis. Statistics regarding the spread of science—as represented by national and international, governmental and nongovernmental science organizations, by science ministries, by the proportion of science and technology in tertiary education, and by level of research activity—are subjected to multiple forms of analysis to yield unexpected and interesting patterns of association and disassociation. For example, while expanded scientific labor force training increases national economic growth, expanded scientific research does not, and indeed "socially relevant" research slows economic growth. Content analyses of primary school textbooks from 60 countries demonstrate a universal shift to representing nature as knowable and science as a human (rather than a superhuman) activity, as personally relevant, and as emotionally accessible. Elementary school education across the world thus carries the message of the global system, inculcating a particular way of being human. Content analysis is also used to show the pervasion of science policy literature by a science for development ethos.

While science is promulgated as advancing economic development, its record in doing so is only partial, and it has effects other than the purely economic. Science has globalized local environmental problems. The spread of a culture of science promotes standardization—from weights and measures to social actors. While individual actors are empowered by

the liberal scientific vision, they are also subjected to homogenizing pressures associated with globalization as information processes and models are standardized. Both the state and its individual subjects are simultaneously though differentially empowered.

These are sweeping claims, some of which are well supported by the evidence adduced in this volume. The very availability of the statistics on which the authors rely supports their claims of increasing homogeneity and their conceptualization of "the world system" as itself an object of scientific investigation. At the same time, one wonders how to think about the various and increasingly forceful movements of religious fundamentalism in the West and anti-Westernism elsewhere. Are they genuine alternatives to scientific modernity or resisters formed in modernity's uniformly empowering wake? One also misses discussion of more fine-grained issues having to do with the unevenness and heterogeneity of science's authority. What, for example, is the relation of the nuclear weapons programs of India and Pakistan to other aspects of scientization in South Asia and to the patterns of global science institutionalization? Regardless of such nagging worries, the perspective outlined by these authors offers much food for reflection to more locally focused science studies scholars. Latourians will find echoes of the co-construction of nature and society and science and politics in this global context; Foucauldians can find evidence of the equation of truth and power and its advancement of a characteristically modern form of governance. Science enthusiasts who see the global spread of science as vindication of its value are confounded by the institutionalist analysis of its authority, while science critics are made to see themselves as products of the system they deplore. All of us in science studies stand to benefit from studying this book.

*Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa.* By Evan S. Lieberman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 334.

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*Race and Regionalism* is a terrific book, showing that apartheid and its less institutionalized precursors ironically led to a progressive and effective system of tax collection: because upper-income whites in South Africa felt a sense of solidarity and collective responsibility for lower-income whites, they were prepared to pay substantial amounts of income and property taxes. This established an efficient tax collection machinery that the contemporary South African state has inherited. In Brazil, by contrast, the ideology of racial democracy prevented cleavages based on race and therefore also prevented a cross-class solidarity based on race that might have

underpinned income and property taxes. Instead, region became the salient cleavage, and resentment at geographic redistribution prevented the development of efficient national income and property tax collection. Evan Lieberman argues that these divergences were established at three moments: the First World War, during which income tax was introduced much more successfully in South Africa, where whites saw themselves as a part of Europe and were therefore willing to pay to finance the war; the Second World War, when regional resistance prevented the huge rise in taxation seen in South Africa from taking place in Brazil; and during the Cold War, when South African whites saw themselves as surrounded by a black Communist majority and were willing to finance a state that was fighting a "war on Communism."

One of the pleasures of the book is Lieberman's methodological and analytical sophistication: in addition to examining archives and government and international data sources, Lieberman conducted over 150 interviews with business and state actors in both countries. He complements his comparative-historical research design with a statistical analysis showing a strong correlation between an exclusionary pattern of race relations and high income and property tax collections around the world. He is careful with the limitations of the various kinds of data and thorough in his attempts to combine the various kinds of analysis. His second chapter, which develops an analytical model of different kinds of "tax states," will be useful to scholars of taxation in other geographical and historical contexts, and the model of how cleavages mobilized at particular junctures can exert significant causal influence decades later will be useful to scholars of race.

There are a few places where the argument is not completely convincing: most important, Lieberman never asks why, if region was such an important cleavage, Brazil did not establish a *regionally based* system of income tax collection. In Germany, for example, a region receives in revenue only what was raised in taxes from that region. A similar principle—returning some proportion of income taxes to where they had been collected—could have placed income taxation on a much stronger footing in Brazil, providing an intraregional basis for cross-class solidarity that could have paralleled the intrarace basis for cross-class solidarity found in South Africa. If this is the case, the true lesson of this book is that what politicians have to do is base taxation on cleavages that are appropriate to the way the community sees itself and avoid redistribution across the salient cleavage. What Brazil did "wrong" was to try to redistribute across the regional cleavage, whereas South Africa did not try to redistribute across the race cleavage. If stability of taxation is the goal, it is redistribution across the salient cleavage—not the particular cleavage per se—that threatens it.

On this score, a continuing annoyance in the book is that Lieberman bases all of his analysis on central tax collection only, but surely if region is so important in Brazil, we need to know what the patterns of local

taxes show. Another important weakness is the lack of explicit attention to the ideologies of the state, particularly in Brazil. Lieberman does not discuss the debates inside government during these three episodes of tax imposition—we hear, for example, only that Brazilian politicians who wanted to implement an income tax in the late 19th century “were rebuked” (p. 32), but not by whom, how, or why. One wonders whether part of the lack of a progressive tax structure in Brazil was the result of an ideology, seen in many other countries, that consumption taxes (especially if basic necessities are exempted) are higher just because the taxpayer can choose to avoid them, whereas income taxes imply state coercion.

Finally, the main action in scholarship on taxation these days is working out the implications of the discovery that countries that rely on sales taxes have been able to finance much larger welfare states than those that rely on income taxes, because income taxes generate greater taxpayer resentment. If this holds true for developing countries, then South Africa’s progressive tax regime based on income taxes is not necessarily cause for celebration; in the long run, Brazil’s regressive tax regime based on sales taxes may provide a more stable revenue base, and South Africa may be headed for a taxpayers’ revolt.

*Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension Privatization in Latin America and Beyond.* By Raúl L. Madrid. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. Pp. xx+313.

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*Retiring the State* is about the causes of pension privatization in Latin America during the 1990s. Unlike more general works on welfare state reform, Raúl Madrid focuses on pension reform out of a conviction that different policy areas have different causal determinants and thus are best analyzed individually. Indeed, one of the book’s most provocative arguments entails the claim that the causal factors that drive pension reform are distinct from those that shape welfare state reform more generally.

The book specifically seeks to explain the extent to which countries in Latin America enacted pension privatization schemes. At the onset, Madrid organizes countries into four groups that follow descending levels of privatization: (1) the complete replacement of public pension systems with private ones (Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic), (2) the reform of public systems such that they compete with private ones (Peru and Colombia), (3) the combination of public and private systems such that workers simultaneously contribute to both (Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica), and (4) the maintenance



of public systems as fully public (Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela). Madrid nicely presents the specific details of these alternative reforms in informative tables, sparing readers from long narratives focused on the details of bureaucratic regulations that may be boring to all but the most specialized.

To explain the variation of interest, the prevailing theories of welfare reform are considered. Madrid provocatively argues that the dominant paradigm in this literature—the power resource perspective—is inadequate. In particular, whereas the power resource perspective assumes that differences in the balance of class power explain welfare reform, evidence suggests that the relative strength of labor and business exhibit no clear association with the scope of pension privatization in Latin America.

The shortcomings of the dominant perspective motivate the development of a new theory. This theory is elegantly parsimonious, proposing that pension privatization unfolds in three steps: (1) pension reform enters (or not) the president's policy agenda, (2) the president opts for a specific type of reform, and (3) the reform is enacted, modified, or blocked by the legislature. Madrid argues that pension reform is likely to enter the policy agenda if a country faces domestic capital shortages and is heavily burdened by pension spending. Once pension reform enters the agenda, the executive's decision to opt for privatization is influenced by the salience of World Bank officials, neoliberal economists, and the Chilean model of reform. Finally, the reform will be successful to the degree that the executive's party is disciplined and well represented in the legislature.

To test the theory, Madrid carries out a close comparative analysis of three cases that exhibit substantial variation in the extent of reform: Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. The case analyses draw on much original research, including many interviews with key policy makers. The narratives are tightly structured around the main theory, so much so that one might wish that Madrid felt more leeway to explore variables associated with alternative explanations at greater length. Chapter 6 examines cases from around the world in a sweeping narrative, and it also presents a brief statistical test using data from approximately 80 countries. Both of these analyses further support the theory.

Although Madrid's effort to combine different research methods is admirable, the multimethod design is not without problems. The author argues that the case analyses of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina are a complement to the large-*N* discussions because "case studies cannot by themselves rigorously test hypotheses" (p. 21). Yet, these case studies end up constituting the bulk of the book and in fact provide the most convincing support of the theory. In comparison, the brief large-*N* analyses in chapter 6 are less developed and less convincing. Indeed, Madrid's theoretical model seems to propose hypotheses about necessary/sufficient causation, for which the probit and ordinary least squares regression models may not be appropriate. There is also tension concerning whether Madrid is offering a theory for Latin America, a theory for Latin America

and Eastern Europe, or a theory for the whole world. I thought the analysis would have been cleaner if Madrid had stuck to the Latin American cases. This focus would have allowed more attention to the key though largely unexplored issue of *why* pension reforms in Latin America do not share the same causes as welfare state reform more generally.

Overall, though, this book constitutes very serious scholarship. It is unambiguous about its explanatory goals, and it is explicit about its key theoretical assumptions. The author demonstrates a mastery of the relevant empirical material, and he makes a convincing case that the causes of pension reform in Latin America are different from the causes of welfare reform more generally. Befitting this clearly focused analysis, Madrid resists the temptation to offer a grand normative statement about the consequences of pension reform. Thus, scholars who want either an indictment or an endorsement of pension privatization will not find it here. But those who want to understand the causes of pension privatization in Latin America will be treated to a first-rate study.

*Law's Dream of a Common Knowledge.* By Mariana Valverde. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. 264.

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On June 8, 2004, the front page of the *New York Times* reported a new determination by New York City's mayor Michael Bloomberg to decrease noise levels in neighborhoods where people complained about too many dogs constantly barking, trucks loudly honking, and the impossibility of enjoying life in a quiet residential area. As I read, I was reminded of analogous "quality of life" initiatives by then aspiring mayor Rudolph Giuliani—for example, ridding the city of squeegee men (who supposedly annoyed people by washing car windows)—and of George Kelling and Catherine Coles's influential "broken windows" theory of urban disorder, eventually translated into police strategies of zero tolerance.

But, after reading Mariana Valverde's interesting perspective in *Law's Dream of a Common Knowledge*, the question of whether changes desired by mayors actually take place seems to involve more than the usually recognized criminal justice system and community dimensions. In addition, one suddenly notices "under the radar" decisions made by a myriad of midlevel officials—say, the actions of investigators who may note or fail to note violations of noise code regulations—that quietly contribute to shifts in the urban landscape.

Valverde's book calls attention to a host of oft-overlooked decisions that, taken together, bring slow but steady changes while amounting to subtle forms of control. Among these are interpretations of parties em-

powered to decide, for instance, whether establishments pose "risks of harm" in selling adult materials in certain neighborhoods, whether (in Britain) a given pub should be licensed, or whether (in the United States) someone was actually driving while drunk. Valverde develops a number of case studies to illustrate this observation and a wider argument to which the studies are linked. This argument is that despite "law's dream of a common knowledge," day-to-day practices that affect issues of legal regulation actually draw on diverse or "hybrid knowledges" from technical expertise to common sense.

Though not initially apparent, the significance of the book's title gradually emerges and coheres. In a chapter on the forensic gaze, Valverde describes how intensifying attempts to focus on "physical details to an obsessive detail" are part of a larger legal project. This is the dream, that is, "the great desire that police and other seekers of legal/moral truths have to acquire ever more sophisticated technologies with which to discern and, most important, to record, document, and visually present objective, factual, incontrovertible evidence that criminal and moral laws have been broken by particular individuals" (p. 58). Yet such grandiose intentions are bound to fail, insensitive as they are to messier day-to-day knowledges that defy usual dichotomies between objectivity and subjectivity and, in social theory, between identities and acts.

While Valverde's main focus is the legal system (her intention of influencing the sociology of law is clearly stated), her approach can also be distinguished from that of feminist and queer theorists, generally influenced by Foucault, with whom she nonetheless politically sympathizes. According to Valverde, though, some feminist and queer theorists fall back on using terms like "the body" as sloppily as functionalist theorists often refer too generally to "society." Thus, while legal scholars with fantasies of objectivity and poststructuralists stressing differences appear on the surface to be polar opposites, Valverde recommends to both the kind of careful empirical study that can replace overly abstract concepts with the clarity of concreteness.

Thus, to succeed at its own goals, this book depends on the strength of case studies to exemplify Valverde's objectives. Many of the case study chapters are quite creative, nicely illuminating the day-to-day practices Valverde seeks to investigate. One involves how it has come about that "risk of harm" became an operative concept in sex zone regulations. The previously mentioned chapter on the forensic gaze considers three different contexts in which "a male bodily substance," that is, semen, has been used for legal purposes: the Clinton affair that involved Monica Lewinsky and her famous stained blue dress, the regulation of a Toronto club in which strippers "produced semen for the entertainment of the customers" (p. 59), and a trial involving a Canadian dominatrix. Moving from sexuality to other forms of legal control and regulation, and perhaps reflecting Valverde's earlier work in this area, I found chapters on liquor licensing in Britain and Canada especially fascinating and well documented.

My only complaint was that, while the case studies cover compelling ground, I sometimes sensed that it was paradoxically elusive for Valverde, given her own highly theoretical orientation, to bring quotidian processes of legal regulation alive. In several chapters, theory seemed to take precedence over case study materials; had the latter been highlighted somewhat more engagingly, Valverde's major points would have stood out even more. Still, this is an intriguing work, well worth reading by sociologists interested in law, theory, sexuality, culture, and in criminology broadly defined.

*Talking about Politics: Informal Groups and Social Identity in American Life.* By Katherine Cramer Walsh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp. xv+292. \$57.00 (cloth); \$19.00 (paper).

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*Talking about Politics* is an exciting intervention in the debate about citizenship in the United States and the role of deliberation in supporting citizenship. Supported by an array of social, psychological, and political theory, Katherine Cramer Walsh masterfully interprets the conversations of several real-world casual groups to provide a glimpse of how people generate political ideas through group identification.

Beginning with a provocative distinction between *preferences* (the stuff of most political science) and *perspectives* ("the lenses through which people view issues" [p. 2]), Walsh seeks to understand how people who rarely talk about politics develop consistent and substantive political positions. The answer is complicated. Sometimes they do talk about politics per se, although generally in tones that reinforce visions of corrupt, ineffective politicians and governments. Sometimes they talk about concerns that they conceptualize as outside the realm of politics, as when they swap aesthetic and moral tales about topics ranging from female sexuality to the design of a football stadium. And sometimes they use informal interactions to build and reinforce group identity, which they use to forge political perspectives.

The common thread running through the book is the "old timers," a group of elderly, white, middle- to upper-class men who meet daily at a coffee shop in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where Walsh was a graduate student. Walsh listened to and participated in their conversations. In addition, she developed comparative cases to test specific theoretical points. These included a "craft guild," a less tightly knit group of women who met to make items for charity, an African-American group who sat at the other side of the coffee shop where the old timers met, and data from Sidren Verba et al.'s 1990 Citizen Participation Survey.

By drawing these comparisons to test theories arising from her observations of the old timers, Walsh offers us the best of both worlds: the rich description of the old timers' conversations, along with serious tests of their representativeness. Nevertheless, at times, the book's ambition exceeds its grasp; the subtitle tantalizes us with the promise of a study of "informal groups and social identity in American life," a project that would require a dramatically different approach. Walsh engages the literature on deliberation and that on social capital and argues convincingly that they inappropriately ignore day-to-day interaction. But the findings she produces properly sit alongside these literatures; they do not supplant them.

Another important theme running through the book is the concept of identity, both in its micro-form (group identification) and in a particular mesoform (race identification). Part of Walsh's argument is that informal group conversations help individuals situate themselves in groups of various kinds and sizes. Their identification with these groups, in turn, gives them clues as to the positions to take on political issues. Participants, Walsh argues, "are neither interacting entirely as individuals nor as members of the community as a whole. Instead, through their interaction, they are collectively defining who constitutes 'one of us' " (p. 52). Identity is strongest when it is called upon to react against a perceived outsider, as when the old timers construct themselves as whites in the multiracial Detroit metropolitan area, or when the women in the craft guild identify themselves as showing different sexual values from "most" women. These ideas will not come as a surprise to sociologists schooled in symbolic interaction or ethnography. What *Talking about Politics* adds is the theoretical and methodological weight to tie these insights to open questions in political science and sociology.

Walsh develops a compelling critique of the work of Robert Putnam: as Putnam acknowledges, social bonds can exclude as well as include. But groups, informal and formal, tend to be relatively homogeneous. According to the Verba data, organizational segregation reproduces neighborhood segregation rather than ameliorating it. Given that segregation and the observed tendency of homogeneous groups to construct identity in reaction to perceived outsiders, Putnam's faith in social capital as a democratic resource has real problems.

The masterpiece of the book comes in chapter 6, which deals with the relationship between political messages coming from the media and informal political conversations. It is a virtuoso performance. Walsh asked the groups for information on their media use, such as what television news they watched and what newspapers they read. She used that information to build a database of perspectives from those media on local and national issues that were current at the time. She then compared the language and ideas the groups used to discuss the issues with the language and ideas in their media sources. The result is fascinating: although, as expected, the groups often argued using the tools provided by their media

choices, they also often reconfigured the stories, bringing personal experiences and outside standards to bear on the issues in the news. This is among the most nuanced treatments of media effects on political discourse I have seen.

Methodologically, theoretically, and substantively, *Talking about Politics* is an excellent book that marks the utility of sociological insights in political science. It deserves attention in many sociological subfields. It is ironic, perhaps, that it took a political scientist to combine several kinds of sociological methodology into a coherent, readable whole.

*Who Is White? Latinos, Asians, and the New Black/Nonblack Divide.* By George A. Yancey. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Pp. x+230.

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As its title suggests, *Who Is White? Latinos, Asians, and the New Black/Nonblack Divide* is a provocative book. While few deny that the post-1965 American racial landscape has been transformed by large numbers of non-European immigrants, there is considerable debate about the probable long-term impact of these changes. George Yancey seeks to contribute to this debate by forcefully arguing that modern-day Asians and Hispanics are on the path to becoming white, following the assimilationist road trod by southern and central European immigrants a century ago. Ultimately, Yancey predicts, America will develop a racial order anchored by blackness—the prediction of a minority white society will prove to be false, as the descendants of immigrants from Asia and Latin America will identify with and be accepted by white society, while African-Americans will grow further alienated and isolated from the rest of the country. Yancey writes, “This book is a warning to blacks about losing allies, as well as a prediction that the largest nonblack minority groups will soon shed their distinctions from majority group members” (p. 164).

To support this claim, Yancey presents data on the social and political attitudes of “European Americans,” “Asian Americans,” “Latino Americans,” and “African-Americans” from the 1990–2000 Lilly Survey of American Attitudes and Friendships (LSAF). For example, whites are significantly more likely to prefer that their children marry an Asian or Hispanic partner than a black one, while Hispanic respondents would prefer that their children marry Asians rather than blacks. Whites are also reluctant to buy a house in a black neighborhood but have no such qualms about buying in an Asian or Hispanic neighborhood.

The heart of Yancey’s argument about changing racial configurations is the “black alienation thesis,” which posits that blacks are becoming more disaffected and disconnected with the rest of America. The dis-

tinctiveness of black public opinion from that of whites is most strongly evident in the significant differences in responses to questions ranging from support for affirmative action to the integration of churches and support for spending on prisons. These differences persist across most questions even when taking socioeconomic variables into account. The evidence from the LSAF points to a wide gulf in opinion between whites and blacks, mirroring much current research on racial attitudes.

However, after taking into account such factors as age, nativity, and socioeconomic status, the responses of Hispanics and Asians are far more ambiguous—at times closer to the positions of whites (especially true for Asians), at other times closer to the opinions of blacks, and often not significantly different from the opinions of either group (some of these differences are discussed, then dismissed; see pp 113–14). Yet Yancey draws a straight line from these survey results to the absorption of Asians and Hispanics into the category of “white.” While the reliance upon only cross-sectional data renders such an assertion inherently problematic, it also reflects the enduring theme of the book: that the lack of a simple white/nonwhite divide implies a black/nonblack divide. One can make a strong case for the distinctiveness of the black experience in America—considerable evidence such as exogamy rates, political opinion, and historical experience exists to support such an argument—without any bearing upon the whiteness or blackness of Asians and/or Hispanics. As Yancey acknowledges, different national origin groups often have vastly different racial experiences in the United States (e.g., Cubans vs. Puerto Ricans). Without a clear and consistent pattern to Asian and Hispanic attitudes and no longitudinal data, the prediction of a white population swelling in numbers due to the shifting racial identities of Asians and Hispanics is largely speculative.

The unmitigated focus upon divisions between blacks on the one hand and Asians, Hispanics, and whites on the other actually detracts attention from some of the more interesting results from the LSAF. For example, whites who are conservative Protestants are much less likely to support racial exogamy than other whites, while there is no similar effect for any other racial group. A strong regional effect of residence in the South on attitudes toward interracial marriage is evident not only for blacks and whites but also for Hispanics. Yet there is virtually no discussion of regional effects, religious differences, or any other variables that might influence interethnic attitudes—just a recurrent invocation of the “black alienation thesis.”

*Who Is White?* raises questions about the future of interracial alliances and identities that are likely to become increasingly important. Yet the book disappointingly provides answers that are heavy on conjecture and thin on empirical evidence.

*The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes.* By Paul M. Kellstedt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xvi+155. \$60.00 (cloth); \$20.00 (paper).

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Utilizing an impressive collection of time-series data, Paul Kellstedt explores the relationship between media coverage of race and public opinion in the United States. Contrary to the prevalent assumption that racial attitudes are fixed, Kellstedt argues that racial policy preferences change slowly over time, oscillating between liberal and conservative eras. These attitudinal ebbs and flows are attributed to the media's shifting emphasis upon two core values. When the media emphasize egalitarianism in framing race relations, the public tends to favor government intervention to remedy discrimination. When the media stress individualism instead, the public tends to favor laissez-faire policies.

Kellstedt asserts that media coverage also affects whether or not the public perceives policy issues as interrelated. By highlighting poverty among blacks, the media have contributed to the convergence of the public's preferences regarding racial and welfare state policies. Media framing has brought about a fusion of policy issues that, prior to the late 1960s, were widely regarded as being separate. Referencing Myrdal's classic study, the conclusion suggests that the contradictory policy implications of egalitarian and individualist values pose the "new American dilemma" (pp. 134-36).

The author has painstakingly collected and coded stories on race appearing in *Newsweek* between 1950 and 1994. Inspired by the innovative work of James Stimson, he also creates a policy mood index using 19 different time-series survey items. Multivariate regression models provide additional analytical rigor. The results indicate that in addition to media framing, policy feedback, general welfare state policy preference, and generational replacement all significantly affect racial policy preferences. The longitudinal nature of the study highlights the dynamic features of racial attitudes and the role of the media as socializing agents.

Certain methodological limitations, however, call for more qualified and less auspicious conclusions than those trumpeted in the book. Kellstedt argues unconvincingly that *Newsweek* accurately represents both the volume and the content of coverage on race by the entire U.S. media over a 44-year period. A comparison of the selection structures and content of several media sources using well-established sampling strategies would have strengthened his case considerably. Moreover, Kellstedt optically scanned for stories in pre-1975 issues of *Newsweek* while using electronic keyword searches on post-1974 issues included in the Nexis database. Because optical scans typically yield lower percentages of relevant stories



than electronic searches, the results probably underestimate the pre-1975 values of measures.

While carefully controlling for several sources of changing racial policy preferences, the study fails to include measures for civil rights mobilization and countermobilization. The omission is curious given the availability of time-series data on civil rights protests and the author's recognition of the ways that the civil rights leadership shaped the media's framing of racial policies. Although not emphasized conceptually, multivariate regression results reveal the effects of institutional political processes upon racial policy preferences. Adding measures for extrainstitutional collective action (including rioting) would have assisted in developing models of the multidirectional interactions between social movements, the state, the media, and public opinion. In the absence of such measures, the book's theoretical achievements fall considerably short of its methodological advances.

Kellstedt points out that most "snapshot" studies in the field miss the proverbial forest for the trees. Yet one can also make the opposite argument—that the study's virtually exclusive reliance upon year-level quantitative data encourages a focus upon long-term dynamics to the neglect of critical historical moments. Both short-term "historical particularities" and long-term social forces shape public opinion. In the absence of sociohistorical contextualization, the quantitative analysis presented rings somewhat hollow.

The book presents egalitarianism and individualism as equally salient but inherently contradictory values. Yet these values only generate opposing policy preferences if those valuing individual achievement fail to recognize ongoing structural disadvantages, or if those valuing equal opportunity fail to accept social inequalities resulting from variations in individual achievement. I suspect that a deeper content analysis would have revealed ways that *Newsweek* stories frequently though not invariably depicted as opposite values that can also be presented as complementary.

Most readers will appreciate the concise and highly accessible writing style. Unfortunately, brevity sometimes comes at the expense of nuance. The introduction ignores important demographic, economic, and political changes in the first part of the 20th century that provided the foundation for both mass civil rights mobilization and changes in racial policies. At the same time, the extent of changes in racial attitudes and policies in the latter part of the century are exaggerated. Throughout, race is treated exclusively as a black and white issue. Media representations of other racial categories (e.g., Asians as the model minority) affect political discourse and, therefore, warrant attention. These limitations aside, the book offers us important insights gleaned through creative uses of new data. Kellstedt takes us into uncharted empirical territory where those in the field should further venture.

*Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America.*  
By Mae M. Ngai. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp.  
ix+377. \$35.00.

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The figure of the “illegal alien” as foreign outsider looms large in the U.S. imaginary. Mai Ngai offers a stunning history of U.S. immigration as she closely examines the production of the illegal alien and the role of immigration policy in the making of modern America. Ngai powerfully establishes that race is entrenched in the creation of the illegal alien and that the construction of the illegal alien in the law renders certain racial groups as unassimilable foreign others. In other words, race and alienage are intrinsically linked in the boundary making of the U.S. nation.

The close relationship between race and illegal status was broadly instituted with the establishment of a national quota system for U.S. immigration under the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924. While this law placed Europeans in a hierarchy, it also created a white and nonwhite divide. Revisiting the 1924 Immigration Act, Ngai establishes that although race is not explicitly mentioned in the law, race entered the calculus in myriad ways as the law discounted those racially ineligible to citizenship, specifically Chinese, Japanese, and South Asians, and severely restricted the entry of free black Africans while barring the descendants of slaves. Although the legal whiteness of Mexicans allowed their entry to the United States, this did not preclude the State Department from restricting them via administrative means, enforcing the ban on contract labor, the literacy test, and the exclusion of persons “likely to become a public charge.”

Indeed, the numerical restriction on immigration created a new class of persons. Ngai writes, “Immigration restriction produced the illegal alien as a *new legal and political subject*, whose inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility—a subject barred from citizenship and without rights” (p. 4). This contradiction challenged the nation to balance its numerical restrictions on immigrants with the recognition of the human rights of illegal entrants. In response, the 1940 Alien Registration Act gave the attorney general the authority to grant discretionary relief, benefiting Europeans considered deserving of legal status and hurting Mexicans. The imposition of border control instituted the racial foreignness of Mexicans, failing to distinguish between the deported and repatriated legal and illegal immigrants, and U.S. citizens. As Ngai concludes, “The exercise of administrative discretion served to racialize the specter of the illegal alien” (p. 90).

This discretionary process of racial exclusion in the making of modern America continued with the limited incorporation of Filipinos in the 1920s and Mexican migrant workers during World War II, as well as in the construction of Chinese and Japanese as perpetual foreigners. Revisiting

the World War II internment of Japanese Americans and the renunciation of U.S. citizenship by more than 5,000 Japanese internees, Ngai establishes the limits of Japanese American citizenship, which disallows sentiments of dual nationalism and includes in it the stereotype of the perpetual foreignness of Japanese American cultural practices. Similarly, Chinese paper immigrants, who circumvented the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 by fraudulently establishing filial relations with legal residents as a means of entry to the United States, were denied amnesty but instead criminalized via their forced confession. Such subtle racial exclusions establish alienage, and the important intervention of Ngai to the literature on race and immigration is the illustration in *Impossible Subjects* that variations of such subtleties figure prominently in the incorporation of Mexicans and Asians in the modern history of the United States.

In illustrating the production of the "illegal alien" in modern U.S. history, Ngai draws from a wide range of sources including archival collections, interviews and oral histories, newspapers and periodicals, government serial publications and documents, and other primary scholarship from several decades. She uncovers how racial exclusion is embedded not only in the subtle discretionary processes of the government's enforcement of border control, but also in various immigration laws, including the aforementioned 1924 Immigration Act as well as the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, noted for abolishing all racial requirements to citizenship, and the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, which is credited for opening the borders of the United States by raising the annual cap on immigration to 290,000. While the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act still retained the national origin quotas and accordingly maintained the "logic which cast the native-born as the most loyal Americans" (p. 237), the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 still cast certain migration flows as "illegal." For instance, Mexican migration was imposed with a 20,000 annual quota, a significant reduction from the legal flow of some 200,000 braceros and 35,000 regular admissions for permanent residency in the early 1960s.

*Impossible Subjects* offers an important contribution to U.S. histories of race, citizenship, and immigration. This stunning history of U.S. immigration policy dispels the liberal rhetoric that underlies popular notions of immigrant America, as it establishes the designation of Asians and Mexicans as perpetual racial others. Everyone in the field of race and immigration should read this thought-provoking book.

*Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective.* By Takeyuki Tsuda. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Pp. xx+431. \$54.50 (cloth); \$27.50 (paper).

Aya Ezawa  
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*Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland* examines a fascinating subject relevant to contemporary debates of race and ethnicity, as well as emerging forms of hybrid identities in a global context: the experiences of Japanese Brazilian migrants in Brazil and Japan. Going beyond conventional assumptions of Japan as an ethnically homogenous and secluded nation, Takeyuki Tsuda's ethnographic study provides insight into a distinctive history of emigration from Japan as well as recent challenges to the Japanese nation and national identity through the return migration of Japanese Brazilians.

Japanese Brazilians, with a population of approximately 1.2 million, constitute the largest community of Japanese descendants outside of Japan. Japanese migration to Brazil began in the early 20th century, when Japanese government policies sought to address rural poverty by encouraging migration to Brazil, where a thriving coffee plantation economy was facing a labor shortage. Between 1908 and 1941, 190,000 Japanese emigrated to Brazil. Japanese migrants successfully integrated into the Brazilian economy and society, and many became small proprietors in Japanese *colônias*. In the postwar era, the population of Japanese descent, also called *nikkeijin*, became associated with higher-than-average educational attainment and a middle-class lifestyle. However, their situation changed dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, when *nikkeijin* were faced with a crumbling Brazilian economy, hyperinflation, and declining living standards. Attracted by the favorable currency exchange rate and work opportunities in the Japanese bubble economy, large numbers of second- and third-generation *nikkeijin* abandoned their white-collar office jobs in Brazil to take up factory jobs in Japan.

*Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland* examines the impact of return migration on the status and identity of Japanese Brazilians. Through the study of a translocal ethnic community, Tsuda explores the consequences of global and transnational processes from a local and interpersonal angle. Japanese Brazilians are in the ambiguous situation of being of Japanese descent, yet being perceived as culturally different—based on the idea that “Japaneseness” entails not only racial belonging but also linguistic and cultural competence. In other words, whereas many had considered themselves as “Japanese” in Brazil—an identity associated with a high status—they found themselves distinguished as “Brazilians”—associated with lower educational attainment and class status—in the Japanese context. Tsuda shows how this experience leads many to consciously assert their Brazilian identities after reaching Japan—through open use of Por-

tuguese in public, "Brazilian" dress, and participation in samba parades they had treated with disinterest while in Brazil. By stressing their Brazilian identity in Japan, he argues, *nikkeijin* are performing counteridentities. Such actions not only refuse assimilation but also destabilize accepted notions of Japanese national identity and cultural homogeneity. Globalization, viewed from this perspective, leads to an intensification rather than elimination of local differences.

Japanese Brazilians provide an insightful case to explore the dynamics of identity in a transnational setting. Going beyond notions of the native homeland and ethnic otherness, they constitute a migrant community with ambiguous origins. Their experience illuminates prevailing ideologies of national identity and sheds light on how identity is contested, enacted, and transformed. Unfortunately, Tsuda's analysis ends up largely reifying binary distinctions between "Japanese" and "Brazilians," rather than exploring the fluid and hybrid nature of Japanese Brazilian identity. By focusing on Japanese Brazilians' reassertion of a Brazilian identity on the one hand, and attempts to assimilate to Japan on the other, he neglects to examine more fully the nature of identities that lie between these options. One reason his study has this effect is that his analysis tends to take individual statements about identity, experiences of discrimination, and attitudes toward the Japanese at face value. Consequently, his discussion tends to reinscribe, rather than transgress, everyday discourse about "Japanese" and "Brazilians."

This brings me to the broader issue of the author's own positioning within his ethnographic setting. Tsuda visited *nikkeijin* communities in Brazil and worked in a Japanese factory with a significant number of *nikkeijin* workers to collect his ethnographic material. Although he elaborates about his experience in the field and the importance of reflexivity at length, throughout the study, he presents himself as a neutral observer. In light of his interest in ethnic stereotypes and the construction of national identities, I would have expected a more self-critical engagement with the author's own assumptions about Japanese identity and migrant groups of other nationalities.

Tsuda's study provides intricate detail about Japanese Brazilian return migration. His study should be of general interest to those engaged in the study of immigrant communities, issues of race, ethnicity, and national identity. Although situated in Brazil and Japan, his ethnographic description could provide a useful case of comparison to the experiences of immigrant communities in the United States. *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland* raises important questions that urge us to think about ethnic and national identities in new ways.

*Affirmative Exclusion: Cultural Pluralism and the Rule of Custom in France.* By Jean-Loup Amselle; translated by Jane Marie Todd. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Pp. xvi+162. \$47.50 (cloth); \$17.95 (paper).

Charles Tilly  
Columbia University

Americans who read ethnographer Jean-Loup Amselle's spirited treatise-tract can take comfort from learning that affirmative action raises issues at least as uncomfortable in France as in the United States. Visibly violating political correctness, Amselle condemns what he sees as racism on both the Right and the Left. On the Right, he excoriates the doctrine of a French racial purity threatened by the genes, customs, and beliefs of new immigrants. On the Left, he abhors the idea of multiple cultures, each deserving its own place in France's genetic, customary, and ideological mosaic. Advocating an earlier universalism, Amselle argues that from the revolution of 1789 onward, the French state committed itself to contradictory principles: on one side, universal natural rights of humans as humans; on the other, the rights of distinctive peoples, including the French. Anthropologists, in his view, became accomplices in the contradiction by espousing cultural relativism while mouthing universalistic slogans; they played a part disproportionate to their numbers precisely because they specialized in studying the people of colonial territories and in bringing the comparative analysis of those people back to the imperial center.

After a preface to the English language edition dramatizing its political critique, Amselle sets out his view of the fundamental contradiction between universal rights and cultural relativism in a brief introduction. He then presents five dense chapters pursuing his argument as intellectual and political history: a quick survey of natural law and national rights back to Hugo Grotius, the origins of French multiculturalism in Napoleon's attempt to conquer Egypt, parallel French efforts in the conquest of Algeria, further development of racial theories and practices under the African colonial administrator Louis Faidherbe, and multiculturalism in metropolitan France from the revolutionary and Napoleonic treatment of Jews onward.

Although Amselle disavows writing a continuous intellectual history of his subject, he engages sharply with thinkers about race, nationality, empire, and human nature both past and present. He suggests, for example, that Karl Marx (who unquestionably read 19th-century historians of France with care) adapted his view of class struggle from the notions of struggle between races that recurred in the French historical thought of his time. He also suggests that by fighting Muslim and North African influence in West Africa, Faidherbe (governor of Senegal from 1854 to 1861), opened the way to endemic ethnic conflict in the region: "Hence the fearsome force of Faidherbe's ideas—in his desire to regenerate Su-

dano-Sahelian societies, he opened the formidable Pandora's box of tribal wars and border conflicts in the region" (p. 99).

Amselle's own specialization in African ethnography allows him to move easily through the relevant anthropological literature at a pace likely to dizzy readers who lack familiarity with Africa, anthropological theory, and French history. Readers who instead come to Amselle from the study of race, ethnicity, nationalism, and contentious politics will find surprising his inattention to the actual organization of ethnicity, to the impact of immigration, to the place of political entrepreneurs, and to the processes that render ethnic and racial divisions more or less salient in public life. These omissions give Amselle's analysis a curiously top-down perspective, as if high officials and intellectuals alone conspired to create cultural policies, and therefore, having heard his analysis, had the power to endow the state with a more enlightened universalistic project. If only it were so simple.

*Voices from the Pagan Census: A National Survey of Witches and Neo-Pagans in the United States.* By Helen A. Berger, Evan A. Leach, and Leigh S. Shaffer. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003. Pp. xi+253. \$29.95.

Tracy L. Luff  
*Concord College*

Neo-paganism is defined as an Earth-based spirituality with no dogma, formal organization, or initiation rituals. The "discreditable" social identity and intentional absence of organizational structure make survey research with this population a difficult undertaking. Much current research on neo-paganism is ethnographic, including Helen Berger's (1999) earlier book in this series, *A Community of Witches*. The Neo-Pagan Census is a national pen-and-paper survey conducted during the mid-1990s. The researchers identified a leader of the New England neo-pagan community who endorsed the research and encouraged participation. General enthusiasm among the target population enabled the snowball sample to grow in size as participants distributed the questionnaire through newsletters, magazines, mailing lists, social networks, and online postings. Although it is nonrandom, the national sample of more than 2,000 is impressive. The data fill a gap in our understanding of the demographic characteristics, spiritual beliefs, and general worldview of people involved in a nonmainstream religious movement. In addition, the census incorporates questions from the General Social Survey and the National Opinion Research Consortium, allowing the researchers to compare neo-pagans with the general population.

In the first chapter, the authors provide a brief historical overview of

paganism in early 19th-century England and the late 20th-century United States. Neo-pagan philosophy emphasizes inclusion and rejects formal initiation rituals. Therefore, joining the movement typically only requires self-identification, and participants need not interact in any formal way with other members of the movement. Indeed, slightly more than half of Berger, Leach, and Shaffer's sample is comprised of "solitary practitioners." The demographic profile of the sample presented in chapter 1 reveals that respondents are disproportionately white women who have higher-than-average levels of education, but income at or slightly below the U.S. median. Neo-pagans are categorized into six variants: Wiccans, pagans, goddess worshippers, druids, shamans, and Unitarian Universalist Pagans. Subsequent chapters make both within- and across-group comparisons regarding attitudes toward mysticism, religious practice, politics, family, sexuality, and institutionalization of neo-paganism.

Comparisons among the variants of neo-paganism yield only minor demographic and attitudinal differences. The most controversial issue among neo-pagans is the extent to which the religion should be institutionalized. Some adherents contend that it is time to "come out of the broom closet," challenge the stigma associated with neo-paganism, and work for mainstream acceptance. Others fear that increased popularization will water down the mystical elements of the religion. The researchers conclude that the large segment of solitary practitioners within the movement make institutionalization unlikely.

Surprisingly, neo-pagans were only slightly more likely than the general population to report having mystical and paranormal experiences. This finding may be explained by the use of questions from the GSS (e.g., "How often have you felt close to a powerful spiritual force?") that refer to experiences that are congruent with mainstream religious beliefs.

The greatest difference between neo-pagans and the general population was in the area of politics. A larger proportion of neo-pagans than non-neo-pagans expressed attitudes consistent with liberal political philosophy. Further, neo-pagans were found to be more politically active—at both the micro- and macrolevels—than the general population. This contradicts the previous research of Margot Adler (*Drawing Down the Moon* [Beacon Press, 1986]) who argued that the mystical emphasis of neo-paganism is incompatible with active engagement in worldly social change.

Readers seeking explanations for the findings will be disappointed with the minimal analysis and lack of theoretical framework. Two empirical problems stand out. First, because the sample is nonrandom, statistical hypothesis testing cannot be performed on the data. This makes it difficult to fully interpret the patterns found. Second, if neo-pagans are overwhelmingly white, middle-class women, the findings of the Neo-Pagan Census should be compared with a subsample of white, middle-class women from the GSS and NORC. This would allow the researchers to determine whether and how neo-pagans differ from a demographically similar group in the general population. The goal of the study, however,



was descriptive, and although the authors raise more questions than they answer, they have contributed ample empirical data for future research on this important spiritual movement.

*Engaged Surrender: African American Women and Islam.* By Carolyn Moxley Rouse. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. Pp. xvii+271.

Garbi Schmidt

*Danish National Institute of Social Research*

In 1996, the author of *Engaged Surrender* participated in a celebration of the Lailat al-Qadr (the night of power, one of the last 10 nights of Ramadan) hosted by a wealthy Pakistani family. Engaging in an Islamic celebration outside her regular fieldwork locations—African-American Sunni mosques in Southern California—and feeling out of place due to barriers of race made her aware of the motivation for her year-long engagement with the community: “I recognized that what drove my interest in the African American Sunni community relates to how they use the faith to address the particularities of the African American experience” (p. 212). As she describes the African-American Sunni Muslim community as a resistance movement, Carolyn Moxley Rouse concentrates on the life stories of convert women (p. 30): Why did they accept the faith, and does conversion grant them new means of agency? The result is a vivid, readable, and informative contribution to the study of African-American Islam.

The direct voice of the author is a consistent thread throughout the text. As an anthropologist, she is a part of the social sphere she describes, and the worries and questions she poses to herself are an integral part of her analytical framework. Rouse is thereby admirably honest with her readers. In particular, her discussion of whether her engagement with Sunni Muslims comprises not only research interest but also an integrated part of her identity (she is a Muslim) is both candid and important. It is rare to find the dialectic dilemmas of fieldwork and identity laid so open to the reader.

However, both the author’s self-reflection and her deep engagement with African-American identity, racism, feminism, and Islam leave the reader bewildered. Rouse is close to her research object, but it is difficult to tell how close. Did she, for example, actually convert to Sunni Islam, or did her thoughts of conversion merely constitute a phase? Does her eagerness to present the liberating dimensions of Islam shadow far more complex and even restraining dimensions of religious interpretation and practice within the community?

Rouse is very explicit about the social challenges that many of the

women in her study face. Here is the convert mother whose son is sentenced to juvenile court. Here is the woman who is beaten up by her husband, who claims that it is his right as a Muslim to do so. Here is the former substance abuser. Further, all women in her study have encountered the face of racism in American society. Social reality for the characters in Rouse's book is far from rosy, and she does not describe it as being so.

Rouse's project is to show that Islam indeed is liberating to the African-American women who convert to the faith. She presents Islam as a way to resist racism, both because it is a religion that bridges cultural borders (p. 211) and because, unlike racial identity, it is a choice: "Choosing to self-identify as Muslim could be considered a form of liberation: freedom to pick your political battles" (p. 177). The women interpret Islamic texts and traditions according to their life situations, surrendering to a lifestyle that to their non-Muslim surroundings may appear confining but that to them is a source of liberation from sexism, racism, and materialism.

Rouse rightly argues that religion is also about reformation: "Religion can keep people complacent in an oppressive system, but there are always religious adherents who are challenging the system and redefining the faith" (p. 216). The women of her study can be seen as reformers and reinterpreters of faith, each in her individual way. But the description of liberation and reform leaves the reader blank: certainly, the women interpret for themselves, but what impact do their religious interpretations have on the overall viewpoints and practices of their congregations? Here the author's ideological intentions and methodological approach blend. Rouse hails a relativist paradigm where the realization of intention is less important than the role that such intentions play in the lives and self-perception of her informants. However, her emphasis on African-American Islam as a resistance movement makes the limited focus on subjectivity problematic: resistance and reformation are also about social change. In her epilogue, when Rouse mentions that most of her women informants have retreated significantly from the community—among other reasons, from their inability to change the leadership of the mosque (p. 220)—the reader is left wondering whether the detachment is caused by the women's inability to have their voices and interpretations heard. Rouse hesitates to describe her informants as "falsely conscious" (p. 4), but, in her eagerness to prove the success of their endeavor, she hampers her own goals. By failing to describe the power relations in which these women engage, be it with men or with the larger society, she is unable to show where the women are truly powerful and where their journey is truly revolutionary and reformative.

*Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America.* By Aihwa Ong. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. 333.

Joseph A. Soares  
Wake Forest University

Aihwa Ong's ethnography on the refugee/citizenship experiences of Cambodians appears in a California series that features anthropologists as public intellectuals engaged with challenging the terms of public debate on social issues. Ong's work attempts to draw lessons from the traumatic flight of Cambodian refugees from Pol Pot's killing fields to the poor neighborhoods of California. Ong's argument, as intimated by the book's title, is that it was a journey of cultural reconstruction for Cambodians, an ordeal that threatens to replace traditions of Khmer Buddhism with state-sponsored neoliberal subjectivities. To employ the personified trope, one could say that while Buddha in Cambodia desperately sought to hide from the Khmer Rouge, he also struggles in America to avoid the rationalizing gaze of various nongovernmental and governmental agents of mental and behavioral modification. Devastated by the killing machine and deprived of its organic context by immigration, Khmer Buddhism carries on as a type of hidden transcript (James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* [Yale University Press, 1990]) that informs the refugees' negotiation of various resettlement trials, ranging from welfare dependency to Mormon rescue efforts, petty bourgeois entrepreneurialism, and youth gangs.

There is a personal and political drama behind this very impressive book. Ong is a Malaysian who came to America as a college student during the Vietnam War. To her credit, she was active in the antiwar movement, and despite a successful academic career, in protest to America's blunders abroad, delayed citizenship for 17 years until parenthood cast that choice in a different light. The tragic Vietnam War informs much of Ong's work, and it was directly responsible for the forces that wrenched tens of thousands of Asians to America's shores.

Once here, Cambodians were stigmatized and placed into a racial and economic underclass. Cambodian refugees were categorized along with those from Laos as being disorderly and primitive, in contrast to the economically disciplined label assigned to Korean, Chinese, and Vietnamese immigrants. They were treated as infected carriers of a superstitious, patriarchal, cultural essentialism, which manifested itself most glaringly in gender and generational conflicts within the household. One persistent goal of professional and governmental interventions was to rescue women and children from traditional patriarchy (p. 13). Male Cambodians were assigned last place in line as desirable candidates for citizenship. Social workers and others used Buddhism as a cultural scapegoat (p. 155) for many problems with Cambodian assimilation into California.

In addition to its extensive fieldwork and broad use of secondary sources, Ong's work is a sophisticated application of Foucault's analytics of power. If one finds Foucault's theories exhilarating, then this will be a very stimulating book indeed. Ong selects the process of turning refugees into citizens as a strategic site to expose the construction of social subjects in modern America. She takes her analytic agenda from Foucault's argument on the modern liberal state's use of biopower to "invest bodies and populations with properties that make them amenable to various technologies of control . . . with the purpose of producing subjects who are healthy and productive" (p. 8). And she fleshes out her narrative with chapters on how the "sociocultural process of 'subjectification' . . . [involves] professionals—doctors, teachers, social workers, church workers, [and] probation officers" (p. 16).

She corrects an imbalance in Foucault, that he "rarely tells us how subjects resist the schemes of control" (p. 17), with accounts of creative renegotiation, including heartbreaking stories of how individual women and youngsters manipulate the state's biopolitics in their own fights against husbands and parents. There were cases of middle-aged married couples where the wife "expertly used social workers, the police, the court system, and the self-help group to turn things in her favor" (p. 164). These were also accounts of teenage girls who escaped parental control over their romantic and sexual relations with the eager assistance of social workers, school authorities, and the courts (pp. 180–90).

Mental and physical health interventions are also often negative. One does not have to read Foucault to see mental health programs as techniques of reprogramming that seek "to bypass or to invalidate the patients' cultural understanding of their lives" (p. 101). And Ong casts much of the clinical practices of physicians in the same Foucauldian agents-of-domination light as psychologists do. Even sensitive, feminist health clinics are criticized for attributing female opacity to the medical gaze (p. 113) to cultural factors, rather than to "the experiences of war and of enforced dependency" (p. 117). Indeed, no matter how well intended, and regardless of gender, race, or education, all of the social and medical service workers in this text are castigated as agents of domination—and social conservatives may draw comfort from that.

One imagines this text being fruitfully taught in seminars on immigration, culture, and social control. But its contribution will probably remain, like Buddha, hidden from the public debate.

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
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
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


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

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
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(Rev. 3/98)

# Taking Turns and Talking Ties: Networks and Conversational Interaction<sup>1</sup>

David R. Gibson  
*Harvard University*

Conversational encounters are permeable to network effects but not entirely so, for conversation is internally structured by sequential constraints and dependencies that limit the latitude people have to act on their relational commitments. The author analyzes the effects of hierarchical (superior-subordinate) and horizontal (friendship and co-working) networks on “participation shifts”—transitions in the identities of speakers and targets (addressees) that occur from one speaking turn to the next—in meetings of 10 groups of managers. The results point to a range of relational obligations and entitlements, such as the obligation subordinates have to bolster superiors’ control of the floor, and the way in which friendship and co-working ties get expressed through remarks made to third parties. The article is perhaps the first to link statistically network-analytic and conversation-analytic levels of analysis.

## INTRODUCTION: THE NETWORK-INTERACTION PROBLEM

Networks and interaction lie at the heart of our everyday experiences, but the study of one is, by and large, removed from the study of the other. One reason is that, theoretically, they constitute orthogonal dimensions of social organization, with interaction unfolding sequentially, and social networks extending (in a certain sense) spatially. Add to this fact scholarly specialization, and we have two very different ways of characterizing the world. Interactionists characterize it in terms of sequences of fleeting ac-

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Cheri Minton for technical assistance, and to Ryan Sperry for help with data collection. For comments on earlier drafts, I am indebted to Matt Bothner, Jim Ennis, Eugene Johnsen, Freda Lynn, Peter Marsden, John Martin, Ann Mische, Joel Podolny, Garry Robins, Kees van Veen, Ezra Zuckerman, and the *AJS* reviewers. This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9811228 and SBR-9820146) and the Citicorp Behavioral Sciences Research Council, as well as by a Clark-Cooke grant from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. Direct correspondence to Harvard University, Department of Sociology, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. E-mail. dgibson@wjh.harvard.edu

tions where each is seen as a response to what came before and as a stimulus for what comes afterward (e.g., Sacks 1995). Network analysts, in contrast, characterize the world in terms of durable relational structures in which a connection between two individuals is rendered more or less probable by the encompassing configuration of ties (e.g., Wasserman and Pattison 1996).

The two perspectives are not easily reconciled. Predictably, what one sees as fundamental, the other views as lacking in substance. Speaking from an interactionist perspective, Schegloff (1987*b*), for instance, calls into doubt the theoretical status of mesolevel constructs, of which "network" is one, for their lack of demonstrable relevance to participants at specific conversational junctures. Network analysts, on the other hand, implicitly view the details of interaction as so much airy chaff, posing little resistance to network effects which, given enough time, will carry the day. Methodological differences widen the divide further. Network analysis is primarily quantitative (Wasserman and Faust 1994), which is necessary both for statistical analysis of network structure taken as an object of study unto itself (e.g., Lazega and Pattison 1999; Watts 1999), and for discerning network effects on outcomes such as job promotions (Burt 1992; Podolny and Baron 1997) and contagion (Burt 1987) where other independent variables are in play. In contrast, conversation analysis, the interactionist school of most interest here—given its emphasis on the direct study of sequences—is mainly qualitative (Schegloff 1993), as it needs to maintain maximum openness to the myriad ways in which a given utterance can be precipitated, warranted, or otherwise occasioned by the talk preceding it (Schegloff 1987*a*).

There have been a few bridging attempts. On the network side, Fararo, Skvoretz, and Kosaka (1994) have theorized the accretion of asymmetric ties of domination as the outcome of a succession of dyadic encounters. On the interaction side, recent conversation-analytic research on "institutional talk" (Drew and Heritage 1992) has examined the conversational effects of at least one aspect of structure, formal role relations (such as doctor-patient) in organizational settings (e.g., Maynard 1991). But neither side has attempted to take seriously the lessons of the other. Fararo et al.'s (1994) account of the formation of hierarchical relations involves only a stylized account of interaction, largely based on Chase's (1982) analysis of chicken interaction, and does nothing to incorporate interactionists' considerable insights into conversational rules. And research on institutional talk ignores the particulars of the network context, the interactional implications of which are far less transparent than those of consensually understood roles.

Though it was not his primary concern, Goffman made a number of insightful observations about the network-interaction problem. The trans-

lation of social structure into interactional behavior, he suggests, is likely to result in a distorted, or at least simplified, representation of that structure. One reason is that the rituals of face-to-face interaction are "not refined enough to express all of the externally based nuances" (Goffman 1983, p. 31) of structure. Another is that a successful encounter is too demanding of the attention of participants to allow for much preoccupation with external factors (Goffman 1961, pp. 15–81). Consequently, preexisting relationships can be filtered into an encounter only selectively, according to "transformation rules" that decide how, if at all, they are given expression (1961, p. 33).

Following Goffman, the dual premise of this article is that networks (as a principal form of social structure) *do* matter for interaction, that networks carry obligations and entitlements that are not somehow suspended when people encounter one another face-to-face, but also that the translation of networks into interaction may, and perhaps *must*, entail some simplification or distortion of network relations. My methodological strategy will be to anticipate statistically such distortion, so as to detect subtle network effects on conversational behavior that would otherwise be obscured by the tangle of interactional constraints and contingencies. This strategy owes something to both network and interactionist perspectives. From network analysis I take the premise that relationships have ontological status even when they are not being directly acted upon. Two people, for instance, can be considered "friends" even when they are not interacting. From conversation analysis I take an appreciation of sequential constraints, including those that prevent one from posing a conversational response to a stimulus that never occurs—something which markedly limits a person's freedom to act upon his or her network ties through conversational behavior which is, by and large, responsive in nature (Goffman 1981; Schegloff 1988).

In the next section, I describe the analysis framework, by means of which "participation shifts"—transitions in who is speaking and/or who is being addressed—are exhaustively inventoried as the first step toward quantitative analysis, eventually of the degree to which pairs of individuals involved in particular participation shifts are also tied in one or more underlying networks. Then, I describe the research setting. Following that, I present a brief analysis of participation shift frequencies and conditional probabilities, which I interpret as reflecting the operation of conversational rules that regulate the availability of each participation shift as an option. The analysis of network effects, the article's core, is then described. This analysis is based on a permutation test that compares the observed association of participation shifts and networks, on the one hand, with what we would have expected were participation shifts produced without regard for networks, controlling for sequential constraints and dependen-

cies. From this we learn how particular types of ties found expression through sequential behavior, including “multiplex” ties defined across two or more networks. In the conclusion I cast this work as the first step in a comparative program for the study of network-interactional settings, or what White (1995) calls “netdoms.”

## PARTICIPATION SHIFTS

Language has many layers—semantic, syntactic, lexical, phonological—each of which is amenable to independent analysis (Jackendoff 2002). Conversation has all of these and more besides, involving implicature (inferences about unspoken meaning [Levinson 2000]), the possibility of discord, a cumulative record of what has already been discussed and referred to (Levelt 1989), fluctuating levels of engagement (Goffman 1961, 1967), and the various rituals whereby people safeguard themselves and one another from face-threatening transgressions (Goffman 1967). When conversation involves more than two people, yet more layers get added: in addition to the strategic possibilities of alliances, manipulation, and mediation discussed by Simmel (1950), group conversation is distinguished by ever-renewed uncertainty as to who will speak and, relatedly, who will be addressed in the following turn—that is, where people will next find themselves in what Goffman (1981, p. 137) calls the “participation framework.”

I refer to transformations in the participation framework, whereby people are moved into and out of the positions of speaker, target (addressee), and unaddressed recipient (for current purposes, everyone else), as “participation shifts.” Much of the experience and action of conversation occurs on the level of participation shifts, for it is here that people seize and lose the floor and single one another out to be addressed while others look on. Moreover, I argue that the phenomenology of a participation shift depends upon the precise transformation of the participation framework that it entails. It is one thing for the target to become the speaker and the speaker to become the target, meaning that they address one another in turn—something that is expected in dyadic conversation, but which is markedly exclusionary when there are other potential speakers and targets present. It is another for the target to become the speaker, and for an unaddressed recipient to become the target. Here, the initial target receives the floor and then tries to hand it off, relay style, to someone else, but to only one of the potential “someone elses” to whom this could be done. And it is still another for the speaker and target to become unaddressed recipients, while two unaddressed recipients become speaker

and target; in this case, the conversational spotlight has jumped to two different people entirely.

Table 1 presents a complete inventory of those participation shifts, or "P-shifts," that occur over the space of two speaking turns; for the purposes of this article, I set aside those that involve a change of target but not of speaker.<sup>2</sup> In each case, the first speaker is denoted as A, and the first target as B, unless A addresses the group, denoted as 0. In the second turn in the sequence, the speaker is denoted as X if it is not A (the first speaker) or B (the first target), and the second target as Y if it is not A, B, or 0 (the group). Thus AB-BA is the prototypical two-turn exchange in which one person addresses another and the second responds; in A0-X0, two people address the group in succession, and in AB-XY, one person addresses a second, and then a third person addresses a fourth. (Table 1 also includes an explanation of the notation for easy reference, as well as an example of each P-shift.) Note that while each P-shift in table 1 involves a "first" and "second" turn, each speaking turn in a conversation (aside from the very first and last) is connected to, and helps define, two P-shifts: the one that preceded and introduced it, and the one that follows it and brings it to an end. Thus each speaking turn is analyzed twice, as the second turn in the two-turn sequence that began with the turn that came before it, and as the first turn in the two-turn sequence that ends with the turn that comes after it.

The P-shifts in table 1 are arranged according to a preliminary typology, based on the way in which the floor is obtained by the second speaker. When a person speaks after he or she is addressed, I refer to it as "turn receiving," since he or she is on the receiving end of a transfer initiated by the prior speaker. When a person speaks after someone *else* is addressed, I refer to it as "turn usurping," under the assumption that he or she thereby appropriates something rightfully belonging to the person who is thus prevented from turn receiving. Finally, when a person speaks after someone addresses the group as a whole, I refer to it as "turn claiming," which connotes a degree of initiative comparable to that involved in turn usurping, but without the implication of theft. Of course, the phenomenology of P-shifts is incomplete if the turn-taking type is detached from the speaker's choice of target, but the threefold distinction will serve as a useful shorthand in what follows.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> I do not consider them here because they are less relevant than the other P-shifts to turn taking, and because their inclusion in the network analysis creates computational difficulties best avoided in this article. For the complete inventory, see Gibson (2003)

<sup>3</sup> One reviewer observed that an alternative typology could be constructed on the basis of choice of target (prior speaker, prior target, etc.). Such a typology is, in fact, implied by the results, but I refrain from complicating table 1 with a cross-classification.



TABLE 1  
INVENTORY OF P-SHIFTS WITH EXAMPLES

P-Shift	Example
Turn claiming:	
A0-XA . . . . .	John talks to the group, then Frank talks to John.
A0-X0 . . . . .	John talks to the group, then Frank talks to the group.
A0-XY . . . . .	John talks to the group, then Frank talks to Mary.
Turn receiving:	
AB-BA . . . . .	John talks to Mary, then Mary replies
AB-B0 . . . . .	John talks to Mary, then Mary talks to the group.
AB-BY . . . . .	John talks to Mary, then Mary talks to Irene
Turn usurping:	
AB-XA . . . . .	John talks to Mary, then Frank talks to John
AB-XB . . . . .	John talks to Mary, then Frank talks to Mary
AB-X0 . . . . .	John talks to Mary, then Frank talks to the group.
AB-XY . . . . .	John talks to Mary, then Frank talks to Irene.

NOTE —The initial speaker is denoted A and the initial target B, unless the group is addressed (or the target was ambiguous), in which case the target is 0. Then the P-shift is summarized in the form (speaker)<sub>1</sub>(target)<sub>1</sub>-(speaker)<sub>2</sub>(target)<sub>2</sub>, with A or B appearing after the hyphen only if the initial speaker or target serves in one of these two positions in the second turn. When the speaker in the second turn is someone other than A or B, X is used, and when the target in the second turn is someone other than A, B, or the group 0, Y is used.

As a tool for integrating interactionist and network perspectives, the concept of participation shift has distinct merits. On the one hand, P-shifts capture the way in which people move themselves and one another onto and off of the floor, which brings us to the very doorstep of interactionist research on turn taking (Sacks et al. 1974; Wilson, Wiemann, and Zimmerman 1984). On the other hand, precisely because P-shifts capture a salient dimension of how people relate to one another in conversation—in terms of whom you speak to, after, and in place of—they are relationally relevant, and are thus a level at which network effects should be in evidence.

Participation shifts are also amenable to statistical analysis, which will prove especially useful when it comes to studying the incremental effects of particular ties and tie combinations on P-shifts. Conversation analysts are generally skeptical of quantification (judging from Schegloff [1987*b*, 1993]), which deprives us of information on the larger sequential context in which a particular event occurs, and which “explains” it in the sense that the context provides the occasion for the event’s occurrence. But the implication of a good deal of research by experimentalists, *and* by conversation analysts who study “institutional talk,” is that conversational prerogatives to engage in particular behaviors—for instance, to interrupt (Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989) or to ask questions (Frankel 1990)—are affixed to individuals by virtue of their attributes or formal roles. Thus

it becomes possible, and meaningful, to inquire into the statistical association between attributes and roles, on the one side, and conversational behaviors, on the other, as a way of studying how conversational prerogatives are pre-allocated without getting bogged down in the detailed analysis of how they are exercised in particular instances.

Evidence for network effects on P-shifts would mean that, just as having certain attributes might endow one with a greater prerogative to speak (Fisek, Berger, and Norman 1991), being tied to someone in a network imposes particular conversational obligations or confers particular entitlements, in terms of how one is expected to act toward that person in P-shift terms. Such evidence, in other words, would indicate that P-shifts are a layer of conversation that can receive influence from networks. Three features of P-shifts, however, complicate the search for such effects, features which are in fact central to conversation yet readily glossed over by most quantitative research. One is the logical-sequential nature of P-shifts, which make it impossible, for instance, for someone to turn usurp after I am addressed if I am never addressed. The second is the serial constraint on conversational participation—the one-speaker rule—as a result of which only one person can seize any particular sequential opportunity when it arises (Sacks et al. 1974).<sup>4</sup> The third feature is that while speaking turns are ubiquitous in a conversation, P-shifts vary greatly in their frequencies. This last feature is, in fact, the easiest of the three to incorporate into a statistical analysis, while having important implications for the later interpretation of network effects. Thus, the empirical analysis will open with an examination of P-shift frequencies.

### RESEARCH SETTING AND DATA

The full participation shift inventory applies to any focused gathering involving four or more individuals (AB-XY being impossible with fewer). By “focused gathering,” Goffman (1961) intended a gathering in which there is a single, if floating, center of attention—the current speaker and whatever he or she is saying. Conversation analysts basically study focused gatherings, and Sacks et al.’s (1974) turn-taking model can be seen as a set of rules safeguarding an encounter’s singular focus against the threat of simultaneous and competing foci. The regular operation of these

<sup>4</sup> Of course, there are times when more than one person speaks at a time, but these are surprisingly infrequent (Dabbs, Ruback, and Evans 1987), and when overlapping speech does occur it is often at the point of transition between speakers (Schegloff 1987c). Rarely do two or more people vie for the floor without one quickly prevailing (Schegloff 2000).

rules is necessary for the identification of P-shifts, which requires that a single speaker in one turn yields to a single speaker in the next.

Thus one requirement of a research setting is that it involve a focused gathering of four or more individuals. Another is that it come with variation in preexisting relationships, for the sake of the analysis of network effects. "Variation" means, for instance, that some pairs of people are friends and some pairs are not—a prerequisite for the analysis of how such discriminations are manifested in a particular conversation. This is an unusual requirement by the standards of recent microsociology. Conversation analysts' data usually come from people interacting with those they already know (e.g., Schegloff 1996), and the degree of "knowing" has, to my knowledge, never been explicitly considered as an independent variable. The experiments of expectation-states researchers, in the meantime, generally exclude pairs of individuals who are already acquainted, lest people have knowledge of one another beyond that manipulated by the experimenters.<sup>5</sup> Here, in contrast, I am concerned with how people behave toward, for example, friends versus nonfriends, which means that such relationships may be neither universal nor entirely absent.

An additional practical requirement is that the encounters be predictable and frequent—frequent so as to ensure enough data for the statistical analysis, and predictable so that researchers know when and where to show up to collect the data. Here I use data on 10 managerial groups, ranging in size from five to twenty-five, that conducted regular—daily, weekly, or monthly—meetings in a large financial services corporation. The groups discussed a range of topics during these meetings, including coordination over shared resources, problems arising from complex interdependencies, changes in corporate procedure, and the formulation of recommendations for higher-ups. Though the meetings sometimes involved the use of agendas and were run to some degree by someone in authority, all allowed for, and were designed to allow for, extended periods of open discussion. At the same time, everyone understood that only one person was supposed to speak at a time. Because the superior (as chair) infrequently decided whom this would be, turn taking had to be centrally managed, as it is in ordinary conversation.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Smith-Lovin, Skvoretz, and Hudson (1986). Not all research in this tradition occurs in the laboratory, however; see, e.g., Silver, Troyer, and Cohen (2000).

<sup>6</sup> It is because these exchanges were neither scripted in advance nor micromanaged by superiors that I use the term "conversation," though conversation analysts might prefer "speech exchange system" (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). I prefer the first term because it is less cumbersome, because it can more easily be turned into an adjective ("conversational"), and because the theoretical questions and methods developed here extend beyond the particular speech exchange system of the business meeting

Two types of data were gathered: conversational and network. The conversational data consist of 37,309 observations of speaking and addressing (and thus about as many P-shifts), derived from the observation of 75 meetings, three to twelve per group, summing to about 100 hours of observation time.<sup>7</sup> The coders identified targets as any competent speaker would, through terms of address, gaze, use of proper name, or substantive response to an "adjacency pair first part" in the prior turn, such as a question or request. Coding was simplified by the fact that much addressing involves two or more of these devices. It was further simplified by the decision not to distinguish between remarks that were ambiguously directed (e.g., when someone spoke while looking at her notes) and those that were manifestly addressed to the group as a whole; thus in what follows, I speak of a remark as directed to the group or as "undirected" interchangeably.<sup>8</sup> It should also be noted that when conversational order broke down—that is, when there was sustained simultaneous vocalization by two or more individuals—a "coding break" was entered; speaking turns to each side of a coding break were not considered adjacent (i.e., joined by a P-shift).

Supplementing the conversational data was a network questionnaire administered to the 105 members of the 10 groups.<sup>9</sup> This questionnaire queried subjects about relations of friendship, co-working, socializing, perceptions of influence, and respect; the first and second of these are used in this analysis. The response format for the friendship question was dichotomous: "Whom do you consider a friend?"—followed by a list of all group members. The response format for the co-working question was a 1–5 scale ("How closely do you work with each person?"), which was dichotomized such that a response of 4 or 5 (the two highest levels) was recoded as a 1, and other responses as a 0. Thus, this question essentially generated information about work collaboration/interdependence that was above and beyond the ambient levels of interdependence we would expect in any work group.

<sup>7</sup> Tape recording, standard in experimental research, was not possible in this corporate context for confidentiality reasons. Simultaneous real-time coding by two observers resulted in 95% agreement on the identity of the speaker and 85% agreement on the identity of the target. The reliability of the coding scheme has also been established by earlier research (Bales et al. 1951; Burke 1974; Stephan and Mishler 1952). For another example of naturalistic observation yielding quantitative data, see McFarland (2001). For more information on the setting and methodology, see Gibson (2003).

<sup>8</sup> The reason is principally a coding one: while the line between addressing one person and addressing another is relatively clear, the line between addressing the group and addressing no one in particular is much less so. This is not to suggest, however, that there is no theoretical distinction between these second two, and future research should attend to it to the degree that reliable empirical distinctions can be made.

<sup>9</sup> The response rate was 75%.

Formal reporting relations were also recorded. Each group had a simple hierarchy, with all members reporting to a single superior, who presided over the meetings. Although in an organizational chart, reporting relations are depicted as a single "network," for current purposes it is useful to factor these into two networks, one summarizing who is a superior of whom (the "superordinancy" network), and one summarizing who is a subordinate of whom (the "subordinancy" network). The reason is that the way subordinates behave toward superiors is not necessarily the inverse of how superiors behave toward subordinates. Subordinates may, for instance, address their superiors after the latter speak to the group, and while this means that superiors *are addressed* after they speak to the group, it tells us nothing about how superiors act toward subordinates in turn. In general, by knowing how one side acts toward the other, we know how the latter is *acted toward*, but not what it sends back in the other direction—thus the need to inquire into the effects of superordinancy and subordinancy separately.

The questionnaires were administered about halfway through each group's observation period (e.g., in week 6 for a group that was observed once a week for 12 weeks). This timing seemingly makes it difficult to say whether the conversational sequences followed from the network ties or vice versa. There are, however, good reasons to think networks did more to "cause" the P-shifts observed in these meetings than the reverse. For one, subjects dealt with one another much more outside of the observed meetings than inside of them, so that even if conversation is important for relationships, the latter were more or less fixed from the perspective of any *given* conversational exchange. For another, if Goffman is right, people strive to preserve their relationships when they come together: "Much of the activity occurring during an encounter can be understood as an effort on everyone's part to get through the occasion and all the unanticipated and unintentional events that can cast participants in an undesirable light, without disrupting the relationships of the participants" (1967, p. 41). Thus, there is an a priori reason to think that people come to group encounters with relationships forged elsewhere and work to keep those networks unaltered for as long as the encounter lasts.<sup>10</sup>

I do not assume that the findings in this particular setting will be generalizable to others; this setting was selected more for reasons of expediency than because it is in any way "representative." I also ignore

<sup>10</sup> This is not to deny that a relationship can be altered by what happens in conversation, only to say that conversational exchanges are more often on the receiving end of the causal link. To study the effect of conversation on ties, we would need, to start, repeated network observations, ideally one immediately before and immediately after each encounter.

differences between these groups—there are various dimensions along which the groups might be distinguished—and between the various tasks they applied themselves to, mainly to ensure enough data for the analysis of network effects. In both respects, then, I bracket the question of how variations in the conversational context affect the way in which networks are translated into conversational behavior. Yet, I consider the comparative study of different interaction settings to be an important avenue for future research and return to this in the conclusion.

### PARTICIPATION SHIFT FREQUENCIES

If the P-shift inventory in table 1 is a logically exhaustive menu of things that can happen at this level of analysis, overall P-shift frequencies (or marginals) are an indication of how available each item on that menu actually was in this setting, or how readily it could be applied to whatever designs people had, including those rooted in relational obligations and entitlements. Thus, I begin the empirical analysis with a consideration of these marginals; only then do I turn to the analysis of network effects, which will obscure the marginals by controlling for them.

P-shift frequencies and conditional probabilities are given in table 2. The P-shifts are divided into two groups: those that start with an undirected (or group-directed) remark in the initial turn of the two-turn sequence (A0), and those that start with a directed remark (i.e., to some individual—AB); the probabilities are conditioned on the occurrence of one or the other of these.<sup>11</sup> Within each group, the P-shifts are then listed in order of decreasing conditional probability.

What we see is that P-shift frequencies and likelihoods varied greatly in these groups, with some very common and others very uncommon. There appear to be two main patterns in these numbers. The first is that the turn-receiving P-shifts were more likely than their turn-usurping counterparts: AB-BA was more common than AB-XA, AB-B0 was more common than AB-X0, and AB-BY was more common than AB-XY. People, in other words, were especially likely to speak after they were addressed. The second finding is that P-shifts in which an unaddressed recipient is transformed directly into the target were very *unlikely*: after an undirected remark, A0-XY was least common, while after a directed remark, AB-BY and AB-XY were least common. A person, in other words, was very unlikely to be addressed unless he or she spoke or was addressed in the prior turn. And from the perspective of a given speaker, very rarely would

<sup>11</sup> For instance, the conditional probability of AB-XB, 09, is the probability that the target of a directed remark was readdressed by the next speaker.

TABLE 2  
P-SHIFT FREQUENCIES AND CONDITIONAL  
PROBABILITIES

P-shift	Frequency	Conditional Probability <sup>†</sup>
A0-XA .	5,143	.48
A0-X0 . .	4,307	.40
A0-XY ..	1,223	.12
AB-BA ...	11,239	.48
AB-B0 ...	3,351	.14
AB-X0 ...	2,869	.12
AB-XA .	2,582	.11
AB-XB	2,104	.09
AB-BY	707	.03
AB-XY .	464	.02

<sup>†</sup> Probabilities of second P-shift set (starting with AB) do not sum to 1.0 because of rounding

he or she, upon seizing the floor, pluck someone from the ranks of un-addressed recipients to be addressed.

The patterns in table 2 are broadly consistent with Sacks et al.'s (1974) turn-taking model. The commonality of AB-BA, in particular, can be seen as following from the "current selects" rule, according to which the target of an adjacency pair first part, such as a question or command, replies in the next turn. Further, that people generally addressed the prior speaker or prior target is consistent with Sacks et al.'s more general claim—not advanced as a rule as such—that "a turn's talk will display its speaker's understanding of a prior turn's talk, and whatever other talk it marks itself as directed to" (1974, p. 728).

Of course, such connections are speculative, inasmuch as P-shifts disregard the content of what is said, and much of Sacks et al.'s argument is couched in terms of the conversational expectations that content (such as a question) creates. But the patterns in table 2 are commensurate with Sacks et al.'s argument at a more abstract level as well. Specifically, there is a loose inverse relationship between the number of ways that a P-shift can occur, conditioned upon the initial directed or undirected remark, and the frequency with which it actually did occur in these groups. Take the extreme case of AB-XY, the least common P-shift. In a group of 10 people, this can happen in 56 ways ( $[N - 2]^2 - [N - 2]$ ), given the initial directed remark, which removes A and B from the list of individuals who can serve as X and Y in the following turn. In contrast, AB-BA, the most common P-shift, can only happen in *one* way, given the initial directed remark: if Jill talks to Sam, there is only one combination of speaker (Sam) and target (Jill) in the following turn that would satisfy the conditions of

AB-BA. This fact alone points to the operation of turn-taking rules, which, in order to maintain conversational order, must preclude the greater number of logical possibilities at every transitional juncture. The important point for current purposes is that networks have to work through a range of options not all of which are readily available; least available are those which, combinatorially, would seem to offer the greatest flexibility.

## NETWORK EFFECTS

The most straightforward network effects on behavior involve people acting differently toward friends versus nonfriends, co-workers versus non-co-workers, and so forth. These are the sort of effects I am concerned with here, with respect to network effects on P-shifts. The first step is to formalize the idea of a P-shift as something that one person "does to" another. The second step is to devise a method for determining whether the observed association of such behaviors with network ties is significantly different from what we would have expected given the null hypothesis of no network effects.

### P-ties

A person produces a P-shift by speaking and addressing. We can denote the individual responsible for the manufacture of a P-shift as  $i$ . In AB-X<sub>A</sub>, for example, it is  $i$  who produces the P-shift, by turn usurping and addressing the prior speaker. (If we are concerned with a particular instance of this P-shift, we can identify  $i$  by name: AB-X<sub>Joe</sub>A.) In so doing,  $i$  acts with respect to other individuals, most explicitly the prior speaker (A) and the prior target (B). While we could identify all three individuals simultaneously (A<sub>J</sub>B<sub>k</sub>-X<sub>A</sub>A or A<sub>Sue</sub>B<sub>Al</sub>-X<sub>Joe</sub>A), it is useful to consider only one pair of individuals at a time, so that we can later ask whether the way in which one person behaves toward another in P-shift terms is indicative of a (dyadic) network tie between them. Thus AB-XA is factored into two "P-ties," A<sub>J</sub>B-X<sub>A</sub>A and AB<sub>J</sub>-X<sub>A</sub>A, where the first points to what  $i$  does to the prior speaker (addresses her after she speaks to someone else), and the second to what  $i$  does to the prior target (addresses her addressor).<sup>12</sup> This is diagrammed in figure 1, where the P-shift is at the top (with  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  indicating the sequence of the two directed remarks), and its constituent P-ties (indicated by curved arrows) below.

Both P-ties and network ties are directional—network ties because they

<sup>12</sup> In each case, the relevant "alter" is denoted as  $j$ . My convention is to use the subscripts to locate alter in the first turn and ego in the second—thus A<sub>J</sub>B-B<sub>A</sub>A rather than AB-B<sub>A</sub>A<sub>J</sub> or A<sub>J</sub>B<sub>J</sub>-BA.






FIG. 1 —P-shift AB-XA and its associated P-ties

are measured from the perspective of some ego reporting a relationship vis-à-vis some alter, and P-ties because an instance of one involves ego *doing* something vis-à-vis alter. What we want to know, then, is whether there is some association between the relationships people reported having with one another and the P-ties they were observed to produce relative to one another. Or more precisely, we want to know whether the observed association is significantly greater (or smaller) than we would have expected given a null model assuming no network effects.

The Simulated Response Permutation Test (SRPT)

While people produce P-shifts, they do not do so under circumstances of their own choosing. No one has the option of speaking to me after I speak to the group (the P-tie  $A_0-X_i A$ ), for instance, if I never speak to the group (the initial  $A_0$ ). In general, the responsive nature of P-shifts and P-ties prevents anyone from producing one unilaterally, but only in response to openings created by others (similar to Leifer [1988]). Further, because of the one-speaker constraint, any given opening can only be appropriated by a single individual, following which it is *that* person's remark that is responded to (i.e., with the next P-shift). Finally, judging from table 2, not all responses are equally available even when the sequential prerequisites are in place. Not only is it logically impossible for someone to speak

to a third person after I speak to the group (A,0-X,Y) if I never speak to the group, no one is likely to do so even when it is possible.

The first two constraints, in particular, preclude the use of conventional statistical techniques, such as log-linear modeling or the quadratic assignment procedure (Krackhardt 1987). The problem is that these methods anticipate simple data structures, in the form of contingency tables or matrices, which would be *structured* by the sequential constraints without in any way *controlling* for them.<sup>13</sup> This would, to return to the first example in the last paragraph, lead us to draw incorrect conclusions about the failure of anyone to speak to me after I speak to the group, since the standard methods would not control for the frequency with which I speak to the group, nor the fact that when I do speak to the group only one person can seize the opening created thereby.

My solution is a "simulated response permutation test," or SRPT. As a first approximation, this randomly reassigns the P-ties produced by each *i* to different *j*s, subject to all of the operative sequential constraints, allowing us to compare the association of network ties and observed P-ties with many measurements of the association between those same network ties and the reassigned (or permuted) P-ties. On this basis we can judge whether the observed association is significantly smaller or larger than would have been expected given the null hypothesis of independence. More simply, the SRPT allows us to compare the observed association of network ties and P-ties with what we would have expected had people produced P-shifts without regard for networks, given the opportunities they had to act.

The procedure is diagrammed in figure 2; additional details are provided in the appendix. The SRPT analyzes a single P-tie at a time; here I use the example of A<sub>1</sub>B-X<sub>1</sub>A. At the first stage (1), it extracts observed instances of directed remarks, which are the necessary condition for this P-tie. The excerpt from the observed data, on the left side of figure 2, contains three: Al addressed Kate, then Kate addressed Al, and then, two turns later, Bob addressed Dale. At the second stage (2), the SRPT *simulates* the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of the P-shift in question: after the observed remark from Al to Kate, a simulated remark from Dale to

<sup>13</sup> This is obviously a gloss on the many ways in which log-linear models, in particular, could be brought to bear upon the problem. Here I assume that one would begin with a contingency table containing the frequencies with which each P-tie occurred between pairs of individuals tied or not tied in each combination of networks. Vuchinich (1984) offers an alternative log-linear approach, but it is only manageable because he bypasses the question of who actually gets to speak in a given turn, asking only what a person of a particular sort (e.g., a male child) says contingent upon getting the floor. Here this would entail asking what a person does upon turn usurping, for instance, but not who actually turn usurps—something which would fall short of my objective.




FIG. 2.—The SRPT for P-tie A,B-X,A

Al follows, which entails the P-shift AB-XA; after the observed remark from Kate to Al, a simulated remark from Bob to Kate follows, which again entails AB-XA; while after the observed remark from Bob to Dale, no one is simulated as producing AB-XA—consistent with the fact that this P-shift did not always occur after a directed remark.

The SRPT at step 2 operates under the relevant constraints. First, a person cannot be simulated as producing a P-shift for which he or she was logically unavailable. In figure 2, after Al's remark to Kate, neither Al nor Kate is available to produce the P-shift AB-XA, since *by definition* this involves someone else in the position of next speaker (X). Second, only one person, at most, is simulated as producing a particular P-shift/P-tie; as a result, the one-speaker constraint that prevents multiple individuals from seizing a single opportunity in the observed conversation is respected in the permutation. Third, P-shift marginal frequencies are approximately reproduced, but indirectly, through the reproduction of individuals' marginal tendencies to produce particular P-shifts. The SRPT manages this by selecting someone to produce a simulated P-shift in ac-

cordance with their observed likelihood of doing so. It is this that allowed me to speak, somewhat loosely, of the P-ties produced by *i* as being "reassigned" to different *js*.<sup>14</sup> This takes into account the fact that people have different conversational styles that need to be controlled for so that we can determine whether particular individuals, whatever their overall propensities, treated their network alters (e.g., friends) differently than their nonalters (nonfriends).

Each permutation, consisting of one "pass" through the conversational data, yields a matrix of the frequency with which each *i* was simulated as producing that P-tie relative to each *j*; this is step 3. On this basis we can make one measurement of the expected degree of association between P-ties and the various networks, given the null hypothesis. A large number (3,000) of permutations then yields a probability distribution for the expected association within which the observed association can be located. This provides a test of whether or not the observed association is above or below the mean expected association, and how likely the observed association (or one more extreme) was given independence.

There is one additional complication. Above, I said that the SRPT controls for individuals' overall P-shift tendencies. While this approach makes sense in networks in which we can assume that people can differentiate between alters and nonalters, it runs aground in the analysis of what superiors did vis-à-vis their subordinates. The reason is that, at least in these groups, a superior was superior to everyone else in the room, so that controlling for what a superior did "overall" means controlling away anything he or she did as an occupant of this role. Accordingly, in the analysis of superordinancy effects, the SRPT first decides upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the P-shift in light of its observed overall probability, and then, contingent upon its simulated occurrence, randomly selects someone as *i*, again as consistent with the sequential constraints. On this basis, we can determine what superiors were especially likely and unlikely to do, in comparison to other individuals. I refer to this as the "equal probability" variation of the SRPT, and contrast it with the "speaker marginal" variation used for all other network effects (described above).

## Results

There are a number of ways to calculate the degree of association between networks and P-ties, and thus as many ways to compare the observed

<sup>14</sup> The reassignments were performed indirectly, however, through the stochastic component of the simulation rather than through direct permutation. For this reason, the SRPT might better be described as a quasi-permutation test.

statistic of association with the distribution of permutation statistics. One approach is to make this into a problem of categorical data analysis and to examine the observed-expected residuals. Table 3 contains these, computed as the observed proportion of instances of a particular P-tie  $k$  that map onto a tie (or tie intersection) in a particular network (or combination of networks)  $l$  minus the mean expected proportion, divided by the mean expected proportion  $([O_{kl} - \bar{E}_{kl}]/\bar{E}_{kl})$ .<sup>15</sup> P-values are calculated as the proportion of  $E_{kl}$  equal to or greater than  $O_{kl}$  if  $O_{kl} > \bar{E}_{kl}$ , or less than or equal to  $O_{kl}$  if  $O_{kl} < \bar{E}_{kl}$ .<sup>16</sup>

There are three things to note about table 3. First, superordinancy (S) effects were determined using the equal probability (EP) variation of the SRPT, so that the first column indicates what superiors were relatively likely and unlikely to do in comparison with nonsuperiors. The other network effects, in contrast, control for individuals' P-shift propensities (using the speaker marginal variation), and those columns tell us what people were more or less likely to do to those to whom they were tied, in comparison to those to whom they were not tied. Second, table 3 includes the effects of simplex networks and multiplex networks, where the latter are defined across two and three (simplex) networks. The second column, for instance, summarizes the effects of friendship (F), while the fifth column summarizes the effects of the multiplex network defined by the intersection of considering someone a friend and a co-worker (FW).<sup>17</sup> Third, table 3 resembles a correlation matrix in that each cell reflects the degree of association between one P-tie and one network tie, *not controlling* for the presence or absence of other network ties. For instance, friendship is significantly and negatively associated with A<sub>0</sub>-X<sub>1</sub>A (-.02,  $P < .05$ ), making no assumptions about whether or not friends were simultaneously tied in other networks. Each column is, in other words, "blind" to the others, a problem that I remedy shortly.

To aid in the interpretation of table 3, a correspondence analysis was conducted on the same residuals.<sup>18</sup> By means of singular value decomposition, correspondence analysis embeds row and column categories in a common  $n$ -dimensional space, allowing us to examine the association

<sup>15</sup> Proportions rather than frequencies were used because a given permutation could result in a slightly greater or lesser number of instances of a given P-tie than were actually observed.

<sup>16</sup> This amounts to a one-sided test, which is appropriate given that the distribution of  $E_{kl}$  cannot be assumed to be symmetric.

<sup>17</sup> Multiplex relations involving superordinancy (FS, WS, and FWS) were analyzed using the speaker marginal variation of the SRPT.

<sup>18</sup> Because correspondence analysis requires non-negative values, the residuals were first rescaled through the addition to all of them of the absolute value of the smallest (most negative) value.

TABLE 3  
RESULTS FROM BIVARIATE SRPT

	<i>S</i> (EP)	<i>F</i>	<i>W</i>	<i>U</i>	<i>FW</i>	<i>FU</i>	<i>FS</i>	<i>WU</i>	<i>WS</i>	<i>FWU</i>	<i>FWS</i>
A <sub>0</sub> -X <sub>1</sub> A <sub>1</sub>	.34***	-.02*	.00	.05**	-.03	.09**	-.03	.04	.06	.06	-.05
A <sub>0</sub> -X <sub>1</sub> 0	.56***	.03	.07***	.04	.09***	.09*	-.01	.10*	.10*	.16**	.07
A <sub>0</sub> -X <sub>1</sub> Y	.26***	.04	.05	-.22***	.06	-.20**	.04	-.26**	.07	-.25*	.18
A <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> A <sub>1</sub> ...	-.04***	-.01*	.00	.02	-.02	.00	-.06*	.00	-.04*	-.02	-.08*
A <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> 0	.06***	-.02	.00	.02	.04	-.01	-.07	.12*	-.02	.15*	.01
A <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> Y	.20***	.05	.00	-.08	.10	-.03	.03	-.12	.01	-.09	.26
A <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> X <sub>1</sub> A <sub>1</sub> ...	.54***	-.02	-.02	.07*	-.03	.09	-.02	-.03	.05	.06	-.03
A <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> X <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> ...	.52***	.05**	.08***	-.09**	.14***	-.04	.04	-.07	.12	-.04	.16*
A <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> X <sub>1</sub> 0	.63***	.05**	.03	-.02	.08**	.05	.08	-.01	.00	-.14	-.04
A <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub> X <sub>1</sub> Y	.60***	.04	.03	-.28**	-.04	-.13	.02	-.32*	.05	-.26	.14
AB <sub>1</sub> -X <sub>1</sub> A <sub>1</sub> ...	.50***	.01	.04*	.04	.04	.10	.05	.15**	.07	.17**	.17*
AB <sub>1</sub> -X <sub>1</sub> B <sub>1</sub>	.54***	-.01	.00	.10**	-.05	.08	-.03	.03	-.02	.01	-.13
AB <sub>1</sub> -X <sub>1</sub> 0	.62***	.00	.03	.08*	.04	.09*	.02	.12*	.03	.13*	.05
AB <sub>1</sub> -X <sub>1</sub> Y	.55***	-.02	.11*	-.15*	.04	-.13	.09	.11	-.01	.14	.09

NOTE.—Cell values are normalized residuals comparing observed proportion of instances of specified P-tie *k* corresponding to specified simplex or multiplex network tie *l* ( $O_{kl}$ ) with mean expected proportion ( $\bar{E}_{kl}$ )—calculated as  $(O_{kl} - \bar{E}_{kl})/\bar{E}_{kl}$ —averaging across 3,000 permutations. *F* = friendship, *W* = co-working, *U* = subordination, *S* = superordinancy, superordinancy effects in the first column are based on the EP variation of the SRPT.

\*  $P < .05$ ,

\*\*  $P < .01$ ,

\*\*\*  $P < .001$

between row categories, between column categories, and between row and column categories (Weller and Romney 1990). This is useful because it highlights which P-ties were associated with the same network ties, and which network ties were associated with the same P-ties, while also reflecting the association between particular network ties (simplex or multiplex) and particular P-ties. With respect to the last of these, however, correspondence analysis is known to be somewhat problematic—capturing relative association between a column and row category, and not its absolute magnitude (Greenacre 1994)—so that it will be important to check any conclusions against table 3.

The location of each P-tie and network tie is mapped along the two most important dimensions, or factors, in figure 3 (disregard the arrows for the moment). Together, these account for 57% of the variance (37% + 20%), or inertia, in the underlying residuals. This is a respectable reduction in dimensionality by conventional standards (Blasius 1994, p. 47), and additional factors do not contribute to theoretical interpretability. The close proximity of a P-tie and network tie (e.g.,  $AB_j-X_iY$  and  $W$ ) in this figure generally reflects a relatively positive association in the underlying table of residuals, which can be discerned in table 3—though correspondence analysis, unlike table 3, does not judge statistical significance. Close proximity of two P-ties indicates similar network “profiles,” in that they tended to be associated with the same types of network tie. Similarly, close proximity of two network ties indicates that they tended to be associated with the same P-ties. Further, because correspondence analysis involves a kind of factor analysis, the axes are, in principle, interpretable as latent variables along which the P-ties and network ties are arrayed.

The two main factors identified are, in fact, readily interpretable. I consider the horizontal dimension first, this being the more important of the two judging from the amount of variation it captures. To the left are all of those P-ties that involve ego addressing alter when alter spoke or was addressed in the prior turn ( $A_jB-B_iA$ ,  $A_{j0}-X_iA$ ,  $A_jB-X_iA$ , and  $AB_j-X_iB$ ), and several that involve ego addressing the group after alter spoke ( $A_jB-B_i0$ ,  $A_{j0}-X_i0$ ) or was addressed ( $AB_j-X_i0$ ). Also on the left of figure 3 is  $U$ , or subordinancy (think  $U$  for “underling”), along with all of the multiplex relations involving subordinancy. This is an indication that it was through these P-ties that the position of subordinate found positive expression, something confirmed by table 3, where all of the associated effects are positive, and many statistically significant.

On the right, in contrast, are located those P-ties that involve ego directing the conversation *away* from alter, and away from whomever alter addressed or was addressed by in the prior turn. These are maximally *disruptive* moves from alter’s perspective, and include  $A_jB-X_iY$ ,  $A_{j0}-X_iY$ ,




FIG. 3.—Correspondence analysis mapping of P-ties and network ties, with significant ( $P < .05$ ) positive effects from multivariate main-effects-only model indicated by arrows—black for results from speaker marginal variation of SRPT, gray for results from EP variation used for superordinancy (S) effects. Network notation is as per tables 3 and 4

and  $A_j B - B_i Y$ . That they are distant from subordinancy in figure 3 suggests that subordinates avoided these modes of behavior vis-à-vis their superiors, and this is confirmed by table 3, where we find subordinancy negatively associated with all three of these P-ties (though the effect on  $A_j B - B_i Y$  is not significant), and with  $AB_j - X_i Y$  as well. Also on the right, however, are the simplex ties of friendship (F) and co-working (W), along with some associated multiplex ties. This indicates that, to the degree that such rare P-shifts occurred at all, they tended to be performed by individuals vis-à-vis their friends and co-workers. This, too, is confirmed by table 3: friendship is positively associated with  $A_j 0 - X_i Y$ ,  $A_j B - B_i Y$ , and  $A_j B - X_i Y$ , while co-working is associated with  $A_j 0 - X_i Y$ ,  $A_j B - X_i Y$ , and  $AB_j - X_i Y$ . That most of these effects are nonsignificant is partially because of the rarity of these P-shifts (recall table 2), and the resulting high variance in the association statistic across permutations.

Consider, now, the vertical dimension of figure 3. The starkest pattern here involves the placement of the turn-receiving P-shifts/P-ties at the top, far away from superordinancy. A look at table 3 explains why: su-



perordinancy was least strongly associated with  $A_jB-B_0$  and  $A_jB-B_Y$ , and was *negatively* associated with  $A_jB-B_A$ . Keeping in mind that this is based on the EP variation of the SRPT, this means that superiors deployed almost all P-shifts with greater frequency than did other individuals, but were less likely than others to proffer traditional responses ( $A_jB-B_A$ ), and not much more likely to turn receive in other ways. Also note that when superiors obtained the floor through turn claiming and turn usurping, they were especially likely to address the group—the normalized residuals are largest for  $A_0X_0$  and  $A_jB-X_0/AB-X_0$ .<sup>19</sup>

At the center of figure 3 are friendship ( $F$ ) and co-working ( $W$ ). In addition to the association of co-working and  $AB-X_Y$  noted earlier, this captures their shared association with  $A_jB-X_B$  and that of co-working with  $A_0X_0$  and  $AB-X_A$ .<sup>20</sup> Friendship was also associated with  $A_jB-X_0$ , though in figure 3 this has been pulled downward by the stronger effect of superordinancy. I will have more to say about these effects shortly.

Before I undertake further substantive interpretation of these findings, a difficulty with the analysis so far must be addressed, though it will prove to be relatively benign to the foregoing. As indicated earlier, the analysis of the effect of a given (simplex or multiplex) network on a given P-tie does *not* control for the potentially confounding effects of other networks. What table 3 and figure 3 tell us is how P-ties fell vis-à-vis networks in comparison to how they would have fallen had there been no network effects; they do *not* judge the independent effects of different types of tie.

Thus I supplement the bivariate analysis in table 3 with a multivariate analysis. This involves regressing the log of the frequency (plus one) with which a pair of individuals was implicated in P-tie  $k$  (as  $i$  and  $j$ ) on the presence or absence of each type of network tie between them (from  $i$ 's perspective), and then comparing each parameter estimate with the distribution of estimates when the same analysis is performed using the

<sup>19</sup> So far as superiors are concerned,  $A_jB-X_0$  and  $AB-X_0$  are equivalent, for whenever a superior turn usurps, subordinates are necessarily implicated in the positions of prior speaker and prior target, assuming that there is only one superior in the room. The slight difference in residuals in the first column of table 3 (.62 and .63) is a result of the stochastic component of the SRPT. The same equivalence applies to  $A_jB-X_A/AB-X_A$ ,  $A_jB-X_B/AB-X_B$ , and  $A_jB-X_Y/AB-X_Y$ .

<sup>20</sup> Fig. 3 is different from a normal correspondence mapping insofar as proximity in the region of the "centroid," indicated by the +, reflects association. Normally it does not when correspondence analysis is applied to a simple contingency table, the centroid reflects the "average" row and column profiles, which are determined by the marginal frequencies. Fig. 3, however, is based on the residuals in table 3, so that the average profiles are not necessarily those expected under independence.

permuted P-ties.<sup>21</sup> Table 4 contains the results, where each value is the difference between the observed and the mean permutation-based standardized coefficients, for the hierarchical models including main effects only, two-way interaction effects, and three-way interaction effects.<sup>22</sup> For instance, .02 is the difference between the observed and mean permutation-based standardized coefficient estimates for the effect of friendship (*F*) on *A<sub>j</sub>B-X<sub>j</sub>B* in the main-effects-only model, while .07 is the difference between the estimates for the effect of the multiplex tie of friendship plus co-working (*FW*) in the model with two-way interaction terms.<sup>23</sup> As in the bivariate analysis (table 3), the main effects of superordinancy are as per the EP variation of the SRPT.

To facilitate an initial comparison of the results of the two analyses, significant positive effects from the main-effects-only model—from the first of the three rows associated with each P-tie in table 4—are graphed onto figure 3. Positive and significant ( $P < .05$ ) network main effects are indicated with arrows, joining network ties with the P-ties that they (the network ties) induced people to produce. Gray arrows are used for the effects of superordinancy, based on the EP variation, and black arrows for all other effects, based on the speaker marginal variation.

At the level of main effects, the multivariate analysis by and large supports the conclusions drawn from the bivariate analysis. Generally speaking, we find again that superiors were given to all P-shifts/P-ties except for those that involve turn receiving, that subordinates were especially apt to address their superiors or the group after their superiors spoke or were addressed and were particularly *unlikely* to direct the floor *away* from superiors, and that friendship and co-working prompted many of these same rare P-shifts and were also associated with many of the P-ties in the middle of figure 3. What table 4 contributes to table 3 is confirmation that these are independent effects.

There is more to be gained from the multivariate analysis than corroboration of the earlier findings, however. The models containing two-way and three-way interaction terms capture the effects of multiplexity *net of* the additive simplex effects, something that the bivariate analysis

<sup>21</sup> This is similar to MRQAP—the quadratic assignment procedure for multiple regression—though the permutation strategy is closer to that of Smouse, Long, and Sokal (1986) than of Krackhardt (1988), the better-known source on the topic within sociology.

<sup>22</sup> Standardized coefficients were used for this analysis in order to control for the variance in the dependent variable, the frequency with which a P-tie occurred or was simulated as occurring between a pair of individuals, which tends to be lower in the simulated than in the actual conversational data. This fact also makes R-squared comparisons inappropriate.

<sup>23</sup> There are no four-way interaction effects and only two three-way effects, because one cannot be someone's superior *and* their subordinate.

TABLE 4  
RESULTS FROM MULTIVARIATE SRPT FOR MODELS WITH MAIN EFFECTS ONLY, TWO-WAY INTERACTION EFFECTS AND THREE-WAY  
INTERACTION EFFECTS

	$S(EP)$	$F$	$W$	$U$	$FW$	$FU$	$FS$	$WU$	$WS$	$FWU$	$FWS$
$A_0-X_1A$ . . . . .	.14***	-.03**	.00	.01	-.03*	.01	-.01	.00	.05**		
		-.01	.00	.01	-.03	.02	.01	.00	.06**	-.01	-.02
$A_0-X_10$ . . . . .	.15***	.02	.04***	.03*	.02	.00	-.01	.00	-.01		
		.01	.04**	.02	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.02	.03	.02
$A_0-X_1Y$ . . . . .	.09***	.03	.01	-.06**							
		.04	.02	-.04	-.01	-.02	.00	-.01	.01		
		.06*	.03	-.02	-.04	-.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.06	.05
$A_1B_1A$ . . . . .	.00	-.01	.01*	.01							
		.00	.02**	.02**	-.01	.00	-.01	-.02*	-.01		
		.00	.02**	.01	-.01	.02	-.02†	-.01	-.01	-.02*	.01
$A_1B_10$ . . . . .	.01	.00	-.02	.00	.03	-.03	.00	.05**	-.02		
		-.02	-.04**	-.03	.01	-.05*	-.02	.01	-.03	.07*	.03
$A_1B_1Y$ . . . . .	.06*	.04*	-.00	-.03	.04	.00	.00	-.03	.04		
		.01	-.02	-.01	.02	.01	-.06	-.02	.00	-.01	.08
		.02	-.01	-.01							
$A_1B_1X_1A$ . . . . .	.15***	-.02	-.01	.02*	.02	.01	-.02	-.04	.01		
		-.03	-.01	.04*							

$A_j B_j X_j B$ ... ..	11***	-.02	.00	.05*	.01	-.01	-.03	-.05*	.00	.03	.01
		.02*	.03*	-.04*							
		-.02	.01	-.01	.07**	.00	.00	-.03	.02		
$A_j B_j X_j 0$ ... ..	.13***	-.02	.01	.00	.07**	-.01	.02	-.04	.04	.01	-.03
		.03**	.01	.00							
$A_j B_j X_j Y$ ... ..	12***	.00	.01	.01	.04	.01	-.01	-.03	-.03	.00	.01
		.01	.01	-.08**	.04	.01	-.01	-.03	-.04		
		.08*	.06*	-.00*	-.12**	.03	-.00	-.02	-.02		
$A B_j X_j A$ ... ..	.12***	.08*	.06*	-.10*	-.12**	.07	-.04	.01	-.04	-.05	.05
		.01	.00	-.01							
		.02	.00	.01	.01	.03	.02	.04*	.03		
$A B_j X_j B$ ... ..	14***	.01	-.01	-.04	-.01	.02	-.01	.04	.01	.01	.04
		-.02	.01	.03***							
		.00	.02	.08**	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.01		
$A B_j X_j 0$ ... ..	.15***	-.01	.02	.07**	-.02	.00	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.02	.00
		.00	.01	.02*							
		-.01	.00	-.01	.01	.03	-.01	.02	-.01		
$A B_j X_j Y$ ... ..	.12***	-.01	.01	.00	.00	.01	-.03	.01	-.02	.03	.02
		-.01	.06*	-.04							
		.01	.05*	-.09*	-.02	-.04	.03	.11**	-.02		
		.03	.06*	-.06	-.05	-.13*	.04	.05	-.02	.12	-.01

NOTE — Cell values are computed as difference between observed and mean expected standardized coefficient estimates, averaging across 3,000 permutations. Notation is as per table 3

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .001$ .

does not do. Some of the multiplex effects in table 3 are thus revealed, by table 4, to be reducible to the additive effects of the constituent simplex ties. An example is the association between  $FW$  and  $A_0X_0$ , which is significant in table 3 but not in the model with two-way interaction terms in table 4, where we find no significant interaction effect net of the main effects of co-working (statistically significant) and friendship (not statistically significant).

In fact, most of the multiplexity effects in table 3 evaporate when viewed through a multivariate lens, which is why I did not dwell upon them earlier. Of those that remain, some made a P-tie more likely than it would have been given additive main effects. Consider the case of  $A_BX_B$ . In table 3, this is positively associated with friendship ( $F$ ), co-working ( $W$ ), and their intersection ( $FW$ ). The simplex effects are confirmed by the main-effects-only model in table 4 for this P-tie: friendship and co-working each had an independent effect, controlling for the other. What we find when we add the two-way interaction terms, however, is that neither of the simplex networks had this effect on its own, but only in combination with the other. That is, ego was more apt to readdress alter's targets if ego and alter worked together *and* were friends, while being one or the other alone had no such effect.

Other intersections rendered P-ties *less* likely. The most statistically significant of these involves friendship, co-working, and  $A_BX_Y$ . Each type of tie had a positive and significant main effect in the model with two-way interaction terms, which means that ego's tendency to direct the floor away from alter in this way was greater when they were friends *or* when they worked together. The effect was not, however, additive: the interaction effect is negative, and when (in a separate analysis) the P-tie is regressed on the multiplex tie alone, the effect is nonsignificant, indicating that the intersection of these two types of tie negates the separate main effects.

And yet, the multivariate analysis, too, has a drawback: multicollinearity, or correlation between types of tie, which diminishes the apparent effect of each, particularly when two- and three-way interaction effects are added (since each is by necessity correlated with its constituent ties). We see this happen, for instance, in the case of subordinancy's main effect on  $A_0X_Y$ , which is rendered nonsignificant when the interaction terms are added, though none of those effects are statistically significant. This is not much different from what happens in ordinary regression, however, and in interpreting the results in the next section, I take the normal approach of starting with the main-effects-only model, and only considering the results of the higher-order models when one or more interaction effects prove statistically significant.

## DISCUSSION

People have options in conversation, but the options are not limitless. One strength of the participation shift framework is that it provides a logically exhaustive inventory of everything that can happen at one level of description. Another is that it formalizes sequential dependencies of a logical nature, whereby what happens in one turn constrains what *can* happen in the next. A third is that, as evident in table 2, it readily yields empirical insight into what is likely and unlikely among those things that are logically possible at a particular juncture. A fourth is that though P-shifts, as originally introduced, abstract away from particular individuals, the framework is amenable to the subsequent reintroduction of individuals as the producers and recipients of P-shifts, or P-ties, opening the door to an analysis of how these discrete, fleeting behaviors reflect relations in preexisting vertical (superordinancy and subordinancy) and horizontal (friendship and co-working) networks.

What the analysis described in the last section reveals is a range of conversational obligations and entitlements operating in this setting. Here, I undertake a more substantive interpretation of these, considering the effects of each of the simplex networks in turn and then a number of the multiplexity effects—an approach justified by the fact that the addition of the interaction terms by and large leaves main effects intact. Particular weight is given to general patterns that span particular P-shifts/P-ties, guided in this respect by figure 3, and to those that are statistically significant in table 4.

*Superordinancy.*—As previously observed, the prerogatives of superiors extended to most P-shifts, particularly those involving undirected remarks ( $A_jB-X_i0/AB_j-X_i0$ ,  $A_j0-X_i0$ ). This is corroborated by table 4. The effect on turn claiming and turn usurping was stronger than that on turn receiving, however, and superiors were especially *unlikely* to reply when addressed ( $A_jB-B_iA$ ), at least according to table 3. Superiors were not at the beck and call of subordinates, it seems. They were less likely than others to accept the conversational openings handed to them, and more likely to squeeze them out of circumstances in which others were hard-pressed to speak. This is interesting from the perspective of expectation-states research on the mechanisms by which high-status actors exercise influence, since it goes deeper than the observation that high-status people talk more (Fisek et al. 1991) to pinpoint exactly what opportunities they avail themselves of (see also Shelly 1997). On the other hand, it is consistent with the conversation analysis of talk in institutional settings, which has demonstrated repeatedly how those in positions of formal authority are more often on the giving than the receiving end of adjacency pair first parts such as questions and commands (Molotch and Boden

1985; Frankel 1990), which could account for their disinclination for responding AB-BA-fashion.

*Subordinancy.*—Subordinates were especially given to addressing their superiors after one spoke or was addressed, in this way presumably returning (or at least attempting to return) control of the floor to them. Interestingly, however, the effect is more statistically significant with respect to  $AB_j-X_iB$  and  $A_jB-X_iA$  than to the much more common  $A_jB-B_iA$  and  $A_0-X_iA$  in table 4. Thus we have another example of a relational effect through out-of-the-way P-shifts, perhaps because the more common ones,  $A_0-XA$  and  $AB-BA$ , are more determined at the level of content. To take the case of  $AB-BA$ , if someone asks you a question, you are apt to respond regardless of your network connection to them, while turn usurping may require more of a network pretense or inducement. Subordinates were also particularly likely to speak to the group (or make undirected remarks) after a superior did ( $A_0-X_0$ ) or after a superior was addressed ( $AB_j-X_i0$ ). These are indications that more is at issue here than merely returning the floor to someone who has power over you, that being a dutiful subordinate may, for instance, entail amplifying a superior's remark to the group ( $A_0-X_0$ ).

And yet, control of the floor certainly *was* at issue, for recall the *negative* effect of subordinancy on  $A_0-X_iY$ ,  $A_jB-X_iY$ , and  $AB_j-X_iY$ . While subordinates were particularly apt to hand the floor back to their superiors, they were especially *averse* to directing the floor away from them. (The effect on  $A_jB-B_iY$  is also negative, but not significant in either table.) In other words, conversational moves that were already rare (table 2) were particularly so after a superior spoke or was addressed. This is relational enactment through abstention, though it is doubtful that every instance of abstaining was consciously registered by the superior or anyone else as a demonstration of respect; when a tie is enacted through the avoidance of a behavior it is probably the failure to abstain that is remembered.

Both the positive and negative effects of subordinancy dovetail nicely with past work on the conversational prerogatives of subordinates vis-à-vis their superiors. Brown and Levinson (1987), for instance, present cross-cultural evidence that subordinates consistently soften the demands they make of superiors with apologies and circumlocutions. Similarly, Johnson, Clay-Warner, and Funk (1996) find that subordinates use more qualifiers when addressing their superiors, back channel (e.g., "uh-huh") more, and are more apt to interrupt in such a way as to support, rather than challenge, a superior's remark. Here, support for a superior took the form of addressing that person when the opportunity presented itself (i.e., after he or she spoke or was addressed), often through an act of turn usurping and, on the other side, refraining from P-shifts that might have done the most to undermine a superior's authority.


*Friendship and co-working.*—Because they were strongly correlated—friends tend to be co-workers and co-workers tend to be friends<sup>24</sup>—it is useful to discuss friendship and co-working together. As indicated earlier, in figure 3, these relational types are closer than any other to the least common P-ties, involving acts of radical redirection:  $A_jB-B_iY$ ,  $A_jO-X_iY$ ,  $A_jB-X_iY$ , and  $AB_j-X_iY$ . The multivariate results are not entirely consistent, however: the effect of friendship does not extend to  $AB_j-X_iY$ , nor co-working to  $A_jB-B_iY$ , and the remaining effects are not all statistically significant, though this is partially attributable to the multicollinearity problem in combination with the sheer infrequency of these P-shifts. Still, it appears that horizontal ties, be they of friendship or co-working, loosened conversational strictures somewhat, freeing people to engage in occasional, and otherwise proscribed, acts of conversational redirection.<sup>25</sup> This is consistent with Wolfson's (1988) "theory of the bulge," according to which one engages in a wider range of sociolinguistic behaviors when interacting with, on the one side, familiars, and on the other, complete strangers, whereas most circumspection is exercised when interacting with those falling in between. In this setting, where everyone can anticipate future interaction, this is nicely illustrated by generally rare behaviors that were, at the same time, symptomatic of preexisting relations involving friends and co-workers.

Friendship and co-working were expressed through a number of other P-ties as well, those in the center of figure 3. In table 4, these include, for co-working,  $A_jO-X_iO$  and  $A_jB-X_iB$ , and for friendship,  $A_jB-X_iO$  and  $A_jB-X_iB$ .  $A_jB-X_iB$  is the structural form of what Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) call "piggybacking," whereby someone readdresses the prior target as a way of affiliating with the prior speaker, and it is easy to extend this to  $A_jO-X_iO$  as well. But while Goodwin and Goodwin view this as a strategy for forging a new tie to a status superior, here, piggybacking seems to have been a vehicle for the enactment of *existing* relations. Perhaps piggybacking in this setting served as an instrument of organizational "team-work" (Goffman 1959), a mode of coordination of individuals with common interests and a common perspective on organizational issues. (Subordinancy ties were also found to be associated with  $A_jO-X_iO$ ; see above.)

*Multiplexity.*—The main effects of friendship, subordinancy, and co-

<sup>24</sup> The association is statistically significant ( $P < .001$ ), based on an analysis using Martin's (1999) modification of QAP for multiple groups. The program is available at [www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jlmartin/data\\_and\\_programs\\_getting\\_page.htm](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jlmartin/data_and_programs_getting_page.htm).

<sup>25</sup>  $A_jB-B_iA$  is also associated with co-working in table 4. The effect, however, is weak, and surely only turns up because this P-tie was so common that even the smallest effect has a good chance of being significant.





working are relatively robust to the addition of the interaction terms. This in itself is noteworthy because it means that hierarchical relationships were modified by horizontal ones, that how a superior behaved toward a subordinate, or vice versa, depended upon whether or not the former also considered the latter a friend and/or a co-worker. There are, however, a number of interesting interaction effects in table 4. Here I limit myself to the two mentioned earlier, because of the strength of the effects involved and because of their theoretical interest. First, as indicated, the apparent main effects of friendship and co-working on the piggybacking P-shift  $A_{jB-X,B}$  are revealed, through the addition of two-way interaction terms, to actually have depended upon their intersection. Second, while friendship and co-working were independently associated with the disruptive, and generally proscribed,  $A_{jB-X,Y}$  (in the model with two-way interaction effects), this effect was *suppressed* at their intersection. What makes these effects especially interesting is the fact that friendship and co-working are, arguably, two constituents of a "strong tie." According to Granovetter (1973) and Krackhardt (1992), a strong tie involves positive affect (here, the perception of friendship), frequent interaction (here, the fact of co-working), and a long history of acquaintance (not measured here). Such ties, Krackhardt (1992, pp. 218–19) claims, possess a "special character" that "falls apart" when any one feature is missing. While he is concerned with the outcome of trust, here we see a number of conversational outcomes: piggybacking is associated with strong ties but not by their constituent simplex ties, while one of the most radical acts of redirection is associated with the simplex ties *only*. The strong-tie interpretation aside, findings such as these indicate that the effect of multiplex relationships cannot always be reduced to the additive effects of the constituent relations.

## CONCLUSION

I began this article with the problem of how to relate two orthogonal axes of social organization. One is that of network structure, which has instantaneous, snapshot complexity but no temporal definition, except as it either does or does not persist. The other is that of conversational interaction, which, in contrast, is marked by snapshot simplicity—generally, one person vocalizes while others look on—but tremendous temporal complexity. My solution involved maximally collapsing each dimension, by breaking the stream of conversation into discrete transitions taken out of wider sequential context, and fracturing the architecture of networks into equally decontextualized dyadic relations. By thus transforming structure into a kind of minimal structure—two people are or

are not tied—and the flow of interaction into a kind of minimal sequentiality—one or another P-shift occurs—I made it possible to focus on the precise point of contact between the two axes, to see how the components of network structure found expression through (one of) the components of conversational interaction.

Because P-shifts, and thus P-ties, are defined sequentially, in terms of how someone responds to a conversational stimulus manufactured by the prior speaker, a statistical method had to be devised to control for the *empirical occurrence* of sequential opportunities, so that we could compare how these were actually used with how they would have been used in the absence of network effects. The SRPT accomplishes this by permuting P-ties subject to the action opportunities people had available to them. The permuted conversational data, in combination with the original network data, were then submitted to two analyses with complementary strengths: a bivariate analysis that lends itself to a graphical mapping revealing overall patterns, and a multivariate analysis that pinpoints independent effects, including effects that arise from network intersections.

The evidence suggests that network ties are, in fact, manifested through P-shift behavior, sometimes in surprising ways. I do not, however, take this to be mean that networks drive conversation; conversation as a recognizable phenomenon could not survive if they did. Rather, I assume that at each step of the way, the rules of conversation delimit a set of options, and that at the instant that these are perceived, relational considerations—such as the deference owed to superiors or the prerogatives enjoyed by friends—may, but need not, weigh into people's decisions of whether, and how, to act.

At the beginning of the article I spoke of Goffman's idea of "transformation rules," which govern, he supposes, the translation of preexisting social structure into encounter behavior. In light of the foregoing, I take "rules" to be too strong a term, suggesting something akin to highly regular grammatical transformations (e.g., Chomsky 1980). What the statistical analyses point to, rather, are transformation *tendencies*, or incremental modifications of conversational norms in light of relational commitments. Thus what we are left with are conversational norms or rules, which guarantee conversational order irrespective of the presence or absence of preexisting ties, and transformation tendencies which enable networks to bubble up through the residual indeterminacy that these rules leave behind.

I have been careful, in describing the findings, to limit my observations to these groups, for not only do I not assume that the network effects are generalizable, I hypothesize that they are not, that the translation of network relations into P-shifts and other conversational behaviors likely depends upon the conversational setting. Useful in this respect is White's

(1995) conception of “network domains,” or netdoms (also Mische and White 1998). This refers to the intersection of a culturally constructed interactional domain, with its expectations about what counts as a legitimate contribution and mode of expression, and the preexisting network(s) that it engages by virtue of the involvement of some particular set of people with varying histories together. Transformation rules, or tendencies, may vary with the exact “domain” in effect. Ties of friendship, for instance, may be translated into some conversational behaviors when a group is engaged in friendly banter, others when it enters into collaborative problem-solving mode, and others still when divergent interests surface and negotiations (or conflict) commence. (For indirect evidence of this, see McFarland and Bender-deMoll [2003].)

The methodology presented here can thus be seen as one for the comparative study of netdoms, and its application to these business meetings as the first step in a wide-ranging research program, extending to other types of interactional settings, as these ensnare individuals previously embedded in a variety of networks. The ambition is to identify the features of a conversational context that are reliably correlated with network effects of particular sorts. Relevant contextual features may include the degree of task orientation, expectations for collective versus individual rewards, conventions of formality versus informality, and time pressures. The payoff of such a program is an understanding of when, and how, networks translate into interactional behavior from which outcomes—such as decisions, rifts, and reputations—follow. Put differently, research such as this can help us trace the path of network influences through encounters—which can refract and even deflect these influences—to the substantive outcomes of interaction.

## APPENDIX

### The SRPT

The SRPT approximately permutes P-ties in such a way as to retain sequential constraints, allowing us to compare the observed statistic of association with the distribution of statistics derived from the permuted data, from which a *P*-value can be calculated expressing the likelihood of the observed statistic or one more extreme, given the no-network-effects null model. It might better be referred to as a “quasi-permutation test,” however, since it does not permute P-shifts directly, but indirectly, through a stochastic simulation based on observed probabilities (in particular, of a given person producing a given P-shift given the opportunity) and sequential constraints (the actual occurrence of such opportunities).

Here I provide a number of technical notes to supplement the expla-

nation of the SRPT given in the text. In the speaker marginal variation, a person's likelihood of completing a P-shift was estimated using logistic regression. The dependent variable is the odds of subject  $i$  producing P-shift  $m$  in any turn  $t$  in which  $i$  was logically capable of doing so. (One could not, for instance, produce AB-BA, or its associated P-tie, if one was not first addressed as B; an additional requirement is that one had to be physically present.) The independent variable is the number of other people present, under the assumption that the number of potential competitors is an important determinant of whether a given individual can produce a P-shift in a given turn. Thus, the model took the form

$$\log O_{imt} = \alpha_{im} + \beta_{im}(N_t),$$

where  $O_{imt}$  is the odds that subject  $i$  produced P-shift  $m$  in turn  $t$ ,  $\alpha_{im}$  is the intercept reflecting (roughly)  $i$ 's proclivity for engaging in this P-shift generally, and  $\beta_{im}$  is the parameter expressing the effect of the number of other people present  $N_t$  on  $i$ 's likelihood of producing the P-shift. From the person-specific equations that resulted,  $i$ 's expected odds of producing that P-shift in each speaking turn were calculated; these odds were then converted into probabilities for the sake of the simulated responses at step 2 in figure 2.

As indicated in the text, the SRPT only "approximately" reproduces individuals' P-shift propensities in a given permutation. Though the stochastic component is partly responsible, more important is the fact that the probabilities calculated in the manner just described need to be slightly adjusted, in each turn, so as to sum to 1.0 across P-shifts. This involves multiplying each—that is, each probability for each person and each P-shift in each turn—by the turn-specific normalizing constant  $C_t$ :

$$C_t = \frac{1}{\sum_m \sum_i \Pr(m_{it})},$$

where  $\Pr(m_{it})$  is the probability of subject  $i$  completing P-shift  $m$  in turn  $t$ , based on the logistic regression. While this ensures that the probabilities of all possible events in a given turn sum to unity, particular individuals' propensities are slightly distorted as a result. This points to the general difficulty in reconciling a rate-based approach to conversation that begins with marginal tendencies and a sequential approach to conversation that takes rates as partial artifacts of the operation of sequential rules. For an attempted first-principles solution, see Skvoretz (1981).

These complications are avoided in the EP variation of the SRPT, which controls for P-shift marginals but not individuals' propensities, and involves no normalization since it begins with the P-shift probabilities in table 1, which already sum to unity. Recall that only the main effects of

superordinancy ( $S$ ) are inferred using the EP variation, since it is these that are controlled away by the speaker marginal variation. The effects of superordinancy in conjunction with other networks—that is, the multiplexity effects involving  $S$ —are as per the speaker marginal variation. An example is the significant and positive effect of  $WS$ , the intersection of co-working and superordinancy, on  $A_0X_A$  in table 4. For most purposes, the interpretation of this is not much different than the interpretation of other interaction effects not involving superordinancy, indicating that the effect of co-working is different when found in combination with superordinancy, and that the effect of superordinancy is different when found in combination with co-working.

The analyses of P-ties implied by a single P-shift are identical through step 2. For example, the analyses of  $A_jB-X_A$  and  $AB_j-X_A$  both begin with the simulation of  $AB-X_A$ , and only diverge starting at step 3.

P-ties in which both  $i$  and  $j$  are found only in the second turn were not analyzed. These include  $A_0-X_jY_j$ ,  $AB-B_jY_j$ , and  $AB-X_jY_j$ . While these are of unquestionable theoretical interest, prior analysis (Gibson 2003) revealed that  $Y$  tends very often to be someone who spoke two or three turns earlier, a non-Markovian effect that the SRPT, as currently implemented, cannot capture.

The SRPT is not confounded by the prevalence of a given type of tie in a given group, since the network, whatever its density, is held fixed through the comparison of observed and permutation association statistics. Take the extreme, and hypothetical, case in which a group lacked any ties of friendship. So far as this group is concerned, both the observed and the expected association of instances of any P-tie and friendship ties would be zero. There is no risk of our falsely concluding that friendship had no effect, precisely because the structure of the friendship network, including its density, is held fixed on both the observed and the expected sides. Finally, the analysis excludes directed dyads (ordered  $i, j$  pairs) for which complete network data were not available.

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# **“Taking the State at Its Word”: The Arts of Consentful Contention in the German Democratic Republic<sup>1</sup>**

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Following the popular uprisings of 1989–91 in Eastern Europe, subsequent research on contention in state socialism has typically focused on transgressive repertoires implicated in the system’s collapse. In contrast, this article investigates certain alternative, more “consentful” forms of contention, in which citizens openly contested official directives by appealing to the state’s own dominant ideology. Drawing on evidence from the German Democratic Republic, as well as other cases, the article develops a dramaturgical framework that classifies contentious repertoires along three dimensions: behavior, standpoint, and stance. This framework is then used to analyze two types of data: a retrospective “resistance” narrative by an ordinary citizen and a secret transcript from the well-known Biermann protest. The conclusion proposes an explanatory model, as well as a regime typology to aid future research.

Until recently, the forms and dynamics of contentious politics in state socialist societies have remained somewhat obscure to sociological research. The prevailing approaches to studying contention have typically

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defined their object as collective claims making directed toward the state in relatively open contexts; hence they have provided little guidance to understanding political life in state socialist contexts, where public dissent is discouraged (Deess 1997; Johnston and Mueller 2001; Joppke 1994, 1995; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Mueller 1999a, 1999b; Osa 2003; Zhou 1993).<sup>2</sup>

The abrupt collapse of Communist-led states in Eastern Europe has opened vast new data sources for investigating political life in state socialism (see e.g., Berdahl 1999; Johnston and Mueller 2001; Joppke 1995; Kantner 1996; Kozlov and MacKinnon 2002; Mueller 1999b; Neubert 1997; Osa 2003; Pfaff and Yang 2001; Torpey 1995; Watson 1994; Williams 1997). To date, much of the research has focused on uncovering the causes and origins of the upheaval (e.g., *AJS* 1995; Banac 1992; Beissinger 2002; Burawoy and Lukács 1992; Goldstone 1993; Kupferberg 1999; Kuran 1995; Mayer 2002; Opp, Voss, and Gern 1995; Róna-Tas 1997; Staniszkis 1991; Suny 1993; Szelényi and Szelényi 1994). Much of this research has continued the earlier emphasis on dissidents, *samizdat* literature, or sporadic insurgency (e.g., Cushman 1993; Joppke 1995; Kozlov and MacKinnon 2002; Neubert 1997; Poppe, Eckert, and Kowalczyk 1995; Stoltzfus 1997; Torpey 1995) which, along with fictive literature from the region, formerly constituted the primary window on political life outside the socialist state. Less commonly researched are the various *nonradical* practices of contention under the old regime—ranging from oral or written petitions by individual citizens to cautious reform attempts by loyal insiders—that used performances of *consent* to contest state directives. Collectively these practices make up the political genre I will call *consentful contention*.

The reasons for this relative neglect relate to the conceptual linkage between contention and social change in the literature since 1990. Current contention research largely subordinates the study of political behavior in state socialism to the explanation of dramatic social change, or else deals with political contention on the a priori presumption of such a causal connection. Thus, post-1990 studies of prior contention repertoires typically still justify their subject by stressing possible links between instances of apparent resistance, on the one hand, and the momentous events of

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wald-Jensen, Mayer Zald, the participants of Susan Gal's Anthropology of Europe Workshop (University of Chicago), and five insightful *AJS* reviewers. Expert transcription of the "Kraus" interview was supplied by E. Schiwietz and her colleagues at the MPIB. Correspondence should be addressed to Jeremy Straughn, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Stone Hall, 700 West State Street, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907-2059. E-mail: jstraugh@cla.purdue.edu

<sup>2</sup> On recent developments in the study of contentious politics, see especially Aminzade et al. (2001), McAdam et al. (2001), Tarrow (1998), and Traugott (1995)

rapid, actor-driven social change, on the other. For example, much of the research on contention in the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) in recent years was stimulated by the contrast between the relative infrequency of open protest and the startling overthrow of the regime in 1989.<sup>3</sup> Many researchers have interpreted unobtrusive or small-scale subversive activities, as well as informal networks of critical dissent, in light of the widely publicized cascade of open protest demonstrations, culminating in the downfall of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe (e.g., Deess 1997; Johnston and Mueller 2001; Kantner 1996; Knabe 1998; Lindenberger 1999; Mueller 1999b; Pfaff 1996; Pfaff and Yang 2001; Stoltzfus 1997). Such research has turned increasingly to what James Scott (1990) calls the "infrapolitics" of subordinate social groups—the use of "clever tricks" and subterfuge to maintain a sphere of mental and discursive autonomy from the state—but still with an eye to uncovering the origins of future, more "transgressive" mobilization.<sup>4</sup>

This growing body of research has usefully challenged obsolete images of an all-powerful state manipulating the minds and behavior of the ruled at will. Yet, at times, almost the opposite presumption has prevailed. When the past is scoured for the origins of radical protest, explanations for social change can verge on the tautological, citing "everyday life" per se as a forerunner of revolution.<sup>5</sup> In the limiting case, Tilly notes, even "compliance . . . turns out to be a sort of constant rebellion" (1991, p. 598) when viewed through the prism of "hidden resistance." Particularly in contexts where mobilization has brought about dramatic change, it is all too tempting to conclude that citizens were in one way or another "resisting" all along. In the absence of decisive evidence, scholars continue to debate whether the quiescence that reigned in the meantime was backed by conviction, coercion, mystification, or simply apathy, and whether the occasional "petty act of resistance" (Scott 1985, 1990) foreshadowed open

<sup>3</sup> Additional impetus for this approach came from analysts of "everyday resistance" (e.g., Certeau 1984; Guha and Spivak 1988; Scott 1985, 1990), through whose lens a great variety of nonconforming activities appear as forerunners of later, more openly defiant genres of contention.

<sup>4</sup> On the distinction between contained and transgressive practices, see McAdam et al (2001, pp. 7–9) and Goffman ([1961] 1990, pp. 199–200).

<sup>5</sup> In the case of state socialism, a number of excellent in situ studies conducted before 1989 have touched on questions of resistance and nonconformity in a nontautological manner (e.g., Borneman 1992; Humphrey 1983, 1994; Kideckel 1993; Nagengast 1991; Niethammer, von Plato, and Wierling 1991; Verdery 1983), although none has dealt systematically with consensual contention in the sense discussed here.

rebellion or merely served as a stabilizing “pressure valve” (Pollack 1990).<sup>6</sup> In the wake of communism’s collapse, researchers have been inclined to interpret apparent quiescence as harboring covert dissidence, and to equate all contention with a rejection of the political system as such.

Much anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise. Former citizens of state socialist countries have not generally echoed the portrayal of everyday life in state socialism as one of perpetual resistance against the authorities. Indeed, inside observers have usually resisted the self-image of heroic dissidents, preferring a picture that is strikingly equivocal and complex—one that mixes both hope and cynicism, both authenticity and dissimulation, “living in the truth” and “a life of lies” (e.g., Drakulic 1992; Engler 1997; Havel [1978] 1991; Kharkhordin 1995; Maaz 1990; Marody 1988; Milosz 1953; Reich 1992; Shlapentokh 2001; Yurchak 1997; Žižek 1989). In a similar vein, recent scholarship on a variety of contexts has increasingly questioned the utility of dualisms like opposition/collaboration, resistance/complicity, or voice/loyalty for analyzing political life in authoritarian or stratified settings (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1990; Coutin and Hirsch 1998; Gal 1995; Groves and Chang 1999; Humphrey 1994; O’Hanlon 1988; Ortner 1995).

In this article, I propose an analytic approach to political contention in state socialism that presumes neither perfect quiescence nor perpetual resistance on the part of most citizens. My purpose is not to explain large-scale social change, but rather to account for the distinctive features of certain contention genres in state socialism. In particular, I attempt to illuminate an important, but recently neglected, phenomenon I will call “consentful contention” using the GDR as a case study. As I discuss at length in the next section, *consentful contention* is a genre of political engagement in which the claim maker enacts the persona of a dutiful citizen, while contesting specific actions or policies of the state. Consentful contention is important because it illustrates how citizens sought to ex-

<sup>6</sup> On this question, Timur Kuran (1995) and James Scott (1985, 1990) represent two poles. Both emphasize the incentives for individuals to conceal their true attitudes toward the socialist state, but Kuran adheres to a “false consciousness” type of interpretation, he believes that an impoverished public sphere stunted the development of critical thought (1995, esp. chap. 13; cf. Kharkhordin 1995; Yurchak 1997) and thereby “deformed, biased, and confused the thoughts of individual Soviet and East European citizens, rendering most, including many dissidents, incapable of recognizing communism’s fundamental flaws” (Kuran 1995, p. 205). By contrast, Scott rejects even “thin” variants of the false consciousness thesis as naïve acceptance of the “public transcript,” and favors a “hydraulic” theory of resentment instead. Far from masking harsh reality, he insists, humiliating subordination causes psychological resentment to build, like water pressure against a dam, and no degree of ideological obfuscation can prevent the political torrent, should the dam of tyranny burst (1990, chap. 4 and pp. 218–19; see also Scott 1985, chap. 8).

ercise the "voice" option under authoritarian conditions without relinquishing the advantages of "loyalty."<sup>7</sup> The case of East Germany is particularly interesting in this context because of the well-documented consentful (reformist) leanings of most contentious activities during the last decades of the GDR's existence, insofar as these activities were not oriented toward achieving "exit" (Joppke 1995; Meuschel 1992; Mueller 1999*b*; Neubert 1997; Pollack 2000; Rüddenklau 1992; Torpey 1995). The East German case also sheds light on the inherently paradoxical quality of contentious politics in state socialism as such.<sup>8</sup> On the one hand, the state's ideological claim to rule "in the interests of the working class" supplies citizens with myriad opportunities to test and contest the sincerity of this commitment, simply by "taking the state at its word"; on the other hand, the ruling party's rigid intolerance of political opposition substantially magnifies the risk that any citizen petition, no matter how patriotically formulated, will be construed as an act of defiance.

In the next section, I define and discuss consentful contention as a characteristic genre of political action in state socialism, drawing on evidence from East Germany as well as other cases. I then propose a conceptual framework that posits the intrinsically dramaturgical quality of political interaction in a state socialist context and discuss the implications of this approach for the interpretation of evidence about political activities under state socialist conditions. After describing relevant aspects of the study on which the article is based, I present two examples of consentful contention in detail. On a methodological level, these examples highlight two different types of documentary evidence now available to researchers—a transcript from a retrospective interview (by the author) and a transcript from a secret negotiation between government officials and leading intellectuals (covertly recorded by one of the latter). On a substantive level, the examples illustrate the "artful" use of consentful contention from two contrasting perspectives—that of an "ordinary citizen" attempting to outwit the state by manipulating the dominant ideological

<sup>7</sup> On the dynamics of loyalty, voice, and exit in East German politics, see Hirschman (1993), Mueller (1999*b*), and Pfaff and Kim (2003). The terms are Hirschman's (1970).

<sup>8</sup> Since the 1970s, some authors (e.g., Joppke 1995; Jowitt 1992, Mueller 1999*b*) have labeled such societies "Leninist," thus classifying Soviet-style regimes according to their historical origin in the Bolshevik movement. I prefer the more general term "state socialism"—not in order "to convey that, despite everything, socialism is still capitalism's future" (Joppke 1994, p. 545)—but rather as way of distinguishing these social formations from socialist governments in democratic states, as well as from smaller-scale examples of nonstate socialism. This nomenclature also allows that there may be cases of state socialism that are not "Leninist" in any historically meaningful sense of the word, but which nonetheless exhibit structural parallels to the Soviet variant.

repertoire, and that of an elite group of true believers justifying dissent as a necessary expression of socialist patriotism.

By way of conclusion, I discuss the implications of the present analysis for the formulation of hypotheses for future research on political contention in both state socialist and other types of authoritarian societies. Exploring the distinctiveness of contention genres under state socialism is not only a matter of historical interest. It is also necessary in order to account for present, evolving patterns of social interaction and political behavior in postsocialist regions, as well as providing a basis for comparison with extant forms of state socialism on other continents. At the comparative level, moreover, the political life of citizens in state socialist countries provides a rich and varied assemblage of cases through which a deeper understanding of contentious politics in other regime types may be achieved.

#### WHAT IS CONSENTFUL CONTENTION?

In state socialist East Germany, ideological orthodoxy combined with political repression to help cultivate a genre of political interaction I will call *consentful contention*.<sup>9</sup> By *contention*, I mean a form of political engagement in which one or more subordinate actors undertake discursive or symbolic interaction with one or more representatives of the state to further their interests in response to official actions or policies that are perceived by the subordinate actors as contrary to their interests.<sup>10</sup> By *consentful* contention, I mean that the actor or actors contest a state of affairs or a government policy or decision by performing the role of a

<sup>9</sup> On orthodoxy, see especially Bourdieu (1977). Although space precludes a full discussion, the present argument is broadly consistent with a Bourdieuan theory of symbolic domination, particularly along the lines suggested by Martin and Szelenyi (1987). Such an approach would develop further the relationship between consentful contention and the biographical acquisition of symbolic mastery of the dominant ideological codes as a form of political capital. See also Bourdieu (1991, 1998)

<sup>10</sup> Two senses of the term "contention" usefully connote divergent forms of political discourse: (a) reasoned argumentation (from the nominal form of "to contend") and (b) quarrelsome or belligerent disagreement (connoted by the adjective "contentious"). The more consentful forms under investigation here relate primarily to the former. In this article, "contestation" is a synonym for contention. The above definition of "contention" encompasses what many authors call "resistance"—in which subordinate actors actively seek to maintain or restore the status quo—as well as the pursuit of more ambitious objectives ranging from reform to revolution. However, it excludes passive noncompliance (e.g., the secret nonpayment of taxes) to the extent that the "resisting" actors do not engage with the state. In other words, contention cannot become "unobtrusive" (Johnston and Mueller 2001) without losing its contentious quality

dutiful citizen seeking to redeem usually explicit state commitments which the state of affairs, policy, or decision at issue are argued to contradict.<sup>11</sup>

Empirical examples of consensual contention are numerous and well documented, although very few scholars have attempted a systematic analysis of the concept.<sup>12</sup> Thus, for instance, efforts to test the sincerity of the state's adherence to formally guaranteed rights have been identified throughout the state socialist world (see e.g., Karklins 1987; Mueller 1999b; Neubert 1997; O'Brien 1996; Poppe et al. 1995; Skilling 1981).<sup>13</sup> Indeed, in some state socialist countries, including the GDR, individual claim making of this kind eventually became routinized (cf. McAdam et al. 2001, p. 5), with thousands of written grievances (*Eingaben*) reaching the authorities each year, and the receiving agency being required to give a written response within a specified period of time.<sup>14</sup>

Consensual performances of contestation are in no way restricted to state socialist contexts. Indeed, the protest repertoires of social movements in Western democracies typically have been stocked with an impressive range of consensual strategies and tactics for bringing social realities into line with foundational political principles. In such societies, even vociferous dissent and civil disobedience have come to be regarded as legiti-

<sup>11</sup> As I will discuss below, "performance" need not imply a dissimulation of underlying motives; following Goffman (1959), I assume it is useful to speak of contention as a performance even when the social actor is seeking to convey an impression in which she or he believes.

<sup>12</sup> An exception is Kevin O'Brien's (1996) insightful account of "rightful resistance" in Communist China, corroborating the generality of the phenomenon across very different state socialist contexts. The main conceptual difference is that "consensual contention" as I use it can employ a rhetorical strategy that cites principles or precedents other than those pertaining to "rights" in the narrow legal sense.

<sup>13</sup> For further examples of consensual contention in state socialism, see Berdahl (1999, pp. 44–71), Borneman (1991, pp. 71–79), Burawoy and Lukács (1992, pp. 81–85), and Williams (1997). Scott (1990, pp. 94–95, 166 n. 70) provides some examples from nonsocialist contexts.

<sup>14</sup> The rhetoric of "taking the state at its word" is often found in collections of such letters and petitions (e.g., Merkel 1998; Reiher 1995), as Engler (1997) illustrates. Reiher's (1995) anthology includes the official replies in many cases. Fitzpatrick's (1996) valuable work on public letters to the authorities in Stalinist Russia uncovers a rich trove of practices employing what I am calling consensual contention, such as appeals for help and critical opinion letters that present the author as pitiable supplicant, dutiful citizen, and the like, and invoke ideals and objectives of socialism using the language of the state. Fitzpatrick likewise details some of the official responses. A fictitious example is found in Wolfgang Becker's 2003 film *Good Bye Lenin!* which depicts the mother of the East German protagonist as an almost compulsive author of *Eingaben*—an art form that the petitioner, who is a loyal Communist, takes seriously as her civic duty. Meanwhile, those around her seem to delight in her skillful use of party slogans to criticize endemic shortages of consumer goods. The characterization illustrates how the same activity may be construed as an expression of either patriotism or artful deception, depending on the observer's viewpoint.

mate, almost mundane, modes of expression, where they once provoked suspicion (Tarrow 1998).<sup>15</sup>

However, several features are distinctive of consentful contention in state socialism. First is its heightened political sensitivity, resulting from the state's low threshold in defining sedition and subversion. On the one hand, when the state stakes its legitimacy in part on claims to rule in the public interest, citizens are able to evaluate its performance "empirically" in everyday life (Meuschel 1992), at least to the extent that such claims do not ring entirely hollow. I will refer to political systems in which the state, at least implicitly, invites citizens to measure the system's performance against stated principles or objectives as systems of "ideological domination."<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, despite the presence of such openings for consentful claims making, persons who attempt to press a demand grounded in the self-imposed normative constraints of the state come under scrutiny by virtue of the fact that they engage in political activity at all (O'Brien 1996). Indeed, the question of whether the activity counts as "political" often becomes a central bone of contention in the course of such interactions. The citizen who seeks to test the responsiveness of the state is thus at risk of being seen as a troublemaker (Fitzpatrick 1996).<sup>17</sup> It is for this reason that taking "the state at its word" arises as a rhetorical strategy that asserts loyalty and deference on the part of the claim maker. In state socialism, a performance of consent becomes the hallmark of every prudent act of contention. As I will argue, this is also true for individuals sincerely desiring to reform the system according to what the reformer views as its foundational principles and values.

Second, under state socialism's system of ideological orthodoxy and repression of critical speech, the boundary between consent and dissent remains more ambiguous and contested, on the whole, than in liberal

<sup>15</sup> This is not to say that open societies lack an organizational underlife. For a recent overview of covert conflict in capitalist workplaces, see Morrill, Zald, and Rao (2003).

<sup>16</sup> Where citizens become convinced that such goals and principles do not (or no longer) provide a credible check on state action, we may speak of a system of "cynical domination." In the latter type of system, consentful contention loses its attractiveness. An excellent example of such a regime is provided by Lisa Wedeen's (1999) account of the Syrian Baathist state under Hafiz al-Assad. There, the official ideologies of Arab nationalism and paternalism are deployed in an explicitly cynical manner, rendering the role of the true believer inherently suspect. It is likely that no political system is entirely devoid of cynical rule in this sense.

<sup>17</sup> Hence, in state socialism, consentful contention had above all to eschew the appearance of representing an *organized* opposition. The simplest approach was to present oneself as an *individual* citizen, although loose, informal networks of friends and associates at times also pressed such claims against the socialist state.



democratic societies.<sup>18</sup> It is important to note that such ambiguity can only arise where contention or contestation is *sanctioned* to some degree. Thus, on the one hand, it is largely true that "critique, as long as it did not relate to the redeeming of guarantees permitted in practice (not ideology), led to the loss of the guarantees" for the individual critic (Huinink et al. 1995, p. 40). In the GDR, open opposition could bring imprisonment, expulsion, or worse, and even the filing of an application for an exit visa could result in the loss of one's job and the withdrawal of other privileges.

Yet, at the same time, the scope of action left open for the redeeming of guarantees was more considerable at times—and the line between what was tolerated in theory and in practice more fluid and contestable—than scholars have sometimes acknowledged. State socialism thus differed as well from pure dictatorships, in which little or no attempt is made to legitimate rule beyond the claim that "extraordinary times demand extraordinary executive powers." Though explicitly a "dictatorship" in this sense (cf. Jarausch 2000), the East German socialist state also tacitly recognized the social role of the patriotic citizen pressing claims in the name of socialism, provided that the claims themselves, or the manner in which they were made, did not spell a loss of *face* for the state.<sup>19</sup> This recognition was in part a result of the fact that the ruling ideology (Marxism-Leninism) symbolically positioned the socialist state as the champion of the working classes. To the extent that this official bias toward the historically exploited classes was expected to appeal to members of those classes themselves, an individual claim made on the state in the name of an official socialist ideal or social guarantee was not only permissible but expected (though not always honored). The most damning criticism of a claim maker was not necessarily the voicing of critique per se, but rather that her critique did not share the *class standpoint* of the ruling party.<sup>20</sup> It follows that, from the state's point of view, the most credible interlocutors came from the ranks of the party faithful, although petitions from ordinary citizens are well documented even under Stalinist conditions (Fitzpatrick 1996).

From the citizen's point of view, episodes of consensual contention were

<sup>18</sup> Clearly the distinction is not absolute, the threshold of tolerance for different forms and objects of protest varies with time and context in all types of societies.

<sup>19</sup> On "face" and impression management, see Goffman (1955, 1959), as well as Holtgraves (2000) and Tseelon (1992b). My application of Goffman's concept of "face" to the behavior of the state assumes that there are costs associated with changing the state's "line" or ideological self-image. This assumption seems warranted in view of the East German state's obsession with self-legitimation at home, and prestige abroad (Meuschel 1992).

<sup>20</sup> Although political repression was often arbitrary, it is noteworthy that the state attempted to justify its practices by accusing victims of betraying the revolutionary interests of the working class.

sometimes seen, at least in retrospect, as displays of exceptional agency, creativity, and skill (cf. Berdahl 1999, p. 65; Certeau 1984; Milosz 1953; Scott 1990). This was particularly the case where the protagonist is credited with having only *dissimulated* consent. As Milosz (1953, p. 56) remarks, “to play one’s adversary for a fool (even as he is playing you for one) . . . [can] lead one to prize one’s own cunning above all else. Success in the game becomes a source of satisfaction.”<sup>21</sup> A social-psychological stake involved in consentful contention was thus the *sense of agency*—the “pride in the latitude of action won from the system” (Engler 1997, p. 44)—that might arise from even modest degrees of success.

Individuals who pretended to engage in consentful contention might also enjoy prestige in the telling and retelling of their exploits after the fact. Autobiographical accounts often include anecdotes that depict the protagonist as manipulating the system by merely posing as a dutiful citizen, who may in reality be having fun at the authorities’ expense. Stories about dissimulated consentful contention belong to the narrative genre of “trickster tales,” found in a variety of cultural contexts (Détienne and Vernant 1991; Hyde 1998; Scott 1990). For the East German case, I will denote such narrated feats of cunning with the emic term *Austricksen* (outwitting through deception).<sup>22</sup> Although individual stories about *Austricksen* would have amounted to “urban legends” (unless told by a narrator who was also the protagonist), the circulation of anecdotal exemplars likely rendered “taking the state at its word” *modular* and transposable—hence the quotation marks in the main title—and thus culturally available to large populations through diffusion and emulation (cf. Certeau 1984, p. 23; Ewick and Silbey 2003; McAdam et al. 2001, pp. 331–40; Sewell 1992; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1993, pp. 272–73).<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Negotiations with the state may thus be analogous to the forms of “making out” identified by observers of Western institutions—a practice in which incentive systems exhibit a game-like structure that subordinate actors take pleasure in attempting to master (Burawoy 1979; Goffman 1990, Roy 1953).

<sup>22</sup> In Central Europe, the trickster genre was exemplified by Jaroslav Hašek’s widely read short stories featuring the “good soldier Švejk” (e.g., Hašek 2000), a fictitious conscript in the imperial army of Austria-Hungary. In the GDR alone, at least 10 collections of Hašek’s stories were published between 1960 and 1985.

<sup>23</sup> Ewick and Silbey (2003) demonstrate how stories of resistance to legal authority in a liberal democratic society may disseminate social knowledge about power structures, perhaps eventually facilitating collective political action in some way. For the East German case, a number of researchers have credited critical speech with cultivating oppositional networks and dissident subcultures that contributed to radical protest (e.g., Kantner 1996, Pfaff 1996). Whether anecdotes about consentful contention functioned in this way will have depended on how they were interpreted. If construed as *Austricksen*, they might reinforce an oppositional collective identity of clever citizens outwitting a goliath state. The same stories, however, might be interpreted by others as illustrating that the socialist system “works,” provided one knows how to work the

Such would-be tricksters could expect acts of nonconformity to reward *twice*—once in the doing (if successful) and again in the telling (among peers). Thus, on the one hand, consentful contention might be deployed on a particular occasion in order to achieve a specific end, while flying beneath the political radar of the dominant actors. On the other hand, individuals might stage these performances with *future* audiences in mind. Indeed, some manipulative interactions with the state might be undertaken, at least in part, with the expectation that a tellable tale will result.<sup>24</sup>

Given the political sensitivity associated with contention per se in a state socialist context, we should expect cultural exemplars of consentful contention to have been emulated for the protective cover they provided, irrespective of an individual's actual motives. According to East German sociologist Wolfgang Engler, the consentful persona helped deactivate what he calls the state's "early warning system"—an uncoded checklist of "standardized phrases, gestures, and activities [that] measured one's distance to the desired and solely legitimate disposition" (Engler 1997, pp. 37–38).<sup>25</sup> Presenting oneself as a dutiful citizen or loyal comrade could also create plausible deniability in the event of an unfavorable outcome.<sup>26</sup> Consentful contention would then provide an automatic *cover story*: afterward, one could stress either the consentful or the contentious dimension of the performance, depending on the audience.

Because the scope of consent was narrowly construed in state socialism, the realm of *dissent* was expanded by definition, even as the existence of an organized opposition was denied (and for the most part suppressed). Under the circumstances, much discontent likely remained shielded from

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system. I argue that, in state socialism, it is not always possible to infer the actual political orientation of the narrator or the protagonist from the action recounted.

<sup>24</sup> Ethnographer Andreas Glaeser makes the analogous finding that officers in the unified Berlin police force execute their patrol duties with just such considerations in mind. They are concerned not only with how they must write up their conduct in daily reports, but also in the generation of entertaining anecdotes that they can share with colleagues (Glaeser 2000, pp. 206–9).

<sup>25</sup> Although detailed familiarity with Marxist-Leninist jargon usually presupposed ideological training, cultural knowledge of the official register was encountered by most citizens in school and at work. What the use of consentful rhetoric measured was avowed political standpoint, not necessarily one's insider status.

<sup>26</sup> As Engler points out, consentful contention could be taken at its word as well, committing the social actor to upholding the line established, even if only as a ruse, in the original performance: "Anyone who played with [the state] played on its terms. Anyone who succeeded in persuading spoke its language. Anyone who struck a deal for something paid its price—the price of self-disclosure. Even if [the disclosed position] was instrumental and tactical, a part of a performance, one was still committing oneself and could at anytime be taken at one's word—that word which had allegedly been given only for show" (Engler 1997, p. 43). Maintaining the original line was imperative, since "sometimes all artistry was for naught: the piece failed, for objective or subjective reasons" (Engler 1997, p. 43).

the political radar of the state. This invisibility is one of the main reasons why contention in state socialism has been the subject of much scholarly (and political) controversy. Yet, the likely prevalence of such “preference falsification” (Kuran 1995) does not rule out the possibility of preference *non*falsification (disclosure). For example, although incentives existed to dissimulate consent for the purpose of making contention more palatable to authorities, it does not follow that consentful contention *always* misrepresented private preferences. On the contrary, in a context where social actors expected a consentful pose to be convincing, it is reasonable to suppose that dissimulators were piggybacking on a genre which at least some actors had employed “sincerely.”<sup>27</sup>

Accordingly, instances of consentful contestation were not necessarily precursors to open rebellion, protest, or revolution even under authoritarian conditions. To be sure, some practitioners would no doubt have preferred to abandon the rhetoric of consent altogether and to protest openly against the system as a whole. As noted above, the consentful demeanor is in their case merely dissimulated and strategic. Once the opportunity arises, the rhetoric of implementing or perfecting socialism may quickly give way to condemnation of the system and demands for radical social transformation. Taken by themselves, prominent examples of the sudden disclosure of dissent seem to support a “hydraulic” model of “voice” under authoritarian rule, when “exit” is blocked (Hirschman 1970; Scott 1990; cf. Johnston and Mueller 2001; Pfaff and Kim 2003). Yet, other actors may be engaging in much the same style of contention for the purpose of bringing society into closer alignment with the official societal blueprint. Still others may have only short-term or individualistic motives for staging such a performance. In short, consentful contention can flow from a wide variety of motivations, rendering its political significance ambiguous much of the time. The actual distribution of persons among political orientations—whether consenting, dissenting, or opportunistic—usually remained obscure (Kuran 1995). Hence, consentful acts of contention did not *necessarily* foreshadow “claim radicalization” (Mueller 1999a), with privately oppositional actors simply awaiting a moment of opportunity.

Finally, in view of its versatility with respect to the actor’s private standpoint, consentful contention is not well captured by dichotomous typologies that categorize political action as exclusively loyal or exclusively

<sup>27</sup> Observers like Yurchak (1997) have maintained that in the latter decades of state socialism “everyone” knew that “no one” believed in the authenticity of the true believer. Even Yurchak concedes, however, that self-described “normal” persons recognized the existence of true believers (“activists”), perceiving those who approximated it as somewhat eccentric.

oppositional. If action comprises both intention and behavior, then seemingly incongruous combinations are possible in principle, however difficult they may be to establish empirically (Levi 1997). In addition, the existence of consensual contention among ordinary citizens attests to the practical difficulty of sustaining apolitical solitude, or "inner emigration" into the niches of private life. In state socialism, every citizen eventually encountered the state—and largely on its discursive terms (Engler 1997). On such occasions, I argue, one potential alternative to capitulation or defiance was to contest specific practices by taking the state at its word on the broader principles of the dominant ideology.

In the next section, I outline a dramaturgical approach to studying contention in state socialism. I intend thereby to contribute to the growing body of recent research that recognizes symbolic interaction and social performance as constitutive features of political contestation (Ellingson 1995; Ewick and Silbey 2003; McAdam et al. 2001; McFarland 2004; Mueller 1999a; Pfaff and Yang 2001; Smith 1991; Steinberg 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1998). In comparison to many of these, however, I place greater emphasis on the *strategic* dimensions of political dramaturgy—the manipulation of roles, identities, professed loyalties, and interests—as well as on the ambiguities and information deficits arising in a context where both loyalty and dissidence, true belief and cynicism, constitute plausible orientations with real political and social consequences for the lives of citizens.<sup>28</sup>

#### THE DUALITY OF PERFORMANCE: A DRAMATURGICAL APPROACH TO CONTENTION IN STATE SOCIALISM

Implicit in the foregoing discussion has been a dramaturgical, or performance-oriented, conception of contention in state socialism. The goal of this section is to lay out a more explicit framework inspired by the early work of Erving Goffman.<sup>29</sup> Goffman (1959, p. 15) defines the sociological concept of "performance" as "all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of the other participants." The vocabulary of dramaturgy has been especially attractive in analyzing cases of *dissimulative* political action—that is, where consensual contenders are assumed to harbor a dissenting standpoint in relation to the ideology of the ruling group or state. Thus, it is when circumstances favor the *covert* manipulation of impressions that a dram-

<sup>28</sup> For a useful discussion of strategic interaction in the context of detection and counterespionage, see Goffman's *Strategic Interaction* (1969).

<sup>29</sup> For an extensive anthology of critical responses to Goffman's work, see Fine and Smith (2000).

aturgical model has seemed most fitting. Indeed, in such cases, the social actors themselves are prone to describe their activities in terms of masks, roles, pretense, and rhetorical prowess (Engler 1997; Kharkhordin 1995; Milosz 1953; Reich 1992; Yurchak 1997; Žižek 1989).

However, the dramaturgical approach implies that *disclosing* actions, too, can involve performance in meaningful respects. As an analytic matter, not all social action can be reduced to *mere* stagecraft, a move that would deprive the theatrical metaphor of all nontrivial meaning.<sup>30</sup> While dissimulation always implies performance, the converse does not hold; some social actors may in fact “believe in the impression fostered by their own performance” (Goffman 1959, p. 17; cf. Chriss 1995; Tseñlon 1992*a*, 1992*b*). Presumably, a “sincere” performance is all the more credible where the observable biographical characteristics of the claim maker support the line that is proffered (Goffman 1959).

In the case of state socialism, however, what justifies the extension of the dramaturgical approach is more specific to the societal context at hand. In many public settings and even some private ones, social actors in state socialist societies were frequently “on stage” because they were knowingly in the presence of an “audience”—whether seen or unseen (Humphrey 1994).<sup>31</sup> Thus, even a person who regarded herself as a “true believer” was at pains to convince superiors and peers alike that she was genuinely committed to the goals and principles of socialist society. Failure to persuade one’s audience of what one believed to be the truth was not without consequences.<sup>32</sup>

The dramaturgical metaphor suggests that all human social action consists of both perceptible and invisible components—of “behavior” and “motivation”—at least from the perspective of an outside observer (the “audience”). This observer could be an opposing party, a confederate of one’s own party, or a third party not directly involved in the interaction.

<sup>30</sup> For many readers of the early Goffman, performance qua impression management seemed to constitute a sociological constant (see Chriss [1995] and Tseñlon [1992*a*] for useful discussions). Later, the overuse of dramaturgical vocabulary in the literature compelled Goffman to introduce further qualifications and distinctions into his approach (see Goffman 1974).

<sup>31</sup> Some scholars have identified structural incentives for impression management in capitalist societies as well (Hochschild 1983; Langman 2000). During periods when political opposition raises suspicions of disloyalty, we should expect protest to couple contention with an emphasis on basic fidelity to the system, even in democratic societies.

<sup>32</sup> As Milosz (1953) explained: “The fact that a man acts is not to his prejudice, is no proof of unorthodoxy. But *he must act well*, for his ability to enter into his role skillfully proves that he has built his characterization upon an adequate foundation. If he makes a passionate speech against the West, he demonstrates that he has at least 10 percent of the hatred he so loudly proclaims. If he condemns Western culture lukewarmly, then he must be attached to it in reality” (Milosz 1953, p. 55, emphasis added).

I will label the observable component of the actor's performance as her *behavior* during the interaction, while the invisible component will be said to comprise the actor's motivational interest complex, or *standpoint*, in relation to the ruling ideology.<sup>33</sup> The "duality of performance" refers to the fact that political interactions involve both of these dimensions on the part of the participants: their standpoint and their behavior.

In much of the literature on state socialism, the genres of political behavior are classified along a single dimension according to their degree of conformity with official or oppositional norms. In the present framework, however, the political valence of the observable behavior constitutes only one aspect of the political performance, albeit one that resonates with the normative categories of the state itself.<sup>34</sup> As Levi (1997, p. 17) notes, "Compliance and noncompliance are not the simple dichotomous variables they at first appear to be. . . . All compliance is not consent; nor is all noncompliance the withdrawal of consent." In order to take into account consentful *noncompliance*, it is therefore necessary to treat the degree of *consent* and the degree of *contention* as two distinct dimensions.

Figure 1 maps four possible performance genres arising from the intersection of the two dimensions. The diagram presupposes that the state has made (prescriptive or proscriptive) claims or demands on one or more citizens.<sup>35</sup>

Before discussing the individual genres themselves, let us first consider the two dimensions in turn. On the behavioral dimension, full *compliance* constitutes the course of "least resistance" (the right-hand pole of the horizontal axis) on the part of one or more subordinate actors. The op-

<sup>33</sup> The correlation between observable/unobservable and behavior/motivation is not perfect (Levi 1997). Some behavior during the interaction may be inaccessible to the state, while some behavior outside the immediate interaction may be observable, e.g., through surveillance. Although the motivational component is fundamentally invisible to others, plausible inferences can be drawn based on patterns of behavior. In addition, I presume the actor to be aware of his or her relevant motivations, even though some "motives" may in fact be unconscious.

<sup>34</sup> It should be stressed at this point that the everyday plausibility of the notion of "standpoint" reflects a process of social construction. It presupposes that motives are real, conscious, and relatively fixed, rooted in the political interests and objectives of an individual or group, even though empirically, motives and interests may be unconscious or may shift over time. My claim is that, in state socialism, the existence of "standpoint" was a question on which most political actors could agree, even when they disagreed about substantive political matters. The analytic utility of the concept is thus somewhat circumscribed. In a society in which, hypothetically, political opportunism or postmodern playfulness are perceived as dominant, the notion of "standpoint" will have little resonance.

<sup>35</sup> I use the term "citizens" throughout as a synonym for "inhabitants under a given state's jurisdiction," even though some legal noncitizens may fall into that category.




FIG. 1 —Genres of political performance in response to state claims. The horizontal axis represents the *behavioral* component of the nonstate actor's performance in a political interaction. The vertical axis identifies the political *standpoint*, or avowed motivational component, underlying the performance. Not displayed in the figure is the *stance* of a performance, which is *disclosing* if the avowed standpoint is identical to the true standpoint and *dissimulative* otherwise.

posite, *contention* pole represents maximal opposition, resistance, or contestation at a given capacity for action.

The vertical (standpoint) axis refers to what Levi calls "ideological" consent/dissent, that is, the commitment to "ideological or moral principles that motivate people to comply with—or resist—government demands with little regard to individual selective incentives" (Levi 1997, p. 29). We need not assume that such ideological commitment amounts to a stable, essentialized quantity to appreciate its importance as a component of political performance in state socialism. As I will discuss at length below, one's position along the standpoint axis may be either dissimulated or disclosed to one's audience. While individual selective incentives need not shape ideological commitments as such, the risks and rewards attending contentious behavior of any kind will presumably shape the conditions under which one's conscious motives are concealed or revealed.

Let us now consider each of the four genres of political performance, corresponding to the quadrants I through IV in figure 1. Generally speaking, different moral orders establish normative frameworks that differentially privilege or stigmatize particular genres of political performance



(cf. Wuthnow 1987). In state socialism, the primary emphasis was on *consentful compliance* (quadrant I). Thus, the socialist state not only desired behavioral conformity from its citizens; it also sought their "inner loyalty" and conviction (Riege 1986). Active participation in socialist society and institutions was supposed to flow naturally from sincere belief in and commitment to the victory of socialism worldwide—in short, from *consent* to the sociopolitical system and all for which it stood. Pro forma allegiance was condemned as "opportunism," although many now believe "radish Communists" (only "red" on the outside) to have been numerous (Kharkhordin 1995; Kuran 1995; Yurchak 1997).<sup>36</sup> The possibility of *consentful contention* (quadrant II) was all but excluded.<sup>37</sup>

In the context of the Cold War, moral opponents of socialism celebrated *dissentful contention* (quadrant III), or oppositional political action motivated by a wholesale rejection of the official ideology. In the East German context, such acts of open rebellion (or "dissidence"<sup>38</sup>) were rare and limited in scope, following the crackdown on the workers' uprising of 1953. Much more common were acts of consentful contention (quadrant II), in which citizens pressed claims rooted in the goals and principles of socialist society as interpreted by the ruling party or by officially recognized socialist classics (e.g., Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Luxemburg).<sup>39</sup> Finally, *dissentful compliance* (quadrant IV) is a genre of political action in which rules were followed or orders obeyed in spite of objections (whether voiced privately to trusted peers or kept to oneself) to the broader goals of state socialism. Though beyond the present scope, this genre represents an understudied phenomenon worthy of further investigation.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>36</sup> For a brief but sensitive analysis of this ambiguity, see Berdahl (1999, pp. 52–58).

<sup>37</sup> The dilemma created by the equation of consent with compliance becomes especially stark for the true believer accused of political crimes. As an analogy, one may imagine the plight of an innocent convict before a parole board. In such cases, it may be futile to insist on one's innocence. Instead, the circumstances favor dissimulative "self-criticism" in which one pleads for an opportunity to be "rehabilitated."

<sup>38</sup> Dissentful contention is a more precise locution, in my view, than "dissidence"—an expression which Havel (1991) traces to the usage of Western anti-Communists. According to Havel, dissident was a label applied to individuals who refused politics and sought to "live in truth."

<sup>39</sup> As late as the fall of 1989, many "oppositional" groups still maintained formal allegiance to the idea of socialism, though some members later disavowed this standpoint (Sandford 2000).

<sup>40</sup> Examples of dissentful compliance are especially plentiful in the literature on shop-floor politics. On dissentful compliance (*mißmutige Loyalität*) among East German workers, see Ludtke (1994). The practices labeled here as dissentful compliance have sometimes been confused with contention, particularly where analysts fail to distinguish between standpoint and behavior. For example, practices such as grumbling on the job or telling jokes at the expense of the ruling elite indicate a dissenting attitude toward the social order, but they fall short of contention in the ordinary sense of the

In state socialism, the very distinction between standpoint and behavior was controversial. On the one hand, the orthodox view altogether denied the possibility of principled noncompliance, leading to the persecution of Marxist reformers as dissidents (thus conflating consentful and dissentful contention). On the other hand, some regime opponents and outside observers have maintained that all *non*contention was tantamount to collaboration (thus merging consentful and dissentful compliance).

Against these normative cross-pressures, consentful contention struggled to create a space for contentious behavior *within* a consentful standpoint. Engaging in consentful contention allowed one to stress the consentful quality of one's demeanor, so that dissent was not automatically inferred from the fact that one was engaging in contention in the first place. At the other extreme, dissentful compliance sought to render non-socialist value systems practically innocuous, since one was abiding by the behavioral dictates of the regime—for example, by going through the motions of participation in official demonstrations, rites of passage, or single-candidate elections, or by paying lip service to official party resolutions.<sup>41</sup>

Though nonradical, consentful contention was in a sense “subversive” in state socialism. On the one hand, it called attention to the gap between lived experience and official representations thereof. On the other hand, it threatened to displace orthodox with heterodox understandings of socialism by citing official principles and values of socialism as grounds for resisting a regime perceived as misguided. In short, consentful contention sought to carve out a discursive space for noncompliance that was neither oppositional nor unflinchingly obedient by insisting that, under the prevailing circumstances, a deeply held commitment to the achievement of socialism necessitated contention rather than compliance.

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word, and as defined above—i.e., as a process of active engagement with an adversary. If fact, such activities illustrate precisely how behavioral obedience can be coupled with at least some degree of attitudinal dissent.

<sup>41</sup> After the fall of state socialism, these two “off-diagonal” categories—consentful contention and dissentful compliance—have remained controversial, while also providing some cover of plausible deniability. Thus, persons who previously engaged in consentful contention may now underscore their contentiousness, in order to refute present-day suspicions that infer complicity from ideological consent. Similarly, some have attempted to defend a record of behavioral conformity by asserting that their compliance was secretly dissentful. However, in the former East Germany, the vetting of former informants for the secret police (the Stasi) has not accepted claims of dissentful compliance as exculpatory (Gauck 1994).

CONTESTING THE *STANCE* OF CONSENTFUL CONTENTION

The widely discussed issue of dissimulation as a factor in political life in state socialism points up a *third* dimension not easily depicted in two-dimensional space (and therefore excluded from figure 1), namely, the mental *stance* of an individual vis-à-vis his or her performance. Following prevailing usage, I label the stance *dissimulative* if the avowed or implied standpoint departs from the real one. I call it *disclosing* if the two converge.<sup>42</sup>

The distinction between stance and standpoint is often overlooked in the literature, yet the two dimensions are equally important for understanding the dynamics of consentful contention in state socialism. Unlike *standpoint* (consent/dissent), which denotes one's orientation toward prevailing political norms, *stance* (dissimulation/disclosure) refers to the degree to which one's actual standpoint is revealed in a given performance. Thus, stance varies depending upon whether the actor, in Goffman's words, "believes in the role he is playing" (cf. Goffman 1959, pp. 17–18). Stance is a distinct dimension from both standpoint and behavior because *any one* of the four genres in figure 1 can be dissimulated simply by *enacting* an orientation other than the one that subjectively animates the performance.

In state socialism, the stance of consentful contention frequently came under assault. For example, debates between hard-liners and liberalizing reformers within the ruling party were not only about standpoint, as both factions claimed to defend "true socialism" in the face of counterrevolutionary revisionism. Rather, each side also leveled charges about *stance*, accusing the other of merely *paying lip service* to the goal of establishing a postcapitalist social formation, while *privately* harboring particularistic motives. While reformers sometimes alleged (usually from the relative safety of exile) that party ideologues cared more about protecting their position than about the building of true socialism, the keepers of orthodoxy

<sup>42</sup> In my judgment the terms "disclosure" and "dissimulation" are more precise in this context than Goffman's "sincerity" and "cynicism." As the reader may be aware, some dramaturgical approaches have rejected the distinction between "sincere" and "cynical" performances altogether, in favor of an all-encompassing notion of impression management qua manipulation (see Chriss [1995] and Tseelon [1992a] for a discussion). Others have rejected the distinction on the grounds that it presupposes a primordial binarism between public and private that is in reality historically constructed (c.f. Mitchell 1990). My position is that while there may be socio-historical contexts in which this particular binarism lacks resonance, the public/private dichotomy played a crucial role in the self-understandings of citizens in state socialism, regardless of political standpoint. It is simply impossible to comprehend the definition of the situation as it appeared to the relevant social actors without appreciating how much was at stake in such contexts in the decision to disclose or conceal one's attitude toward socialism (cf. Goffman 1955, 1959, 1969; Holtgraves 2000).

rejected the immanent critiques of Marxist reformers as part of a secret plot to sell out socialism to counterrevolutionary interests. From the perspective of the hard-liners, "consentful contention" seemed like a contradiction in terms, since consent was believed to entail compliance. As a result, any act of consentful contention automatically raised the suspicion of harboring an oppositional or dissenting agenda, and thus of dissimulation. For the reformers, virtually the opposite logic obtained. Genuine commitment to the realization of true socialism could never satisfy itself with the status quo. From their point of view, it was consentful *compliance* that implied duplicity. Only an opportunist concerned above all with power could wish to preserve a "deformed reality" like state socialism in its present form.

The stance of consentful contention could also become a source of friction among *subordinate actors*. Let us consider a case involving a tactic that Pfaff and Yang (2001) term "piggybacking"—the use of unauthorized placards in a state-mandated political demonstration. The following composite vignette illustrates how the sequence of events might be rendered if we were to equate stance with standpoint:<sup>43</sup>

On January 17, 1988, in East Berlin, some 160 individuals surreptitiously joined in the annual mass demonstration commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Otherwise indistinguishable from approved participants, the interlopers carried homemade placards bearing Luxemburg quotations such as "Freedom is always the freedom of those who think otherwise!" Almost immediately, a well-informed secret police arrested most of these "dangerous persons," along with well-known opposition leaders—in many cases, before they had reached their destination. Within days all but a few were tried, then expelled from the country.

As portrayed above, the ad hoc demonstrators would seem to employ consentful contention in a relatively straightforward manner—in order to criticize the behavior of the state as conflicting with the views of a hal-lowed socialist martyr.<sup>44</sup> On the surface, the motive of the protesters was simply the exercise of "voice"; the apparent objective is to bring state socialist society in line with principles articulated by a particular socialist

<sup>43</sup> This episode, which came to be known as the Luxemburg affair, is well documented (Jeschonnek 1988, Joppke 1995, pp. 130–32; Neubert 1997, pp. 696–700; Ruddenklau 1992, pp. 171–77, 203–23; Torpey 1995), though outside analysts have not always recognized the ambiguities involved.

<sup>44</sup> It is a clever tactic, since the state's predictably repressive response will offer "proof that actually existing socialism disregards officially guaranteed rights, namely, the right to demonstrate" (Jeschonnek 1988, p. 258).

"classic." (Much the same rhetorical strategy is employed by petitioners in the Biermann controversy, discussed in a later section.)

As it happens, the matter was more complex, for the true purpose of the action was contested among the participants themselves. For some, the protest did indeed amount to an act of "loyal opposition": "In spite of everything," one of them recalls, "we still believed in the legitimacy of the ruling Communist parties" (Rüddenklau 1992, p. 13). They were attracted to the action as a means of demanding free speech ("voice"). For others, commitment to socialism was more equivocal. As it turned out, the idea for the action had originated among groups dedicated to the right of emigration ("exit"), not freedom of expression per se (Jeschonnek 1988, p. 254; Rüddenklau 1992, p. 204). Though employing the same piggybacking tactic, these two activist groupings represented contrasting political agendas—"voice" and "exit." Their reactions to the outcome differed accordingly. The goal of the voice contingent was "the creation of a political climate that no longer motivates anyone to leave the country" (Rüddenklau 1992, p. 222); thus, the expulsion of several key leaders deeply demoralized the reformist camp (Neubert 1997, p. 698; cf. Rüddenklau 1992, p. 220). By contrast, members of the proemigration group "celebrated the release" of their imprisoned leaders to West Berlin as a victory for "those who think otherwise" (Jeschonnek 1988, p. 264), even though it meant that the group itself had to disband.

In the weeks that followed, a rancorous debate ensued over the *stance* of the original performance. Members of the loyal opposition accused the emigration-rights group of an "egoistic" misuse of reformist protest tactics for the purpose of triggering deportation. That motive was vehemently disavowed by the former leader of that group, Günter Jeschonnek. After his expulsion to West Berlin, Jeschonnek insisted that exit per se had not been the intended result of the protest, only the *right* to emigrate. In any case, he argued, no one could have predicted how the state would react. Notwithstanding Jeschonnek's denials, his group's suspected dissimulation of consensual contention to secure exit—or what amounted to piggybacking on a piggybacking ritual—deepened the long-standing rift between the two factions of the nascent GDR opposition (Jeschonnek 1988; Joppke 1995; Neubert 1997; Rüddenklau 1992; Torpey 1995).<sup>45</sup> In the aftermath, friction arose as much over the imputed stance (sincere or pretended) of the performance as over the standpoint (consent or dissent)

<sup>45</sup> Whether or not the action was originally intended as a ploy, its consequences appear to have exerted a demonstration effect on numerous would-be emigrants. After news of the deportations became public, the peace organization reported receiving a flood of visits and requests for membership from exit-visa applicants (Rüddenklau 1992), whom the loyal opposition perceived as opportunists with little genuine regard for the reformist aims of the peace movement

of the participants. From the reformers' point of view, dissimulated consentful contention threatened to subvert the already precarious credibility of the sincere variant by confirming the state's fear that all reformism in reality served oppositional interests.

#### ANALYZING TRANSCRIPTS OF CONSENTFUL CONTENTION

The study of contention under authoritarian rule poses unique methodological challenges. On the one hand, authoritarian states often establish "closed societies" in which official documents are carefully guarded, and individual citizens are discouraged from speaking publicly about contentious activity. As a result, the true level of social conflict is likely to be suppressed, as both ordinary citizens and state bureaucrats face incentives to maintain appearances (Adas 1986; Kuran 1995; Scott 1985, 1990). In contexts where authoritarian rule has given way to an "open society," on the other hand, vast archives may become available to historical researchers, and former citizens may be at liberty to recount their experiences without fear of reprisal (provided they are not subject to incrimination for past crimes). Yet, even here, questions about the validity and completeness of the data remain. Can the retrospective narratives of former citizens be taken at face value as formerly "hidden transcripts" of everyday life under the old regime (Scott 1990)? To what extent do they represent *ex post facto* inventions, responding to the altered political conditions and social incentives of the post-transition era? And how trustworthy are archival records of political life that were generated under the pressure of impressing superiors? Are the reports of the secret police more reliable than those of the individuals on whom they were spying, or is the reverse a more appropriate presumption?

While no simple answer to such questions exists, progress can be made by understanding both the virtues and the limitations of different types of data. In the case of consentful contention, retrospective accounts present us with a *dual* record—a transcript within a transcript. On one level, they purport to describe a past contentious event as originally experienced by the protagonist-cum-narrator. On another level, the account itself may be regarded as an "event" or performance for the researcher to analyze. The *post hoc* narration is typically performed for a different (presumably more sympathetic) audience and thus under different genre constraints from the original performance. An *archival* record of contention may appear more "solid" at first blush, yet the dual structure of the data in fact remains the same. On one level, we find an account of contentious interaction. Yet the episode is embedded within a second "performance"—that of the observer (for example, a newspaper reporter or a police officer). From a

dramaturgical perspective, it is necessary to take into account the degree of agency, as well as the constraints, involved in both the contentious episode depicted *and* the act of representation. (If one were to take the procedure a step further, one could point out that the interpretation offered by the researcher represents a third level of "performance," one presumably constrained by the canons of sociological methodology.)

Hence, the accuracy of any given account cannot be taken for granted. *Pace* Scott, we cannot assume that the "hidden transcript"—the "critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant" (Scott 1990, p. xii)—is not itself a strategic pose simply because the back of the dominant has been broken. In the retelling, incentives may exist for the narrator to reshape the event sequence and mode of emplotment to heighten the entertainment value of the story or the social prestige of the narrator cum protagonist. As a result, the true standpoint and stance of the original performance may be very difficult to determine. Only diligent historical investigation can corroborate—or refute—the facts as presented in such records, and in many cases the necessary evidence may no longer be extant, if it ever existed at all.

At the same time, retrospective accounts of consensual contention may reveal features of the genre that remain obscure in archival records generated by a third party. For example, insofar as such "resistance narratives" circulated under the old regime, their recitation after the fact may "reveal the tellers' consciousness of how opportunities and constraints [were] embedded in the normally taken for granted structures of social actions" and thereby highlight the broader sociological significance of "what seem like petty acts" (Ewick and Silbey 2003, p. 1331). Unlike official documents created for the purposes of bureaucrats and domestic spies, retrospective accounts can assist contemporary researchers in reconstructing the characteristics of particular genres of contention, understanding why these mattered to ordinary citizens, and ascertaining why they were expected to function in particular ways. Although the details of specific incidents cannot always be corroborated, retrospective firsthand accounts may contribute to a more adequate picture of the *cultural scripts* that circulated through informal communication channels than do most archival documents. Where possible, the careful researcher should employ *both* retrospective and contemporaneous types of data, rather than relying on either by itself.

In the following analyses, I will discuss two different types of transcripts. The goal of the analyses will be to reconstruct the rhetorical features of consensual contention as a characteristic political genre in state socialism. The first example draws on excerpts from a retrospective interview conducted by the author in 1997. Here, the narrator recounts a series of episodes of consensual contention in the first person. Although

this type of data is normally difficult to corroborate in its factual details, in this case, the respondent's biography has been documented with some rigor at an earlier time point, though still on the basis of retrospective interviews.<sup>46</sup> As a firsthand account, moreover, it usefully supplies the respondents' own interpretations of the episode.

By contrast, the second transcript provides a "real-time" record of consentful contention as it unfolds. An electronic record of this kind is quite valuable in its own right. Unlike Scott's metaphorical "hidden transcript," which merely denotes any "discourse that takes place 'offstage,' beyond direct observation by powerholders" (Scott 1990, p. 4), this document provides a rare glimpse of behind-the-scenes negotiations with the state at a pivotal juncture in East German political history. Because it was published some years after the end of state socialism, it includes some retrospective commentary by one of the key participants as well.

In both cases, I provide historical background and biographical details where probative. These two cases will also illustrate two further components of consentful contention as a characteristic genre of political performance under systems of ideological domination: the establishment of

<sup>46</sup> The interview itself belongs to the qualitative component of a retrospective life-history study of former East Germans conducted under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin in 1991–92. As a complement to the survey (see Huinink et al 1995), the author reinterviewed 33 participants in the two-wave panel study in 1997–98 using semistructured interview methods. The respondents were selected from among the 1940 and 1960 cohorts of the original four-cohort stratified sample and limited to the Berlin and Dresden subsamples. Within this restricted frame, a theoretical sample was drawn that balanced sex, cohort, and relative continuity or discontinuity of employment history. Ten were residing in Dresden at the time of the reinterviews, and 23 were living in Berlin. Respondents were asked to narrate the "most salient events, turning points, and developments" of their individual biographies, and follow-up questions were posed on the basis of an interview guide. Respondents were permitted to narrate as they wished; they were further probed as to the details and circumstances surrounding key events, turning points, and developments. After transcription, the interviews were coded for, among other things, episodes purporting to describe acts of contention, as well as compliance. The excerpts discussed in the following were selected for richness of detail and for the self-conscious employment of consentful contention—a tactic the respondent refers to as "taking [the authorities] at their word." The research design has the advantage of helping optimize the reliability of the biographical data by permitting one to assess the consistency of responses over several years. In the case below, basic details of the accounts, such as the dates and forms of military service rendered (or not rendered), could be verified. It was not possible to obtain further information about the specific incidents themselves. Of the 33 respondents, 10 mentioned participation prior to 1990 in at least one episode coded as consentful contention. Whether this proportion is construed as high or low will depend upon the analyst's expectations. It is noteworthy that, contrary to Kuran's (1995) reasoning, the majority of respondents refrained from asserting *ex post facto* that they had been private critics of the regime, even though little evidence could have been obtained to refute such a claim.



*working consensus* and the role of *saving face*. Both Goffmanian components help illuminate the arts of consensual contention as they appear in interactions with an authoritarian state committed to a foundational ideology, as well as the rhetorical strategies deployed on both sides of the bargaining table.

#### "TAKING THE STATE AT ITS WORD": THE ART OF OUTFLANKING THE LEFTISTS

Shortly after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the GDR introduced mandatory military service for all able-bodied men. For youths who reached majority by the early 1960s, military conscription was among the first hurdles the state erected between individuals and the achievement of their life goals. As in most societies, compulsory military service in the GDR met with some resistance.<sup>47</sup> Many recruits objected to the prospect of combat training for reasons of principled pacifism; others simply found the regimentation and hierarchy disagreeable. The case of Norbert Kraus (a pseudonym) illustrates both types of motive, though his principles are not linked to religion (a common basis of resistance to conscription in the GDR). Rather, he attributes his oppositional standpoint to the historical context of a childhood in the immediate wake of a disastrous war. Deprived of his father, who was reported missing in action during World War II, Herr Kraus says he became "a strict opponent of anything military."<sup>48</sup>

Born in 1941, Herr Kraus belonged to the first cohort to be inducted into service. Accordingly, in 1961, he was summoned by the National People's Army (NVA) to register for 18 months of combat training. This was not the first time Kraus had disagreed with official norms pertaining to his age group. Although he had belonged to the state-run Pioneer organizations along with the vast majority of his elementary-school peers, he found the prospect of joining the more politicized Free German Youth (FDJ) for secondary-school students unacceptable. Even then, he asserts, "I was really always [in] opposition" to the state. "I always knew how to keep myself on the outside; I was never in anything. Then [in secondary

<sup>47</sup> For a sophisticated study of consent and dissent in relation to military service, see Levi (1997).

<sup>48</sup> Unless otherwise noted, the quotations in this section are from the transcript of the author's interview with "Norbert Kraus" in 1997. Transcribed passages employ the following conventions: English words and phrases inside square brackets have been inserted to improve clarity, particularly where the English translation is more ambiguous than the original. Where helpful, the original German is included in square brackets. No effort has been made to represent most of the linguistic and paralinguistic nuances inherent in all spoken discourse.

school] came the heavy pressure to join the FDJ. I never did. . . . I was never in it."

Resisting this pressure was risky. Teachers and FDJ representatives generally cultivated the impression that career chances would be compromised if one refused to participate. Although the need to fill understaffed occupations led to numerous exemptions, the adolescent Norbert must have known his refusal could be held against him later in life. Fortunately for him, he was an exception. Contrary to expectations, he is careful to add, "it never hurt me either, it never hurt me either."<sup>49</sup>

Standing before the recruitment office some years later, however, he faced a more serious tension between his own convictions and the requirements of the state. In this case, one might have expected a particularly dramatic gesture of refusal. Instead, he found a subtler way to escape compliance, at least for the time being. His account of this tactic is worth examining in more detail:

Then in '61, right after the Wall was built, the compulsory military service was introduced here in the GDR, and I would have been the first birth year that they would have wanted to have, and already on the basis of the experience that my father never returned from the war, I was and am to this day a strict opponent of everything military. No matter where. And now I had to get myself out of it. And I succeeded too—I had already been summoned, I had an appointment and everything—by alluding to my mother [a war widow] and saying "What is she supposed to live on? How is she to be supported?" and so on. That was an art that we learned back then. Not to present oneself openly as an opponent, but rather to take them at their word and maybe to be more "left" than they and to "overtake them from behind," so to speak. So. And I succeeded too. I was sent back.

As with the FDJ, Herr Kraus might have simply refused induction and risked future barriers to his life goals. As we will see presently, the consequences would have been even more dire than before. Instead, he chose a rather surprising strategy: he made an *argument*. As he recounts: "I succeeded . . . by alluding to my mother and saying, 'What is she supposed to live on? How is she to be supported?' and so on." Even more

<sup>49</sup> At two important junctures, simple refusal could have come back to haunt him. First, shortly after finishing school, he was able to find work as a chemical researcher in the Academy of Sciences, a prized placement usually requiring loyalty credentials. The reason was fortuitous: the academy's ranks had been decimated by the construction of the Wall, and the need for new personnel was desperate. The second occasion arose when, several years later, an acquaintance put him onto an opportunity to run an independent drugstore in Berlin. Initially, the local mayor wished to reserve the opportunity for a fellow party comrade. In time, however, Herr Kraus's persistence paid off, and he was permitted to take over the drugstore after the death of the former proprietor, and he still ran it at the same location at the time of the interview.

striking, his argument evidently swayed his audience. The recruitment office's reported acquiescence (though unquoted) is telling. On the one hand, the incident implies a level of discretion and sympathy on the part of the recruitment office that is somewhat surprising in a state known for its strict chain of command. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary citizens may have exercised a modicum of leverage in dealings with state officials.<sup>50</sup>

What might this leverage have been based on? Certainly, the authorities need not have agreed with Herr Kraus's conclusions. In view of their position, they would have been at liberty simply to ignore Herr Kraus's claim and leave his mother, who had been widowed by Hitler's war, to her own devices. Alternatively, they could have taken up the debate but disputed the facts of Herr Kraus's case, arguing, for example, that his mother did not need her son's income to make do. Instead, Kraus says, they acceded and postponed his induction: "I was sent back." Why, supposing the story to be accurate, could an argument like Herr Kraus's have prevailed? To answer this question, we must consider the historical context of the events.

The potential force of arguments like Herr Kraus's must be seen against the background of the GDR's intensified needs for self-legitimation. In the context of newly secured borders, the introduction of compulsory military training was still an extremely sensitive issue domestically—one that provoked open dissent even from the mostly quiescent Protestant churches (Neubert 1997). Herr Kraus, knowingly or not, had hit upon a point of vulnerability in this legitimation project, namely, the provision of a minimum of material security to all GDR citizens. Committed by the 1949 constitution to "ensure everyone an existence fit for human beings" (article 19; Thomanek and Mellis 1989, p. 52), the state in this account proved unwilling or unable to support Herr Kraus's mother without his own modest income. Kraus in effect offered to exchange one moral duty for another. Rather than leaving her to fend for herself, the officials conceded the point to Herr Kraus and allowed him to go home. They accepted his claim that his mother's need for material security outweighed the state's desire for his services as a soldier at that moment. We do not know the true motive behind the decision. We do know that, in doing so, the recruitment office would have complied with a central tenet of the state's legitimating ideology: to take care of the existential wants of its needier

<sup>50</sup> Research on the socialist political economy suggests that workers and plant directors in key sectors enjoyed some leverage because of the chronic labor and supply shortages (e.g., Burawoy and Lukács 1992, Kornai 1992; Sabel and Stark 1982). Individuals offering to care for needy relatives may have enjoyed occasional latitude for similar reasons

citizens. In a word, the state's acquiescence saved face—and at no great cost, providing such occasional concessions could be defended according to “socialist” principles.<sup>51</sup>

Just as significant as the outcome—and less subject to doubt—is Herr Kraus's own interpretation of the tactic as a form of Austricksen, or clever manipulation of the system. Indeed, it is largely this self-narrative that distinguishes the episode from an exercise in making excuses (cf. Ewick and Silbey 2003). According to his characterization, Kraus artfully outwitted the system by beating it at its own game of lefter-than-thou politics: “That was an art that we learned back then. Not to present oneself openly as an opponent, but rather to take them at their word and maybe to be more ‘left’ than they and to ‘overtake them from behind,’ so to speak.” For him, what was decisive was thus a peculiar skill, an “art” that allowed one at times to resist the injunctions of the state. It was an art, moreover, that was not purely an individual possession but rather one he attributes to other East Germans as well: “an art that *we* learned back then.” For Herr Kraus, this tactic is the hallmark of a shared social identity of ordinary citizens as artful “tricksters” who use cleverness and deception to achieve a measure of agency in the face of formidable constraints imposed by the state. According to our typology, his narrative recounts an instance of *dissimulated* consentful contention.

Herr Kraus further describes this tactic as “overtaking them from behind.” The phrase is telling in its own right, as it paraphrases a ubiquitous bit of party propaganda. “Overtaking without passing” was an expression coined by the GDR's first head of state, Walter Ulbricht, to describe the mission of “actually existing socialism” in relation to the West (Meuschel 1992).<sup>52</sup> It conveys the idea of *surpassing by an unexpected route*. Socialism, in this view, was expected to defeat capitalism by pursuing an alternative development strategy, one whose advantage lay in transferring ownership of the means of production to the “workers and peasants” who

<sup>51</sup> Couching a decision in “loyal” language also saved face for the well-meaning subaltern bureaucrat wishing, for whatever reason, to help an individual citizen. Mastery of the official linguistic code on the part of lower-level officials may have helped conceal the existence of principal-agent problems, including arbitrary generosity as well as corruption.

<sup>52</sup> The German phrase is “überholen ohne einzuholen.” The distinction between überholen (to pass or surpass) and einholen (to catch up to) evokes the image of a car race. Taken literally, “überholen without einholen” would require one competitor to move ahead of the other's vehicle without ever drawing even with it—a logical impossibility under Euclidean assumptions. As widely interpreted, however, Ulbricht's phrase was simply a catchy formulation for the idea that socialist nations would be running a different race, playing by different rules; by taking an alternate (socialist) route, they would end up “ahead” of their bourgeois counterparts, who remained trapped at an earlier “stage of history.” I thank Frederick Amrine for questioning me on this point.

would use surplus value, not for personal gain or for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, but to create a superior form of civilization that would eventually displace capitalism and lead to its natural extinction.<sup>53</sup> In tapping the language of "overtaking without passing," Herr Kraus is suggesting that he beat the authorities at their own game: by appealing to their own legitimating value system, by being "more left" than the comrades. Instead of challenging their value system as a whole, he is appealing to one of its constitutive legitimating principles in order to resist a specific policy that he accuses of violating those principles. Yet, he does not claim to have supported the cause of socialism himself. On the contrary, in describing his actions as "overtaking" by an alternate route, he is crediting himself with a successful feat of Austricksen.

One final point to note about Kraus's performance is its highly *individual* character. In spite of his self-identification with an "opposition," the success of his tactic depends in part on *avoidance* of any group affiliations. By contrast, members of the Protestant churches sometimes openly refused to bear arms. Resembling a nascent opposition movement, these so-called "construction soldiers" (*Bausoldaten*) pitted Christian heterodoxy against socialist orthodoxy, with predictably adverse consequences. Conscientious objection was likely to be recorded in one's dossier and could be used in the future to justify denials of promotions, access to certain jobs and occupations, or the training necessary to qualify for them. For professional reasons, Herr Kraus chose not to go this route. As he explains, "I didn't go that far in my refusal. I didn't want to *completely* ruin my occupational chances; I was never a hero or a martyr." Norbert Kraus's alternative is an individual act of Austricksen—here, the dissimulation of consentful contention by a self-described "opponent" of the state.

"IN THE INTEREST OF THE REPUBLIC, IN THE INTEREST OF SOCIALISM, AND EVEN IN THE INTEREST OF THE PARTY": THE BIERMANN PROTEST

In the previous example, the performance of consentful contention is recounted retrospectively as a feat of dissimulation. By contrast, the next case illustrates the arts of consentful contention in a context in which the consentful standpoint is both credible and public for most of the participants—a group of artists and authors who had made personal sacrifices for the larger cause of socialism and were residing voluntarily in the GDR. Compared to the first case, the stakes were much higher. These privileged cultural producers sought to influence an issue that had already exploded

<sup>53</sup> Khrushchev's defiant challenge "We will bury you!" also expressed this philosophy of history.

into an open ideological battle across the Iron Curtain. Their goal was to reverse a decision by the Politburo that they perceived as a threat to their creative autonomy, and which they argued endangered the credibility of socialism abroad and its chances for realization at home. In the process, they engaged the state in a critical debate about the character and future of the public sphere in East German state socialism.

Consentful contention differs here in two important respects. First, as noted above, the political standpoint of most of the claim makers is that of long-standing support and active engagement on behalf of the cause of socialism. Because they were also critical of actually existing socialism, they perhaps constituted the GDR's closest equivalent to a loyal opposition. Second, because the effort was *collective*, the petitioners attempted to establish a "working consensus" in Goffman's sense: a "single over-all definition of the situation" around "values to which everyone present feels obliged to give lip service," while "avoiding an open conflict of definitions of the situation" (Goffman 1959, pp. 9–10; see also Spencer 1992).

The nature of the data is also very different in this case. The record of the contentious interaction is drawn, not from a retrospective life history, but from the transcript of a meeting with representatives of the state secretly tape recorded in 1976. As a more exact documentation of engagement with the state, it provides a rare glimpse at an actual instance of consentful contention in progress. The transcript thus allows us to see in greater detail, and with less likelihood of retrospective bias, the give-and-take involved in consentful contention—the presentations of self, the rhetorical strategies, and the pressing of grievances and demands.<sup>54</sup> Finally, because it depicts an actual instance of this contention genre as it was occurring, it also permits us to attend to the *countertactics* employed by a representative of the state. Before examining the transcript itself, let us first look at the events leading up to the meeting.

In a press release on November 16, 1976, the Politburo of the GDR made a stunning announcement: "The responsible authorities of the GDR have withdrawn from Wolf Biermann . . . the right to further residence in the German Democratic Republic" (Berbig 1994, p. 69). This move to expatriate the East German singer-songwriter followed a November 13, 1976, concert in Cologne in the course of which Biermann publicly criticized the East German bureaucracy and certain high-level functionaries. Such antics were nothing new to those who knew Biermann, an open, if

<sup>54</sup> The possibility of bias cannot be ruled out entirely, as we cannot verify the accuracy of the transcript or the completeness of the tape recording (a medium that is inherently incomplete in any case). Nevertheless, this possibility is greatly reduced in comparison to a retrospective account, and substantial misrepresentations could in principle have been subsequently challenged by the participants, most of whom are still living. To the best of my knowledge, none have done so as of the time of this writing.

ironic, critic of the Wall and the stodginess of prominent bureaucrats. Though never a member of East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party (hereafter SED or the Party), Biermann always coupled his barbed satire with the public identity of a Marxist committed to the realization and spread of socialism. By the mid-1970s, he had won some renown among Leftists and labor groups in the West as the GDR's unofficial court jester, yet until the year of his expulsion, he had remained rather unknown in his home country, which released his work only infrequently and in homeopathic batches.

The abruptness and severity of the Politburo's reaction that day came as a shock on both sides of the Wall. It followed, by a few months, the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on human rights and the relaxation of travel policy in cases of "pressing family matters" (Torpey 1995). Just as actually existing socialism was beginning to show a more human face, it seemed, the Party was retrenching into a hard-line defense of its partisan interests. Had it made a tactical error, one that could be reversed with persuasion, through an appeal to its own interests and socialist program? The same day, a small group of GDR writers and artists set out to find out for themselves. On the initiative of authors Stephan Hermlin and Stefan Heym, 12 of the GDR's leading cultural figures drafted and signed a petition on November 17, 1976, registering their "protest" and requesting that the decision be "reconsidered." Later that day, another 26 signatures of solidarity were added, and by November 21, when the list was closed, the total number of signatories had reached over 80.

As the petition stated, "Wolf Biermann was and is an uncomfortable author—he has that in common with many authors of the past." Biermann had been an "uncomfortable" author for several decades before Cologne. An eager advocate for the "the better Germany" since his youth, Biermann drew suspicion through his early association with physicist Robert Havemann, whose anti-Stalinist lectures on philosophy at East Berlin's Humboldt University were legendary. In 1965, Biermann was among those barred from public performance in the wake of the eleventh plenum on cultural policy (Agde 1991). In 1968, he had supported Alexander Dubček's reform efforts in Czechoslovakia (see Williams 1997), and the tenor of his lyrics and commentary became decidedly acerbic after the movement was crushed with GDR assistance. As agit-prop chief Werner Lamberz would insist in his meeting with the petitioners, "We have had great patience, very great patience in fact" (Krug 1996, p. 20).

For the petitioners, more was at stake than the loss of a fellow artist. Consensual contention itself was on trial. For one thing, Biermann himself exemplified consensual contention taken to its limit. Although his caricatures of top functionaries were often merciless, he had never relinquished his faith that socialism would one day triumph in all of Germany.

According to a well-known lyric, repeated at the concert in question, "One way or another, the earth will become red" (So oder so, die Erde wird rot). Whether Biermann's songs and remarks in Cologne were truly more "shocking" than previously, as Lamberz would insist, and whether the socialist public sphere should tolerate such "self-criticism" in any case, were at the heart of the controversy. Biermann's fate thus became a test case for the degree of contentiousness the state would tolerate as an expression of loyalty.

For another, consentful contention was a logical means for the petitioners to press their appeal without explicitly challenging the authority of the socialist state. Thus, the outcome of the petition drive and the secret negotiations that followed would set a kind of procedural precedent for any future rounds of contention between loyal critics and the socialist state they hoped to reform. For this reason, the petition had to be carefully worded:

In view of the sentence from Marx's "18th Brumaire," according to which the proletarian revolution criticizes itself unabatingly, our socialist state should, in contrast to anachronistic forms of society, have to tolerate such discomfort calmly and reflectively. We do not identify with every word and every action of Wolf Biermann and distance ourselves from attempts to misuse the events around Biermann against the GDR. Biermann himself has never, not even in Cologne, left any doubt as to which of the two German states he champions, for all his criticism. We protest against his expatriation and request that the adopted measures be reconsidered. (Berbig 1994, p. 70)

Up to the final sentence, the petition was "formulated in good socialist fashion," as one participant would later remark (Krug 1996, p. 59). Its quotation from an accepted classic, its emphasis on the progressivism of socialist society (in contrast to "anachronistic" Western capitalism), its distancing of the signatories from the "misuse" of the affair against the GDR, and its defense of Biermann as essentially loyal to the ("better") German state—all these elements asserted the petitioners' fundamental partisanship on behalf of socialism and the GDR. This framing of the petition as an expression of *consent* is also bolstered by the names of the signatories themselves, who were mostly authors or artists well known for their pro-GDR standpoint. These elements were meant to palliate the core message: a *protest* against Biermann's expulsion and a request for the state to reconsider it. Moreover, the defense of "self-criticism" as a duty of the revolution applies not only to Biermann but also to the petitioners and the state. The rhetorical thrust of the petition is to challenge the orthodox definition of loyalty with a heterodox reading of the "18th Brumaire." The injunction to self-criticism implicitly justifies the further



heresy of carrying out a "protest" on the territory of the "class enemy"—in this case, the mass media of the Federal Republic.

Two elements, however, are in tension with the consensual framing—a tension that is not lost on Comrade Lamberz, as we will see. First, the "protest" of the final sentence endorses a heterodox *means* of criticism. For the SED orthodoxy, protest against the state was not an expression of loyalty but of dissidence and (illegal) opposition. Among the truly faithful, criticism was to be voiced only in the proper context, usually in closed meetings or other private interactions. A second element is subtler but no less controversial: the presentation of a heterodox reading of an orthodox classic. This move does more than assert the loyalty of the signers to socialism; it claims a *greater* fidelity to the fundamentals than the party itself allegedly exhibits. Implicitly but powerfully, it presents the state with two uncomfortable options: comply with the petitioners' demands or be seen as hypocritically ignoring the implications of the Marxist-Leninist canon. Compliance, in short, is presented as the only face-saving option for the state.

In its rhetorical elements, the petition exemplifies the *arts of consensual contention* in state socialism as outlined in the previous section. Like the arguments of Herr Kraus before the recruitment officers, the petition takes the state "at its word" by mounting a protest "from the left," while taking care "not to present oneself openly as an opponent" of the regime. In doing so, however, it brings the petitioners perilously close to the tactics of more open critics from the left like Havemann, who had been under house arrest since 1964, or indeed those of Biermann himself. The petition is cautious, but the message is clear. When the petitioners meet with representatives of the state, the discussion is not simply about Biermann; it is about whose vision of socialism is best, and what its implications should be for the proper structuring of political discussions in the GDR.

At the invitation of two of the petitioners, 12 signatories met with Politburo member Werner Lamberz and two colleagues on November 20, 1976. Unbeknown to the other participants, actor Manfred Krug possessed a state-of-the-art recording device, which he put to use during the meeting for self-protection.<sup>55</sup> The four-hour discussion depicted by the transcript is rich and full of subtleties. My treatment here is necessarily cursory and selective. I will consider the arguments of two principals from the artists' side, Marxist gadfly Stefan Heym and SED member Christa Wolf, both

<sup>55</sup> Krug published a transcript of the recording in 1996, along with a diary from the year preceding his own emigration to West Germany. Hereafter, citations to the transcript as it appears in Krug (1996, pp. 16–112) are indicated as *KT*. Krug states that he obtained permission for verbatim reproduction from all living participants except three (Krug 1996, p. 16); none of the latter are quoted in this article.

prominent authors, as well as key elements of a response by Werner Lamberz, representing the state and Party leadership.<sup>56</sup>

After a brief introduction, Lamberz is given the floor. His motive for attending is “simply the concern about the direction in which all this is developing.” In his opening remarks, he immediately refocuses the agenda away from the demands of the petition and polarizes the affair into two sides: “Today the issue is no longer the problem of expatriation or non-expatriation, but rather of *one* political program and *another* political program, and the attempts by the [West German] side to interfere [in the affairs] of the GDR in this matter, and in a very massive way” (*KT*, p. 18). Because of the collective character and confrontational tone of the petition, he insists, its signatories are becoming dupes of the class enemy. Whether they are unwitting in this regard is something he wishes to determine.

Whatever its motive, he maintains, a group petition was the wrong approach. It would have been more constructive and in keeping with one’s “civic duty” to seek out individual members of state for conversation. Publishing the petition in the West amounted to befouling the nest—a deadly sin in socialism, Krug notes in the introduction (*KT*, p. 14)—and has helped bring the country to the verge of crisis. “Why did no one look for a way to obtain a normal discussion, to make a phone call, to request, to ask: can we talk about this or that?” Lamberz asks (*KT*, p. 31). Throughout, Lamberz’s arguments presuppose that the GDR already possessed an open political sphere for the critical discussion of political issues, shifting the burden of proving otherwise onto the artists. The arguments of Heym and Wolf that follow will be particularly instructive, illustrating two contrasting presentations of self within the frame of the loyal socialist.

In their defense, several of the artists point to recent experiences when they have been unable to respond to attacks on them in their own media. They complain of a lack of trust on the part of the state and fear a return to the “old days” of purges and persecution. Heym uses their anecdotes to defend his decision to hand the petition over to the other side. Criticizing the current political climate in the GDR, he proposes “that we should not now be discussing so much why our resolution, this request to the government, was also given to the Western press agencies. The comrades here, the friends [of Biermann] have made clear that *there is no public sphere in our country for any opinion, for any appeal, that deviates from*

<sup>56</sup> Lamberz was head of the Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda and, until his untimely death in 1978, considered to be heir apparent to the GDR presidency. According to archival records, he was present when the decision was made to expel Biermann (Berbig 1994, p. 68).

*the currently dominant opinion of the government, directed to the government and to the people*" (KT, pp. 42–43; emphasis added).

Christa Wolf, initially, follows suit. As evidence of the state's aversion to dialogue, she cites an indignant editorial that appeared in the SED's official news organ *Neues Deutschland* (hereafter *ND*) a few days before, describing it as "demagogical and dishonest." Written by a certain "Dr. K.," the commentary had accused Biermann of "slander against our socialist state and its citizens" and of abrogating the "duty of loyalty of every citizen to the state" (Roos 1977, pp. 36–37).<sup>57</sup> Where was the openness to dialogue in this? she exclaims. "I asked myself: what can you say to that? There are no arguments there that I can react to. What am I supposed to say against lies?" (KT, p. 31). To support these misrepresentations, she continues, the editorial took remarks by Biermann out of context. Such flagrant dishonesty could have a dispiriting effect on those East German readers who knew Biermann's work, potentially discrediting the party news organ in the minds of even sympathetic readers. Furthermore, resorting to *ad hominem* attacks against one's critics makes the party look weak, as if it did not believe its own arguments.

In subsequent statements, both Heym and Wolf attempt to appeal to the interests that ostensibly guided the expatriation decision—the defense of socialism and the reputation of the GDR as its German incarnation—to bolster their proposals. However, each also mounts a somewhat contrasting rhetorical strategy. Heym's *realist* approach addresses what he takes to be the state's partisan interests and seeks to define the expatriation as a tactical error, one that he is more than willing to help correct in the interest of the republic, of socialism, and "even" of the Party. In other words, he presents repatriation as the option that best saves face:

That this man, who criticizes you from the left, will remain a thorn in your flesh for many years, I call that a political mistake. . . . The letter [i.e., petition] of the comrades contains the request to the government to think over the matter anew. I don't know if it is possible for you to do this. I recently—on television again—said that *it would not be a sign of weakness*, but rather *a sign of great inner strength*. I mean, if you were to say . . . that you reverse this decision at the request of many prominent artists and writers . . . [or] on whatever basis. There are possibilities to formulate it so that it would be interpreted and received reasonably. Otherwise, Comrade Lamberz, the situation will arise . . . in which the matter becomes ever more dire, ever more unpleasant. And that is something that we all do not want *in the interest of the Republic, in the interest of socialism* and—I am not a Party member, but—even *in the interest of the Party*. (KT, pp. 45–46; emphasis added)

<sup>57</sup> Gunther Kertzsch, the vice-chief editor of *ND* and a former Nazi Party member.

In short, Heym is arguing that the expatriation is having the opposite effect from what was intended. Instead of getting rid of Biermann, the move threatens to leave him "a thorn in your side for many years," freer than he would have been to continue his crusade, but now with a higher profile and better access than before (through broadcasts from the West) to the East German public. In the short term, moreover, the affair now threatens to escalate further, with "dire" and "unpleasant" consequences for the hard-won prestige and recognition of the GDR abroad. Heym likens the situation to that of the worker uprising of 1953, when the state's reliance on coercive means to boost production led to pro-unification demonstrations. To its credit, he continues, the state at that time recognized its mistake and took steps to correct it (*KT*, pp. 44–45). Why not learn from this example here?

In this passage, Heym noticeably retreats from the accusatory tone of his previous remarks and attempts to establish a working consensus around common interests.<sup>58</sup> For Lamberz, however, the damage has already been done by the petition's use of "protest," as well as the signature drive, which he considers an especially alarming development. Throughout the meeting, the artists will have to contend with insinuations of complicity with the "capitalist enemy" and of agitation around an oppositional "platform," referring to both Biermann's performance in Cologne and the petition. As a result, the discussion never fully achieves working consensus, the relevant claims and issues being contested at every turn and the debate nearly escalating into open conflict on more than one occasion.

Christa Wolf's approach is similar to Heym's in that she seeks to establish working consensus by adopting the consentful frame and appealing to values and interests presumably shared with her fellow comrades in the Politburo. It differs in that she explicitly positions herself as a true believer who is *more* loyal to the cause of socialism than certain others in the Party (especially some educators), whereas the petition did so only implicitly. One prong of her strategy is to distance herself from other critics from the left, including Heym and Biermann: "On one point, I am quite at odds with Stefan Heym: I see absolutely no inkling of signs of similarity to situations like that before 1953. My firm conviction . . . is that our state is stable (*KT*, p. 48).

<sup>58</sup> Heym also launches an appeal that is more confrontational. He goes on to insist that expatriation is patently a Nazi practice and that the *ND* commentary is virtually plagiarized from commentaries of that era (*KT*, p. 42). Himself a secular Jew (like Biermann and Havemann), Heym is squarely targeting the GDR's claim to represent the "antifascist" Germany. However, the GDR had long refused to recognize Jews as especially noteworthy victims of National Socialism (Herf 1997). Heym's argument therefore carries little weight in the discussion and is virtually ignored by the others.

Similarly, her support of Biermann's possible repatriation (which is soon retracted) is laced with criticism; its basis is the assurance that she and her colleagues will help keep him in line if he were to return:

If it *were* to come, maybe later on, to Biermann's returning again, we would be his partners in discussion, with whom he would not have an easy time, I would just like to say that as well. Because I have never—as far as I know, like everyone here—belonged to those who simply parrot Biermann's words, who have ever given him any [latitude]. . . . So we would very definitely be people whom he would *also* have confront. He should not think that he will have it easy with us, that he will have a bed of roses or return as a national hero or anything. I am prepared to say all that, to say it publicly. (KT, p. 48; original emphasis)

She further illustrates her loyalty by emphasizing her self-restraint when criticized in the media of her own country (KT, p. 32), as well as during the petition drive: "If someone asked me, I told him: 'The list is closed. We don't want a campaign. . . . This is not about attempts at extortion. We [simply] want to express ourselves'" (KT, pp. 33-34).

Although an original signatory of the petition, Wolf eventually drops the issue of Biermann's return. For her, the whole affair raises deeper concerns about creative freedom for intellectuals and the credibility of socialism in the population. Perhaps sensing that the protest is foundering, she changes her tack. The next prong in her strategy becomes a self-distancing from educators and others in the Party who suppress open communication and thereby betray an alarming lack of faith that "our arguments are the better ones":

The issue now is really that . . . —and I hear it from other people: authors and actors and other intellectuals have a strong need to express, to articulate themselves; that is their vocation. I hear from many circles in the population that, at the [present] moment, there is emerging a very strong relationship to the GDR, in the sense that there is security, that they are working, very often have a job they value, and that they can actualize themselves in this labor process. And it would be, . . . I believe, a great help to us all—here I mean *to us as a Party*—if we . . . gradually created a situation in which students at their universities could speak more openly with each other and with their instructors. In which the pupils in the schools could enter into open communication with each other and with their teachers. *Because our arguments are the better ones, I am convinced of that.* What I don't understand is why the teachers, why the instructors are *not* convinced of that. (KT, p. 49; original emphasis)

The real issue, in other words, is the state of the public sphere in the GDR, which has much to offer to intellectuals like her but which must do more to accommodate their vocational duty to self-expression. If ardent

advocates for “our state” cannot get a hearing, then something is wrong. It is as if some Party members are losing their faith in the inherent superiority of the socialist viewpoint. Why not enlist true believers like her and others to make the case for socialism in forums throughout the country? A return to argumentative means of persuasion, especially in the educational system, could help win new converts among the youth.

Wolf’s avowed (and very likely true) motive is steadfast commitment to the socialist cause. We need not doubt the sincerity of Wolf’s commitment to reforming socialism to appreciate the brilliance of her performance. Like that of Heym and the others, her criticism is from the left, but she positions herself closer to the orthodox interpretation of what consent entails than does Heym. She limits her criticism of the state to those in its midst whose dogmatism seems to bespeak a lack of conviction, and to institutions that are depriving true believers of the means to swell their ranks through persuasion. Dogmatists, she implies, are not true believers but dissimulators whose lack of faith is compromising socialism’s position in the battle of ideas. In sum, she no longer bases her criticism on a heterodox reading of orthodox principles and canonical texts, as was done in the petition. Nor does she press for Biermann’s repatriation, which could be seen as challenging the Party’s authority. Instead, she explicitly claims to be *more orthodox* in her interpretations and values than certain others and exploits this standpoint in order to call for greater openness in the public sphere, as a forum in which to evangelize for socialism.

Both of these approaches—Heym’s realist appeal to partisan interest and Wolf’s consentful antidogmatism—fail in the end. As the meeting concludes, the only point of agreement reached is that the petition drive will not continue. In the weeks that follow, *ND* prints numerous declarations of support for Biermann’s expatriation from (mostly lesser-known) artists and authors and “clarifications of position” by several of the signers of the petition.<sup>59</sup> Biermann makes his peace with life in the Federal Re-

<sup>59</sup> In one case, the denunciation seems to contain built-in deniability—a ruse that Krug unmasks during the meeting. “A linguistic acrobat appears here in Neues Deutschland. The composer Gerhard Rosenfeld came up with the following, you really have to let it roll off the tongue: ‘I read with astonishment in *ND* about the performance of Wolf Biermann in the FRG. The report about his behavior demands my distancing.’ A work of art, this sentence. Belongs in an anthology of artful dodges [pfiffigkeiten]” Stefan Heym quips. “Looks like someone pulled a Schwejk on you!” (*KT*, p. 39), alluding to Hašek’s trickster soldier as an exemplar of Austricksen as dissentful compliance (see footnote 22). If Milosz (1953) is correct, Krug’s and Heym’s willingness to expose the Austricksen suggests personal familiarity with such “acrobatics” and may represent an effort to deflect suspicion from themselves. Writing on what he calls *Ketman* (a Persian form of tricksterism to which Milosz finds analogs in state socialism), Milosz states, “There are cases of accidental unmaskings of *Ketman*; and those who are most helpful in detecting deviations are those who themselves practice a similar form of

public, while continuing his mission of reconciliation between Leftists in East and West. Except for a brief visit at Havemann's deathbed in 1982, Biermann does not set foot in the GDR again until 1989.<sup>60</sup>

We can only speculate as to why the protest did not succeed. Perhaps the petition drew too close to the line of open opposition. Perhaps there was too much at stake for the Party leadership to risk a reversal of its position. Perhaps the arguments of the artists were simply unconvincing to Lamberz, who goes to great lengths to argue the other side. Or perhaps they never stood a chance to begin with—once the state had made its decision, any reversal might have appeared too costly to its image at home and abroad. In the conclusion, I will hypothesize that the state's intransigence is most likely when its acquiescence threatens a loss of face—a risk that increases with the profile of the issue at hand. Before concluding this section, however, let us take a look at some counterarguments presented by Lamberz, as they offer us a rare glimpse at the tactics deployed by the other side. How is consensual contention itself contested by the socialist state?

In a monologue midway through the meeting, Lamberz presents several arguments that typify his rhetorical strategy throughout. His first move is to insist that there is already an atmosphere of "trust" in the country, and that the recent political trajectory is positive, while conceding that "small minds" within the Party are still a problem:

Someone spoke of trust. . . . I ask you really to look at this party, which itself speaks of a sea change [*Wende*] in its politics since the 8th Party Congress, in a variety of areas, and to look at the development that it has completed since then. And I feel that, with regard to the relationship of the Party to the artists, [this] is really a trustful relationship. But trust cannot of course exclude the possibility that there are often here and there members of the Party who don't understand that. That there are people who are small-minded, that there are also things that are not okay; . . . all that does exist. (*KT*, p. 62)

Like the others, Lamberz thus tries to establish a working consensus on the essentials. Surely they can all agree that there are still problems. These are to be expected in actually existing socialism, which is after all only a transition phase in history: "So, anyone who has the idea that this

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Ketman. *Recognizing in other acrobats the tricks they themselves employ, they take advantage of the first occasion to down an opponent or friend.* Thus, they protect themselves; and the measure of dexterity is to anticipate by at least one day the similar accusation which could be leveled against them by the man they denounce" (Milosz 1953, p. 60; emphasis added).

<sup>60</sup> At a concert in Leipzig, he is welcomed as a returning hero.

is *pure* Communism . . ." (KT, p. 62; original emphasis).<sup>61</sup> But do these problems really signal a contradiction inherent to socialism? he asks, or will they be overcome in due time?: "It's just: Are they a societal phenomenon, one that is desired by the political leadership of this country, something that is immanent to socialism? Or are they deficiencies that we want to overcome and in which we are just as interested as you? I affirm the latter" (KT, p. 62).

In statements like these, Lamberz outbids even Wolf's self-presentation in the true-believer frame. In effect, he challenges the latter's claim by reaffirming his own faith in the upward trajectory of socialist society, thus implicitly questioning the sincerity of those who insist on emphasizing "deficiencies."

To shore up this counterstrategy, Lamberz exploits the precarious role of intellectuals like the petitioners in state socialism, playing the most important trump card available in socialist identity politics: the reference to *class standpoint*. In this way, he turns the tables on the artists by rhetorically reversing the poles of "above" and "below":

I ask that you do not see us [in the SED leadership] as parochial people who do not know how life is, who do not live among the workers . . . We are all normal people . . . with enormous responsibility, with a difficult workday, with a life where they have shown dedication in many critical situations, and who always, always think about how the simple people can live better. That's how things are. No one has enriched himself, even Biermann had to admit that. . . . There are more intellectuals in the GDR who earn twice as much as, and live better than, the members of the Party leadership. That is the truth, the whole truth. So. We don't have to be told how the people live. We know how the people live. . . . We live among the people. (KT, pp. 62–63)

Thus, the Party leaders, Lamberz insists, are firmly rooted in the working class and live "among the people." It is artists and intellectuals who seem aloof and privileged, often earning more than the leadership. And unlike Biermann, who allegedly "slanders" the workers as thieves and loafers, the leadership continues to work hard to fulfill its professional and political obligations. It is the artists who are obsessed with their own private interests.<sup>62</sup> For ordinary working people, Lamberz continues, the public sphere is healthy and open:

<sup>61</sup> The phrase "actually existing socialism" was meant to assert that the construction phase of socialism was complete, but it allowed an indefinite duration before the onset of real communism

<sup>62</sup> The allusion is to comments in Cologne that Biermann maintained were misinterpreted.



And if you walk through a factory, so many conversations are taking place, and there are often so many discussions and so many critical questions. I'm not making this up. I invite you—not together, but individually—please, let's go together, and we'll hold forums together and experience that. . . . I don't want to polemicize in this regard, but. *We have an open atmosphere.* We really have it. We have it. I ask you please to go into the workplaces in this country and to talk with the people—we do that too—and to see the trend here. And this trend is positive. (KT, p. 63; original emphasis)

As for the merits of the petition itself, he can see no justification for its publication in the West. To do so simply involves the enemy in private matters of the state, and would have been unnecessary if only dialogue had been sought: "This is our affair. If one can't reach agreement, then maybe this path remains open. But there was no attempt undertaken, no attempt to engage anyone or invite them to a discussion. And I can guarantee: Everyone would have come to such a discussion" (KT, p. 63).

In spite of his obvious rhetorical skill, Lamberz never relies on arguments alone. At several points, he issues thinly veiled threats, providing assurances that "no one will be arrested" for their participation in the petition drive, while reserving the right to crack down on anyone who continues it—pointed reminders of who has the coercive power of the state behind him. The fact that he bothers with arguments at all, however, is revealing. His rhetorical tactics shed light on those of the Party leadership in many contexts and its legitimation strategy for the GDR as a whole: the faith in the development of socialism, the emphasis on its provisional character, the claim to represent "the working people in town and country," a cautious tolerance for consensual contention so long as it is kept under wraps, and above all the demonization of the West in a historical drama of "system conflict." These motifs illustrate that, for the Party, ideology served as a means of legitimation and persuasion, as well as detection.

These competing objectives—legitimation and surveillance—fed the contradictions of everyday life in state socialism. While citizen compliance was often the result, so too were forms of contention, as the artists help show. This is true, moreover, of both loyalists to socialism and the Party, on the one hand, and of those like Herr Kraus with a fundamental disagreement on matters of principle, on the other. Where consensual contention transgressed these limits, coercion or expulsion could result, though they were not the first line of defense. Yet, the claim makers, too, were not without a tactic of last resort. One year after the Biermann affair, a number the GDR's leading artists, including Krug, emigrated to the West out of protest. Heym and Wolf remained.

## THE FUTURE OF CONSENTFUL CONTENTION: EXPLANATION AND COMPARISON

## Accounting for the Success and Failure of Contention in State Socialism

When should consentful contention succeed in winning acquiescence from the state? The dramaturgical approach presented in this article implies a number of distinctive causal mechanisms that need to be made more explicit before consentful contention can be investigated further by other researchers. In the following, I propose a causal model that is broadly consistent with the evidence presented so far. It elucidates the causal logic embedded in the two accounts above, explaining why consentful contention evidently succeeded (for a while) in the case of an individual seeking reprieve from military service ("Norbert Kraus") and failed in the case of a well-organized network of leading intellectuals with the communicative scope of the Western mass media at their disposal (the Biermann petitioners). None of the material presented in this article is intended as an empirical test of the model. Rather, its purpose is to serve as a guide for comparison with the findings of future research.

Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical causal model for the likelihood of state compliance under a system of ideological domination—that is, in an authoritarian political system in which the state seeks to legitimate its rule by formally committing itself to a particular set of normative values and principles. The model is probabilistic rather than deterministic, and the likelihoods in question are relative; hence, the chances of obtaining compliance from the state may be quite small in absolute terms.

The model in figure 2 begins, in the upper-left corner, with *petitioner capacity*, a variable commonly associated with the success of petitions by citizens in obtaining state compliance with their demands. In many contexts, it is reasonable to assume that the chances of state compliance with citizens' demands increase monotonically with the capacity of petitioners to demonstrate worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment ("WUNC"; Tilly 1998), because of their improved leverage to force compliance. *Petitioner leverage* will refer to the relative power of subordinate actors (petitioners) to coerce the state on a given occasion. As we saw, however, collective action directed at coercing concessions from the state is likely to be counterproductive in state socialist contexts, inviting repression or expulsion rather than state compliance.<sup>63</sup> Authoritarian states generally discourage organized political activity not directly under their control.

<sup>63</sup> Indeed, small groups may have occasionally used collective protest precisely to trigger expulsion, thereby gaining compliance with demands for the right to emigration by means of an unconventional mechanism. For an example, see my discussion of the Luxemburg Affair in the section "Contesting the Stance of Consentful Contention."




FIG. 2.—Factors hypothesized to influence likelihood of state compliance with a citizen petition, under a system of ideological domination by an authoritarian state. All effects are positive except where marked as negative (“-”).

The direct effect of petitioner leverage on state compliance is therefore assumed to be negative.

Petitioner capacity also has an *indirect* effect on petitioner leverage, by way of *issue profile*, or the extent to which a controversy has become public.<sup>64</sup> Citizens can bolster their relative power position if they can “go public” with their petition, which the Biermann petitioners accomplished by virtue of their access to the West German mass media. As the model would predict, however, the petition drive only provoked countermeasures by the state, rather than achieving its immediate objective of obtaining Biermann’s repatriation. Understandably, some of the petitioners went on to pursue a modified strategy in which they *reduced* their numbers (petitioner capacity) and met *secretly* with a representative of the Politburo—a strategy that, though unsuccessful in the event, would be expected to increase their likelihood of state compliance.

Besides petitioner leverage, a further factor shaping the likelihood of state compliance is the degree to which the state believes it will *save face* if it acquiesces to citizens’ petitions. Granting a citizen petition should be more palatable for the state if doing so does not entail a loss of face. “Saving face” occurs if the state believes it has increased its legitimacy at home or prestige abroad; it presupposes a perceived imminent threat of *losing face*. This mechanism is only relevant where solidarity among supporters of the state depends at least in part on its adherence to a set of principles, beliefs, and values. In a system where political authority rests entirely on threats of coercion and material incentives, the state will care little about whether citizens regard the system as legitimate, and hence the mechanism of saving face drops out of the model, as far as domestic

<sup>64</sup> Issue profile will likely reflect the scope of the issue in question—that is, the extent of its likely impact on society as a whole.

legitimation is concerned.<sup>65</sup> In state socialism, the state had to weigh the expected benefits of making a good impression (saving face) against the potential loss of credibility if it acceded to pressure from contentious petitioners.

Framing contention as *consentful* represents an attempt to tip the balance in favor of the “face-saving” option. It does so by making an argument for why compliance would enhance the legitimacy or prestige of the state, whereas the status quo threatens a loss of face. Thus, the model assumes that a “*consentful*” *petition*, which presents the petitioner as a dutiful citizen pressing claims consistent with socialist principles, should stand a better chance of success, on balance, than one articulating an oppositional political platform. As we saw, much depends on the credibility of the consentful standpoint as performed by the individual petitioner; thus, there is one component of petitioner capacity, “worthiness,” that may interact with the consentful standpoint of a petition to increase the likelihood of state compliance.

The model as a whole implies that, for low-profile issues, a claim maker who combines social worthiness with a *lack* of connection to an organized group should have the greatest chance of success (however modest these chances may be). This logic should hold true up to some variable threshold of petitioner leverage. Below that threshold, even a well-organized opposition with access to the means of mass communication will likely suffer repression by a state at risk of losing face. Until the leverage threshold can be surpassed (often, through a serious weakening of the central state), any petitioner will enjoy greater success on issues of a given scope if compliance can be credibly framed as *consenting* to the state’s professed broader mission (“ruling ideology”), and if the contentious interaction maintains a *low profile*.

Note, finally, that there is no assumption of *claim escalation* in this model; thus, it does not imply, nor can it explain, claim radicalization (Mueller 1999a).<sup>66</sup> However, in line with the mainstream of mobilization research, we would expect that, if escalation did occur, the rhetorical and performative elements of protest would draw first on the existing stock of familiar contention genres. Thus, if the cultural scripts for consentful contention did indeed become modular, as I have suggested, it would not be surprising if some of the dramaturgy of protest in 1989 was staged as

<sup>65</sup> Tyrannical states may still care about international prestige, but citizens who cannot appeal to a founding ideology will have few means of threatening a loss of face in the domestic arena

<sup>66</sup> This omission may be regarded as both a weakness and a virtue. On the one hand, overall explanatory ambition is reduced; on the other hand, the omission implies that the radicality of claims may be exogenous to the claims-making process itself. In short, there is no automatic escalation of claims as opportunity increases

an exercise in consensual contestation, even after the central state had grown too weak to resist more revolutionary demands.

### On Consensual Contention in Other Types of Authoritarian States

The obvious generality of consensual contention beyond the East German case, and even far beyond state socialism, calls for the setting of boundary conditions for future theorizing. In the process, it will be possible to address the question of why inside observers of state socialism have tended to stress dual consciousness, performance, and dissimulation as defining features of everyday politics, whereas outside analysts have been quicker to find evidence of "resistance" as precursors to radical protest. Can these two perspectives be reconciled?

Given the preliminary character of the present investigation, the following framework should be regarded as a proposal, not a conclusion. Nevertheless, it should be helpful to state in advance of future research how and why particular types of cases might resemble, or differ from, the one analyzed here, and, conversely, what makes the present case distinctive as a societal context for consensual contention. As the differences in relation to liberal democracies have already been discussed, I limit the following typology to the class of authoritarian (nondemocratic) states.

In earlier sections, it was argued that consensual contention was meaningful only in social contexts where voluntary consent to the prevailing system (i.e., the true believer persona) remained plausible as a social role. We can now briefly explore the implications of this point for a relevant classification of regime types. Figure 3 shows a continuum of ideal-types based on the type of dominant ideology and the corresponding modes of domination. These types range in ideological "robustness" from regimes governed by full-blown blueprint ideologies, at the one extreme, to regimes that offer little justification for rule beyond "might makes right" (*Macht* ideology), at the other. Ideological domination stakes popular legitimation on the successful implementation of a societal template argued to serve the interests of the ruled;<sup>67</sup> by contrast, the ideology of pure power claims only the capacity, not the right, to dominion.<sup>68</sup> In between, as we move from left to right, are the classical right-to-rule ideologies (e.g., divine right of kings, traditionalism, prophetic charisma) and what may be called

<sup>67</sup> A blueprint is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for ideological domination. Some states attempt to implement a societal template without a legitimation strategy.

<sup>68</sup> However, some apparent examples of "pure" dictatorship may involve a paternalistic legitimation strategy (cf. O'Donnell 1999), thus inviting attempts at consensual contention (Scott 1990, p. 166, n. 70).




FIG. 3.—Types of dominant ideologies and corresponding modes of authoritarian domination, examples based on Anderson (1974), O'Donnell (1999), Przeworski (1991), Riesebrodt (1993), Scott (1990), Wedeen (1999), Yurchak (1997), and Zaslavsky (1979)

"corrupted" ideologies, resulting in a form of rule that purports legitimacy, but is perceived by most citizens as "cynical."

This spectrum does not necessarily represent a natural progression over time. A regime may be *founded* on any of the four ideal-types of rule and may in principle move in either direction, perhaps even skipping over "stages." For example, historical experience suggests that Communist states in Eastern Europe probably included and even combined some or all of the four at one time or another. While it is not uncommon for scholars of the region to posit a logical (though nonlinear) sequence over time, such teleological models should be viewed with suspicion. For instance, the post-Stalin era is often contrasted with the early postrevolutionary years in terms of a shift from a right-to-rule ideology (based on historical arguments about the vanguard party) in the direction of a socialist blueprint by the 1960s and 1970s (when modernization efforts seemed to be bearing fruit), finally culminating in "cynical" rule by the 1980s (cf. Burawoy and Lukács 1992; Jowitt 1992; Kharkhordin 1995; Yurchak 1997; Zaslavsky 1979). Sandwiched between the first two "stages" would be the Stalinist reign of terror, with its arbitrary purges, suggesting a *power*-to-rule claim, or *Macht* ideology. Though intuitively appealing, such a progression was not evident in all countries, or even all parts of the Soviet Union. The classification of any given society or portion thereof at a particular moment in time should be left as an empirical question.

The typology does offer one possible basis for explaining some of the *discrepancies* among different accounts of contention in state socialism and related authoritarian contexts, with respect to the associated forms of consentful contention. For example, we would expect levels of consentful contention to reach a peak in a context characterized by ideological

domination, or authoritarian rule via blueprint legitimation. The Norbert Kraus episode discussed above dates to such a period in East German history. By contrast, scholars writing on the last decades of Soviet rule (e.g., Engler 1997; Jowitt 1992; Kharkhordin 1995; Maier 1997; Yurchak 1997; Žižek 1989) often portray a world in which loyalty is still compulsory, but most citizens no longer regard "true belief" as a credible standpoint. In effect, they are claiming that dissentful compliance, masquerading as consent, became the norm in "late socialism." This ideological environment is characteristic of cynical domination, in which only half-hearted vestiges of a legitimating blueprint remain, and compliance leaves individuals feeling morally compromised.<sup>69</sup> In such a setting, it may be less misleading to suppose that citizen compliance masks a state of "perpetual rebellion." Scholars familiar with other state socialist contexts, including the GDR, will no doubt recognize symptoms of cynical domination as well. It may be that few political systems are entirely devoid of this mode of rule.<sup>70</sup> In between cynical and ideological domination, finally, lie the more truncated right-to-rule claims of traditional and charismatic domination. Here, we would expect to find forms of consentful contention akin to the peasant petitions described by Scott (1990, pp. 96–103) under monarchic rule, which seek to cajole through flattery.

To conclude, causal *interactions* between efficacy and regime type are likely. In particular, consentful contention should be the more effective, *ceteris paribus*, the more credible its sincere form remains *within the ruling apparatus*; conversely, efficacy should diminish as conviction (and hence, reformism) gives way to cynicism within the apparatus itself. In the East German case, we encountered relatively unbiased evidence that, as late as the mid-1970s, adherence to a socialist worldview still commanded a following among individuals who were willing to take significant risks in the interest of mounting undiluted consentful contention. At the same time, the partial successes of reformism during some periods may have helped encourage the *dissimulation* of consentful contention by regime *opponents*, in addition to kindling hopes among those who would later promote a democratic socialist alternative.

<sup>69</sup> Lisa Wedeen (1999) offers a very similar characterization of Baathist Syria under the personality cult of Hafiz al-Assad.

<sup>70</sup> "Cynical" governance may also characterize individual organizations including, but not limited to, the state. See, e.g., Goldner, Ritti, and Ference (1977) on the acquisition of "cynical knowledge" in religious organizations.

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# The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power<sup>1</sup>

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The exercise of symbolic power has become a privileged focus of scholarship on the state, but without much attention to how states acquired this power in the first place. This article lays a foundation for systematic historical inquiry into the primitive accumulation of symbolic power by modernizing states. It introduces an analytical framework for research on how new domains of administrative activity become recognized as legitimate state practices. This framework is deployed to analyze how a popular revolt in northeastern Brazil managed to frustrate the Brazilian state's attempt to implement civil registration in the mid-19th century. The conclusion considers broad implications of this analysis for students of modern state formation and suggests the need for comparative historical analyses that historicize the naturalization of state power.

Drawing inspiration from Max Weber's enduring definition of the state as a compulsory political organization that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within its territory (Weber 1978, p. 54), accounts of the rise of modern states in Western Europe have devoted sustained attention to the political-military dimensions of state formation. Struggles to wrest the capacity to legitimately coerce from the array of

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historical contenders have received pride of place in the literature. Modern state formation is seen as driven by the intertwining historical imperatives of waging war and collecting taxes to pay for waging more war. From this perspective, the advent and expansion of modern, centralized, rational administration is the cumulative product of successive "extraction-coercion cycles" in the drive to ward off external threats through preparation for war (Tilly 1992, p. 75).<sup>2</sup>

This "bellicist" perspective, as Philip Gorski (1999) refers to it, illuminates the modern state as a military, political, and economic accomplishment. But it tends to obscure the fact that the modern state is also, and essentially, a *symbolic* accomplishment (Bourdieu 1999, p. 40).<sup>3</sup> Indeed, historical struggles over the exercise of symbolic power were integral to historical struggles over the legitimate exercise of military, political, and economic power.

The neglect of the accumulation of symbolic power as a central dynamic in modern state formation is not surprising given that an essentially materialist conceptualization of the *explanandum* serves as the point of departure for most existing accounts of the rise of modern states. Traditional definitions of the modern state highlight the tight linkage between political organization, territorial jurisdiction, and control over the exercise of physical coercion as constitutive of modern statehood (e.g., Tilly 1975, p. 27). Such definitions are not wrong, but they are incomplete. In part, as Gorski (2003, pp. 165–66) notes, they are incomplete because "states are not only administrative, policing and military organizations. They are also pedagogical, corrective, and ideological organizations."

The problem, however, is not just that conventional approaches privilege the military, political, and economic power of modern states, paying only secondary attention to their ideological power. More fundamentally, such approaches fail to recognize explicitly that the state's capacity to carry out its ideological, economic, political, *and* military functions hinges in crucial respects on the exercise of symbolic power. Even the most material aspects of modern state formation have a cultural dimension that has been largely neglected by existing accounts. Of course, Weber himself was clearly aware of this, as the centrality of *legitimacy* to his concep-

<sup>2</sup> See also Porter (1994), Downing (1992), Mann (1993), Finer (1975), and Ertman (1997).

<sup>3</sup> This insight pertains to all cases of modern state formation, but it may be especially relevant for understanding cases outside the Western European "core." In ex-colonial contexts, in particular, the historical roles of coercion and capital as stimuli to bureaucratic development are ambiguous, leaving a much greater explanatory void (e.g., Centeno 1997, 2002).

tualization of the state makes clear.<sup>4</sup> And neo-Weberian approaches to modern state formation also generally recognize that cultural processes were involved. But until recently (cf. Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Coronil 1997; Adams 1994; Gorski 2003; and the essays collected in Steinmetz [1999]) cultural dimensions of the historical dynamics of modern state formation have not been a central analytical focus.

This neglect has become more glaring in light of the growing body of scholarship focused on the symbolic dimensions of state power. Indeed, many analysts see the capacity to exercise symbolic power as a defining characteristic of the modern state.<sup>5</sup> To cite only a few well-known examples from a rapidly growing field of inquiry, we know that seemingly mundane state practices like taking censuses, making maps, and building museums (Anderson 1991) can become powerful instruments of state rule, as they help to constitute what they appear merely to represent. Similarly, the development of civil registries, tax lists, land surveys, and other strategies to render land and people "legible" for administrative purposes help to remake geography and society along lines deemed relevant to the state (Scott 1998). Systems of national primary education, meanwhile, impart to their students more than a curriculum of standardized substantive knowledge; schools also introduce and naturalize fundamental categories of perception, "principles of vision and division," which then shape how people understand society and their place within it (cf. Bourdieu 1999; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1993).

Through the establishment and routinization of myriad administrative practices, the modern state may actively constitute the subjects in whose name it claims to exist legitimately (cf. Kertzer and Arel 2002; Brubaker 1996; Giddens 1987; Weber 1976). Though clearly very important, the capacity to give definite commands and exact conscious obedience (what Mann [1986, p. 8] terms "authoritative power") seems less central to the

<sup>4</sup> Weber's definition of the state as an organization that claims the *legitimate* use of *physical force* yokes cultural and material power together from the beginning. Yet the intimacy of their interconnection, implied already in the German term "herrschaft," was diluted by the English translation of this term as either the more ideal/cultural "authority" (Parsons 1960a, p. 752) or the more materially construed "domination" (Bendix 1960).

<sup>5</sup> Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., 1999, p. 40) takes this argument further than most. He suggests that the state claims a *monopoly* of the exercise of symbolic violence analogous to its claim to monopolize the legitimate exercise of physical violence. Just as others have qualified Weber's emphasis on the state's monopolization of the use of physical force (cf. Mann 1993, p. 55; Giddens 1987, p. 18), Bourdieu's claim of the state's monopolization of symbolic power demands qualification as well. Indeed, Bourdieu himself notes in some contexts that the state's hold on symbolic power is never absolute (e.g., Bourdieu 1990, p. 137). But overall he tends to neglect other loci of symbolic power in the modern world, most significantly, organized religion.



modern state's power than the capacity to order social life through the notion that its practices are natural, inevitable, or self-evidently useful (what Mann [1986, p. 8] terms "diffuse power").

The culturalist revision of what the modern state *is* has not yet been adequately extended to accounts of how modern states *came to be*. Recent work has focused on the variety of ways modern states exercise symbolic power, but not much consideration has been given to how states acquired this power in the first place. There are some important exceptions, most notably the work of Torpey (2000) and Gorski (1999, 2003). For the most part, however, existing work has explored how and to what ends modern states wield symbolic power, as opposed to how the gradual accumulation of symbolic power helped constitute modern states as such. Consequently, while we know much about the historical dynamics that concentrated military, political, and economic power in the modern state (and there are several competing theories that seek to explain the rise of modern states construed in these terms), and we know quite a bit about how states exercise symbolic power in the modern world, we know relatively little about how the modern state accumulated symbolic power.

This article lays a foundation for systematic inquiry into the primitive accumulation of symbolic power by modernizing states. Following a brief discussion of the concept of symbolic power, it introduces an analytical distinction between two phases in the relationship of symbolic power and the state: (1) primitive accumulation of symbolic power, and (2) routine exercise of symbolic power. It then presents a conceptual framework for research on the primitive accumulation of symbolic power by modernizing states. The leverage provided by this framework is then demonstrated through analysis of "the war of the wasps," a little-known popular rebellion against the implementation of civil registration in mid-19th-century Brazil. The war of the wasps frustrated the Brazilian state's attempt to establish civil registration as a legitimate state practice; it represents a significant missed opportunity for the accumulation of symbolic power by the modernizing Brazilian state.

The article concludes with a discussion of broader implications for students of modern state formation. To anticipate, it suggests, first, that our understanding of modern state formation would be enhanced by a broadened conceptualization of the explanandum, and particularly by supplementing the analytical focus on cycles of extraction and coercion with critical attention to the dynamics of early administrative extension—dynamics that enabled the accumulation of symbolic power and helped make sustained extraction and coercion possible. Second, it suggests the need for closer scrutiny of causal sequence in accounts of modern state formation to clarify the role of war making as a stimulant to administrative growth (cf. Centeno 1997). Third, the analysis lends support to

Gorski's (2003) suggestion that particular forms of state-society interdependence in the early phase of modern state formation may be a sign of state strength rather than weakness. In some cases, the dependence upon nonstate actors and resources could be pivotal for the state's administrative development. Finally, the analysis points to the general importance, in the current context, of research that historicizes the symbolic power of modern states.

### SYMBOLIC POWER

Symbolic power is the power to "constitute the given" (Bourdieu 1991, p. 170). It is the ability to make appear as natural, inevitable, and thus apolitical, that which is a product of historical struggle and human invention. Through practices of classification, codification, and regulation, for example, modern states not only naturalize certain distinctions and not others, but they also help constitute particular *kinds* of people, places, and things (cf. Hacking 1986; Starr 1987, 1992; Patriarca 1996; Scott 1998).<sup>6</sup>

Symbolic power, in Bourdieu's sense of the term, derives from the recognition of authority as legitimate, be it authority originally based in political, economic, or cultural power. The recognition of authority as legitimate confers its carrier with an additional "value-added" power above and beyond the specific form and amount of power upon which that authority is originally based. Somewhat paradoxically, while symbolic power derives from the *recognition* of legitimate authority, symbolic power produces its effects through *misrecognition*, that is, through the appearance that no power is being wielded at all (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 168).<sup>7</sup> Thus, if legitimacy, in the Weberian sense, is enjoyed when the basis of a claim to exercise authority is recognized as valid (Weber 1978, p. 214), symbolic power renders particular legitimizing claims superfluous, because the exercise of authority is no longer recognized as such.

Symbolic power is not of the same "kind" as other forms of power. In

<sup>6</sup> Thus, for example, when the inclusion of a "Hispanic" category on the U.S. census helped to bring a new social grouping into existence (Petersen 1987; Goldberg 1997), this act of *constitution* was generally perceived as an act of mere *description*. A more ominous example: when the Belgian colonial government issued identity cards to Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, what appeared to be simply an act of registration was actually an act of (re)constitution that helped to alter fundamentally popular understandings of ethnic identity, helping to set the stage for genocide (Longman 2001)

<sup>7</sup> Bourdieu refers to this phenomenon as "misrecognition" in order to emphasize what he sees as the contributing role of the dominated to their own domination: their "doxic submission" to "the objective structures of a social order of which their cognitive structures are the product" (Bourdieu 2000, p. 177; also 1992, pp. 167–68)

Michael Mann's (1986, pp. 2, 22–32) model of four sources of organized power, for example, symbolic power would not be an additional, parallel source of social power that exists alongside ideological, economic, military, and political power. In contrast to these other forms of power, symbolic power does not have its own distinctive networks of social interaction and institutions. Rather, symbolic power may be based on any or all of Mann's four forms of social power. Symbolic power is a sort of *metapower* that accrues to the carriers of specific forms of power to the extent that their particular basis of power is recognized as legitimate.

Symbolic power is a crucial stake in the struggles between the carriers of cultural, economic, political, and military power, precisely because it is the power to shape the terrain upon which such struggles take place. Symbolic power is not simply the power to set the rules of the game, but the power to "enframe" (Mitchell 1990) the game itself, establishing the practices, categories, and cognitive schemes through which the game is understood and experienced. The outcomes of competitions for ultimate legitimacy, meanwhile, are cumulative; the recognition of one basis of power as more legitimate than another in a given domain gives an upper hand to the victor in future competitions on that terrain.

Symbolic power is thus not equivalent to cultural power *per se*, at least not as cultural power is traditionally understood in the literature on modern state formation. Cultural power has figured in existing theories of modern state formation primarily as *ideology*. In particular, state-created nationalism is highlighted as a crucial ideological tool of modernizing states, used to foster the loyalty of citizens (Hobsbawm 1990; Giddens 1987). The modern state's deployment of ideological power hinges in crucial respects on the exercise of symbolic power, but the two forms of power are not one and the same. Ideological power, as traditionally understood, is exercised through the use of specific symbols, the promotion of specific cultural messages, or the inculcation of particular beliefs.<sup>8</sup> Symbolic power, meanwhile, is exercised through the naturalization of the practices and cognitive schemes that make it possible for such messages to resonate with their intended audiences. Symbolic power is exercised through that "which goes without saying" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p.168). As it accumulated in the modern state, symbolic power therefore increasingly facilitated the state's capacity to exercise ideological power. For example, it bolstered the state's capacity to "invent traditions" that

<sup>8</sup> Of course, ideological power and symbolic power are both "symbolic" in the sense that they both rely on symbols (including symbolic practices) to exert their effects. The point here is not to engage in terminological casuistry, but to draw attention to a "cultural" dimension of state power that is not adequately captured by conventional understandings of ideological power

seemingly confirm the primordial origins of national identities that were only recently constructed (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

### SYMBOLIC POWER AND THE MODERN STATE

Bourdieu (1999) has argued that modern states are the primary repositories of symbolic power in the modern world.<sup>9</sup> The exercise of symbolic power may not be a complete monopoly of modern states, but these do play with a loaded deck in struggles “to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division” of the social world. States are simultaneously contenders for particular symbolic prizes, and referees who authoritatively proclaim and enforce the rules of the game (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 134, 137). But of course this was not always the case (as Bourdieu [1999] himself strongly cautions). How, then, did symbolic power accumulate in the modern state?

#### From Primitive Accumulation to Routine Exercise

Addressing the question of how symbolic power accumulated in the modern state requires a conceptual distinction between two phases in the relationship of symbolic power and the state: (1) the *primitive accumulation of symbolic power*,<sup>10</sup> and (2) the *routine exercise of symbolic power*. In both phases, the realm of *administration* is of primary importance. But different aspects of administration demand analytical scrutiny during each phase. To grasp the dynamics of the primitive accumulation of symbolic power requires a focus on the particular modes of *extension* of the state’s administrative reach. Elucidation of the state’s routine exercise of symbolic power, on the other hand, demands attention to the broad array of state practices involved in the administrative *regulation* (broadly understood) of social life.

Symbolic power is incrementally accumulated in modern states as (or to the extent that) their administrative activities are recognized as legitimate. To begin to accumulate symbolic power, the state must carve out

<sup>9</sup> Note that while Bourdieu writes about modern states as “repositories” of symbolic power, invoking the language of *monopolization*, he nonetheless conceives of the exercise of symbolic power as characteristically *diffuse*, implying a more Foucauldian perspective on how symbolic power operates.

<sup>10</sup> The phrase “primitive accumulation” is, of course, borrowed from Karl Marx (*Capital*, vol. 1, in McLellan 1977, p. 484). It is used to capture the idea of a historical process that was part of the “prehistory” of the modern state: it is a process that is both a necessary precursor to, and constitutive of, the realization of modern statehood. Unlike the primitive accumulation of capital, however, the primitive accumulation of symbolic power is conceived as a process that *may* be zero sum, but is not necessarily so.

a new domain of social life to administer, co-opt the administrative practices of others, or wrestle existing administrative functions away from their traditional executors, imbuing them with new meanings in the process. In order to take a census of the population, for example, the state had to establish political and administrative control over a given territory. But census taking was not purely a logistical feat. The state also had to establish its legitimacy as social accountant. At least in some places, this entailed hard-won battles with existing secular and religious authorities and with local populations. The state had to engage in concrete struggles with an array of historical contenders to establish legitimate authority in a new domain. As this example suggests, during the phase of primitive accumulation of symbolic power, conflicts occur over the *boundaries* and *nature* of state involvement in particular areas of social life. State victories in such struggles are the watershed events in the historical process of the accumulation of symbolic power in the state.

Once the state has accumulated sufficient symbolic power in a given domain, subsequent struggles within that domain take place on a reconfigured terrain. The state's routine exercise of symbolic power begins when activities that were once controversial—whether issuing birth certificates, establishing standardized weights and measures, or taking a census—are no longer challenged. They come, like the modern state itself, to appear as natural features of the social landscape. As a given state practice becomes taken for granted, conflicts over the state's right to engage in that practice become increasingly rare. Attention turns instead to the specific mechanisms and techniques the state employs to get the job done. To return to the census-taking example introduced above, contemporary debates over official counts of the population may rage over which questions, categories, and sampling methods to use, but few question the right of the state to count the population in the first instance.<sup>11</sup> With the accumulation of symbolic power, the institutional reality of the state becomes naturalized. And to the extent that the array of state practices is taken

<sup>11</sup> This may be changing, however, as certain groups organize to denounce this traditional state activity (see, e.g., Scheuch, Graf, and Kuhnel 1989). The questioning or challenging of previously legitimate state activities—those that are routinely “misrecognized” as part of the natural order of things—is the primary means of undermining the state's capacity to exercise symbolic power. It is important to note, however, that efforts to *denaturalize* state power are not analytically equivalent to resistance to the extension of state authority into new domains in the first place. In the former case, the challengers are confronting the state on entirely different terms—from a position in a field characterized by the hegemony of modern states as legitimate arbiters of “domestic” social conflicts. It is an open question, and one I do not take up here, of whether we are now moving into some third stage, characterized by the declining legitimacy of the modern state with a concomitant dissolution of the state's symbolic power

## Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power

for granted, it becomes increasingly difficult to think—let alone act—“outside the state” (see Bourdieu [1999] on “minds of state”). Table 1 summarizes two dimensions of contrast between these two phases in the relationship of symbolic power and the state.

Like all ideal-typical constructs, the distinction between the primitive accumulation of symbolic power and routine exercise of symbolic power is a heuristic tool for analytical purposes. As complex organizational webs, modern states may engage in primitive accumulation of symbolic power in one domain while they already exercise symbolic power in another. Similarly, though the types of political struggles characteristic of the routine exercise of symbolic power presume that earlier struggles to accumulate symbolic power have already been settled in the state’s favor, both

TABLE 1  
SYMBOLIC POWER AND THE MODERN STATE

Phase	Types of Practices	Types of Opposition
Primitive accumulation of symbolic power	Extension of the domain of legitimate state practices through administrative innovation, imitation, co-optation, or usurpation.	Struggles over what counts as legitimate state practice (e.g., the boundaries of the state’s administrative reach).
Routine exercise of symbolic power	Naturalization of categories, cognitive schemes, and social practices through administrative regulation, codification, routinization, and socialization	Struggles over the mechanics or techniques of state practices that are recognized without question as such.

types of struggles could occur simultaneously over different state practices. Even within a single domain, once states have accumulated a modicum of symbolic power, they may begin to exercise it in ways that favor the accumulation of more. Of course, the conceptual distinction between the primitive accumulation of symbolic power and its routine exercise in itself explains nothing. But it is a necessary starting point for any analysis that seeks to understand how states became the primary repositories of symbolic power in the modern world. The next step is to develop an analytical framework that illuminates the principle *mechanisms* through which the primitive accumulation of symbolic power occurs.

### Administrative Extension and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power

Bureaucratic administration is at the heart of the modern state's ability to exercise symbolic power. Crucial to the surveillance capacities of modern states (Foucault 1979), the written documents and registers that undergird bureaucratic administration (what Weber referred to as "the files") enable the state to "contain" (Giddens 1987), "embrace" (Torpey 2000), and "penetrate" (Mann 1993) individual lives. Bureaucratic administration also enables the state to *define* more effectively the parameters of individual identities and existence (Brubaker 1996; Longman 2001; Caplan and Torpey 2001; Burleigh and Wippermann 1991).

The extension of the means of administration enables the state to gain control over the production, unification, codification, and dissemination of knowledge (what Bourdieu [1999] terms "informational capital") that is central to the state's routine exercise of symbolic power. Whether a given administrative practice primarily operates within, or is oriented to, the cultural, economic, political, or military sphere, the informational capital it generates facilitates the state's exercise of symbolic power by helping to constitute (what is then taken to be) the natural order of things. To understand better where the state's capacity to exercise symbolic power came from, it thus makes sense to focus on the historical development of the state's administrative infrastructure.

Of course, existing accounts of modern state formation have emphasized the development of the means of bureaucratic administration. This emphasis follows Weber (1978, p. 223), who saw the development of bureaucratic administration "at the root of the modern Western state." However, bellicist accounts have treated this development in almost entirely "materialist" terms. To take one well-known example, Tilly's account of the rise of modern states in Western Europe highlights how administrative structures were generated by preparations for war: "A ruler's creation of armed force generated durable state structure. It did so both because an army became a significant organization within the state and because its construction and maintenance brought complementary organizations—treasuries, supply services, mechanisms for conscription, tax bureaus, and much more—into life" (Tilly 1992, p. 70). Administrative structures are viewed as a by-product of the material demands of preparing for war.

The cultural dimension of administrative development is all but lost in such accounts. To develop administrative capacity, the state had to succeed in harnessing existing material and human resources and putting them to work for its purposes. Brute force alone could not accomplish this, at least not on the scale or for the duration necessary to yield "durable state structure." To be sustained on a broad scale, administrative under-

takings such as conscription, taxation, or systems of individual identification required the compliance that comes from recognition of the state's legitimate authority to engage in such activities (cf. Weber 1978). The early development and expansion of bureaucratic administration thus hinged on establishing such activities as legitimate state practices.

States accumulated symbolic power as they succeeded in making particular administrative activities recognized as legitimate state practices. As specific administrative practices came to appear as naturally, rightfully, or inevitably the prerogative of the state, the power of the state to "order" more of social life was enhanced. To understand the historical foundations of the state's symbolic power, the question thus becomes: How, or through what means and to what extent, did states manage to garner recognition of their legitimate authority to undertake particular administrative practices, especially in the early phases of their administrative development? Or put more simply, how did states manage to extend their administrative reach?<sup>12</sup>

The extension of the state's administrative infrastructure was at once a logistical and a cultural feat. The state's administrative growth was not a uniform, automatic, or inevitable outcome of purely "material" processes, even though it may sometimes appear as such in retrospect. Administrative development (or the lack thereof) is better conceived as the cumulative product of concrete historical struggles, of varying types and intensity, over the boundaries of legitimate state practice—and thus, over the practical definition of the state itself.

### Modes of Administrative Extension

Generally speaking, the administrative reach of modernizing states was extended in one of four ways. First, agents of the state could *innovate*, inventing new administrative practices and carving out new domains of social life to administer (cf. Zerubavel 1997). Second, agents of the state could *imitate* the existing administrative practices of nonstate actors, possibly (but not necessarily) rendering such practices redundant or superfluous. Third, agents of the state could *co-opt* the traditional administrative practices of local or religious authorities, incorporating them into the state's administrative apparatus. Finally, agents of the state could *usurp* the administrative practices of nonstate actors, stripping them of the means and/or authority to continue their traditional practices and taking over these practices themselves, imbuing them with new meanings in the process.

<sup>12</sup> The question of *how* states extended their administrative reach is different from the question of *why* they sought to do so; it is the former question that is considered here.



*Innovation.*—The traditional view of state formation as a top-down, center-out process implies that much of the administrative development of modern states occurred through innovation: the creation of new organizations, institutions, and administrative practices to solve concrete problems faced by modernizing states. Censuses, for example, are typically viewed as administrative tools originally developed to facilitate resource extraction, especially taxation and conscription. Similarly, passports are seen as an invention of modernizing states intent on controlling the flow of humans across (and within) their borders (Torpey 2000). The invention and implementation of new administrative practices is most likely to succeed when such practices do not directly threaten the ideal or material interests of local or nonstate authorities or the populations who are their targets. To the extent that administrative innovations do challenge established interests, the state's success in implementing them will hinge on its capacity to impose its will. This capacity may depend, in the last analysis, on the effective control of the means of physical coercion. But coercion may prove unnecessary when the state's right or authority to engage in such administrative practices is already seen as legitimate—that is, where the state has already accumulated a modicum of symbolic power. Moreover, as suggested by the case discussed below, control over the means of physical coercion may itself depend on prior success in accumulating symbolic power.

*Imitation.*—Even when it appears that modernizing states are innovating, they may actually be imitating the existing practices of religious or local authorities. For example, Gorski notes how the introduction of systems of venality in many Catholic polities of early modern Europe followed the model provided by the papacy, while forms of bureaucratic office holding that eventually took hold in many Protestant polities drew inspiration from the *Reformatio*, an early critique of the Roman Church (Gorski 2003, pp. 144–54). The extension of the state's administrative reach could occur through the adoption by state actors of existing administrative practices of nonstate actors or organizations. In many countries, for example, the implementation of secular systems of civil registration closely emulated the long-established record-keeping practices of local religious authorities. The establishment of seemingly parallel administrative practices by state actors might inspire resistance from traditional authorities and local populations to the extent that the state's activities are seen as a threat to traditional prerogatives or as an illegitimate infringement on the traditional order of things.

*Co-optation.*—Rather than creating parallel state agencies to undertake administrative activities already practiced in a closely related form by local secular or religious authorities, the state could extend its administrative reach by incorporating traditional administrative practices—and

practitioners—into the state apparatus. Indeed, it could be to the state's advantage to capitalize upon the experience and legitimacy of traditional authorities rather than directly challenging them. One way to do this would be through cooperative ventures. Thus, for example, a church-run poorhouse or orphanage could be made a state institution with no change in staff and minor, if any, change in administrative practice. Or, a state could extend its authority by regulating economic activities and the labor market through previously existing guilds. Likewise, a system of civil registration could be established with parish priests serving as the local authorities in charge of keeping the records. Such co-optation could simultaneously bolster the power, prestige, and administrative capacity of local, religious, and central state actors. A more likely outcome, however, is the eventual if not immediate subordination of the original administrative objectives, and their practitioners, to the designs of the state.

*Usurpation.*—Finally, states could extend their infrastructural power by taking over and modifying the administrative practices of authorities or organizations outside the state. This approach is most likely to yield resistance from traditional authorities since it generally implies a diminution of their power, status, and possibly even material well-being. It is also quite likely to spark opposition by the “administered” population, though this will depend on, among other things, the relative legitimacy of traditional versus central state authority in a particular context.

In important respects, the struggles between local, religious, and central state actors that result from efforts to extend the state's administrative reach are akin to the “jurisdictional struggles” detailed by Andrew Abbott in *The System of Professions* (1988). Two (or more) sets of social actors, positioned in different but overlapping institutional fields, vie with each other for authority over a particular domain of administrative practice, and the outcomes of these battles help delimit the boundaries of each field (i.e., where “the state” ends and “civil society” or “the church” begins). One important difference, however, is that while jurisdictional struggles are conceived as zero-sum games, the extension of the state's administrative reach *may* result in zero-sum conflicts (especially in the case of usurpation), but it may also generate positive-sum games (in the case of innovation, imitation, or especially co-optation).

Modes of administrative extension that involve cooperation or coordination between state and nonstate actors may enhance the symbolic power of both parties, resulting in a greater overall capacity to “order” social life (cf. Mann's [1993, pp. 6–7] discussion of “collective power”; also Parsons [1960b, pp. 199–225; 1967, pp. 378–82]). Historically, however, the overall balance of symbolic power tended to shift in the state's favor, suggesting another important difference from the jurisdictional struggles analyzed by Abbott. In the context of modern state formation, one set of

contenders was apt to enter into jurisdictional struggles with a loaded deck; in successive rounds, state actors simultaneously competed with those in other fields for jurisdictional authority over particular practices *and* increasingly managed to define the nature of the game and set the rules of engagement.

Attention to the distinct modes of administrative extension creates analytical leverage to explore how, exactly, states managed to establish new administrative activities as legitimate state practices. Which strategy was most likely to succeed, and under what conditions? Why did state actors opt for one strategy rather than another? How did the particular mode of initial administrative extension in a given domain affect the subsequent development of bureaucratic administration in that or other domains? And building on Gorski's (1993, 2003) findings, under what conditions did the availability of particular institutions and cultural practices outside the state become a resource for bureaucratic growth? What made the potential of such resources "visible" to state actors? What conditions facilitated the "harnessing" of such resources, through "organizational entwining" or other means?

To theorize the formation of modern states qua repositories of symbolic power requires comparative historical research to address these sorts of questions. The remainder of this article takes an initial step down this path through analysis of the 19th-century Brazilian state's failed attempt to establish civil registration as a legitimate state practice. As a single instance of *failure* to accumulate symbolic power, the case of the war of the wasps does not alone suffice to generate or test a fully developed theory of how states accumulate symbolic power. Nor, in this instance, does the negative case serve to test or expand upon an existing theory (cf. Emigh 1997), given that no theory of how states accumulate symbolic power yet exists. Rather, consideration of this case serves a primarily *heuristic* purpose: it suggests why we ought to attend to the historical constitution of the state's symbolic power, illustrates how we can go about doing this, and indicates where the work of theory building could fruitfully begin. Cases such as the war of the wasps are ideal for exploring the historical dynamics through which specific state practices become naturalized, because it is precisely in moments of contestation over the boundaries of legitimate state practice that the historical contingency of the state's symbolic power is exposed.

#### THE WAR OF THE WASPS

The war of the wasps is a little-known popular revolt that frustrated the Brazilian state's attempt to implement civil registration and take its first

national census in the mid-19th century.<sup>13</sup> Though a relatively minor episode compared to other major revolts in the history of Brazilian state building, the war of the wasps is particularly interesting because the rural backlanders emerged victorious from their violent encounter with state authority. Civil registration of births and deaths and the census of the population were suspended indefinitely. The war of the wasps forced the retreat of the Brazilian state from this administrative domain—it would not try to enter it again for several decades.

The failure to establish civil registration represented a significant setback for the Brazilian state in the 1850s. Civil registration lies at the heart of the modern state's extractive-coercive power, facilitating rationalized systems of conscription and taxation. It is also central to the modern state's symbolic power, conferring control over the legitimate means of individual identification (Noiriel 2001; Torpey 2000). The establishment of a system of universal civil registration in 1851 would have represented a pivotal administrative accomplishment for the modernizing Brazilian state.

#### The Brazilian State in 1850

In contrast to the Spanish-American republics that won independence through years of destructive war with Spain, Brazil became independent from Portugal through a peaceful negotiation that left Pedro I, son of King João of Portugal, on the throne of the Brazilian monarchy and ruler of the Brazilian Empire. In the decade following independence in 1822, political battles raged over the form the Brazilian nation-state would take. At root were competing conceptions of nationhood: "A conception of the nation as polity based on traditional forms of inherited authority and directed by a ruler of heroic stature was increasingly challenged by a conception that equated the nation with the people and derived all authority from the popular will" (Barman 1988, p. 131). With the abdication of Pedro I in 1831, the latter conception emerged victorious. Brazil would be a constitutional monarchy. The throne was left to the five-year-old Pedro II, and regents were appointed to rule in his name. The following six years witnessed a devolution of considerable political autonomy to the provinces and various liberal experiments in formal political arrange-

<sup>13</sup> The following account is a summary based on original archival research conducted at the National Archive in Rio de Janeiro and the State Archive of Pernambuco in Recife. For a detailed historical analysis of the revolt that situates it in the Brazilian historiography, see Loveman (manuscript). The origins and course of this episode are not documented in the existing historical literature in English, though it is mentioned briefly in some general histories of Brazil (e.g., Barman 1988, p. 236). In the Brazilian literature, I am aware of one detailed secondary account (Palacios 1989), along with brief treatments by Monteiro (1981, p. 19) and Melo (1920).

ments. By the late 1830s, the centrifugal force unleashed by the decentralization of political power threatened to tear asunder the unity of the Brazilian Empire. With the (relative) opening up of the polity, local factional disputes had triggered mass uprisings and major revolts throughout Brazil, all of which espoused strong nativist inspirations, and some of which included claims to independent statehood.

The suppression of regional revolts and the restoration of order became the central goal of the second phase of the Regency period, known as the *Regresso*. The Regresso leaders were intent on reestablishing the primacy of the national government and crushing threats to the political unity and territorial integrity of the Brazilian nation-state. The centralizing aims of the national government fomented resentment among provincial leaders, who envisioned Brazil as a federation of autonomous provinces. The attempt to centralize power in Rio de Janeiro was seen as a return to Portuguese colonial ways and fueled intense opposition in both northern and southern provinces. With the final defeat of separatists in the south (Rio Grande do Sul) in 1845, and the north (Pernambuco) in 1849, the last serious threats to the political existence of the Brazilian nation-state in its current form were eliminated (Barman 1988).

In the 1850s, the national government undertook to consolidate the triumphant nation-state through the development of the central state's administrative apparatus and its extension into the provinces. The slew of new laws that aimed simultaneously to concentrate power in the central state and extend the state's administrative reach into the "interior" (i.e., beyond the court in Rio de Janeiro) included decree 797, calling for the first census of the entire population of Brazil and, as prelude to this, decree 798, calling for civil registration of births and deaths.

### The Civil Registration Law

In September of 1850, a provision for the government to incur the necessary expenses to undertake a general census of the empire and to institute regular registration of births and deaths was included in the budget law for the following year. The first census of the Brazilian Empire was scheduled to take place in June of 1852. Civil registration of births and deaths would commence six months earlier, beginning January 1, 1852.

By the provisions of decree 798 (June 18, 1851), civil registration was placed in the charge of notaries of the justices of the peace. Notaries were to register newborns within 72 hours of birth. Without official certification of birth, parish priests were to withhold baptism "except in cases of evident danger to the life of the newborn." Registration of death was to occur within 24 hours. Without an official death certificate, cadavers were not

to be buried in cemeteries (*Coleção das Leis* 1851, decree 798, articles 5 and 10).

The civil registry decree did not formally encroach on the traditional recording activities of parish priests. Indeed, the wording of decree 798 carefully avoided any suggestion of a jurisdictional struggle between secular and religious authorities over the control of the legitimate means of identification. The final article of the decree stated explicitly: "By the dispositions of this Law it is not to be understood that the Ecclesiastical registers, which the Parish priests customarily do, are suppressed. . . . These will be continued, as they have until now, to prove baptisms and marriages" (*Coleção das Leis* 1851, decree 798, article 33). Civil registration was envisioned as a parallel, secular system of documenting individuals' existence that would not challenge or replace parish registers.

The judicious wording of decree 798 suggests that the state anticipated the possibility of opposition from religious authorities and attempted to preempt it. Apparently, this preemptive move succeeded. Though parish priests and their superiors registered some disapproval of how the decree was to be carried out, disruptive opposition to the decree came not from church authorities but from the population to be registered.

### The Revolt

In the days following January 1, 1852, when decree 798 was meant to take effect, reports of violent uprisings began to appear in local newspapers and were reproduced in the papers of the court in Rio de Janeiro. In settlements and small towns across the northeastern interior, hundreds of men and "even women armed with knives" threatened the lives of local authorities who attempted to comply with the law. In some settlements, anywhere from 600–1,000 people swarmed the central square (*matriz*) to block the enactment of the decree.<sup>14</sup>

In the face of violent opposition, the government appealed to local authorities to make the people see the errors of their ways and clarify the "good intentions" of the government. These efforts proved useless; resistance to the decree spread throughout the northeast. While claiming to the press that everything was under control, the provincial president of Pernambuco, Victor d'Oliveira, ordered the ninth infantry battalion dispatched to the epicenter of the uprising, the hardscrabble farming town of Pau d'Alho. The lieutenant colonel in command of the battalion followed his orders dutifully, marching his 90-some men across the backlands

<sup>14</sup> See, e.g., the report of a local religious authority to the provincial president of Pernambuco on January 7, 1852 (Arquivo Público Estadual Pernambucano, "Autoridades Eclesiásticas" [hereinafter APEP-AE] 1852, p. 16).

and promising to use force if necessary to pacify the populace. As they marched, the battalion was ambushed; two soldiers were killed and five others were wounded. The battalion commander reported that the entire area was in turmoil and that "given the circumstances of things" he doubted pacification could be achieved without the use of force (Arquivo Estadual Pernambucano, "Oficiais do Exército" 1852, n. 16).<sup>15</sup>

Not wanting to rely solely on the sword (or in this case, the musket), the provincial president had also sent the cross to pacify the tumultuous backlanders. Fortunately for the populace, the Capuchin missionary, Frei Caetano de Messina, arrived first on the scene. Winning the trust of the populace, he managed to transform the violent uprising into an occasion of mass religious fervor. Explaining his success to the provincial president, Frei Caetano noted that "it was not fear of military force, which only irritated them further, that obliged them to put down their weapons, it was only the reign that Sacred Religion still has over them" (APEP-AE 1852, p. 45).<sup>16</sup>

An imperial decree on January 29, 1852, announced the indefinite suspension of the decrees calling for civil registration and the census of the empire (*Coleção das Leis* 1852, decree 907). This was clearly a direct result of popular opposition.<sup>17</sup> The next attempt to conduct a national census—this time divorced from the implementation of civil registration—would come only 20 years later, in 1872. Brazil would reintroduce civil registration in 1874, but it was not until after 1889, when Brazil transitioned to a republic, that obligatory civil registration would meet with any degree of success (Meira 1994).

### Why Did the Revolt Succeed?

How did a relatively small, popular uprising in a remote region of the Brazilian interior manage to force the suspension, and, ultimately, the cancellation of a decree that sought to establish civil registration throughout all of Brazil? Put another way, why did the Brazilian state fail to implement civil registration *despite* this popular opposition?

The seemingly most obvious answer is that the Brazilian state lacked a reliable, well-equipped, and professionally trained army to enforce its

<sup>15</sup> Report from Hygino José Coelho, lieutenant colonel in command of the ninth infantry battalion, to Victor d'Oliveira, president of the Province of Pernambuco, sent from the Engenho Cajueiro, January 6, 1852.

<sup>16</sup> Letter from Frei Caetano de Messina to Victor d'Oliveira, provincial president, dated February 21, 1852.

<sup>17</sup> The minister of empire cites the "grave occurrences" engendered by the decrees as justification for delaying civil registration and the census in his annual report to the legislative assembly in 1852 (*Relatório apresentado* [1852] 1853, p. 33).

will. Had the Brazilian state been backed by a dependable, professional army instead of scattered contingents of more or less competent, more or less reliable “battalions” of forced recruits, criminals, and unfortunate “desprotegidos,” the war of the wasps might well have unfolded differently.<sup>18</sup> As it was, the 90 men sent in to pacify the town of Pau d’Alho proved to be a catalyst for intensified protest rather than an effective guarantor of public order. The bands of men forcibly assembled to stand in for a professional army belied the limitations of the Brazilian state’s concentration of the legitimate means of physical coercion.

But the lack of a professional army also underscores the limitations of the state’s infrastructural power—its power to rule *through* society rather than over society (Mann 1993). From this perspective, the Brazilian state’s rather pitiful show of an organized threat of physical coercion can be read as a *symptom* of the state’s failure to extend its administrative reach, rather than its primary cause. The creation of a modern, professional Brazilian army depended on the very sort of administrative infrastructure that decree 798 sought to establish. Indeed, as several generations of reform-minded officers within the Brazilian army would subsequently insist, civil registration was the crucial *precondition* for universal conscription, which stood at the heart of a modern, professional army (McCann 1984, 2004; Beattie 1994, 2001).

Even if it were possible for a mass standing army to be created in the absence of a rationalized system of individual registration, and even if the Brazilian state in 1850 had had such an army, it is unlikely that the threat of physical coercion alone would have sufficed to guarantee the successful implementation of civil registration. To enforce a law of civil registration through the threat of physical coercion alone would demand a monitoring and enforcement capacity that is beyond the reach of even most 21st-century states. A modern and formidable standing army might very well have quickened the suppression of the revolt or attenuated its spread in the first place. But it is unlikely that the threat of physical coercion would have been sufficient to guarantee the compliance of the population with decree 798, day in and day out, across the vast expanse of Brazil (cf. Weber 1978).

The war of the wasps forced the suspension of decree 798 by making it plainly evident that the state could not count on the population to comply voluntarily with the new system of civil registration. Without the cooperation of those who would be registered, the massive administrative undertaking of identifying all individuals born and deceased in Brazil

<sup>18</sup> Literally, “desprotegidos” means “unprotected ones.” Beattie (1994, 2001) and Meznar (1992) both document the importance of patronage ties to local authorities or landowner/employers for guaranteeing protection from forced recruitment into the army.



was simply an impossible task. Cooperation from the population, in turn, hinged on establishing the legitimacy of the state to engage in the practice of individual identification. As it was, registration of individuals was not recognized as something that the state could and should legitimately do. The war of the wasps disputed the boundaries of what was considered legitimate state activity. It challenged the state's attempt to extend the boundaries of the state itself by broadening the domain of legitimate state practices.

The Brazilian state's failure, then, was a failure to elicit the population's voluntary compliance with the new procedures for civil registration. Viewed through the analytical framework outlined above, this failure can be seen as primarily a result of the *particular way* that the state attempted to extend its administrative reach into the domain of individual identification. Of the various modes of administrative extension (innovation, imitation, co-optation, usurpation), the Brazilian state opted for a strategy that combined considerable imitation—of religious forms of registration as well as foreign models of civil registration—with some minor innovation. This strategy appeared to maximize state autonomy, deliberately avoiding the co-optation of religious record-keeping practices and practitioners. The strategy also sought to avoid “jurisdictional struggles” (Abbott 1988) by steering clear of procedures that might be construed as attempts to usurp directly the competencies of religious authorities.

Intended to guarantee the measure's success, this go-it-alone strategy instead undermined the state's objective. The formal stipulations of autonomy from agents of the church could not hide the fact that the state's parallel system of individual registration depended entirely upon the continued demand for baptism and religious burial to secure the cooperation of the population. Lacking sufficient legitimacy to elicit voluntary compliance with the decree, the state attempted to free ride on the legitimacy of the church. Without formal co-optation of local religious authorities, it relied on the “reign of Sacred Religion” over the populace to ensure cooperation with its secular demands. The creation of a secular system of identification that was essentially parallel to church registries may have preempted some forms of opposition from religious authorities, but it also exposed the state to direct opposition from the population it intended to register.

The creation of a separate register of births and deaths in the hands of local secular authorities fomented popular resistance for two primary reasons. First, it fueled a rumor that the government intended to use the lists to enslave free people of color: decree 798 was dubbed the “law of enslavement” (*lei do captiveiro*). The importation of African slaves had been banned only a year earlier, in 1850, creating new pressures on the

domestic slave market.<sup>19</sup> For the impoverished inhabitants of the northeastern backlands, the idea that the government would collude with landowners to develop an alternative means to ensure a fixed labor supply took little stretch of the imagination. After all, why would the state go to the enormous trouble of keeping its own records of every single birth throughout the territory without some tangible purpose in mind?<sup>20</sup> Moreover, collusion between land owners and local agents of the state to enslave the free poor was not without precedent (Freitas 1994). The practice of outright enslavement of the free poor appears to have been uncommon, but even one known instance would be sufficient to lend credence to the rumor that decree 798 was, in fact, a “law of enslavement.”

The idea that the state sought to strip the rural poor of their freedom was no doubt also supported by prevailing practices of forced recruitment into the army. Involuntary conscription was quite common, with the army barracks serving as a quasi-penal institution for vagrants, petty criminals, derelicts, dishonorable lovers, and other unfortunates (Beattie 2001). Though conscripts were not legally reduced to slavery, conscription was often experienced as a form of “abduction” by the state. And while there is no direct evidence that the populace feared civil registration’s use to rationalize conscription, the pervasive threat of involuntary recruitment no doubt contributed to the general distrust of the state that made the rumor that decree 798 was a “law of enslavement” seem plausible. In the eyes of the rural population, decree 798 would facilitate the state’s ability to identify, control, and coerce, and there was no reason to think anything good could come of that. In part, violent opposition to civil registration was a product of this quite rational fear of physical coercion at the hands of government authorities.

Second, the state’s strategy for implementing civil registration engendered its own opposition by interposing agents of the state between individuals and their hopes for eternal salvation. In requiring priests to withhold baptism or burial rites in the absence of a notary’s certificate,

<sup>19</sup> The 1850 ban on the import of African slaves was a direct consequence of diplomatic and military pressure from the British government, including the authorization of British cruisers “to enter Brazilian harbors . . . and to seize and destroy all vessels suspected of slaving.” The Brazilian government sought to preserve the pretense of sovereignty by passing a law to end the illegal importation of slaves (Barman 1988, p. 233, also Bethell 1970). Slavery remained legal in Brazil until 1888.

<sup>20</sup> Notably, decree 798 did not call for the color of free persons to be recorded in birth or death registries, although it did require this information in the registration of slaves. The tangible motivations attributed to the government for implementation of decree 798 were not correct. (In fact, the Brazilian government’s motivations for taking a census and conducting civil registration were more symbolic than material at this particular conjuncture [Loveman 2001; Ventresca 1995]). But the inaccuracy of the rumors did not temper their resonance among the northeastern Brazilian populace.

the state appeared to be erecting capricious obstacles to people's access to the promised land. Indeed, from one day to the next, entrance to "God's Kingdom" became contingent on possession of a piece of paper from an agent of the state. While in principle such papers would be readily available, in the reality of the Brazilian interior of the time, securing such papers would often be a major hurdle, requiring lengthy and hazardous journeys across rough, arid terrain to the house of the nearest notary. Decrying the severity of the consequences to the rural poor who failed to comply with the decree, a vicar wrote to his superior that withholding baptism to those who failed to register with notaries would "drive the *povo* to complete despair" (APEP-AE 1852, p. 2). Against a backdrop of general distrust of the state's material aims, the backhanded interposition of secular authority between people and their priests sabotaged whatever chance decree 798 had of success.

### The Path Not Taken

Before the disturbances began, the archbishop of Bahia wrote a letter to Pedro II criticizing the decree. Through a veil of conciliatory language, the archbishop reprimanded the government for placing parish priests in the position of having to choose between "submission to the powerful veto of the notary of the peace and obedience owed to the orders of Heaven" (*O Argos Maranhense* 1852, n. 52). The aims of the state would be better served, he suggested, if parish priests were put in charge of the registries. In the archbishop's view, priests could effectively serve the interests of the state if the government would only enforce three conditions: "(1) employ all prudent means to enforce execution of the law of the Church on the reception of baptism; (2) impose severe penalties on parish priests who show themselves to be negligent in certifying baptisms, marriages and deaths; (3) in order to remove all pretexts and excuses, make sure [priests] are supplied with the official books required for the registrations" (*O Argos Maranhense* 1852, n. 52).

Clearly, in proposing that priests take over the role of local notaries and that the power of the state be employed to ensure compliance with "the law of the Church," the archbishop sought to bolster the power of the church through an alliance with the state. But whatever his own motivations, the archbishop was probably correct to suggest that such an alliance would have also bolstered the power of the state. If the Brazilian government had accepted the archbishop's proposal—or even a modified version that charged parish priests with the maintenance of two registries, one religious, one civil—it is likely that the popular distrust of the registry's aims would have been attenuated, along with most of the opposition to civil registration.

In principle, there was no reason why the parish priests could not be charged with this secular task. In contrast to the situation in Spanish Latin America, the peaceful transition from Portuguese colony to independent constitutional monarchy had not interrupted the pope's recognition of the Brazilian state's royal patronage over the church, or *padroado real* (Meecham 1947; see also Boxer 1978). In practice, this meant that church officials were already, technically, functionaries of the state.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, the legitimacy of priestly authority in the northeastern backlands, and the unquestioned acceptance of their practice of recording baptism and burial, made parish priests ideal allies in the state's quest to establish the legitimacy of its registration of births and deaths. In the hands of parish priests the registries would not have taken on the menacing aspect that they acquired *precisely because* they were in the charge of secular authorities.

However, to rely explicitly on agents of the church to do what "ought" to be the work of the state went against prevailing ideas of what made a modern state a modern state. Inspired by the French example, state modernization was equated with secularization. Hence, the archbishop's call for parish priests to take over the role of maintaining the registries was dismissed by the Council of State, the constitutionally enshrined advisory body to Pedro II, when it met in January of 1852 to address complaints lodged by various public authorities in response to decree 798. The council's report included a curt response to the archbishop's plea: "Since the registers pertain to the civil status of Citizens, it is only appropriate that it be done by civil functionaries." Moreover, putting the priests in charge of the registers would be a hindrance to individuals who do not practice "the State's Religion." And finally, the Council blithely noted, "Our country's experience has shown that the parish priests are not the most apt for this type of work."<sup>22</sup> The idea that the state could bolster its legitimacy, and hence, its administrative capacity, by heightening its dependence on the church, even for the short term, seemed anathema. Such reliance on the church would blur the boundaries of church and state precisely when the state was working to sharpen that

<sup>21</sup> Pedro II did not have much confidence in parish priests, but civil registration in this context was not an open attack on the church. In general, church-state conflict was not a major issue in imperial Brazil, precisely because the pope recognized the monarchy's royal patronage over the church, including "the right to nominate Church officials and supervise Church administration" (Burkholder and Johnson 1998, p. 353).

<sup>22</sup> Quotations are from the report of the Council of State's session of January 22, 1852, concerning "doubts raised by some Provincial Presidents and the Reverend Archbishop of Bahia with respect to the execution of Articles 2, 9, 23 and 24 of Decree 798 of June 18, 1851" (Arquivo Nacional [hereinafter AN-CE] 1852, pac 2, doc. 38).

divide, in the belief that such differentiation was in itself a benchmark of state strength.

Notably, a lone member of the Council of State dissented with the majority's decision to modify some of the administrative technicalities of decree 798 without any fundamental changes to its basic design. In a minority opinion at the end of the council's report, the Visconde de Olinda made a case for transferring responsibility for civil registration to religious authorities. He rejected the presumption that parish priests would prove unreliable functionaries and argued that they were in fact "the only authorities capable of carrying out this function." Given the actual conditions in Brazil's interior, he argued, the desire to enforce a strict separation of civil and ecclesiastic functionaries was "nothing but a lovely ideal, with no base in reality" (AN-CE 1852, pac. 2, doc. 38). His call fell on deaf ears, however. In the end, the Council of State would choose to cancel the decree altogether before it would consider relying on religious authorities to undertake the quintessentially "civic" task of registration of births and deaths.

Thus, the French-inspired, liberal assumption that state modernization meant secularization may have had the unintended consequence, in 19th-century Brazil, of undermining the very sorts of administrative advances that would have greatly bolstered the infrastructural power of the state.<sup>23</sup> Co-optation would likely have enabled the Brazilian state to "harness" (Gorski 2003) the legitimacy and local administrative resources of the church, transforming them, at least partially, into instruments of the state. Explicit reliance on parish priests as employees of the state would have meant an apparent sacrifice of state autonomy in the short run. But by

<sup>23</sup> The influence of France on 19th-century Latin American elites is well established (on Brazil, see, e.g., Needell [1987]). With respect to this particular episode, the archbishop's letter to Pedro II makes clear that the French model for civil registration was, in fact, a contemporary reference point: "I know that in many other countries there are similar laws, and that in France they went so far . . . as to require that newborns be presented to the civil authority to be entered into the birth register before going to Church to receive the sign of salvation. But, Sir, Your Imperial Majesty knows better than I, that the population of France is all clustered together in its respective parishes or districts, with the convenience of easy communication, while in our country the population is all dispersed across an extensive surface and lacks comparable facilities for prompt communication with local authorities. Additionally, the French legislation in ecclesiastical matters is biased by old religious controversies, and more than anything else, by the influence of the great revolution, which abolished the Catholic religion and made everything profane. . . . It is evident that in Brazil, where thanks to divine mercy the purity of our religious doctrine and customs was never even slightly altered, we are not in that offensive situation. And if I am permitted to comment on the goals that the government of Your Imperial Majesty has in proposing this measure, I will observe that they can be equally, if not better, fulfilled—without vexing the populace—by using parochial registers instead" (letter from the archbishop of Bahia to Pedro II, reprinted in *O Argos Maranhense*, February 20, 1852, n. 52).

ensuring the compliance of the population with registration of births and deaths, the reliance on the local religious authorities would have yielded greater state capacity—both material and symbolic—in the end. Instead, the state attempted to go it alone, exacerbating popular suspicions and cultivating violent protest. Rather than enabling the extension of the state's legitimate authority to a new domain, the particular way the state attempted to implement decree 798 undermined whatever hope it might have had for success. The Brazilian state failed to accumulate symbolic power because central state actors were unable (or unwilling) to see ecclesiastical authorities as resources to be “harnessed” instead of obstacles to be avoided or overcome.

### BROADER IMPLICATIONS

Analysis of the war of the wasps has several broad implications for our understanding of modern state formation. First, it suggests the need for a broadened conceptualization of what theories of modern state formation need to explain (cf. Gorski 2003). Increasingly, modern states are sustained and empowered—to the extent that they are sustained and empowered—by their routine exercise of symbolic power. The capacity of modern states to wield effectively ideological, economic, political, and even military power hinges largely, and perhaps ultimately, on the capacity to constitute the “givens” of social life. Theories of modern state formation, therefore, must account for how states came to be the preeminent wielders of symbolic power in the modern world.

To theorize the historical dynamics of the primitive accumulation of symbolic power demands a shift in analytical focus from the dynamics of extraction and coercion toward the mechanisms of early administrative extension. From a primary focus on the concentration of military power, the analytical lens hones in on the historical foundations of naturalized administrative power. This shift in focus does not eclipse the traditional bellicist concerns from view; rather, it reframes the picture, bringing the intimate relationship between the accumulation of symbolic power and the concentration of military, economic, political, and cultural power into clearer view.

Expanding and deepening our current understanding of modern state formation requires greater attention to the incipient administrative development of central state infrastructure. And, in particular, it requires an analytical lens that sees the creation of “durable state structure” as simultaneously a logistical and a cultural feat. The protoadministrative development of states—the symbolic/material groundwork that was laid before war or any other potential engine of state growth could exert its

effects—appears to be a crucial determinant of subsequent state development (Centeno 1997; Gorski 2003).

This points to a second implication of the foregoing analysis: the need for closer scrutiny of causal sequence in accounts of modern state formation. In particular, the case of the war of the wasps calls into question the precise nature of the relationship between the concentration of military power and administrative growth. In bellicist accounts, the primary engine of administrative development was the creation of armed force in preparation for war, as in Tilly's oft-cited dictum: "War made the state, and the state made war" (Tilly 1975, p. 42). The growth of administrative structure is basically viewed as a by-product of preparation for war (Tilly 1992, p. 70). But Centeno (1997, p. 1569) has demonstrated that war only fosters state growth where existing administrative mechanisms can "manage the explosion in both revenues and expenditures," and where states enjoy enough support from key sectors of the population "to make domestic extraction profitable." Similarly, Torpey (2000, pp. 14–15) argues that conscription and taxation can only fuel state growth if states succeed in "embracing" their populations through a variety of administrative techniques. These studies indicate that some threshold of administrative development and accompanying naturalization of state authority has to be reached before war-driven "extraction-coercion cycles" (Finer 1975) can drive subsequent state development.

The case of the war of the wasps lends support to this claim, albeit indirectly. The weakness of the Brazilian army, and hence its failure to put down the revolt, was clearly a symptom of the inadequacy of the state's administrative foundations. The shortcomings of the Brazilian state on this front were thus compounded; the lack of a professional armed force, stemming from inadequate administrative capacity, resulted in the failure to enforce a measure that would have improved that capacity considerably.

This suggests that early failures to accumulate symbolic power—that is, to establish the state's legitimacy to engage in basic administrative practices—hindered the accumulation of other forms of power as well. Conversely, initial success in accumulating symbolic power was apt to breed additional success in state-building endeavors, as the naturalization of state authority in one domain facilitated the extension of the state into others. For example, once set in motion, the accumulation of symbolic power via administrative extension and the concentration of military power via rationalized conscription were mutually reinforcing. Once established as legitimate state practice, systems of individual identification facilitated the creation of standing armies. These armies increased the state's capacity to exercise coercion, whether in pursuit of additional military might or in the name of other social, economic, or political aims. At

the same time, armed forces bolstered the symbolic power of states in ways that facilitated the exercise of ideological power: ritualized shows of military force appeared to signify the inevitability of state power, while techniques of training soldiers inscribed the legitimacy of state authority into individual bodies and minds.

Each success in accumulating symbolic power tilted the playing field to the state's advantage, as more and more state practices delimited the "givens" of individual and social existence. Early victories in the naturalization of seemingly inconsequential state practices could thus have cascading effects for subsequent state development. If on the one hand, the absence of underlying administrative capacity inhibited extraction-coercion cycles from ever getting off the ground, on the other hand, early successes in administrative development could be self-reinforcing and thus very difficult to stop. This makes it all the more important to scrutinize the dynamics that portend the success or failure of the primitive accumulation of symbolic power by modernizing states.

A third implication of the case examined here is the suggestion that the relative success or failure of the state's administrative extension into new domains was determined, at least in part, by the *particular way* the state attempted to extend its administrative reach. The administrative extension of the state could occur through innovation, emulation, co-optation, usurpation, or some combination of these methods. The war of the wasps suggests that co-optation of existing administrative and symbolic resources of nonstate, and especially religious, actors could yield better results for the state than either constructing wholly autonomous administrative structures through innovation or imitation, or attempting to usurp existing practices and risking clashes over jurisdiction.

Though additional research is necessary to fully specify this claim, it is supported by Gorski's research on the role of Calvinism in state formation in early modern Europe. As part of a larger, more nuanced argument about the influence of Calvinist "disciplinary revolutions" on the development of early modern European polities, Gorski suggests that whether administrative structures were generated from the top down (through innovation and emulation) or the bottom up (through co-optation) had significant repercussions for the extent and profundity of bureaucratization and thus the strength and capacity of modernizing states. Gorski argues that the "unusual capacity" of states such as the Netherlands and Prussia is at least partly a product of the way they managed to harness the "new ethics and practices of self-discipline" unleashed by Calvinist disciplinary revolutions (Gorski 2003, pp. 20, 38).

To the extent that state actors could harness the existing organizational and symbolic resources of local and religious authorities, gradually incorporating them into the state, the administrative capacity and symbolic



power of the state would be enhanced. The war of the wasps supports this hypothesis, though as a negative case. The state's failure to take advantage of the existing administrative and symbolic resources of the church frustrated its attempts to establish a foothold of legitimate authority in the domain of individual identification. The war of the wasps thus suggests that in the phase of early administrative development, less state autonomy—and thus, perhaps, the *appearance* of a weaker state (at least according to the conventional equation of state autonomy with state strength)—might actually be a source of strength, leading to much greater state capacity down the road.

Finally and more generally, the case of the war of the wasps suggests that the interconnections of state and society during the state's early development may be much more consequential for subsequent trajectories of state formation than has generally been recognized. Drawing inspiration from Foucault's vision of state power emanating upward and inward from diffuse sites and sources of social discipline (cf. Foucault 1981, pp. 71–72), Gorski argues that “top-down” accounts of state formation “must be complemented by an ascending analysis of state-formation as a bottom-up process in which the capillaries and synapses of power within the social body are gradually plugged into and connected with the central circulatory and nervous systems of the state” (Gorski 2003, pp. 23–24). From this perspective, the strength of the state is infrastructural. And infrastructural power is a two-way street (Mann 1993, p. 59). In other words, the state's power is not derived from autonomy from society, but rather from the webs of interconnections to actors and institutions outside the state.

The nature and extent of “organizational entwining” (Gorski 2003, p. 167) in the early phases of state formation thus becomes a crucial part of the picture if we want to understand subsequent variations in state capacity, and possibly even state form. A focus on organizational entwining as an impetus to the early development of the state also raises a host of questions for future research. For example, what sorts of nonstate administrative and symbolic resources were actually available to be harnessed by states in their early development? What made state actors able and willing to see nonstate actors as potential allies in their quest to concentrate power as opposed to obstacles to overcome or competitors to vanquish? More generally, what determined the chosen route of administrative extension, its likelihood of success, and its consequences for the subsequent development of the state's infrastructural power? And under what conditions was a particular mode of administrative extension more likely to succeed than others?

The analytical framework presented here provides a starting point for comparative-historical analyses of how distinct types of state-society in-

terconnection affected administrative extension and accumulation of symbolic power by modernizing states. Future research on the primitive accumulation of symbolic power by modernizing states will not only improve our understanding of how modern states qua repositories of symbolic power came to be, but it will also open up new directions for comparative research on the tremendous variation in the actualized "stateness" of modern states.<sup>24</sup>

#### CONCLUSION: HISTORICIZING THE STATE'S SYMBOLIC POWER

By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that episodes such as the war of the wasps underline the fact that the modern state's capacity to wield symbolic power through mundane instruments such as "censuses, maps, and museums" (Anderson 1991) was a hard-won privilege. For any given state, and in any given domain of social life, the primitive accumulation of symbolic power resulted from a series of struggles over the state's infrastructural penetration and administrative "ordering" of everyday life. These struggles were not always openly conflictive. As is made clear in Weber's (1976) account of the modernization of rural France, the state's attempts at administrative extension could provoke a range of responses—or none at all. But it is in the moments of contestation that we can glean the historical contingency of the state's concentration of symbolic power (cf. Bourdieu 1999).

Once state practices become self-evident as such, they tend to appear as natural features of the social landscape. Thus, for example, as Gérard Noiriel (2001, p. 48) has observed: "Today, the formalities of civil status—the basis for the entire logic of modern identification practices—are part of the administrative routine. We all conform to them automatically, as if they are self-evident, and to such an extent that we find it hard to imagine that they might once have been contested." In crucial respects, the institution of civil registration and related forms of state identification of individuals are at the core of modern states' capacity to exercise symbolic power. Through the monopolization of the issuance of identity papers, modern states both shape the terms in which "identity" is understood and exercise a fundamental power over the rights, privileges, and opportunities of those within their territory.<sup>25</sup> In consequential ways, indi-

<sup>24</sup> On "stateness" as a matter of degree, see Nettl (1968); Tilly (1975, p. 70).

<sup>25</sup> As with the state's monopolization of the legitimate exercise of physical coercion, the state's monopolization of the legitimate power of identification is never effectively absolute. Counterfeit documents obviously undermine the state's identification monopoly. In doing so, however, they simultaneously reinforce the idea that only the state can issue legitimate, officially recognized (and recognizable) proofs of "identity."

vidual identity in modern society hinges on official recognition of birth by the state. Yet the modern state's hold on the meaning of individual existence tends to go unnoticed by most people, most of the time.

Analysis of the popular rebellion against civil registration in mid-19th-century Brazil helps bring to light the historical contingency of the state's power to confer legitimate "identity." Of course, as Noiriel (2001, p. 48) notes, "to put into relief . . . the misunderstandings, refusals, and sufferings entailed by the construction of the civil bond, is not the same as denouncing or questioning the need for it." Today, civil identification is the basis for many of our most fundamental rights and privileges as well as specific burdens and constraints. Still, at a time when many state actors are attempting to make self-evident the state's need for means to "embrace" their populations more tightly than ever before, it is worth reflecting on the historically contingent foundations of much of state-structured social life that we now experience as natural.

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# Strikes as Forest Fires: Chicago and Paris in the Late Nineteenth Century<sup>1</sup>

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Historians have persistently likened strike waves to wildfires, avalanches, and epidemics. These phenomena are characterized by a power-law distribution of event sizes. This kind of analysis is applied to outbreaks of class conflict in Chicago from 1881 to 1886. Events are defined as individual strikes or miniature strike waves; size is measured by the number of establishments or workers involved. In each case, events follow a power law spanning two or three orders of magnitude. A similar pattern is found for strikes in Paris from 1890 to 1899. The “forest fire” model serves to illustrate the kind of process that can generate this distribution.

Transgressive contention occurs in waves. People suddenly shift from quiescence to defiance; they strike, sit in, demonstrate, or riot en masse; protest spreads across social networks and from place to place. When analyzed quantitatively, exogenous variables are unable to predict the magnitude of such waves. There is growing recognition of an endogenous process—a process of *positive feedback* (Biggs 2003). In short, people often engage in defiant collective action because others have recently done so, and not simply because their external circumstances have changed. This process has been investigated systematically in various ways. The thresh-

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old model (Granovetter 1978) illustrates theoretically how a slight shift in individual proclivities can lead to a large jump in participation; the basic insight can be elaborated in more complex models. Event history analysis (Strang and Tuma 1993) estimates empirically whether the occurrence of one event raises the probability of another; the framework can incorporate an array of endogenous and exogenous variables.

This article contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of transgressive contention. It emphasizes that we can identify waves at very different scales. A wave on one scale—such as a peak in an annual time series—is composed of multiple waves on a smaller scale. In other words, waves are *fractal*. This conceptualization enables us to recognize a similar process of positive feedback operating at different scales. The mechanisms underlying such a process are elaborated here in terms of *interdependence* and *inspiration*. Positive feedback is implied by the metaphors employed by historically minded observers to describe the dynamics of large strike waves: metaphors of wildfire, avalanche, and epidemic. By taking these metaphors seriously, we can draw on recent research by natural scientists. Natural events like wildfires, landslides, and epidemics are characterized by a *power-law* distribution of event sizes. The probability of an (unfinished) event doubling in size is constant, no matter how large it has become already. This yields an empirical prediction for collective protest, which is tested here for the first time. The same kind of distribution is generated by the forest fire model. This simple model, like the threshold model, serves to illustrate an endogenous process of positive feedback.

Although academic interest in strikes has waned along with the intensity of class conflict in recent decades, no other kind of collective protest has been recorded in such detail. In the era before collective bargaining, when trade unions were small and fragile, strikes depended on the collective action of ordinary workers, leavened by the agitation of activists. This article focuses primarily on strikes in Chicago from 1881 to 1886, using exceptionally detailed data collected by the U.S. commissioner of labor. The period includes years of quiescence as well as a massive upsurge of class conflict in 1886. In the analysis, two levels of events are defined: individual strikes and miniature strike waves comprising strikes initiated on consecutive days. The size of these events is measured by either the number of establishments or of workers involved. For strikes and strike waves alike, I find that the size distribution follows a power law spanning two or three orders of magnitude. (An “order of magnitude” is the interval between one power of 10 and the next.) This analysis is extended to strikes in Paris from 1890 to 1899. Again, I find that the size distribution of strikes follows a power law spanning two orders of magnitude, though without additional clustering at the level of strike waves.

The findings vindicate the intuition of historical sociologists and social



historians. They may not “prove” that these waves of collective protest were generated by an endogenous process of positive feedback, but they provide important new evidence. An alternative hypothesis—that the size of events merely reflects the distribution of firms in economic sectors—can be rejected. The method developed here can be applied to strikes in other contexts and to other forms of transgressive contention. If this finding is repeated, it should become a significant criterion for evaluating formal models of collective protest: they should generate “events” that also follow a power law. Finally, the results suggest how the contingency of particular events is compatible with the emergence, in aggregate, of stochastic regularity. A huge event still demands a particular historical explanation, but we need no longer treat it as an outlier.

The article begins by suggesting that a similar endogenous process of positive feedback operates at very different scales. It then elaborates the underlying mechanisms of interdependence and inspiration. Next, the power laws discovered for natural events are described. After introducing the data and method, results for Chicago in the 1880s are presented. The method is then extended to Paris in the 1890s. A simple model, the forest fire model, is discussed to illustrate the kind of process that can generate a power law. I address the broader implications of these findings in the conclusion.

## FRactal Waves

Transgressive contention occurs in waves: collective mobilization and collective protest are clustered in time and space (Koopmans 2004; Oberschall 1989; Oliver and Myers 2003). Waves are usually identified when actions are aggregated by national units and annual intervals. Thus Shorter and Tilly (1974, pp. 106–7) define a “strike wave” as a year when the number of striking workers and the frequency of strikes both exceed the average of the preceding five years by at least 50%, all within the boundaries of a national state.

Nevertheless, we can recognize waves—clusters of transgressive contention—on a wide range of scales. Tarrow’s (1998, chap. 9) “cycle of contention,” which encompasses actions within different countries and may continue for some years, is a wave at the largest scale. Conversely, a single “incident” of protest—like a strike or riot—is simply a wave on the smallest scale. As Oliver and Myers observe, there are “smaller waves within waves, and waves within those waves” (2003, p. 7). This invites the appellation *fractal*, which simply denotes self-similarity or self-affinity at different scales (Mandelbrot 1983). Just as Abbott (2001) uses the con-

cept to probe social and cultural structures, we may use it to sharpen our conceptualization of the dynamics of transgressive contention.

Consider Shorter and Tilly's (1974) definition of a strike wave. For the United States, 1886 meets their criteria. But the year's strikes were concentrated in May; that single month accounted for half the total number of workers involved in strikes throughout the year (*Bradstreet's*, January 8, 1887, p. 21). Applying the same numerical threshold—50% higher than the average of the last five intervals—at this finer scale of months, there would be a strike wave in May 1886. To disaggregate further, on the scale of days, there would be a strike wave on May 1. Conversely, the same threshold could be applied on a coarser scale. The proportion of workers who struck in 1919 dwarfs any other year (before or since), but the surrounding years were also high. There would be a strike wave in the quinquennia 1916–20. Nothing compels us to restrict “waves”—in Shorter and Tilly's (1974) operational definition as peaks in a time series—to annual intervals (or indeed to national societies).<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the scale, waves of contention are puzzling insofar as they resist explanation in terms of exogenous variables (cf. Abbott 1988). If causes such as relative deprivation or political opportunities could “predict” the timing and magnitude of waves, then we would have a straightforward and satisfactory explanation. This sort of explanation has been tested most rigorously for strikes. After all, national states have been collecting comprehensive data on strikes since the late 19th century, providing time series over a lengthy period. Social scientists have attempted, with increasing statistical sophistication, to correlate strikes—measured by strike frequency or the number of striking workers—with various exogenous variables. This literature has focused on adjudicating between competing causes, most notably between economic and political ones (for the United States, see Snyder [1975, 1977], Edwards [1981, chap. 3], Kaufman [1982], Skeels [1982], and McCammon [1993]). Certainly some variables emerge as statistically significant; we usually find a negative relationship with unemployment. Nevertheless, it is still not possible to predict peaks in the series, when class conflict suddenly erupted. Analysis of strikes in the United States before the New Deal does not explain the great upsurges in 1919 and 1886; indeed, the latter is predicted to be an “average” year (Biggs 2003). Even Franzosi's (1995) analysis of Italian strikes in the postwar period, the most sophisticated of the genre, does not predict the *autunno caldo* (“hot autumn”) of 1969.

These limitations allow us to understand why the eruption of transgressive contention has taken social scientists by surprise, most memorably

<sup>2</sup> This may recall a very different example, of physicians allocating tonsillectomies (Abbott 2001, p. 194).

in 1989 (Koopmans 2004). It is comforting that participants and opponents were equally unable to predict the upsurge. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the benefit of hindsight, three-quarters of East Germans still admitted to being totally surprised by what had happened (Kuran 1991, p. 121). In response, we could simply admit defeat; if each wave of contention results from a unique conjunction of circumstances, the subject may be excluded from the domain of (generalizing) social science. A more ambitious response is to pursue a different kind of explanatory strategy, which emphasizes an endogenous process of positive feedback (Biggs 2003). This kind of self-reinforcing process "feeds on itself to the point where there is a continual increase or decrease of some variable, and there is no true point of equilibrium" (Boulding 1968, p. 103).

Positive feedback is inherent in the character of defiant collective action, because an individual's decision to participate is strongly influenced by the action of others. Workers surely look to the recent actions of other workers, and not just at their external economic and political circumstances; strikes can lead to further strikes, unionization to more unionization. This fundamental insight has appeared in various guises in different sociological literatures. As "circular reaction," it was present in Blumer's (1951) synthesis of collective behavior. This incarnation had the unfortunate effect of associating positive feedback with irrationality. Just as sociologists were rejecting the tradition of collective behavior, positive feedback emerged in formal models of collective action, originating with Granovetter's (1978) threshold model (see Oliver 1993). Ironically, the insight is now most often appreciated within the tradition of rational choice, broadly defined (e.g., Chong 1991; Hedström 1998; Kuran 1995; Oberschall 1989).

## MECHANISMS OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND INSPIRATION

Before proceeding to empirical analysis, it is worth outlining theoretical "mechanisms" (Elster 1989) that give rise to positive feedback. For transgressive contention, we can identify two core sets of mechanisms; I term these *interdependence* and *inspiration*. In elaborating these mechanisms, my aim is to show why people have reason to participate in collective action because others have recently participated. The emphasis is on the logic of individual decision making. After all, causal explanation requires understanding the reasons for action, as Weber famously observed. Moreover, sociologists still tend to associate positive feedback with the irrationality of collective behavior, and therefore it is important to emphasize how positive feedback can be generated by rational decisions. "By assuming that actors act *intentionally*," as Hedström (1998, p. 311; original

emphasis) suggests, “we are forced to probe more deeply into the reasons or mechanisms that explain why actors follow the lead of others.” The discussion will focus on strikes for illustration.

Interdependence is inherent in collective protest (Chong 1991, chap. 6). For the great majority, a decision to participate in protest is contingent on the actions of others (Schelling 1978, p. 17). At the very least, one worker alone cannot “strike”; he or she would be fired. The motivation to participate increases with the number (or proportion) of participants, for three reasons. First, the expected collective benefits increase. The greater the number of workers on strike, the more reason they have to hope for concessions. Second, the expected individual and collective costs decrease. The greater the number of workers on strike, the less reason they have to fear being replaced or singled out for victimization. Neither reason would dissuade truly selfish individuals from trying to free ride, of course (Olson 1971). Another reason may prove persuasive. As the number of participants increases, so does the moral obligation to participate, and the likelihood of being punished for violating this obligation. The greater the number of workers on strike, the more reason a potential “scab” would fear ostracism or violence.

Interdependence applies to collective protest where everyone either succeeds or fails—or, at least, success for some will make success for others more likely. Interdependence explains propagation within a collectivity or group and thus predominates at smaller scales. The second set of mechanisms operates between such groups and thus predominates at larger scales. Inspiration is less familiar, as theories of collective action have focused on a single group pursuing an indivisible collective goal. Even in the absence of interdependence, collective action by one group can nonetheless inspire another group to act.

Because collective protest is rare and risky, the actions of others are potentially inspirational for three reasons. People are not continually deciding whether to initiate transgressive contention. Learning that others elsewhere have acted raises the possibility—and so provides what Oliver (1989, p. 11) calls “an occasion for deciding” one way or the other. Hearing that other workers have struck, workers are more likely to consider whether to strike. In addition, the action of others can influence a group’s expectations of their own success. Before the outcome of others’ action is clear, the simple fact that they have acted implies that they expect success. That inference provides a second-order reason to hope—one based on “expected” facts rather than “accomplished” facts (borrowing terminology from Pigou [1929, p. 73]). Inferring that other workers hope to win a strike, workers may raise their own expectations of victory. Once the outcome of others’ action becomes clear, more information is provided.

If they are successful, there is further reason to hope for success. Conversely, of course, failure should lower expectations.<sup>3</sup>

Interdependence and inspiration provide reasons for people to act because others have done so. These two sets of mechanisms can be differentiated as ideal types; in reality, they are often intertwined. Moreover, they depend on culturally constructed—and contested—answers to the questions, “Who are we?” and “Are they like us?” Interdependence implies solidarity; inspiration depends on the “attribution of similarity” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). These complexities are important. The point here is to demonstrate the theoretical plausibility of positive feedback.

#### POWER LAWS

There are two principal sources of empirical evidence for positive feedback. First, investigations of significant waves of contention show that exogenous changes are not sufficient to explain the magnitude of the upsurge and provide qualitative evidence that people were influenced by others’ actions. Such episodes include the sit-ins against racial segregation in the U.S. South in 1960 (Oberschall 1989), the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Kurzman 1996), and the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 (Koopmans 2004; Kuran 1995, chap. 16). Second, event history analyses of collective protest estimate to what extent the occurrence of one event makes it more likely that another will occur, usually within an interval of days or weeks (e.g., Andrews and Biggs 2002; Conell and Cohn 1995; Myers 1997, 2000; Soule 1997).<sup>4</sup>

A new method of empirical analysis can be derived from the metaphors used to describe waves of contention. Metaphors of wildfire, epidemic, and avalanche are ubiquitous. When American workers organized and struck en masse in 1886, Engels (1887, p. *i*) described how the movement “spread with the rapidity of a prairie fire.” “The fever of joining [the Knights of Labor] seemed to be epidemic,” recalled one railroad worker (quoted in Allen 1942, p. 26). Metal manufacturers in Chicago noted that “in the majority of our factories content existed before this contagious fever caught them” (*Chicago Tribune*, May 9, 1886, p. 9). Many social historians and historical sociologists employ the same metaphors. Hobs-

<sup>3</sup> Remarkably, Conell and Cohn (1995) find that even defeat raises the probability that other workers will strike. This finding may be interpreted as showing the importance of the first reason for inspiration, the opportunity to make a decision.

<sup>4</sup> Event history analyses of organizational founding (e.g., Conell 1988; Conell and Voss 1990; Hedstrom 1994; Hedstrom, Sandell, and Stern 2000; Voss 1988, 1993) provide similar findings—one founding raises the probability of another—though the time interval is annual.

bawm (1985, p. 18) discerns a “snowball effect” in the mobilization of British workers in 1889–90. According to Perrot ([1984] 1987, p. 17), strikes “spread like an epidemic” in France in May 1880 and May 1890. Moore (1978, p. 244) refers to a strike by German coalminers in 1889 as “a spark which ignited a ‘prairie fire’ in the Ruhr.” Aside from strikes, other forms of protest attract the same metaphors (e.g., Polletta 1998). Why not take these metaphors seriously?

Wildfires and landslides—along with earthquakes—have recently been investigated by geologists and physicists (Malamud and Turcotte 1999; Turcotte 1997; Turcotte et al. 2002). Remarkably, these disparate phenomena share the same kind of cumulative distribution of event sizes. The number ( $N$ ) of events exceeding a certain size ( $x$ ), follows a power law:

$$N(\text{size} > x) = cx^{-\beta}, \quad (1)$$

$$\ln N(\text{size} > x) = \ln c - \beta \ln x. \quad (2)$$

If the cumulative distribution follows a power law, then so does the density distribution:

$$\text{prob}(\text{size} = x) = c'x^{-\alpha}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\alpha = \beta + 1$ . I will focus on the cumulative distribution, because it facilitates interpretation and estimation. As a matter of terminology, the word “law” is unfortunate, because that is best reserved for relationships between two or more variables. Calling the power law a Pareto distribution invites confusion because that also denotes two related types of distribution (power law is synonymous with a Pareto distribution of the first kind).

A power law entails a skewed distribution, with many more small events than large ones. The greater the magnitude of  $\beta$  (the steeper the slope), the more pronounced the skew: the greater the preponderance of small events relative to large ones. The distribution is also “fat tailed,” which implies many more huge events than would “normally” be expected from more familiar distributions like the lognormal. If  $N$  events exceed size  $x$ , then  $2^{-\beta}N$  events exceed  $2x$ . The distribution has some strange properties. If  $\beta \leq 2$ , then the distribution has no variance; if  $\beta \leq 1$ , it has no mean. Although these statistics can be computed for a given sample, they will not converge on a finite nonzero value as the sample size increases.

To make all this more tangible, consider the example of wildfires in the Australian Capital Territory over several decades (Turcotte 1997, fig.

16.17, p. 338). The cumulative distribution of size, measured by area burned, follows a power law with  $\beta = .59$ . Observing a fire in progress, the probability of it doubling in size is .66 ( $= 2^{-\beta}$ )—regardless of how large it is already. This means that the larger a fire becomes, the more likely it will spread further. If a fire has consumed only 1 km<sup>2</sup>, the probability of it burning at least 2 km<sup>2</sup> is .66; once it has consumed 10 km<sup>2</sup>, the probability of it burning at least 11 km<sup>2</sup> is .95; once it has consumed 100 km<sup>2</sup>, the probability of it burning at least 101 km<sup>2</sup> is .99. Positive feedback is commonly misconceived as implying the inevitability of explosive growth. This fallacy is easily dispelled. Most fires are small: the median ( $.5^{-1/\beta}$ ) burns about 3 km<sup>2</sup>. Mathematically, a power law has no limits, either at the upper or lower end of the scale. In reality, of course, wildfires fall within a certain size range. In this sample, the power law spans the range from .1 km<sup>2</sup> to 1,000 km<sup>2</sup>.

For wildfires in general, estimates of  $\beta$  range from .3 to .6, spanning up to six orders of magnitude. For landslides (also measured by area), whether caused by earthquakes or rainfall, estimates of  $\beta$  range from 1.3 to 2, spanning three orders of magnitude (Malamud and Turcotte 1999; Pelletier et al. 1997; Turcotte et al. 2002). The same distribution can be created experimentally with avalanches in piles of rice, though this depends on the type of rice (Frette et al. 1996). As for epidemics, a study of measles epidemics in island populations finds that the number of infected cases follows a power law with  $\beta = .3$ , spanning three orders of magnitude (Rhodes and Anderson 1996).

Surely it would surprise historically minded observers to learn that the vehicles of their metaphors share such a quantitative resemblance. This leads us to a bold hypothesis: that waves of transgressive contention have the same kind of size distribution. This hypothesis would vindicate the intuition of historians and provide further evidence for positive feedback. Do strike waves follow such a power law? Strike waves are clusters of strikes; the notion of fractals enables us to recognize individual strikes as waves on a smaller scale. Do strikes also follow a power law?

This would not be unprecedented in social science. Power laws were first discovered for social phenomena (Cioffi-Revilla manuscript). In 1896, Pareto claimed that the distribution of personal income is governed by a power law (Persky 1992), though we know now that it applies only to the upper reaches of the distribution (Champernowne and Cowell 1998). The fact that the distribution of city population follows a power law with  $\beta = 1$  was discovered in 1913. This special case of a power law with  $\beta = 1$  has come to be known as "Zipf's law," after its most enthusiastic proponent (Zipf 1949).<sup>5</sup> This power law holds for cities in many times

<sup>5</sup> Zipf's law is usually expressed by relating the size of the *i*th entity (*S<sub>i</sub>*) to its rank

and places (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999, chap. 12). The same power law describes the size of firms (Axtell 2001). In addition, power laws have been found to describe (absolute) growth rates, such as the daily rate of return in financial markets (Mandelbrot 1963) and the growth of formal organizations (Liljeros 2001). All these phenomena differ from *events* like fires or strikes, where the distribution summarizes the completed size of events, each of brief duration, over a lengthy period. Wars are events of this character. Richardson (1948) showed that the cumulative distribution of wars over the period 1820–1945—measured by deaths—followed a power law, with  $\beta = .5$  over five orders of magnitude (see also Roberts and Turcotte 1998; Cederman 2003).

## DATA AND METHOD

The method used here, following the lead of natural scientists, is simple. It entails delimiting clusters of collective protest—events—and examining the resulting cumulative size distribution. This procedure disregards *when* events occur in time.<sup>6</sup> It is concerned with the process that generates events. The meaning of “event” in this analysis differs from its meaning in more familiar methods, like event history models of diffusion (Strang and Tuma 1993), narrative analysis of event structures (Griffin 1993), or optimal matching of event sequences (Abbott and Hrycak 1990). These methods analyze relations *between* events; either events are correlated with one another in order to make inferences about causation, or sequences of events are matched in order to discern typical patterns. Here, by contrast, we focus on the size of events, in order to make inferences about the underlying generative process. Therefore this analysis of strike *waves* is roughly equivalent to event history analysis of individual strikes (e.g., Conell and Cohn 1995), insofar as both attempt to capture how collective action propagates from one group of workers to another. This method is distinctive in two ways. First, it tests a bold conjecture, derived from

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in the distribution ( $r_i$ ):  $S_i = cr_i^{-1}$ . Of course,  $r_i = N(\text{size} \geq S_i)$ , in the absence of tied ranks.

<sup>6</sup> Thus it differs from time-series analysis, such as a simple autoregressive equation:

$$Y_t = a + \phi Y_{t-1} + \epsilon.$$

Even if  $t$  refers to daily intervals, this method cannot be used to analyze how a strike propagates across firms, because that occurs within a single day. It could be used to investigate the duration of strike waves, as defined here. For Chicago between 1881 and 1886, when  $Y_t$  is a dichotomous variable coded one if a strike was initiated on day  $t$ , a positive effect emerges from the equivalent logistic regression:  $\text{prob}(Y_t = 1 | Y_{t-1} = 1)$  is more than double  $\text{prob}(Y_t = 1 | Y_{t-1} = 0)$ . This finding is convergent with the results of my analysis of strike waves.



historical metaphors: that the size distribution of events conforms to a power law. Second, it is allied with formal models of process which generate events of this kind, to be discussed below.

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics published exceptionally detailed data on strikes and lockouts in the late 19th century. The commissioner of labor's third annual report published details of every strike and lockout from 1881 to 1886. (Henceforth, lockouts are subsumed under "strikes.") The bureau's staff compiled a list of strikes by searching through newspapers and periodicals and by canvassing employers and labor organizations in each district. They then obtained details from both sides to each dispute, yielding 35 fields of information in the published report (U.S. Commissioner of Labor 1887, pp. 9–10). Subsequently, the tenth annual report continued coverage—albeit with less detail—to the middle of 1894. Later reports published only summary figures.

Disaggregated data from this source have recently been exploited by economic historians and labor economists (Card and Olson 1995; Currie and Ferrie 2000; Rosenbloom 1998), following Friedman's (1988, 1998) pioneering work. They concentrate on what happened after a strike had begun: how long it lasted, and whether workers were victorious (see Biggs 2002). By contrast, here the analysis is restricted to the initiation of strikes and strike waves: how many workers or firms were involved.

The scope is one city, Chicago, in the years from 1881 to 1886 (U.S. Commissioner of Labor 1887, table 1, pp. 100–171, and table 2, pp. 624–26). Because the bureau's method of classification changed in the subsequent report, extending the series to 1894 would pose problems of consistency. The bureau tabulated strikes by locality. Only in a few cases, like the national telegraphers' strike of 1883, did it combine the actions of workers in different places.<sup>7</sup> This tabulation reflected the locus of class conflict in the late 19th century. Apart from railroads, almost all employers were confined to one location. Many local trade unions were independent (Friedman 1999), while those affiliated with international unions still had a large measure of autonomy. The Knights of Labor, the leading workers' organization at this time, was also decentralized; most of its local assemblies were combined into geographical district assemblies.

As a laboratory of class conflict, Chicago is an obvious choice. During the 1880s it overtook Philadelphia to become the United States' second-largest metropolis. In the first half of the decade, workers were quiescent; strikes were few and far between. Class conflict erupted at the beginning of May 1886, when 70,000 workers went out on strike for shorter working hours and higher wages; more workers in Chicago than in any other city

<sup>7</sup> This strike is necessarily excluded from the analysis below, as the bureau did not report separate figures for Chicago.

took part in the strikes. Police clashed with anarchists in the notorious Haymarket incident. By the end of May, most workers had accepted defeat. In the fall, however, packinghouse workers attempted to defend their gains in two successive strikes (Biggs 2002).

There are no shifts in external circumstances sufficient to explain the upsurge of transgressive contention in 1886 (Biggs 2003). At the national level, political and economic variables—in a time-series analysis over the period 1881–1936—predict an average year for strikes. Although the economy was emerging from recession by 1886, unemployment was still high. In Chicago, political opportunities were shrinking. The mayor had signaled a shift toward repressive policing by promoting an inspector who brutally suppressed picketing (Schneirov 1998, chap. 7). A peculiar feature of the upsurge of 1886 was the synchronization of strikes for May 1. In the fall of 1884, two dozen trade unionists, styling themselves the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, had resolved “that eight hours shall constitute a legal day’s labor from and after May 1, 1886” (1884, p. 14). But they had neither resources nor authority, and the plan was disavowed by the paramount leaders of the Knights of Labor. A small number of working-class activists embraced the campaign. Even they were taken by surprise as ordinary workers mobilized *en masse*—in Chicago and other major cities—in the spring of 1886. I argue that this rapid mobilization can be explained by an endogenous process of positive feedback (Biggs 2003). As each new group of workers became sufficiently optimistic to organize, the fact of their organization inspired others to follow suit. New hopes gave rise to new organization; new organization became evidence that such hopes were justified.

The analysis conducted here encompasses not only the massive upsurge of May 1886, but also the sporadic activity of “normal” times. It aggregates workers’ actions into two levels of event—strikes and strike waves—one nested within the other.

Individual strikes are relatively easy to delineate, almost like landslides or wildfires. The commissioner decided “to make the establishment the unit in the tabular presentation, and not the strike” (1887, p. 11). Where strikes involved multiple establishments, the information was tabulated on multiple records—unless it was identical, in which case there was one record with total figures. This testifies to the meticulous detail gathered by the bureau. There were 533 records for locations in Cook County (which includes industrial districts just outside the city’s jurisdiction). In many cases, multiple records referred to incidents involving workers in the same occupation, industry, and location, who struck on the same day. These differed in other particulars, such as the day on which strikers eventually returned to work or the exact nature of their demands. Because such differences are irrelevant for analyzing the initiation of strikes, these

multiple records are combined, creating 341 strikes.<sup>8</sup> Each of these events was a dense cluster of interdependent actions by a particular group of workers, which occurred on a single day.

To capture clusters of action involving different groups of workers—connected by inspiration—strikes must be aggregated into strike waves. Such events are not neatly bounded, but neither are epidemics. To analyze measles epidemics, Rhodes and Anderson (1996) define events by aggregating cases in consecutive months in which one or more new cases of infection appeared on an island. In a similar fashion, I create strike waves by aggregating strikes that began on consecutive days in which one or more new strikes were initiated within the city. Strike waves are thus delimited by days without new strikes, just as measles epidemics are delimited by months without new cases. This operationalization of “strike wave” differs fundamentally from Shorter and Tilly’s (1974), which identifies intervals of time with unusually high levels of strikes. My definition, by contrast, delimits clusters of strikes, with great variance in size. Of 163 strike waves, four-fifths consist of a single strike. The largest—at the beginning of May 1886—combines 115 strikes, which together contributed over 60% of the strikers for the whole year. (This wave does not, however, include the largest single strike, by carpenters in 1883.)

It should be emphasized that this definition of strike wave captures the *outbreak* of strikes within a short span of time. The largest wave combines strikes initiated over nine consecutive days (almost all of which occurred over three days); two other waves combine strikes initiated over four days; the remainder lasted for three days at the most. By comparison, the mean duration of strikes in this period was 14 days, and the median seven days (cf. Biggs 2002). A strike wave usually reached its full extent before its constituent strikes had ended in victory for one side or the other, with very few exceptions. This justifies my relatively parsimonious definition of wave. A more generous definition—encompassing all strikes separated by intervals of seven days or less, for example—would include some strikes that had terminated before other strikes had even begun.

For both levels of event—strikes and strike waves—there are two measures of size: the number of firms (strictly speaking, establishments) and the number of workers involved. The correlation of these logged measures is modest ( $r = .55$  and  $.59$  for strikes and waves respectively). However size is measured, it cannot be zero. Mathematically, a power law excludes zero. Substantively, nonevents are literally uncountable. It is inconceivable

<sup>8</sup> Two corrections are made: the strike of lumber shovers (no. 964) began on May 1, not May 10; a lockout of packinghouse employees (no. 57) on May 24 is not mentioned in any newspaper, and so it is excluded.

to ask how many strikes involved zero workers, for example, because that means asking how many strikes did *not* occur.

To test whether the size of events follows a power law, a linear equation is estimated:<sup>9</sup>

$$\ln N(\text{size} \geq x) = \ln c - \beta \ln x. \quad (4)$$

The cumulative is preferred to the density distribution (which would mean estimating  $\alpha$ ) as it obviates the need to choose arbitrary size intervals. By plotting every data point, rather than aggregating them into a handful of bins, we view the data in all their messy glory. Scientists investigating power laws in nature indicate goodness of fit with  $R^2$ . This value is inevitably high, because a cumulative distribution always slopes downward; a good fit is indicated only by extremely high values. The appendix describes estimation of the standard error for  $\beta$  and of prediction intervals for the power law.

## RESULTS

Table 1 summarizes the results for Chicago between 1881 and 1886. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of firms involved in strikes. The data are compared to the best-fitting power law, a straight line on the logarithmic graph, with  $\beta = .92$  ( $R^2 = .98$ ). The estimated 95% prediction interval is also indicated: if we draw samples of 341 events from a distribution defined by this power law, 95% of these points fall within that interval. The prediction interval highlights some discrepancies. There are significantly fewer strikes than predicted involving two to four firms. In effect this discrepancy shows that it was relatively difficult for a strike to spread beyond a single firm. Strikes that achieved a "critical mass" of five firms, however, conform more closely to the power law. There is still some systematic deviation, with more strikes than expected involving 10–20 firms. Most important, however, the power law predicts the occurrence of the very largest strikes, involving over 100 firms. This is rather remarkable, especially as compared to an obvious alternative skew distribution: the lognormal, also described by two parameters. That alternative fits very poorly ( $R^2 = .87$ ) and makes the largest strikes appear as abnormal outliers.

Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of workers involved in strikes. The power law fits remarkably well, with  $\beta = 1.0$  ( $R^2 = .99$ ), but only for strikes involving 150 or more workers. This threshold is roughly

<sup>9</sup> Where the measure of size is discrete (as with strikes) rather than continuous (e.g., wildfires), it makes sense to consider  $N(\text{size} \geq x)$  rather than  $N(\text{size} > x)$

TABLE 1  
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF EVENTS. STRIKES IN CHICAGO, 1881–86

Event	Measure	Range	Threshold	$\beta$	SE	$R^2$
Strikes ( $n = 341$ ) . . . .	Firms	1–301		.92	.06	.98
	Workers	3–12,000	150	1.00	.08	.99
Strike waves ( $n = 163$ )	Firms	1–714		.75	.06	.99
	Workers	3–68,807	150	.88	.13	.97

equal to the median size, and so the power law fits the upper half of the distribution; it still spans almost two orders of magnitude. The lower half of the distribution is flatter: there are fewer small events than the power law would predict. Incidentally, this flattening at smaller scales is also characteristic of landslides (Pelletier et al. 1997).

For strikes, the explanation for the flattening of the distribution at smaller scales has two parts. First, when a firm was struck, almost all its employees would join the strike. In over four-fifths of strikes, the entire workforce was involved. Exceptions occurred mainly where one section of workers in a large establishment (skilled butchers in a meat-packing plant, for example) struck for their own benefit. To some extent, the high rate of participation may be due to the inherent difficulty of distinguishing workers who actually decided to strike from those thrown out of work if the firm was forced to suspend operations.<sup>10</sup> The high rate of participation surely also demonstrates the strength of interdependence among workers within the same establishment. On one hand, proponents of a strike would initiate collective action only when they were sure of a positive response from the workforce as a whole; on the other, once collective action had been initiated, all employees had compelling reasons to join.

Therefore the number of workers involved in a strike was essentially the product of the number of firms involved and the number of employees per struck firm. The mean of the latter (averaging across strikes) was 162, and the median was 65. As these figures show, workers in small establishments tended not to strike (Biggs 2002). This provides the second part of the explanation for why the distribution becomes flatter at smaller scales. Altogether, workers in larger firms were most likely to strike, and when they went on strike, the entire workforce would come out. Thus relatively few strikes involved a handful of workers. Clearly it is the propagation of a strike *among* firms that gives rise to a power law—measured directly by the number of firms involved and indirectly by the number of workers involved.

<sup>10</sup> The figures used here do include the number of workers “indirectly involved,” as well as the number of strikers, but in most cases the former was zero.




FIG. 1.—Firms involved in strikes, Chicago, 1881–86

Strike waves show a remarkably similar pattern to strikes. Figure 3 shows the cumulative distribution of firms involved in strike waves. The power law, with  $\beta = .75$ , is actually a better fit ( $R^2 = .99$ ) than for strikes and spans nearly three orders of magnitude. Discrepancies include the disproportionate number involving around 30 firms and a long gap until the six largest waves—which occurred in May 1883, May 1884, and May 1886. These nevertheless fall within the 95% prediction interval, which is wider than for figure 1. Most important, the huge wave in early May 1886 fits perfectly into the distribution. The cumulative distribution of workers involved in strike waves (not shown) is also similar to that for strikes. A power law with  $\beta = .88$  is a good fit ( $R^2 = .97$ ), again above about 150 workers. The distribution implies a return time of about 12 years for an event comparable to the massive strike wave that occurred at the beginning of May 1886.<sup>11</sup> In both cases,  $\beta$  is smaller for strike waves than for strikes, indicating a greater preponderance of larger events relative to smaller ones.

To interpret these results, we can return to the process of growth that is implied by a power law. Once an (unfinished) event has grown to a given size, the probability that it will grow to at least double that size is  $2^{-\beta}$ . If we see a strike in progress, the probability that it will grow to involve twice as many firms—in the same industry or occupation, in the

<sup>11</sup> The return time is the average time between events which attain a given size, over a lengthy period. It does not imply that such events are cyclical.




FIG. 2.—Workers involved in strikes, Chicago, 1881–86

same location, on this day—is about .53. If we see a strike wave in progress, the probability of it growing to involve twice as many firms—on this or subsequent days—is .59. Viewed incrementally, a strike or strike wave gathers momentum as it grows: it is more likely to propagate to yet one more firm. Consider the probability of a strike spreading further to involve at least another firm. For a strike in one firm the probability is .53; once the strike has encompassed 10 firms, it is .92; once it has encompassed 100 firms, it is .99. Some readers may find this counterintuitive. It is easily forgotten that the conjunction of a series of high probabilities is a lower probability. Thus the probability of a strike involving at least 300 firms is only .005. A power law has no limits, but in reality strikes and strike waves—like natural events—have an upper bound. Presumably the strike wave in early May 1886 approaches the practical maximum for a city of this size.

In sum, then, we find that strikes in Chicago in the 1880s resemble natural events like wildfires, landslides, and epidemics. Cumulative distributions of event size follow a power law over two or three orders of magnitude, whether events are defined as strikes or as strike waves, and whether size is measured by the number of firms or of workers involved. This pattern encompasses numerous tiny strikes, confined to a single firm, and one extraordinary strike wave, which paralyzed the city's commerce for days. The latter now appears as an extreme event, but not an outlier.




FIG 3.—Firms involved in strike waves, Chicago, 1881–86

## EXTENSIONS

It is worth applying the same method to strikes in a different national context. Patterns of class conflict differed considerably in France, as Friedman (1998) demonstrates, and so it provides a useful comparison. The French Office du Travail (subsequently Direction du Travail), inspired by the U.S. commissioner of labor, published information on strikes and lockouts from 1890 onward (available in digital format thanks to Tilly and Jordan [1984]).<sup>12</sup> The city selected for analysis is Paris (more precisely the Seine department). It was much larger than Chicago, growing slowly from 2.5 million in 1891 (Mitchell 1975, table B4, p. 78). By comparison, Chicago doubled in size from half a million over the 1880s. The years from 1890 to 1899 yield a comparable number of strikes, 469. This period includes one significant peak of class conflict: a series of strikes by construction and allied workers in the fall of 1898, which threatened to become a general strike. Overall, however, Parisians were 10 times less likely to strike than the inhabitants of Chicago.

Table 2 summarizes the results. One caveat is in order. For 16 strikes, the number of firms (establishments, to be precise) was not recorded; several were large strikes, involving thousands of workers.<sup>13</sup> The lacunae

<sup>12</sup> The date of strikes, excluded from Tilly and Jordan's (1984) dataset, is taken from the original reports (France—Office du Travail 1890–98; Direction du Travail 1899).

<sup>13</sup> The number of workers was modestly correlated with the number of firms (both measures logged,  $r = .50$ ).



TABLE 2  
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF EVENTS: STRIKES IN PARIS, 1890-99

Event	Measure	Range	Threshold	$\beta$	SE	$R^2$
Strikes ( $n = 469$ ) . . . . .	Firms <sup>a</sup>	1-600	2	.62	.08	.98
	Workers	2-14,500	100	.85	.08	.99
Strike waves ( $n = 364$ ) .	Workers	2-14,503	100	.83	.09	.99

<sup>a</sup>  $n = 453$  due to missing data

emphasize the exceptional quality of the data collected in the United States. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of firms involved in strikes. (The gray line superimposes a power law with the same slope as in figure 1.) Again, it conforms to a power law, with  $\beta = .62$  ( $R^2 = .98$ )—but only for strikes involving two or more firms. Far more strikes are confined to a single firm than would be predicted from the remainder of the distribution. In Paris, only 15% of strikes involved two or more firms, whereas in Chicago the figure was 38%. Nevertheless, once Parisian workers had propagated the strike beyond a single firm, it was more likely to spread to others. The probability of a strike (once it had reached at least two firms) doubling in size is .65, compared to .53 for Chicago. The power law spans over two orders of magnitude. The cumulative distribution of workers involved in strikes (not shown) reveals a familiar pattern. A power law with  $\beta = .85$  ( $R^2 = .99$ ) applies above a threshold of approximately 100 workers. The threshold is lower than in Chicago, because workplaces were smaller. (The mean number of strikes per struck firm was only 68, compared to 162, averaging across strikes.) Again, the power law spans at least two orders of magnitude.

Aggregating strikes into strike waves—as defined above—reveals minimal clustering. About four-fifths of these waves comprise a single strike, and the largest barely exceeds the largest strike. Therefore the cumulative distribution of workers involved in strike waves is essentially the same as for strikes.<sup>14</sup> By this definition, then, there was little inspiration among different groups of workers. The definition does not capture the connections among seven successive waves in September and October 1898, which belonged to an escalating struggle on the city's building sites, swollen by preparations for the Exposition of 1900 (France—Office du Travail 1898, pp. 252-63). Over a period of a month, various groups of construction workers went out on strike, though they did not act on consecutive days. This omission alerts us to a limitation of this definition of wave.

<sup>14</sup> Missing data make it impossible to examine the number of firms involved in strike waves, because these lacunae are concentrated in the largest strike waves




FIG 4.—Firms involved in strikes, Paris, 1890–99

Adding all seven waves together, however, does not greatly alter the result.<sup>15</sup>

The comparison of Chicago and Paris demonstrates some significant differences. In Paris, the analysis of strike waves does not reveal a higher level of clustering. In addition, strikes were far more likely to be confined to a single firm, and so the power law holds only for strikes involving two or more firms. These differences defy stereotypes of revolutionary France and exceptional United States. In fact, Chicago was a city at the leading edge of capitalism, with concentrations of huge establishments—railroad depots and meat-packing plants, for instance—while Paris retained more traditional, artisanal production. This distinction is seen in the fact that Chicago’s workers were far more likely to go out on strike. Given the differences, it is remarkable that the size distribution of strikes in both cities follows a power law.

## DISCUSSION

The findings provide an impressive confirmation of the intuition of historically minded observers. Just like wildfires, landslides, and epidemics,

<sup>15</sup> Adding all the strikes from September 12 to October 15, 1898, yields 42,983 workers—still far fewer than the strike wave in Chicago at the beginning of May 1886. A power law with  $\beta = .90$  ( $SE = .13$ ,  $R^2 = .97$ ) holds for 100 workers and above.

these strikes follow a power law. What are the implications of these findings? Readers familiar with population ecology (Kingsland 1995) may be reminded of an earlier debate about the implications of the logistic curve, used to describe an entity growing over time, such as national population. "An empirical formula is not so much the solution of a problem as the challenge to such solution," as Lotka observed in this context (quoted in Kingsland 1995, p. 85). A power-law distribution of events is also, in his phrase, "an animated question mark." For answers, I suggest we focus on the dynamics of collective protest; after all, social historians and historical sociologists employed those metaphors to convey their understanding of dynamics.

An alternative hypothesis, however, is worth considering first. For strikes, the power law could merely reflect the clustering of economic activity. If the number of firms (or workers) by economic sector follows a power law, and if each strike tends to involve all the local firms in one particular product or labor market, then the number of firms (or workers) involved in strikes would naturally follow a power law. This hypothesis can be tested for Chicago, as the tenement and factory inspector classified the city's establishments into 247 "trades and occupations," from agricultural implements to toys and fancy goods (Chicago Department of Health 1885, pp. 87–92). The number of firms and of workers by economic sector both conform to a lognormal distribution ( $R^2 = .99$ ). The hypothesis therefore can be rejected. Moreover, it is not applicable to strike waves, because they are not confined to a particular economic sector.

To understand the dynamics of natural events like wildfires, scientists have investigated simple models that generate a power law. One family of models is characterized by "slow driving or energy input (e.g., dropping of sand grains, increase of strain, growing of trees) and rare dissipation events which are instantaneous on the time scale of driving (e.g., avalanches, earthquakes, fires)" (Drossel 1996, p. 936).<sup>16</sup> These models, I argue, are usefully borrowed by social scientists, for they enable us to formalize the insight of historically minded observers—which, after all, has just been empirically vindicated. Such borrowing is anticipated in Hobsbawm's (1952, p. 139) discussion of strike waves: "The normal process of industrial development tends to produce explosive situations, i.e., accumulations of inflammable material which only ignite periodically." He wondered "whether we should regard the whole process on the . . . analogy of the ordinary internal combustion engine, whose explosion is ignited by an outside spark, or the more elegant Diesel engine, in which the

<sup>16</sup> These models have been popularized under the conceptual umbrella of "self-organized criticality" (Bak 1996). This overarching concept is less useful for social scientists, in my judgment, than particular models (Frigg [2003] provides a judicious evaluation).

compression itself produces the explosion" (p. 140). Also worth noting is Hexter's (1971, chap. 5) borrowing in defense of traditional narrative history. Arguing that the French Revolution of 1789 should be explained as a process of rapid, endogenous change—rather than the inevitable effect of exogenous causes—he elaborates an analogy with the self-excited torsional oscillation that destroyed the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in 1940.

The forest fire model is offered in this spirit. It was formulated by Drossel and Schwabl (1992) after Bak, Chen, and Tang (1990; see also Clar, Drossel, and Schwabl 1996; Drossel 1996; Turcotte et al. 2002). It is a stochastic cellular automation: a two-dimensional (or  $n$ -dimensional) grid of cells, where the state of a cell can be affected by the state of adjacent ones. A cell is either empty, planted with a tree, or occupied by a burning tree. Flammable material gradually accumulates, as trees are randomly planted. Occasionally lightning strikes, igniting a fire which spreads across contiguous trees. More formally, on every iteration each empty cell has a certain probability,  $g$ , of growing a tree. There is a small probability,  $s$ , that a spark falls randomly on the grid. If it falls on a tree, then a fire begins. A burning tree sets alight every tree in the four neighboring cells, and the fire continues until it reaches empty cells; once burned, the cells become empty once again. Figure 5 illustrates a simulation using a  $100 \times 100$  grid.<sup>17</sup> On this iteration a fire has burned three trees on the right. The large clearing is the legacy of an earlier fire.

The cumulative size distribution of fires (measured by the number of trees burned) follows a power law. This result is robust to different specifications, so long as there are two time separations: burning is far more rapid than planting ( $g$  is sufficiently small), and planting occurs far more often than ignition ( $s/g$  is sufficiently small). If  $g = .0004$  and  $s = .001$ , for instance, the distribution of sizes follows a power law with  $\beta = .13$ . The model can be altered so that a fire spreads from one tree to another with a certain probability,  $f$ . The cumulative distribution still follows a power law, though only when  $f$  is high ( $> .7$ ). The model does not, however, reproduce the magnitude of  $\beta$  ( $\approx .6$ ) that is found with real wildfires; it generates a greater preponderance of larger fires relative to smaller ones. Needless to say, the model is not intended to represent the complexities of real wildfires. It treats the rate of accumulation ( $g$ ) and ignition ( $s$ ) as constant, whereas in reality they depend on exogenous causes like rainfall and temperature, not to mention human reactions. The point of the model is to illustrate a process of positive feedback that generates events conforming to a power law.

In this sense, the forest fire model provides a useful way of thinking

<sup>17</sup> This was implemented using RePast (<http://repast.sourceforge.net/>). The grid is a torus so that fires may spread from one side to the other




FIG. 5.—Forest fire model—example

about the dynamics of collective protest. It can be compared to the threshold model (Granovetter 1978; Granovetter and Soong 1983). Both models have the virtue of simplicity. In the threshold model, the analogous event is the number of individuals who shift from nonparticipation to participation when the distribution of thresholds is perturbed. The generative process in the threshold model follows from individual heterogeneity rather than spatial distribution, and it is deterministic rather than stochastic. The forest fire model offers two advantages. It generates a continuing series of events without changing the basic parameters. More important, the model has an empirical implication (one hesitates to say “prediction”): the cumulative distribution of event sizes should follow a power law. As we have seen, a power law can indeed be found in strikes and strike waves, albeit with a larger magnitude of  $\beta$ .

Needless to say, the forest fire model is not the only one to generate this kind of distribution of event sizes. Watts (2002) formulates a more

complex model, which combines heterogeneous individual thresholds with random spatial networks. As long as connectivity is sufficiently low, this yields events (or "cascades") which follow a power law with  $\beta = .5$ . The utility of the forest fire model is that it explicates—in a simple manner—the intuition of historically minded observers.

## CONCLUSION

Why is transgressive contention clustered in waves? When such waves cannot be explained by changes in exogenous variables—and quantitative analyses of strikes reveal a very substantial "residual"—then we must seek an alternative type of explanation. This article contributes in three ways: conceptually, theoretically, and empirically.

Conceptually, the notion of fractals sensitizes us to the similarity of waves on different scales. A single incident of protest may result from the same kind of process as a massive "cycle of contention." At all these scales, I argue, there is evidence of positive feedback: people participate in defiant collective action (in part) because others have recently done so. Theoretically, the underlying mechanisms of interdependence and inspiration explain why previous actions by others are so influential, without resorting to irrational contagion. The forest fire model enhances our comprehension of positive feedback. As a very simple model, it is intended neither to capture the full complexity of transgressive contention nor to advance the art of modeling. Its virtue is that it is readily understood. Most important, it embodies the intuition of social historians and historical sociologists, who have persistently likened waves of collective protest to wildfires, along with avalanches and epidemics. These natural phenomena are characterized by a power-law distribution of event sizes, a characteristic replicated by the forest fire model.

Empirically, power laws have been discovered in data from two cities in the late 19th century. In Chicago from 1881 to 1886 and in Paris in the 1890s, the size distribution of strikes follows a power law spanning two or three orders of magnitude. A simple relationship encompasses the numerous small strikes, too trivial to warrant the attention of contemporaries or historians, and a few huge ones. In Chicago, moreover, the same kind of relation holds for strike waves, constituted by clusters of strikes that began on successive days; this encompasses the enormous strike wave of May 1886. To be sure, the fit is not perfect. When size is measured by the number of firms, departures at the lower end of the distribution reveal that it was relatively difficult for a strike to spread beyond a single firm. When size is measured by the number of workers, the systematic flattening of the lower portion of the distribution is ex-

plained first by the tendency for a strike to involve a firm's entire workforce, and second by the paucity of strikes in smaller firms. It is the propagation of a strike among firms that gives rise to a power law; the number of workers is a derivative measure. A power law means that the probability of an (unfinished) event doubling in size remains constant, regardless of how large it has already become. Considered incrementally, the greater the number of firms already involved in a strike, the more likely it is to propagate to one more firm. This implies positive feedback.

In the course of my argument, a historical metaphor led to a novel prediction. This prediction was indeed borne out. The social historians and historical sociologists who likened strikes to wildfires, avalanches, and epidemics never expected a quantitative resemblance. Nevertheless, this empirical finding does not necessarily prove that these events were generated by an endogenous process of positive feedback, illustrated by the forest fire model. There could be alternative explanations. Hypothetically, the distribution of firms involved in strikes (though not strike waves) could merely reflect the distribution of firms within industries, supposing that strikes tend to spread to all firms in a given industry. This explanation can be rejected using data from Chicago. Other explanations—which do not posit an endogenous process of positive feedback—may be conceivable. There is, however, considerable qualitative evidence for mechanisms of interdependence and inspiration underlying workers' collective action (e.g., Biggs 2003; Fantasia 1988; Lane and Roberts 1971). At the very least, this line of investigation has discovered a hitherto unknown characteristic of strikes and strike waves. Until now, wars were the only events in the social sciences known to follow a power law.

There is no reason to believe that this empirical regularity is peculiar to Chicago and Paris in the late 19th century. Whether strikes and strike waves in other times and places follow a power law demands further investigation. We might not expect this power law to hold once collective bargaining becomes institutionalized, to the extent that strikes are decided by the ballots of union members rather than generated by the propagation of collective action. If so, then a power law could be treated as a signature of "spontaneity." Whether other kinds of collective protest follow power laws also awaits investigation. All this requires is reliable measures of the size of events. One could analyze the number of people involved in riots, for example; waves of riots across cities could be analyzed by aggregating the number of participants in riots that erupted on consecutive days.

There are implications for formal modeling too. The forest fire model generates events whose size follows a power law, but  $\beta$  is considerably lower than is found for strikes and strike waves (and indeed real wildfires). One challenge is to find the minimal modification to the model which generates a similar  $\beta$ —in other words, generates fewer large events. Pre-

sumably this entails replacing the grid of cells with a sparse network of connections among cells. It should be possible to discover how different types of networks generate different distributions of event size (cf. Watts 2002). Another, more ambitious, challenge is to build an agent-based model of transgressive contention that generates events that follow a power law (Macy and Willer 2002). This means abandoning the simplicity of the forest fire model in favor of a model incorporating a plausible representation of individual decision making. Such complex formal models usually escape empirical testing (Oliver 1993). The findings presented here provide a “stylized fact” for models to replicate. If the size of protest events—generated by the propagation of collective action rather than ordered by formal organizations—typically follows a power law, then formal models should also generate this kind of distribution. In a similar fashion, economists develop agent-based models of financial markets to replicate the fact that daily returns follow a power law (e.g., Lux and Marchesi 1999). Once again, this may not prove that the model is a good representation of the underlying process. Perhaps the same distribution can be generated by completely different models, though this remains to be seen. As a necessary though insufficient condition, the distribution promises guidance for constructing better models.

My argument has transgressed the boundary between social science and natural science, and between metaphors and measurement. I hope, perhaps, to have shown that these are not irreconcilable. Here, at least, scientific models converge with historical intuition. The same process can generate small events as well as huge ones. Most fires soon peter out, while a few develop into huge conflagrations. This does not reduce the significance of historical explanation, tracing how and why a particular event unfolded as it did. To explain the strike wave of May 1886 in this sense, one must understand (among other things) the unique events that brought a handful of unionists, meeting 18 months before, to resolve to enforce an eight-hour day on May 1. Yet contingency does not preclude the emergence of patterns at a higher level of abstraction. The number of firms involved in the strike wave of May 1886 in Chicago fits neatly into a power law for strike waves over several years. What may be illusory is the quest to discover the exogenous causes of huge events, to identify independent variables that predict their occurrence in space and time.

## APPENDIX

### Standard Errors and Prediction Intervals

Natural scientists are nonchalant about assessing how well a power law fits the data; they rely on visual inspection, supplemented by  $R^2$ .



To estimate standard errors for the parameter  $\beta$ , I use bootstrap sampling. A sample (of size  $n$ ) is drawn from the data, sampling with replacement; a power-law curve is then estimated from the resulting cumulative distribution. This procedure is repeated 1,000 times, thus providing estimates of the standard errors.

To estimate 95% prediction intervals for samples drawn from a power law, I use Monte Carlo simulation. A sample of  $n$  events is drawn from the cumulative distribution described by the (estimated) power law:  $\text{size} = \text{round}(r^{-1/\beta})$  where  $r$  is a random number from a uniform distribution between zero and one, and the function  $\text{round}(\cdot)$  rounds down to the nearest integer. This yields a cumulative distribution of event sizes,  $N(\text{size} \geq x)$ . The procedure is repeated 250 times. For each value of  $x$ , the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile are calculated. More concretely, to estimate the prediction intervals in figure 1, 341 "strikes" are created, each of size  $\text{round}(r^{-1/92})$ . This is repeated 250 times. Then the resulting distributions are compared. Looking at the number of strikes of size  $\geq 2$ , for instance, the 2.5th percentile is 162 and the 97.5th percentile is 199. Under the hypothesis that the empirical data are actually drawn from such a distribution, we would predict (with 95% confidence) that between 162 and 199 strikes would involve two or more firms.

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# Race, Class, and Changing Patterns of Migration between Poor and Nonpoor Neighborhoods<sup>1</sup>

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This study merges data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and four decennial censuses to analyze historical changes in the determinants of residential mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. Between 1970 and 1997, blacks and whites became increasingly similar in the rate at which they move between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods, but much of this racial convergence was driven by changes in the relative sociodemographic characteristics of white and black households and shifting ecological conditions of metropolitan areas. Furthermore, race remains a salient factor in determining the likelihood of exiting or entering poor neighborhoods, and there is little evidence of increasing class selectivity in this movement.

Following several decades of neglect, the study of urban neighborhood change was reinvigorated by Wilson's now-classic study *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987). Wilson's thesis encompasses several key elements, including the role of imbalanced marriage markets in fostering family dislocations and the many inimical consequences of the growing spatial concentration of poverty. One key dimension of Wilson's argument con-

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cerns the proximate causes of the increasing concentration of poor families in low-income neighborhoods, especially within the African-American community. While noting that the exodus of stable manufacturing jobs to the suburbs and abroad negatively impacted employment prospects and poverty levels in inner-city neighborhoods, Wilson locates the proximate cause for the expansion of uniformly low-income neighborhoods in the changing migration patterns of middle-class blacks. In earlier decades, Wilson argues, racial discrimination in housing markets constrained middle- and working-class blacks to live in poor, predominantly inner-city neighborhoods. More recently, however, the gains of the civil rights era have ostensibly allowed those blacks with the financial wherewithal to leave largely impoverished inner-city neighborhoods for wealthier communities elsewhere in the metropolitan area, including, but not limited to, the suburbs. This aspect of Wilson's thesis has been challenged (Massey, Gross, and Shibuya 1994; Pattillo-McCoy 2000) and qualifiedly defended (Quillian 1999). However, prior studies have failed to provide a convincing and straightforward test of the critical hypothesis that the impact of socioeconomic resources on blacks' ability to move out of high-poverty neighborhoods has increased over time. Nor do we have a clear understanding of how racial differences in interneighborhood mobility have changed over recent decades, or how gentrification might have affected the class selectivity of mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods among white migrants.

In this article, we use individual, longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1970 to 1997, in conjunction with tract-level data from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses, to trace changes in the levels and determinants of movement between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods among both blacks and whites. We have several goals for this analysis. First, we test the pivotal hypothesis that patterns of black and white mobility into and out of poor neighborhoods have converged over time, concomitant with historical declines in racial discrimination and segregation. Second, we examine whether the impact of socioeconomic status (SES) on residential mobility between neighborhoods of varying economic composition has changed over recent decades. And third, we examine the effects of changing metropolitan-level structural conditions and established individual-level predictors of residential mobility in an effort to isolate changes in the net impacts of race and income on mobility out of and into poor neighborhoods.

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

Wilson's arguments provide the basis for two central hypotheses regarding race-specific patterns of mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. Wilson's "declining significance of race" argument suggests that as racial discrimination in the housing market has waned, mobility opportunities for African-Americans have increased, eroding racial differences in the ability to leave poor neighborhoods or to avoid moving into them. Supporting this argument, recent research questions whether racial discrimination in housing markets continues to shape patterns of black residential mobility as strongly today as in the past (Clark 1992; South and Crowder 1998; Wilson 1987). All else equal, declining discrimination against blacks should broaden the number of neighborhoods and dwellings available to them and thus facilitate their movement out of poor areas, both absolutely and relative to whites. To the extent that there has been a decline in whites' aversion to having blacks as neighbors (Farley et al. 1993; Schuman et al. 1997), we might also expect that there has been a commensurate narrowing of the differential in the rates at which blacks and whites move into poor neighborhoods where black residents have historically been concentrated.

Counterposing these arguments for a temporal convergence in racial patterns of interneighborhood mobility is evidence of continuing discrimination against black home seekers (Yinger 1995). The discriminatory practices of real estate agents (Pearce 1979; Yinger 1995), local governments (Shlay and Rossi 1981), and mortgage lenders (Shlay 1988; Squires and Kim 1995) combine with whites' persistent resistance to black neighbors (Emerson, Yancey, and Chai 2001) to create a racially segmented housing market that obstructs the mobility aspirations of African-Americans (Crowder 2001), especially for those wishing to move to middle-class neighborhoods. Despite the enactment of fair housing legislation, many observers see relatively little change in African-Americans' housing opportunities (Massey and Denton 1993). In fact, despite moderate declines in average levels of residential segregation by race (Farley and Frey 1994; Lewis Mumford Center 2001) and attitudinal data showing some increasing tolerance for black neighbors among white respondents (Schuman et al. 1997), the percentage of blacks living in high-poverty neighborhoods actually increased between 1970 and 1990, and, despite relatively large declines during the 1990s (Kingsley and Pettit 2003), was still 10 times higher than for whites by 2000 (Jargowsky 2003). Of course, this persistent cross-sectional racial stratification in neighborhood poverty may obscure significant changes in race-specific patterns of mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. Thus, whether or not racial differences



in the ability to exit poor neighborhoods or to avert entering them have declined over the past quarter century remains an unresolved issue.

Also central to Wilson's recent arguments is a second hypothesis—that waning discrimination has increased mobility opportunities mainly for relatively well-off African-Americans, resulting in increasing class selectivity of mobility from poor neighborhoods. This hypothesis has also generated considerable debate. Some authors question whether recent out-migration of middle-class blacks from poor, inner-city neighborhoods really represents a break with the past, as Wilson argues. Pattillo-McCoy (2000) maintains that the out-migration of more advantaged African-Americans has been a historically continuous process. She argues that, contrary to Wilson's (1987) hypothesis, "the post-civil rights era is not distinctive in the inclination of African Americans with means to move to better neighborhoods" (Pattillo-McCoy 2000, p. 226). Still, others argue that consistently high levels of racial discrimination continue to constrain the residential patterns of even well-off blacks, thwarting their aspirations to relocate to middle-class (and often racially mixed or predominantly white) neighborhoods (Massey 1990; Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Eggers 1990; Yinger 1995).

The relevant empirical literature, much of it inspired by Wilson's theory, reflects these competing expectations. One key implication of Wilson's argument that black out-migration from poor neighborhoods has become increasingly class selective is that, within the African-American community, economic residential segregation should be increasing. An enhanced ability of middle-class and affluent blacks to avoid living near impoverished blacks should increase the spatial separation of poor and nonpoor African-Americans. Although the evidence on this score is not entirely consistent (Farley 1991), both Jargowsky (1996) and Massey and Eggers (1993) find evidence of increasing residential segregation by income among blacks. Yet, these aggregate trend studies can shed only indirect light on changes in actual patterns of residential mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. Minimally, residential segregation by economic class could increase not because of class-differentiated patterns of migration, but rather because blacks originally residing in nonpoor neighborhoods became richer over time, while blacks residing in poor neighborhoods became poorer.

### Recent Research on Race, Class, and Residential Mobility

Besides the current study, two others—Massey et al. (1994) and Quillian (1999)—address the possible changing effect of socioeconomic resources on mobility between neighborhoods with different levels of poverty. Like our study, both of these studies use longitudinal data from the PSID in

conjunction with tract-level census data. These studies differ in focus from our study, since they are concerned primarily with the impact of changing migration patterns on the growth of high-poverty neighborhoods, rather than with the more general questions of whether race- and class-specific patterns of interneighborhood migration have changed over recent decades. Moreover, these studies reach quite different conclusions about the role of class-selective out-migration in accounting for the growth of poor neighborhoods.

Massey et al. (1994) use PSID data from 1970 through 1984 to examine changes in levels of mobility between neighborhoods categorized by both socioeconomic and racial composition. Central to their analysis is the examination of changes in the rates at which blacks move out of poor black neighborhoods and, conditional upon moving out of such neighborhoods, the rates at which they move into nonpoor areas. Massey et al. (1994) offer little support for the argument that the out-migration of African-Americans from impoverished inner-city neighborhoods has become more class selective over time, finding instead that the poor blacks had actually become more likely than nonpoor blacks to leave poor census tracts by the 1979–84 period.

Quillian (1999) takes issue with several aspects of the Massey et al. (1994) analysis. He argues that Massey et al. (1994) give insufficient attention to the *flow* of migrants between neighborhoods of varying economic (and racial) composition, and that the Massey et al. distinction between the unconditional probability of moving out of the neighborhood of origin and the conditional probability of moving into various destination neighborhoods not only obscures the most important patterns of interest, but is unfaithful to the intent of Wilson's thesis. Quillian's own (1999) analysis of the PSID data from 1970 to 1990 explores differences in the flow of poor and nonpoor black and white migrants between neighborhoods of varying poverty status and racial composition. He finds (among other things) that the net flow of black nonpoor migrants into white nonpoor neighborhoods far exceeds the net flow of poor black migrants into these areas, a result consistent with Wilson's hypothesis.

Yet, like the Massey et al. (1994) study, Quillian's (1999) analysis also fails to answer unequivocally the questions of whether, over time, black out-migration from poor neighborhoods has become increasingly class selective, and whether blacks' overall likelihood of moving out of poor neighborhoods has converged with that of whites. When disaggregated by time period, the *trends* in both the net flows of nonpoor blacks into white nonpoor neighborhoods and the probability that nonpoor blacks will move into a white nonpoor neighborhood are somewhat ambiguous. Nor does Quillian present tests for whether the trend in these flows or probabilities is statistically significant or, more important, whether the

trend differs significantly between poor and nonpoor blacks, or between blacks and whites. In addition, while Quillian's study suggests a historical trend in the probability that nonpoor blacks will move into a white nonpoor neighborhood, it is not clear from this analysis that these black in-movers originated from poor neighborhoods. A change in the *net* flow of migrants into or out of nonpoor neighborhoods could occur either because more people begin moving from poor to nonpoor neighborhoods, or because more people stop moving from nonpoor to poor neighborhoods. The size of this latter migration stream is nontrivial, especially among African-Americans (Quillian 2003; South and Crowder 1997). More generally, neither the study by Quillian (1999) nor the study by Massey and his colleagues (1994) provides a direct test of Wilson's argument that the net effects of race and SES on mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods have been fundamentally altered in recent decades. Testing this argument requires attention to simultaneous changes in the sociodemographic conditions of black and white households and the structural conditions of metropolitan areas that define their mobility options.

While Wilson's (1987) thesis focuses primarily on changing class selectivity among black migrants out of ghetto neighborhoods, a growing literature on the gentrification of inner-city communities suggests that socioeconomic differentials among *white* movers may also have changed over recent decades. Scholarly interest in gentrification encompasses several dimensions, including the geographic displacement of poor, usually minority, residents (Hutchinson 1992); the role of public policy, corporate actors, and capital reinvestment in fostering urban redevelopment (Wyly and Hammel 2001); and the frequently contentious conflicts between social classes and racial/ethnic groups over land use in revitalizing neighborhoods (Abu-Lughod 1994; Spain 1992). Common to all theoretical accounts of this process is the argument that gentrification entails the movement of white, predominantly middle- and upper-class residents initially residing in fairly affluent neighborhoods into previously disadvantaged urban areas (Zukin 1987). Moreover, although the pace of gentrification varies with cycles of economic expansion and contraction (Smith and Defilippis 1999) and may differ across specific localities (Carpenter and Lees 1995), urban scholars seem to agree that generally increasing levels of gentrification in U.S. cities have significantly altered the urban landscape over the past several decades (Wyly and Hammel 1998).

Taken together, these observations suggest that, among whites, the effect of socioeconomic resources on reducing the likelihood of moving from a nonpoor to a poor neighborhood has weakened over time. That is, we hypothesize that white migration from nonpoor to poor neighborhoods has become *decreasingly* class selective. Although we anticipate that higher levels of income will serve to retain whites (as well as blacks) in

nonpoor neighborhoods throughout the time period examined, we nonetheless expect to find that the impact of economic resources on preventing migration into poor neighborhoods has moderated over time, as higher-earning white households initially residing in nonpoor areas increasingly find central city neighborhoods attractive places to live and work.

The studies by both Quillian (1999) and Massey et al. (1994) leave unresolved questions regarding trends in the selectivity of white migration into and out of poor neighborhoods. For example, the Massey et al. (1994) study shows that the likelihood of out-mobility for both poor and nonpoor whites was lower in the period between 1979 and 1984 than between 1970 and 1973, but the findings reveal little about changes in the relative likelihood of poor and nonpoor whites' choosing poor neighborhoods as their destinations. Similarly, while the results presented by Quillian (1999) show that the net flow of poor whites into poor and very poor tracts exceeds that of nonpoor whites, no attention is paid to the possible attenuation of this selectivity as would be predicted based on the increasing prevalence of gentrification.

We emphasize that these limitations of prior analyses stem not from any analytical or interpretative faults, but rather because their focus is on the implications of class-selective out-migration for the growth of high-poverty inner-city neighborhoods, rather than on the more general issues of changing class selectivity and racial disparities in interneighborhood migration patterns. Accordingly, we believe that the validity of Wilson's claims that, over recent decades, black out-migration from inner-city neighborhoods has become increasingly class selective and has converged toward that of whites remains an open question, as does the possibility of decreasing class selectivity of white mobility into poor neighborhoods.

### Isolating the Changing Effects of Race and Income

As noted above, Wilson's (1987) treatise includes both a descriptive component—that over time, blacks (and particularly high-income blacks) have become increasingly likely to move from poor to nonpoor neighborhoods, resulting in a racial convergence in these migration streams—and a causal argument—that declining racial discrimination in the housing market is the primary mechanism driving these changes. Although it is of course difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly racial discrimination or historical changes therein, a key implication of Wilson's "declining discrimination" explanation for changes in the racial stratification of interneighborhood migration patterns is that such changes are not readily attributable to race-specific changes in the sociodemographic composition or geographic distribution of these populations. Moreover, historical changes in some characteristics of the black and white populations have

conceivably masked changes in racial and class differences in interneighborhood mobility patterns that are consistent with Wilson's causal argument. Thus, to evaluate the causal dimension of Wilson's thesis, it is necessary to attempt to isolate the changing effects of race and class, net of changes in other established predictors of migration between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. Any temporal changes in sociodemographic characteristics that affect mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods could either exaggerate or obscure the actual trends in the effects of race and income on these mobility patterns.

One possible example of this type of confounding influence is provided by Massey et al. (1994), who find that in the early 1980s, the overall likelihood of leaving a poor, black neighborhood was actually lower for nonpoor blacks than for poor blacks, representing a reversal of the pattern of the early 1970s. The authors speculate that the lower likelihood of leaving a poor neighborhood among nonpoor blacks in the early 1980s may reflect their relatively higher rate of home ownership, a factor that tends to retard the likelihood of moving in general. Implicit in their reliance on home ownership as a source of this reversal in the effects of poverty status is the assumption that either the ownership gap between poor and nonpoor blacks increased between the 1970s and 1980s, or that the deterrent effect of home ownership on mobility out of poor neighborhoods became stronger over time. The latter would be the case if, over time, it became more difficult for black home owners in ghetto neighborhoods to sell their homes for a reasonable price. The growing concentration of poverty, in which poor neighborhoods were increasingly surrounded by other poor neighborhoods (Jargowsky 1997), may have made such transactions increasingly difficult. Moreover, to the extent that poor neighborhoods have become increasingly suffused with social problems such as crime, physical deterioration, and job loss, the prospects for selling a home in such a neighborhood may have declined. Following these arguments, it becomes clear that in order to assess fully Wilson's argument that SES has become increasingly important in shaping blacks' opportunities for leaving a poor neighborhood, countervailing trends in both the level and the effects of home ownership must be taken into consideration. That is, we might observe increasing class selectivity in black out-migration from poor neighborhoods only after we have adjusted for historical changes in the level and effect of home ownership among blacks. Such a finding would not completely salvage support for Wilson's hypothesis, since Wilson clearly intends his hypothesis to *describe* changing patterns of black out-migration, without qualifying conditions. But this result would lend support to the idea that, *ceteris paribus*, the *causal* impact of SES on black migration has indeed changed over recent decades. In a similar way, changes in the racial home ownership gap (Masnick

2001) may obscure true changes in the effects of race on the likelihood of leaving a poor neighborhood.

While there are fewer theoretical arguments to suggest that the *effects* of other microlevel conditions have undergone transformations in recent decades, the *levels* of other microlevel factors that influence the overall likelihood of mobility and the choice of destinations have changed over this period. For example, we know that the size and composition of families and the education, marital status, and gender distribution of American household heads have changed markedly in recent decades, and that these changes have affected different income and racial groups somewhat differently (c.f., Teachman, Tedrow, and Crowder 2000; U.S. Census Bureau 2003). The arguments raised by Massey and his colleagues highlight the importance of controlling for these changing determinants of mobility in order to assess fully Wilson's arguments regarding the declining significance of race and the increasing importance of economic status.

For similar reasons, it is crucial to take into consideration the changing structural characteristics under which household mobility decisions are made. Past research on the topic indicates that patterns of residential mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods are shaped not only by characteristics of individuals, families, and households, but also by characteristics of both the neighborhood of origin and the larger metropolitan area (South and Crowder 1997). For example, opportunities for residential mobility in general should be greater in cities with an abundance of available housing, although the concentration of housing vacancies in relatively poor neighborhoods where demand for housing is weakest may translate into lower probabilities of mobility into nonpoor tracts (South and Crowder 1997). In contrast, a greater availability of recently built housing in the metropolitan area should enhance the ability to escape a poor neighborhood. More generally, the relative number of high-poverty neighborhoods in the metropolitan area helps to determine the destination options available to movers. All of these structural conditions of metropolitan areas have undergone substantial change in recent decades. Unprecedented metropolitan expansion has ostensibly increased the availability of housing in lower-poverty suburban segments of many metropolitan areas and left larger pools of vacant housing units, especially in central city neighborhoods. At the same time, the geographic concentration of poverty, characterized by both a higher level of poverty in already poor neighborhoods and the spread of concentrated poverty into adjacent neighborhoods (Jargowsky 1997), also fundamentally changed the distribution of poor and nonpoor neighborhood options available to movers. Consideration of these changing structural determinants of mobility is essential in order to isolate trends in the effects of race and income *per se* on the mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. At the

very least, controlling for these and other determinants of mobility allows for an examination of the factors that have contributed to changes in overall race- and class-specific patterns of mobility between these types of neighborhoods.

Thus, our analysis goes beyond prior research on interneighborhood mobility in four key ways. First, we provide a direct examination of the extent to which the mobility of blacks out of and into poor neighborhoods has converged toward those of whites over the past three decades. We examine overall trends in these race-specific patterns, and, in order to isolate changes in the net effects of race on these mobility outcomes, we control for changes in microlevel and contextual factors that independently affect either the propensity to move or the choice of destinations.

Second, we present a clear and straightforward test of whether there has been a change in the effect of economic resources on the rate at which African-Americans and whites move out of poor neighborhoods and into nonpoor communities. In a similarly straightforward way, we also examine whether there has been a change in the effect of economic resources on the probability that individuals already residing in nonpoor neighborhoods will move into poor neighborhoods, as suggested by the existing literature on gentrification.

Third, we explore—at least indirectly—the mechanisms driving historical changes in the sociodemographic determinants of interneighborhood residential mobility. As noted above, Wilson (1987) argues that declining housing discrimination against African-Americans is the root cause of the increasing class selectivity of black out-migration from ghetto neighborhoods. Presumably, then, we would expect that any racial convergence in the likelihood of escaping and/or avoiding poor neighborhoods would be driven primarily by changing patterns of migration among black rather than white households, since the latter are obviously not subject to housing market discrimination on the basis of race. Similarly, because declining discrimination is presumed to create opportunities primarily for higher-income blacks, we would not expect to find parallel changes in the class selectivity of out-migration from poor neighborhoods among whites. Similar changes in rates of out-migration from poor neighborhoods among both blacks *and* whites and similar changes in socioeconomic differentials in this mobility would cast doubt on declining housing discrimination as the main force behind the change for African-Americans. Prior studies in this area have not been able to assess declining discrimination as the prime dynamic behind the changing levels and class selectivity of black out-migration because they do not systematically compare blacks and whites.

Finally, prior studies that have used the PSID to explore these issues have been hampered by a discontinuous data series; until recently, geocode

data were missing for several years during the 1970s. Now, however, geocodes for most of these years are available, and we use them to create a complete annual time series of panel data. Further, while the latest year examined in prior studies is 1990, we are able to extend our analysis through 1997, allowing us to determine if any changes observed in earlier decades persisted, or perhaps reversed, during the most recent decade, a time period in which the geographic concentration of poverty declined (Jargowsky 2003; Kingsley and Pettit 2003).<sup>2</sup>

#### DATA AND METHODS

The PSID is a well-known and frequently used longitudinal survey of U.S. residents and their descendants (Hill 1992). Beginning in 1968 with approximately 5,000 families (or about 18,000 individuals), the sample has been interviewed annually, and new families have been added to the sample as children leave home to form new households. By the mid-1990s, the cumulative total of individuals participating in the PSID had grown to over 50,000, representing about 8,700 families. The PSID is an extraordinarily rich source of data, providing individual- and family-level information on many of the hypothesized determinants of residential mobility. Attrition from the PSID sample has been fairly modest, and in general has not compromised its representativeness (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt 1998; Lillard and Panis 1994).

What makes the PSID uniquely suited for the study of residential mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods are the PSID-geocode match files. The PSID-geocode files match the annual addresses of PSID respondents to the corresponding census (Federal Information Processing Standards, or FIPS) codes for tracts and enumeration districts, as well as for larger geographic areas such as census-designated places, minor civil divisions (MCDs), counties, and metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Following much prior work in this area (Massey et al. 1994; Quillian 1999; South and Crowder 1997), we use these codes to attach census information on the metropolitan area and tract of residence at each annual interview. Although census tracts are imperfect operationalizations of neighborhoods, they undoubtedly come the closest of any commonly available spatial entity in approximating the usual conception of a neighborhood, and their use in this capacity is widespread in sociological and demographic research (Hill 1992; White 1987; Jargowsky 1997). Census data

<sup>2</sup> After 1997, PSID data have been collected biennially, thereby eliminating the opportunity to examine annual mobility events. In addition, because addresses for the 1969 PSID interview year have yet to be located, we are unable to examine annual mobility between 1968 and 1969 or between 1969 and 1970.



are drawn from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB), in which census tract boundaries have been matched across all censuses from 1970 to 2000.<sup>3</sup> The consistency of tract boundaries in the NCDB allows us to employ linear interpolation based on data from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses to describe the contextual characteristics of PSID respondents' census tracts and metropolitan areas of residence during intercensal years.

Because many of the residential moves identified in the PSID will be by members of the same family, we include only respondents who were classified as heads of the household either at the beginning *or* at the end of an annual mobility interval (i.e., the period between annual interviews). Many moves, of course, are undertaken by families, and thus, a decision to move made by the household head (or made jointly by the family) perforce means a move by other family members. If all respondents were included in the sample, a single move would be counted several times, one for each family member. Imposing this selection criterion avoids counting as unique and distinct those moves made by members of the same family (e.g., children and spouses), since only moves by the head of the household are included. At the same time, moves by family members who were not the household head at the beginning of the interval but become the head at the end of the interval—for example, when a child leaves the parental home or when an ex-husband or ex-wife establishes a new residence—are included in our sample.

Two other sample selection criteria are imposed for this analysis. First, given our interest in examining structural constraints on mobility and Wilson's concern with the spatial mobility of metropolitan residents, we include only those respondents living in a census-defined metropolitan area at both the beginning and end of an annual mobility interval. Second, we focus only on black and white household heads. Because the initial PSID panel was drawn in 1968, the numbers of members of other racial groups, at least prior to 1990, are too small to support a separate analysis. In addition, the focus on blacks and whites maintains the comparability of the current study with other recent research on the topic. The effective sample for our analysis contains 5,269 black and 8,222 white household heads.

<sup>3</sup> Additional information on the NCDB can be found at <http://www.geolytics.com>. The use of the NCDB requires that the 1990 tract codes reported in the PSID geocode data be converted to corresponding 2000 tract codes. This was accomplished through the use of the U.S. Census Bureau's "Census Tract Relationship File," available at <http://ftp2.census.gov/geo/relfiles/tract/us/>.

## Dependent and Independent Variables

Following past research on the topic (Massey et al. 1994; Quillian 1999; South and Crowder 1997; Wilson 1987), we classify census tracts with poverty rates of at least 20% as poor neighborhoods and all others as nonpoor neighborhoods.<sup>4</sup> Given the focus of the theoretical arguments outlined above, we examine the overall likelihood of moving to a different type of tract between successive annual interviews. Thus, for respondents originating (time  $t$ ) in a poor tract, we examine the likelihood of residing in a nonpoor tract by the end of the annual mobility interval (time  $t + 1$ ) versus remaining in a poor tract (either not moving or moving to a different poor tract). A parallel outcome is examined for respondents originating in a nonpoor tract—a binary variable tapping movement to a poor tract.

Key independent variables include demographic, socioeconomic, housing, and contextual characteristics shown in past studies to influence residential mobility in general and mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods in particular. We include these variables not only to assess the general determinants of mobility between neighborhoods, but also to isolate the changing effects of race and income to which these variables may be related. With the exception of the variables used to indicate if the respondent is black (1 = yes) or female (1 = yes), these variables are treated as time-varying covariates, measured at the beginning of the mobility interval. The age of the household head is used as a primary indicator of life-cycle stage, and age squared is used to capture the nonlinear relationship between age and mobility. To tap the generally greater mobility of unmarried individuals, we also include an indicator of whether the head is married (1 = married or cohabiting long term) at the beginning of the mobility interval. Because changes in marital status are often associated with mobility (Speare and Goldscheider 1987), with divorce in particular often associated with downward mobility, we specify whether the respondent became unmarried (1 = yes) during the mobility interval in the analysis of mobility into poor neighborhoods. Similarly, we examine

<sup>4</sup> We replicated the entire analysis using both 30% (see Kingsley and Pettit 2003) and 40% (see Jargowsky 2003) poverty thresholds to define poor tracts. Overall, these additional analyses lead to substantive conclusions that are quite similar to those presented here. In general,  $t$ -values for coefficients indicating racial and income differences are slightly less pronounced in the analysis of mobility out of poor tracts, largely reflecting the fact that very small numbers of whites, especially moderate- to high-income whites, originated in tracts with poverty levels as high as 30% or 40%. In contrast, racial differences in the likelihood of moving into poor tracts are slightly more pronounced when 30% or 40% thresholds are utilized, but the substantive conclusions remain unchanged. Given these similarities, we have retained the use of a 20% threshold in order to maintain consistency with past research on the topic. Full results of the additional analyses are available upon request.

whether the likelihood of moving out of a poor neighborhood is greater if the respondent became married (1 = yes). Overall, children tend to reduce family mobility by establishing social ties to the community and local institutions, an effect that we consider by including a measure of the total number of children in the household.

Critical to understanding migration patterns between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods and racial differences in these migration streams are the economic resources available to families. Theoretically, these resources provide the means for mobility into nonpoor neighborhoods and protect families from slipping into poor neighborhoods. In our study, family income represents the total taxable income of the household head and (if present) their spouse in the preceding year and is measured in constant 1997 dollars. We also include two aspects of socioeconomic conditions that may influence mobility outcomes independently of annual family income. Changes in income, measured here as the difference between the family taxable income in the year leading up to the mobility interval ( $t - 1$  to  $t$ ) and the income during the preceding year ( $t - 2$  to  $t - 1$ ), may be particularly salient to decisions to move between economically disparate neighborhoods. Education, representing the total number of years of formal school completed by the household head as of the annual interview, may influence mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods, independently of the effects of income, by affecting access to information about mobility opportunities, the likelihood of residential adjustments, and mobility preferences (Deane 1990).<sup>5</sup>

Housing characteristics include an indicator (home owner) of whether the current dwelling is owned by the head of the household and a measure of household crowding, that is, the number of persons in the household relative to the number of rooms (persons per room). Home ownership tends to reduce mobility in general, while household crowding may provide the impetus to move.

Although the 1990s saw some reduction in the overall geographic concentration of poverty (Jargowsky 2003; Kingsley and Pettit 2003), high-poverty tracts have become increasingly agglomerated since the 1970s (Jargowsky 1997). As a result, the economic conditions of the tract of origin are likely to be related to its spatial proximity to poor or nonpoor tracts. And, because mobility is distance dependent, with most residential moves covering a relatively short distance, this relative proximity to poor and nonpoor tracts is likely to affect the probability of moving between

<sup>5</sup> While education of the householder and changes in family income are correlated with family income ( $r = .395$  for education and family income;  $r = .287$  for change in income and family income), their inclusion in the analysis changes none of our central conclusions regarding trends in race- and income-specific patterns in mobility.

these types of tracts. We include a variable indicating the percentage of the tract-of-origin population with incomes below the poverty level (tract % poverty) to capture this effect. Complementing this neighborhood-level measure are three characteristics of the census-defined MSA in which the respondent lived, all included to reflect the relative distribution of opportunities for moving into and out of poor tracts.<sup>6</sup> These include the percentage of all tracts in the metropolitan area with poverty levels above 20% (MSA % poor tracts), the percentage of housing units that are vacant, and the percentage of housing built within the past 10 years. Regional differences in ecological structures, patterns of growth, economic conditions, and overall mobility rates are captured with a set of dummy variables indicating residence in the Northeast, Midwest, South, or West (the omitted category).

### Analytical Strategy

The PSID provides information on the residential location of respondents in each year of the study, thereby allowing us to examine multiple residential moves for the vast majority of respondents. We take advantage of this wealth of information by constructing our analysis files in person-year format, with each observation referring to the period between successive annual interviews. Utilizing this strategy, our analysis includes a total of 36,703 observations in which respondents originated (at time  $t$ ) in a poor tract and 75,512 person-year observations in which respondents originated in a nonpoor tract.

We use logistic regression to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the likelihood of making a specific type of move during the annual mobility interval. Simple binary logistic models contrast the log odds of moving to a different type of tract versus remaining in the same type of tract (either not moving or moving to a different tract of the same poverty type).<sup>7</sup> While the examination of multiple observations per in-

<sup>6</sup> For the relatively small number of respondents moving between metropolitan areas during the mobility interval, these variables refer to the characteristics of the metropolitan area of destination (time  $t + 1$ ), since these characteristics define the available residential options

<sup>7</sup> In supplemental analyses, we also differentiated between those who did not move between times  $t$  and  $t + 1$  and those who moved to a tract with a similar level of poverty. For example, for those originating in a poor tract, we performed a multinomial logistic regression analysis in which the dependent variable differentiated between three mobility outcomes: remaining in the same tract, moving to a different poor tract, and moving to a nonpoor tract. These supplemental analyses allow for an investigation of the relative effects of the predictors on the likelihood of moving per se and the choice of destinations. Complete results from these multinomial analyses are available from the authors upon request.

dividual allows us to make maximum use of the available data, this strategy violates the basic regression assumption of observational independence and, potentially, leads to an underestimation of standard errors for model coefficients. In order to correct for this nonindependence of person-year observations, we use Stata's "cluster" procedure in all of our regression analyses to produce robust standard errors (StataCorp 2001).<sup>8</sup> We examine temporal changes in mobility between poor and nonpoor tracts by including in the regression models an indicator of the year of observation (time  $t$ ).<sup>9</sup> We use product terms to test hypotheses regarding changes in the class selectivity and racial stratification of mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. All analyses use unweighted data, although the substantive conclusions using weighted data are identical to those presented here.<sup>10</sup>

## RESULTS

The theoretical arguments reviewed above raise three key questions around which the analysis is organized. First, have patterns of migration between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods become more similar over time for black and white households? Second, to what extent are these trends attributable to changes in the sociodemographic characteristics of black and white householders and the broader structural conditions in which their mobility decisions are made? And third, within racial groups, have the effects of income on migration between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods changed over time to produce more economically selective mobility flows?

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics disaggregated by respondents' race

<sup>8</sup> Some respondents share the same census tract, which represents an additional source of clustering that could affect the estimated standard errors of these models. While such a data structure often necessitates the use of more complex multilevel modeling techniques (c f. DiPrete and Forristal 1994), the necessity and utility of these procedures are greatly limited by a low level of neighborhood clustering in the PSID data (Teachman and Crowder 2002). In the majority of census tracts represented in our data, there is only a single respondent, and the average is fewer than two respondents per tract.

<sup>9</sup> Models utilizing indicators of seven different four-year time periods rather than the continuous year variable to identify temporal shifts in mobility outcomes and the effects of mobility predictors produce very similar results.

<sup>10</sup> Our decision to present the results using unweighted data was based on two considerations. First, according to PSID weighting rules, respondents who were not members of, or children born into, the original panel families are considered "nonsample individuals" and receive individual weights of zero. These respondents are lost from the sample when the PSID weights are applied. Second, we prefer the unweighted regression results because the PSID sampling weights are primarily a function of independent variables included in the regression models (Winship and Radbill 1994).

and neighborhood-origin type for all variables used in the analysis. Highlighting racial differences in residential location at the beginning of the mobility intervals are the sharp differences in the distribution of black and white observations across neighborhood-origin types. While just over 11% ( $7,302/65,456 = .112$ ) of the person-year observations contributed by white householders began with residence in a poor tract, black householders began an annual mobility interval in a poor tract almost 63% ( $29,401/46,759 = .628$ ) of the time. Nearly as pronounced are gross racial differences in the likelihood of moving between poor and nonpoor census tracts. Blacks originating in a poor tract face only about a 6% annual probability of successfully escaping to a nonpoor tract. In contrast, 11% of the annual observations contributed by white householders in poor tracts were characterized by a move to a nonpoor area. An even more dramatic racial difference is apparent among those observations originating in nonpoor tracts. Among black householders originating in a nonpoor tract, the risk of moving into a poor tract by the end of the mobility interval was about nine times the rate for whites (.09 vs. .01, respectively).

Some of these racial disparities in interneighborhood migration can likely be attributed to the fairly pronounced racial differences in socio-demographic characteristics and contextual conditions. In comparison to their white counterparts, black householders originating in poor and nonpoor tracts had lower average incomes and education at the beginning of the mobility interval and were less likely to own their home. Black householders also were more likely to be female, were slightly younger, were less likely to be married, and had more children than did whites from similar neighborhood types. And, even within neighborhood-origin types, there were marked differences in the level of neighborhood poverty experienced by black and white householders. Among those originating in tracts over the 20% poverty threshold, the average tract poverty experienced by black householders was over five percentage points higher than the average for whites (35.41 vs. 30.09). In the nonpoor tract sample, black householders experienced tract poverty levels that were over four percentage points higher (11.84 vs. 7.28). The metropolitan contexts of black and white householders were generally similar, although blacks tended to be more concentrated in the south and in metropolitan areas with slightly higher levels of recent housing construction. Also of interest is that, in comparison to their black counterparts and to whites from nonpoor neighborhoods, those whites who originated in a poor neighborhood tended to be located in metropolitan areas with higher concentrations of poor census tracts overall, implying a relative shortage of nonpoor residential alternatives.

TABLE 1  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS OF MOBILITY BETWEEN POOR AND NONPOOR CENSUS TRACTS: PSID HEADS  
OF HOUSEHOLDS, 1970-97

	IN A POOR TRACT AT TIME <i>t</i>				IN A NONPOOR TRACT AT TIME <i>t</i>			
	Blacks		Whites		Blacks		Whites	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Dependent variables:								
Moved to a nonpoor tract, time <i>t</i> to <i>t</i> + 1 . . .	.06	.24	.11	.31	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
Moved to a poor tract, time <i>t</i> to <i>t</i> + 1 . . . . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	.09	.28	.01	.11
Independent variables:								
Family income (\$1,000s) . . . . .	15.76	19.11	20.56	24.98	30.04	27.01	49.05	50.99
Change in family income . . . . .	-.20	11.82	-1.01	18.26	.52	15.81	-.11	29.37
Education . . . . .	10.54	2.85	10.83	3.63	11.78	2.73	12.92	2.81
Female . . . . .	.52	.50	.38	.49	.40	.49	.23	.42
Age . . . . .	40.99	16.13	45.83	18.50	38.52	13.89	43.46	16.60
Age squared . . . . .	1,940.61	1,514.49	2,442.24	1,870.33	1,676.51	1,270.57	2,164.41	1,650.92
Married . . . . .	.33	.47	.49	.50	.48	.50	.67	.47
Became unmarried . . . . .	.04	.20	.04	.20	.05	.22	.04	.20





### Changing Racial Disparities in Mobility from Poor to Nonpoor Tracts

While the descriptive statistics in table 1 reveal pronounced racial differences in residential mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods, our central goal is to investigate whether these racial disparities have declined over the three decades of the study, and whether the class selectivity of mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods has changed over this period. Figure 1 begins the investigation of these issues, focusing on basic racial differences in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts. The observed trends reported in this figure show the actual percentages of black and white households located in a poor tract at the beginning of a mobility interval who moved to a nonpoor tract by the following year. In order to highlight general trends in these race-specific mobility patterns, rather than annual fluctuations in these patterns, the annual observations are grouped within seven four-year periods.

In all years between 1970 and 1997, white householders, in comparison to blacks, exhibited a substantially higher likelihood of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract during an annual mobility interval. However, the observed percentages in figure 1 also provide evidence that, despite temporal fluctuations among both groups, the gap between blacks and whites in the overall likelihood of moving from a poor neighborhood to a nonpoor neighborhood narrowed considerably over the three decades of the study. During the 1970–73 period, whites experienced an annual probability of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract of about 14%, in sharp contrast to the black rate of about 7%. But by the 1994–97 period, about 10% of at-risk whites and over 8% of at-risk blacks were moving annually to a nonpoor census tract.

These trends in the racial stratification of mobility out of poor neighborhoods are also reflected in the logit coefficients presented in model 1 of table 2. This model regresses the binary indicator of moving from a poor to nonpoor tract on the dummy variable for black race, the time trend variable (year), and their interaction. The coefficients indicate that while the racial difference in the likelihood of escaping a poor neighborhood is statistically significant, so too is the reduction of this racial gap. Specifically, the positive coefficient for black race indicates that, as of 1970, black householders' odds of moving to a nonpoor tract were only about 34% ( $e^{-1.0814} = .339$ ) of the odds for white householders. However, as the positive (and statistically significant) coefficient for the interaction of black race and year indicates, this racial gap in the odds of escaping residence in a poor tract narrowed by an average of 3% ( $e^{.0315} - 1 = .032$ ) per year between 1970 and 1997.

Although the basic racial convergence in observed mobility patterns displayed in figure 1 provides support for the descriptive dimension of

## Race, Class, and Changing Patterns of Migration




FIG. 1.—Observed and predicted trends in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts, by race PSID heads of households, 1970–97

Wilson's argument that race has declined in importance as a determinant of the likelihood of escaping a poor tract, there are several caveats that must be attached to this assessment. First, the racial difference in the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor tract remained nontrivial even as of the late 1990s. For example, combining the coefficients for race and the interaction of race and year from model 1 of table 2 indicates that the overall odds of mobility into a nonpoor tract were still about 20% ( $1 - e^{-1.0814 + [0.315][27]} = .206$ ) lower for blacks than for whites in 1997, a statistically significant difference ( $P = .009$ ).

Second, and perhaps more important, is that the racial convergence revealed in figure 1 is driven as much by a declining propensity for white households to move from poor to nonpoor areas as by an increase in the likelihood of this type of mobility among black households. While the overall rate of escape rose modestly for blacks across the decades (from 6.8% per year in the early 1970s to 8.8% per year by the late 1990s), this trend was actually slightly less pronounced than the downward trend for white householders (from 14.0% per year in the early 1970s to 10.5% per year by the late 1990s). Thus, only part of the racial convergence in the likelihood of escaping a poor tract can be reasonably attributed to declining racial discrimination in housing markets and liberalizing racial attitudes, because these shifts would presumably have little effect on the mobility opportunities facing white householders.

TABLE 2  
LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS FOR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL MOBILITY BETWEEN POOR AND NONPOOR CENSUS TRACTS: PSID HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS, 1970-97

	MOVE FROM A POOR TO A NONPOOR TRACT			MOVE FROM A NONPOOR TO A POOR TRACT		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Black . . . . .	-1.0814*** (.1216)	-1.1179*** (.0104)	- .9413*** (.1240)	2.5174*** (.1169)	1.8904*** (.1217)	1.6786*** (.1270)
Family income (\$1,000s) . . . . .		.0104*** (.0014)	.0090*** (.0014)		-.0104*** (.0019)	-.0076*** (.0018)
Change in income . . . . .		-.0027 (.0014)	-.0020 (.0015)		.0026 (.0016)	.0015 (.0016)
Education . . . . .		.0623*** (.0103)	.0617*** (.0105)		-.0746*** (.0126)	-.0688*** (.0127)
Female . . . . .		.0618 (.0633)	.0755 (.0632)		-.1813** (.0646)	-.1692** (.0654)
Age . . . . .		-.0999*** (.0085)	-.0972*** (.0086)		-.1082*** (.0100)	-.1089*** (.0101)
Age squared . . . . .		.0007*** (.0001)	.0007*** (.0001)		.0008*** (.0001)	.0008*** (.0001)
Married . . . . .		-.0346 (.0691)	-.0261 (.0697)		-.8531*** (.0843)	-.8897*** (.0846)
Became married . . . . .		.6933*** (.0819)	.7120*** (.0829)			
Became unmarried . . . . .					1.8324*** (.0911)	1.8582*** (.0913)
No. of children . . . . .		-.0173 (.0174)	-.0098 (.0174)		.0949*** (.0197)	.0844*** (.0201)
Home owner . . . . .		-.6778*** (.0667)	-.7158*** (.0671)		-.8062*** (.0674)	-.8307*** (.0678)

Persons per room . . . . .	.0345*	0346*		.0332	.0339
Tract.	(0173)	(0176)		(0197)	(0200)
% in poverty . . . . .		- 0172***			0425***
MSA:		(0023)			(0055)
% poor tracts . . . . .		- 0259***			0250***
		(0027)			(0031)
% housing units vacant . . . .		- 0442***			.0248
		(0138)			(0128)
% units built 0-10 yrs. ago . .		0146**			.0016
		(0047)			(0052)
Region					
Northeast . . . . .		- 4297***			- .0640
		(1021)			(1155)
Midwest . . . . .		- 1200			1521
		(0833)			(0868)
South . . . . .		- 0766			- .2052*
		(0733)			(0819)
Year (1970 = 0) . . . . .	- 0224***	0179**		.0187***	.0189+*
	(0057)	(0066)		(0055)	(0064)
Interaction, black x year . . .	0315***	.0181**		- .0301***	- 0191**
	(0066)	(0069)		(0067)	(0070)
Constant . . . . .	- 1.7078***	.9571*		- 4.3223***	- .0644***
	(1069)	(.4311)		(.0892)	(0180)
Model chi-square . . . . .	138.77***	1,261.17***		1,392.12***	3,073.29***
No. of observations . . . . .		36,703		2,990.88***	
				75,512	

Note.—Nos in parentheses are SEs. West is the reference category for region.

\*  $P \leq .05$

\*\*  $P \leq .01$

\*\*\*  $P \leq .001$

Finally, as argued earlier, it is important to note that both the slight upward trend in the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor neighborhood among black householders and the more pronounced downward trend among whites are likely conflated with trends in a variety of other microlevel and contextual determinants of mobility. In order to isolate the changing effects of race on the probability of escaping a poor tract, it is important to consider coincidental changes in the sociodemographic characteristics of those originating in poor tracts and shifts in the mobility options to which they have been exposed. Toward this end, model 2 of table 2 adds a series of controls for other microlevel determinants of mobility measured at the beginning of the annual mobility interval. As expected, many of these microlevel characteristics exert a significant influence on mobility independently of the effect of race.<sup>11</sup> For example, the likelihood of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract increases significantly with income, education, and household crowding; is higher for those recently marrying; and is lower for residents of poor tracts who own their own home. The net risk of making such a residential move also declines significantly with age, albeit at a decreasing rate, presumably by reducing the likelihood of moving at all.

Given racial differences in these characteristics, most of these effects favor whites in terms of enhancing the likelihood of escaping poor neighborhoods. Yet, the modest change in the coefficient for black race between model 1 ( $b = -1.0814$ ) and model 2 ( $b = -1.1179$ ) of table 2 indicates that controlling for these factors has very little impact on the baseline effect of race. Thus, the pronounced racial difference in interneighborhood migration behavior at the beginning of the period of study is not due to basic racial differences in sociodemographic characteristics. More pronounced are the effects of these controls on the coefficients used to model temporal changes in race-specific patterns of mobility. Most notably, the negative coefficient for the year of observation, which in this model indicates the annual change in the log odds of moving to a nonpoor tract among white householders, is reduced by half with these controls ( $b = -.0118$  in model 2 compared to  $-.0224$  in model 1). This attenuation indicates that a sizable portion of the downward trend in whites' likelihood of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract is attributable to changes in the sociodemographic characteristics of whites originating in poor tracts. Supplemental analyses indicate that two sociodemographic changes

<sup>11</sup> This and other pooled models unrealistically constrain the effects of all predictors (except year) to be invariant by race. However, models that include race interaction terms to account for all significant racial differences in regression coefficients lead to conclusions about the effects of race and temporal changes in the effects of race that are identical to those reported here.

were especially important in this regard. First, the rate of home ownership among whites originating in poor tracts increased between 1970 and 1997, reducing the overall rate of white mobility from poor tracts in later years. Second, the average age of whites originating in poor tracts increased over time, and, given the strong negative impact of age on mobility in general, this too tended to suppress some of the trend in whites' mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts.<sup>12</sup>

The relatively modest difference in the coefficient for the interaction of black race and year between models 1 ( $b = .0315$ ) and 2 ( $b = .0279$ ), and the fact that the coefficient actually becomes slightly smaller (somewhat counterbalancing the positive change in the coefficient for year), indicates that changes in sociodemographic characteristics played a relatively smaller role in accounting for observed mobility trends among black householders. Combining the coefficients for the year of observation and the interaction term from model 1 indicates that the overall odds of mobility into a nonpoor tract increased by about 0.9% ( $e^{[-.0224 + .0315]} - 1 = .009$ ) per year for blacks. In comparison, the coefficients in model 2 indicate that removing the influences of sociodemographic characteristics increases this annual change in the odds of escape among blacks to about 1.6% ( $e^{[-.0118 + .0279]} - 1 = .016$ ). Once again, the effect of home ownership is important here; the rate of home ownership among blacks originating in poor tracts increased between 1970 and 1997, and, somewhat consistent with the Massey et al. (1994) argument, removing this influence reveals what would have been a slightly stronger upward trend in blacks' mobility into nonpoor neighborhoods.

Even more dramatic are the influences of changes in broader structural conditions on race-specific trends in mobility out of poor tracts. Model 3 of table 2 adds controls for the level of poverty in the tract of residence and the structural conditions of metropolitan areas to which individual respondents were exposed during an annual mobility interval. All of these factors significantly influence the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor tract in theoretically predicted ways. The level of poverty in the tract of origin is negatively associated with the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor tract,

<sup>12</sup> Because the PSID data do not represent a set of true staggered, independent panels, it is difficult to differentiate completely temporal trends from the effects of panel aging. We note, however, that the PSID panel is continually replenished with new, younger households through the incorporation of split-off families so that even as of 1997, the median age of householders in our sample is quite similar to the median age for the U.S. population. Furthermore, supplemental analyses indicate that the inclusion of interactions involving the age of the householder, in addition to those involving the year of observation, does not affect conclusions drawn about the temporal trends in mobility between poor and nonpoor tracts or trends in the effects of mobility determinants

presumably because the poorest of poor tracts are especially distant from nonpoor neighborhoods. In addition, the odds of moving to a nonpoor tract are significantly lower for those residing in metropolitan areas in which a larger share of potential destination tracts are poor and in metropolitan areas that have high vacancy rates. The availability of recently built housing in the metropolitan area increases the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor tract. Net of these factors, the odds of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract are significantly lower in the Northeast than in the West.

Despite these strong influences, the introduction of controls for the structure of mobility opportunities reduces only slightly the overall racial difference in migration from poor to nonpoor tracts. The coefficient for black race in model 3 of table 2 indicates that, even net of the influences of both microlevel characteristics and contextual conditions, the odds of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract were about 61% ( $1 - e^{-.9413} = .610$ ) lower for black than for white householders in 1970. But the inclusion of these controls has a dramatic impact on the coefficient for year of observation. In fact, the coefficient for year of observation becomes positive and statistically significant in model 3 ( $b = .0179$ ), indicating that once temporal changes in the tract and metropolitan conditions faced by householders are taken into consideration, the net likelihood of mobility from a poor to a nonpoor tract actually *increased* significantly for white householders. These controls reduce the coefficient for the interaction of black race and year of observation only slightly ( $b = .0181$  in model 3). Thus, the time trend in the relative black-white difference remains relatively unchanged with the introduction of controls for the contextual conditions faced by residents of poor tracts. The combination of this interaction and the coefficient for year of observation indicates that the positive trend in the net likelihood of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract is slightly, but statistically significantly, more pronounced for blacks than for whites.

Supplemental models indicate that historical changes in three contextual factors combined to produce the dramatic differences between the coefficients in model 3 of table 2 and those in model 2. First, the average level of tract poverty experienced by black and especially white residents increased over the decades of the study, and because tract poverty reduces the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor tract, this trend tended to suppress whites' overall mobility to nonpoor areas in later decades. Further reflecting the effects of poverty concentration, the share of tracts with poverty rates exceeding 20% in the metropolitan areas in which respondents were located increased sharply for both black and white householders (correlations with year = .344 for black householders and .378 for whites), thereby reducing the relative number of potential nonpoor destinations

for movers in later years. Finally, following the end of the suburban housing boom of the 1960s and 1970s, the availability of recently built housing in these metropolitan areas declined significantly during later years (correlations with year =  $-.318$  for black householders and  $-.307$  for whites), thereby further reducing the opportunities to move to nonpoor neighborhoods.

The impacts of individual-level and contextual conditions on black and white mobility trends are summarized by a comparison of the predicted trendlines in figure 1. The unstandardized trendlines are based on the coefficients from model 1 of table 2 and closely parallel the observed trends in the percentage of householders moving from a poor to a nonpoor neighborhood—a downward trend for whites and a slight upward trend for blacks to produce a noteworthy racial convergence. The standardized trendlines, in contrast, are based on the application of mean values for all variables, except race and year, to the coefficients in model 3 of table 2, thereby removing the influence of temporal changes in both microlevel characteristics of householders and the contextual conditions to which they were exposed. The comparison of these trendlines shows that the observed decline in the likelihood of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract among white householders is, in actuality, a reflection of changing sociodemographic composition of the white population residing in poor tracts and, most important, the changing structural opportunities afforded by their tract and metropolitan area of residence. Once these factors are taken into account, the predicted likelihood of moving from a poor to nonpoor tract among white householders shifts from a downward (unstandardized) trend to a positive (standardized) trend. Similar but less dramatic dynamics have influenced the mobility patterns of black householders. Thus, the remarkable aspect of the trends in mobility for blacks to be gleaned from the models in table 2 is that black mobility into nonpoor tracts increased over time despite increasing metropolitan-level constraints on such mobility (unstandardized trendline); controlling for the influence of these constraints reveals a somewhat sharper increase in the net probability (standardized trendline) of making such a move.

These results provide mixed support for Wilson's theoretical arguments. The descriptive aspects of Wilson's thesis are supported by the fact that the likelihood of escaping a poor tract has increased for black householders and converged toward that of whites. However, the causal aspect of Wilson's argument—that, due to a reduction in racial discrimination, race is declining in salience as a determinant of the ability to escape poor neighborhoods—receives relatively limited support. In fact, while statistically significant, the change in the net influence of race has been quite modest, as indicated by the standardized trendlines in figure 1. In 1970, the probability of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract for a black householder



with average characteristics was .057 lower than those for a white householder with similar characteristics and facing similar contextual conditions (.042 for blacks vs. .099 for whites). By 1997, this gap had dropped to .050 (.094 vs. .144) and was still statistically significant ( $P < .001$ ). Given that the net trend in the likelihood of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract is so similar for blacks and whites, it seems unlikely that declining racial discrimination in the housing market has played a major role in enhancing blacks' opportunities to escape poor neighborhoods.

### Changing Racial Disparities in Mobility from Nonpoor to Poor Tracts

Although the dynamics and consequences of mobility into poor tracts differ from those of mobility out of poor tracts, both types of moves are linked to ongoing theoretical debates about the persistence of race as a central determinant of migration and residential attainment. Thus, figure 2 and models 4–6 of table 2 complement the analysis above by assessing racial differences in the log odds of moving from a nonpoor tract to a poor tract. These results indicate that, among householders originating in nonpoor census tracts, there has been a modest racial convergence in the likelihood of moving into a poor neighborhood. The observed trends in figure 2 show that in all years, black householders moved from nonpoor to poor tracts at a substantially higher rate than did their white counterparts. In the 1970–73 period, for example, about 9.4% of black householders starting a mobility interval in a nonpoor tract moved into a poor tract by year's end—a rate almost 12 times higher than the comparable percentage for whites (0.8%). This overall gap, however, closed slightly over subsequent years as the overall rate of mobility into poor tracts declined among blacks and increased modestly among whites. These differences are also reflected in model 4 of table 2. Not surprisingly, the coefficient for black race indicates that the substantial black-white gap in the log odds of moving to a nonpoor tract as of 1970 is statistically significant, as are the increase in the rate of mobility into poor tracts among white householders (coefficient for year = .0187) and the difference between the trends for white and black householders (coefficient for interaction of black race and year =  $-.0301$ ). Despite these opposite trends, the rate of black mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts was still 5.4 times higher for black householders than white householders by the late 1990s (7.62% vs. 1.41%), a statistically significant difference ( $P < .001$ ).

Once again, this convergence of race-specific mobility patterns should not necessarily be interpreted as a declining effect of race per se, because it may also reflect the influence of other microlevel and contextual factors that have also changed over time. Model 5 of table 2 helps to isolate the net effects of race and changes in this effect, through the addition of a

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


FIG 2.—Observed and predicted trends in mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts, by race: PSID heads of households, 1970–97

series of controls for sociodemographic characteristics of individuals at the beginning of each annual mobility interval. The inclusion of these controls reduces the coefficient for black race by about 25% (from 2.5174 in model 4 to 1.8904 in model 5 of table 2), indicating that a substantial part of the large racial difference in the log odds of moving from a nonpoor tract to a poor tract as of 1970 is the product of sociodemographic differences between black and white householders. Especially important in this regard are racial differences in income, education, age, and home ownership. As reported in table 1, blacks originating in nonpoor tracts tend to be younger and less likely to own their own homes, both of which tend to increase their residential mobility relative to their white counterparts. In addition, the lower rate of home ownership among blacks originating in poor tracts implies access to fewer financial resources which, along with their lower average levels of education and income, increases the likelihood that they will move into a poor tract when they do move.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, even when these factors are controlled, the residual racial difference remains pronounced; the coefficient for black race in model 4 of table 2 indicates that, as of 1970, the odds of moving from a nonpoor

<sup>13</sup> The relative effects of these variables on the likelihood of mobility per se and the choice of destinations among those who move were confirmed in supplemental multinomial logistic regression models.

to a poor tract are still almost seven times higher ( $e^{1.8904} = 6.622$ ) for blacks than for whites with similar sociodemographic characteristics.

The addition of controls for tract- and metropolitan-level contextual factors reduces this baseline racial difference even further. Specifically, the race coefficient in model 6 of table 2 indicates that, with both micro-level and contextual conditions controlled, the odds of moving from a nonpoor tract to a poor tract are just over five times higher ( $e^{1.6786} = 5.358$ ) for blacks than for whites in 1970. Supplemental analyses reveal that the level of poverty in the tract of origin is primarily responsible for the attenuation of this race coefficient between models 5 and 6. Specifically, tract poverty is positively associated with the risk of moving to a higher-poverty neighborhood, and, on average throughout the period of study, black householders tend to originate in tracts with substantially higher levels of poverty relative to those occupied by white householders (see table 1).

Of greater interest for our purpose are the countervailing influences exerted by these microlevel and contextual factors in shaping race-specific trends and the resulting racial convergence in the likelihood of moving from a nonpoor to a poor neighborhood. As shown in table 2, the introduction of microlevel controls increases the logit coefficient for year of observation (from .0187 in model 4 to .0316 in model 5), indicating that changes in these sociodemographic characteristics helped to suppress what would have otherwise been a greater increase in the risk of moving to a poor tract among white householders. Two variables, age and income, are of particular importance here; both variables are negatively associated with the overall risk of moving to a poor tract, and both variables increased among whites between 1970 and 1997. However, the increasing prevalence of high-poverty tracts in the metropolitan areas in which white respondents live counterbalanced the downward pressure exerted by these microlevel changes on the risk of moving to a poor tract. By eroding the relative number of nonpoor neighborhood options for those seeking a move, this growing concentration of poor tracts between 1970 and the 1990s tended to increase white householders' overall risk of moving to a poor tract. Thus, adding this and other contextual variables to model 6 of table 2 reduces the positive coefficient for year of observation ( $b = .0189$ ) to just above its original value in model 4 ( $b = .0187$ ), and applying mean values to the coefficients in model 6 produces a standardized trendline for white householders in figure 2 that closely resembles the observed and unstandardized trends.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> The fact that the standardized trendline for whites is higher than the observed line in all years and, for blacks, is below the observed line reflects the use of pooled means for all variables. For example, whites in the sample have higher-than-average values

Combining the coefficients for the year of observation and the interaction between black race and year in model 6 implies that, for blacks, the annual net change in the log odds of moving to a poor tract is virtually zero ( $.0189 - .0191 = -.0002$ ). Thus, the downward trend in the observed likelihood of moving from a nonpoor tract to a poor tract among blacks displayed in figure 2 is completely explained by changes in the sociodemographic characteristics of blacks originating in nonpoor tracts and the contextual (i.e., tract and metropolitan) conditions to which they were exposed. Once again, this attenuation reflects a combination of sociodemographic and contextual influences. Most notably, blacks from nonpoor tracts experienced increases in income and education that exceeded those experienced by whites from such neighborhoods. And, unlike whites, blacks experienced declines in the level of poverty in their neighborhood of origin, perhaps increasing their distance from poor destinations. These changes for blacks helped to counterbalance the declining opportunities for mobility into nonpoor tracts afforded by changing metropolitan-area ecological conditions.

Comparing the black and white standardized trendlines in figure 2 shows that the pattern of effects implied in model 6 of table 2 does indicate some racial convergence in the net risk of moving from a nonpoor to a poor tract. In other words, once the influence of changes in the sociodemographic characteristics and contextual conditions are accounted for, black and white householders did become more similar between 1970 and 1997 in the likelihood of moving into a poor tract. This convergence, however, reflects the combination of a virtually flat standardized trend among blacks and a modest net increase in the risk among whites. Overall, then, the observed trends in mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts hide a good deal of complexity that belies a simple explanation based on increasing mobility opportunities for black householders. Furthermore, as with mobility *out of* poor tracts, a large and statistically significant net racial disparity in the likelihood of moving *into* a poor tract remains at the end of the time period. Specifically, even after controlling for racial differences and trends in sociodemographic and contextual conditions, the estimated annual probability of moving into a poor tract is still over three times higher for black householders (.0754) than for white householders (.0249) by 1997.

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on income, education, and a number of factors that reduce the likelihood of moving to a poor tract, and lower-than-average values on tract-level poverty and other factors that increase this risk. The use of these pooled means provides the opportunity to make comparisons between black and white householders with similar characteristics.

### Changing Class Selectivity of Mobility within Racial Groups

Having identified the nature of the racial convergence in mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods, we now turn to our second set of questions concerning temporal changes in the socioeconomic selectivity of movers out of and into poor tracts. As described earlier, Wilson (1987) argues that the diminution of the most blatant forms of racial discrimination has opened opportunities mainly for higher-status blacks to leave poor neighborhoods for more advantaged communities. Bearing on this hypothesis, figure 3 presents the observed trends in annual mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts for three income groups of black householders. For the sake of indirectly assessing the impacts of discrimination on these income-specific trends, we present parallel figures for income groups among whites. We categorize the entire sample into thirds based on their total family income (in constant 1997 dollars) at the beginning of the mobility interval. Those black and white household heads in families with incomes below \$13,300 (the 33.3d percentile) are considered low income, those above \$13,300 but below \$42,800 (the 66.7th percentile) are considered middle income, and those with family incomes above \$42,800 are considered high income.

A number of important contrasts are revealed in the observed mobility trends displayed in figure 3. First, the disaggregation by income shows that low-income members of both racial groups are at a disadvantage relative to their higher-income counterparts in the ability to escape a poor tract, a reflection of the positive effect of economic resources on the likelihood of gaining access to a nonpoor neighborhood upon moving. Second, within racial groups, the distinction between middle- and high-income groups is less clear. For example, among blacks, the percentage of middle-income blacks moving out of poor tracts is quite similar to that of high-income blacks after the mid-1980s. And, the extremely small numbers of high-income whites originating in a poor tract in any year means that even a few moves in any year could produce dramatic fluctuations in the percentage moving to a nonpoor tract. This instability generates observed mobility percentages among high-income whites that are well above those of middle-class whites in some years (e.g., between 1978 and 1981) and dip below in other years (e.g., in the 1990s). Third, revealing the extent of the racial stratification in the likelihood of escaping a poor tract, white householders in the low-income category have higher rates of mobility out of poor tracts than do even middle- and high-income blacks throughout most of the past 30 years; only in the 1990s did the rate of escape among high- and middle-income blacks exceed that of low-income whites.

Most important for our purposes is that the observed trends in figure 3 provide only modest evidence that historical changes in mobility from

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


FIG. 3—Observed trends in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts, by race and income PSID heads of households, 1970–97.

poor to nonpoor tracts differ by income within either of the racial groups. These income differentials are explored more formally in the race-specific logistic regression models presented in table 3. The coefficients in model 1 of table 3 indicate that among black householders, the log odds of entering a nonpoor tract do vary significantly by income ( $b$  for family income = .0128), and that, in general, the likelihood of making such a move did increase significantly over time ( $b$  for year of observation = .0153). However, the negative interaction between income and year of observation ( $b = -.0003$ ) indicates that the upward trend in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts was actually somewhat greater for *lower*-income blacks than for higher-income groups. Thus, these observed trends run counter to Wilson's argument about the increasing class selectivity of black out-migration from poor tracts. Similarly, the nonsignificant interaction coefficient in model 4 of table 3, like figure 3, provides no evidence that family economic conditions have become either less or more important in determining the likelihood of escaping a poor tract among white householders.

Although Wilson's arguments are, at their core, descriptive, outlining overall changes in the composition of poor neighborhoods, the theoretical importance of this hypothesis warrants additional scrutiny. Most notably, it is possible that the increasing class selectivity of black mobility out of poor tracts hypothesized by Wilson is simply suppressed by other socio-

TABLE 3  
LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS FOR RACE-SPECIFIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL MOBILITY FROM POOR TO NONPOOR CENSUS  
TRACTS: PSID HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS, 1970-97

	BLACKS			WHITES		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Family income (\$1,000s) ....	.0128*** (.0027)	.0140*** (.0031)	.0124*** (.0032)	.0052 (.0040)	.0103* (.0042)	.0105* (.0044)
Change in income .....		-.0024 (.0018)	-.0025 (.0018)		-.0020 (.0021)	-.0020 (.0021)
Education .....		.0940*** (.0150)	.0955*** (.0150)		.0266 (.0148)	.0266 (.0148)
Female .....		.0508 (.0740)	.0517 (.0739)		.1325 (.1213)	.1325 (.1213)
Age .....		-.0849*** (.0112)	-.0863*** (.0113)		-.1230*** (.0143)	-.1231*** (.0143)
Age squared .....		.0006*** (.0001)	.0006*** (.0001)		.0009*** (.0002)	.0009*** (.0002)
Married .....		-.0619 (.0841)	-.0584 (.0840)		-.0057 (.1250)	-.0065 (.1252)
Became married .....		.7056*** (.0969)	.7040*** (.0970)		.7022*** (.1648)	.7025*** (.1648)
No of children .....		.0029 (.0194)	.0017 (.0193)		-.0800 (.0413)	-.0795 (.0414)
Home owner .....		-.6963*** (.0837)	-.3589* (.1744)		-.7065*** (.1108)	-.7512** (.2926)
Persons per room .....		.0359 (.0206)	.0355 (.0206)		.0347 (.0351)	.0348 (.0351)

Tract:				
% in poverty . . . . .	-.0157*** (.0024)	-.0156*** (.0024)	-.0199*** (.0056)	-.0199*** (.0056)
MSA:				
% poor tracts . . . . .	-.0290*** (.0036)	-.0288*** (.0036)	-.0182*** (.0041)	-.0182*** (.0041)
% housing units vacant . . . . .	-.0607*** (.0186)	-.0610*** (.0186)	-.0127 (.0211)	-.0125 (.0211)
% units built 0-10 yrs. ago . . .	.0231*** (.0061)	.0226*** (.0061)	.0006 (.0079)	.0005 (.0079)
Region:				
Northeast . . . . .	-.4972*** (.1330)	-.4911*** (.1331)	-.4481** (.1643)	-.4488** (.1643)
Midwest . . . . .	-.2133* (.1025)	-.2073* (.1025)	.0186 (.1458)	.0180 (.1459)
South . . . . .	-.1782 (.0984)	-.1660 (.0985)	-.1566 (.1171)	-.1568 (.1170)
Year (1970 = 0) . . . . .	.0153*** (.0046)	.0445*** (.0061)	-.0238*** (.0075)	.0081 (.0098)
Interaction:				
Income × year . . . . .	-.0003* (.0002)	-.0002 (.0002)	-.0001 (.0002)	-.0001 (.0002)
Homeowner × year . . . . .		-.0242* (.0110)	.0026 (.0160)	.0026 (.0160)
Constant . . . . .	-.3.0184*** (.0779)	-.8083*** (.2399)	-.1.8315*** (.1410)	2.1922*** (.5650)
Model chi-square . . . . .	51.64***	895.15***	31.78***	542.18***
No. of observations . . . . .		29,401	7,302	542.68***

NOTE.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs West is the reference category for region.

\*  $P \leq .05$ .

\*\*  $P \leq .01$ .

\*\*\*  $P \leq .001$ .



demographic and contextual changes that have differentially affected various income groups. The coefficients in model 2 of table 3 explore this possibility, adding the full set of variables describing the individual-, family-, tract-, and metropolitan-level characteristics of individuals during each annual mobility interval to the model predicting mobility outcomes for blacks. For the sake of comparison, a parallel set of controls are included in model 5 of table 3, predicting the log odds of mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts among whites.

In models for both black and white householders, the effects of these control variables on the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor tract are generally consistent with the results of the pooled models presented earlier.<sup>15</sup> And, once again, controlling for trends in these characteristics reveals a positive (but nonsignificant) net upward trend in mobility among whites ( $b$  for year = .0081 in model 5, table 3) and a somewhat stronger (and statistically significant) upward trend among blacks ( $b$  for year = .0445 in model 2, table 3). Furthermore, among blacks, the income differential in the likelihood of moving to a nonpoor tract becomes slightly more pronounced with the addition of these controls, as indicated by the larger positive and statistically significant coefficient for family income ( $b$  = .0140 in model 2 vs.  $b$  = .0128 in model 1), and the increase is even more pronounced among whites ( $b$  = .0103 in model 5 vs.  $b$  = .0052 in model 4). This change in coefficients with the addition of controls reflects the fact that high-income black and white householders are more likely to be married and more likely to own their home than are their lower-income counterparts, and both factors tend to reduce the relative likelihood of mobility among high-income householders. Thus, comparing members of each racial group that differ in income, but are similar on these and other microlevel and contextual conditions, reveals a more pronounced gap between lower- and higher-income members of each group.

This pattern of net effects is illustrated in the standardized trendlines in figure 4, which are based on the application of race-specific means for all variables, except income, to the coefficients in models 2 and 5 of table 3. To represent the three income groups referenced in figure 3, we applied the average income for householders within each of these broader income categories. Specifically, the low-income line for each racial group is based on a value for family income of \$5,500, the middle-income lines assumes a value of \$28,000, and the high-income lines a value of \$68,000.

For our purposes, the most important fact to be gleaned from figure 4

<sup>15</sup> The stronger positive effect of new housing construction on mobility out of poor tracts for black than for white householders might reflect the movement of blacks into neighborhoods with larger concentrations of whites in rapidly growing metropolitan areas (Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004)

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


FIG. 4.—Standardized trends in mobility from poor to nonpoor tracts, by race and income, standardized for microlevel and contextual mobility determinants: PSID heads of households, 1970–97.

(and the models in table 3 on which it is based) is that controls for sociodemographic and contextual characteristics fail to reveal a changing income differential in the likelihood of leaving a poor tract that is consistent with Wilson's argument. In the models for black householders, the negative coefficient for the interaction between income and year simply becomes slightly weaker and loses its statistical significance with the addition of these controls.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, model 3 of table 3 shows that controlling for the changing *effects* of home ownership fails to reveal a significant positive interaction between income and year of observation among blacks. While the significant negative coefficient for the interaction between home ownership and year of observation ( $b = -.0242$ ) does support the Massey et al. (1994) suggestion that owning a home in a poor tract has become an increasingly important impediment to moving to a nonpoor neighborhood among blacks, there is no evidence that this effect has suppressed an increase in the class selectivity of black mobility from poor tracts. Thus, the likelihood of moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract

<sup>16</sup> Further investigation reveals that higher-income blacks who originate in poor tracts were concentrated in metropolitan areas that experienced a relatively greater expansion of poor tracts. Controlling for this differential and their higher level of home ownership pushes the negative coefficient for the interaction term to nonsignificance.

increased at virtually the same rate for black householders at all economic levels. Following a similar pattern, the addition of controls for sociodemographic and contextual conditions in model 5 of table 3 fails to reveal a significant change in the class selectivity of mobility to nonpoor tracts among whites. Furthermore, model 6 shows that, in contrast to the case for black householders, we observe no time trend in the effect of home ownership for whites, nor does the inclusion of the interaction term for home ownership and year substantially alter the effects of income or the trends therein.

Also of interest are possible trends in the class selectivity of residential mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts for black and white householders. The observed mobility patterns displayed in figure 5 confirm that, across all years of observation, high-income members of both groups are least likely, and low-income members most likely, to move into a poor tract during a mobility interval. Gross trends in mobility are quite modest among all income categories of both races. In fact, according to the coefficients for the year of observation ( $b = -.0089$ ) and the interaction between family income and year ( $b = -.0001$ ) in model 1 of table 4, the slight temporal decline among blacks is not statistically significant and does not differ significantly by income. Among whites, the slightly more pronounced slope of the trend line for middle- and high-income householders in figure 5 and the statistically significant positive interaction coefficient ( $b$  for income  $\times$  year = .0007) in model 4 of table 4 indicates that the overall likelihood of moving from a nonpoor tract to a poor tract increased only among householders with higher incomes.

The coefficients in table 4 show that the addition of controls for the sociodemographic and contextual conditions of householders during each mobility interval reinforces the observed patterns of mobility displayed in figure 5. Once again, the effects of these control variables on the mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts of both black (table 4, model 2) and white (table 4, model 5) householders is generally consistent with the racially pooled analysis. Also consistent with the pooled models, the coefficient for year of observation in the analysis of black mobility changes direction with the introduction of these controls, but still fails to attain statistical significance ( $b = .0020$  in model 2). Thus, even removing the influence of changing sociodemographic characteristics of black householders and structural conditions of the tracts and metropolitan areas to which they were exposed, the likelihood of moving into a poor tract remained consistently high for black householders between 1970 and the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the absence of a significant interaction with income indicates that this flat trend applied to blacks of all economic strata; only the standardized trendline for high-income blacks in figure 6 shows even a modest decline in this risk. And, while the negative (but statistically non-

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


FIG. 5.—Observed trends in mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts, by race and income: PSID heads of households, 1970–97

significant;  $P = .105$ ) coefficient for the interaction between home ownership and year in model 3 of table 4 provides some weak evidence that the retentive effect of home ownership may have become more potent over this time period, there is still no evidence of increasing or decreasing class selectivity of mobility into poor tracts among blacks even with the inclusion of this interaction (i.e., the coefficient for the interaction between income and year remains nonsignificant).

Among whites originating in nonpoor tracts, removing the influence of changes in microlevel and contextual characteristics in model 5 of table 4 reveals an even stronger net change in the effect of income on mobility into poor tracts. While the coefficient for year of observation ( $b = -.0058$ ) remains statistically nonsignificant, the negative coefficient for the interaction between year and income becomes larger ( $b = .0009$  in model 5 vs.  $b = .0007$  in model 4). As the standardized trendlines in figure 6 show, among low-income whites, the likelihood of moving to a poor tract has remained virtually unchanged since 1970, while the likelihood among similarly situated high-income whites has increased significantly. The result is that by the mid-1990s the (net) likelihood of moving from a nonpoor tract to a poor tract was virtually identical for whites of all economic strata. It is important to note here that this increasing risk of downward residential mobility among high-income whites does not appear to be attributable to coincidental downward economic mobility, given

TABLE 4  
LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS FOR RACE-SPECIFIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ANNUAL MOBILITY FROM NONPOOR TO POOR CENSUS  
TRACTS: PSID HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS, 1970-97

	BLACKS			WHITES		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Family income (\$1,000s) . . . .	-.0176** (.0031)	-.0046 (.0035)	-.0057 (.0036)	-.0328*** (.0046)	-.0240*** (.0057)	-.0238*** (.0058)
Change in income . . . . .		.0022 (.0022)	.0022 (.0022)		.0010 (.0020)	.0010 (.0020)
Education . . . . .		-.0790*** (.0165)	-.0778*** (.0166)		-.0573*** (.0192)	-.0574** (.0192)
Female . . . . .		-.1593 (.0834)	-.1560 (.0833)	-.1964 (.1037)	-.1964 (.1037)	-.1966 (.1037)
Age . . . . .		-.1067*** (.0129)	-.1076*** (.0129)	-.1070*** (.0166)	-.1070*** (.0166)	-.1070*** (.0166)
Age squared . . . . .		.0007*** (.0002)	.0007*** (.0002)	.0008*** (.0002)	.0008*** (.0002)	.0008*** (.0002)
Married . . . . .		-.9120*** (.1076)	-.9054*** (.1075)	-.8833*** (.1375)	-.8833*** (.1375)	-.8842*** (.1371)
Became unmarried . . . . .		1.8579*** (.1170)	1.8520*** (.1167)	1.8487*** (.1468)	1.8487*** (.1468)	1.8487*** (.1468)
No. of children . . . . .		.0833*** (.0230)	.0798*** (.0229)	.0975* (.0427)	.0975* (.0425)	.0978* (.0425)
Home owner . . . . .		-.8392*** (.0879)	-.6252*** (.1574)	-.7874*** (.1062)	-.7874*** (.1062)	-.8194*** (.2386)
Persons per room . . . . .		-.0086 (.0250)	-.0084 (.0250)	.0964*** (.0266)	.0964*** (.0266)	.0964*** (.0266)






FIG 6.—Standardized trends in mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts, by race and income, standardized for microlevel and contextual mobility determinants: PSID heads of households, 1970–97.

that recent changes in income are included as a control in this model. Nor does the control for changing effects of home ownership alter this assessment (see model 6 of table 4). Instead, it appears that the net class selectivity of white mobility *into* poor tracts had virtually disappeared by the end of the time period. Thus, the general increase in the likelihood of moving from a nonpoor to a poor tract among whites (figure 2) is driven primarily by the growing propensity of middle- and, especially, high-income whites to make such a move, a finding consistent with expanding gentrification.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Nearly four decades after the passage of the nation's first major civil rights legislation, research continues to reveal persistent racial disparities in a variety of social and economic outcomes. Given the potential impact of neighborhood poverty on educational and job opportunities, child development, and even family-formation behavior (Harding 2003; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002), it is not surprising that racial disparities in residential location and geographic mobility have been frequently studied and hotly debated. Yet, despite recent research on the

ability of African-Americans to escape poor neighborhoods and to avoid moving into such areas, the existing literature provides few clues about the extent to which racial disparities in these migration patterns have abated over time. Similarly, despite strong theoretical claims, past research provides little direct evidence regarding possible temporal changes in the effects of socioeconomic factors on interneighborhood mobility. We draw on nearly 30 years of data from the PSID linked to contextual data from four different U.S. censuses to address these issues.

Providing basic support for the descriptive aspects of Wilson's (1987) influential theory, our results point to shrinking racial disparities in patterns of residential mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. Specifically, the observed percentages of black and white households moving from poor to nonpoor tracts and from nonpoor to poor tracts during a given year have become more similar since 1970. However, this basic assessment fails to reveal the complexity of forces affecting this observed convergence of black and white mobility patterns. First, and perhaps surprisingly, the general racial convergence of mobility patterns reflects the combination of pronounced changes in mobility patterns among whites and more modest improvements in mobility opportunities for blacks. In fact, the percentages of blacks moving from a poor to a nonpoor tract or from a nonpoor to a poor tract have changed only slightly in recent decades. This fact alone casts doubt on the argument that progress toward racial equality in mobility processes has occurred through an erosion of discriminatory barriers to black residential mobility.

Just as important is the fact that the observed trends in race-specific interneighborhood migration patterns have been driven largely by changing characteristics of white and black households and, especially, shifts in the geographic context in which household mobility decisions are made. Controlling for these changes in sociodemographic characteristics and contextual conditions reveals that changes in the net effect of race on mobility outcomes has been quite modest. Specifically, the net probability of moving from a poor to a nonpoor census tract increased for both black and white householders between 1970 and 1997, but slightly more rapidly for black householders, producing a small but statistically significant racial convergence in these predicted mobility probabilities. The probability of moving from a nonpoor into a poor neighborhood has also become more similar for blacks and whites during the period, but this convergence has been driven by the increasing probability of whites' making such a move, a trend broadly consistent with the increasing gentrification of inner-city neighborhoods. Thus, even as late as the mid-1990s, blacks remained substantially less likely than whites with similar sociodemographic characteristics and facing similar tract and metropolitan conditions to move from poor to nonpoor neighborhoods—and substantially more likely to



move in the opposite direction. The relatively modest changes in the net influence of race and the persistence of pronounced racial disparities in these mobility outcomes provide limited support for a key causal claim in Wilson's argument, namely, that declining discrimination has reduced the salience of race in the process of residential attainment.

Our findings also shed light on historical changes in the class selectivity of migration between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. As is true among white householders, high-income blacks are more likely than low-income blacks to escape a poor neighborhood. However, in contrast to Wilson's influential argument, we fail to find that income has become more important in determining which black householders are able to make such moves. On the other hand, once home ownership and other factors are taken into account, we also find no evidence that blacks' mobility out of poor neighborhoods has become *less* selective, as research by Massey and his colleagues (1994) suggested. Instead, the persistence of these socioeconomic differentials is most consistent with Pattillo-McCoy's (2000) contention that the selective mobility of higher-status blacks out of poor tracts is a historically well-established process. In contrast, our results indicate that, among whites, mobility *into* poor neighborhoods has become decreasingly class selective in recent decades. Although in general, high income provides protection against moving from nonpoor to poor neighborhoods, for whites this effect had nearly disappeared by the mid-1990s, reflecting the increasing propensity for whites with relatively higher incomes to move into such areas. In combination with the increasing pace of white mobility into poor tracts, this declining class selectivity provides additional support for inner-city gentrification as an important process shaping patterns of interneighborhood mobility.<sup>17</sup>

Our study also raises a number of potentially interesting questions for further research. For example, the current study highlights the importance of changing metropolitan structural conditions in shaping patterns, trends, and racial differences in mobility between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods. The effects of housing vacancy rates, new housing development, and other structural determinants of mobility options raise important questions about the general efficacy of existing explanations for metropolitan growth and residential attainment that are worthy of further consideration. Future studies might also profit by investigating the causes and consequences of increasing white mobility into poor tracts, including

<sup>17</sup> An alternative explanation is that this mobility reflects moves of white householders from nonpoor areas into relatively poor, undeveloped suburban zones of metropolitan areas. However, throughout the time period of the study, the vast majority (70.2%) of the poor tracts entered by these mobile whites were located in census-designated central cities and were, on average, more densely populated than the nonpoor tracts from which the movers relocated

detailed descriptions of the types of neighborhoods these mobile whites are most likely to leave, what areas they are most likely to enter, their reasons for moving, and the implications of these moves for householders, their families, and their origin and destination neighborhoods.

Perhaps more pressing are questions regarding the persistence of an even higher level of mobility from nonpoor to poor tracts among black householders. Indeed, the persistently high rate at which blacks move from nonpoor to poor neighborhoods is a neglected area for both research and policy. Although housing mobility programs, such as the Gautreaux program and the Moving to Opportunity project (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1997), have focused on facilitating residential movement out of poor inner-city neighborhoods and into middle-class areas, policies and programs that serve to *retain* migrants in those more advantaged neighborhoods are likely to be equally important for improving residents' life chances and for sustaining economically diverse communities.

If declining discrimination is responsible for opening opportunities for black mobility out of poor tracts, then it would be reasonable to expect similar gains in terms of increasing protection against slipping into a poor tract. Given the absence of such a trend, several issues would appear to be especially pertinent for future research. First, additional information on the specific factors motivating blacks to move from nonpoor to poor neighborhoods is clearly needed. In particular, direct information on whether such moves reflect responses to restricted mobility options, neighborhood preferences, voluntary versus forced mobility, or other factors is important for assessing the relative role of discrimination in maintaining this high level of mobility into poor tracts. Similarly, future research is needed to investigate the extent to which the flow of blacks into poor neighborhoods has become more or less diverse in terms of mobility intentions, motivations, and other determinants. Certainly the rapid increase in the number of relatively high-income black families in recent decades has increased the pool of potential black gentrifiers, and it is possible that any gains since the 1960s in the ability of blacks to avoid moving into poor neighborhoods has been counterbalanced by an increase in voluntary mobility into such areas, although the absence of significant shifts in the class selectivity of this black mobility suggests that other factors also play important roles.

Complementing this research should be additional investigations into possible racial differences in housing search processes that might maintain racial differences in mobility patterns in general, but especially higher black mobility into poor neighborhoods (c.f. Farley 1996). A wealth of research on longer-distance migration suggests that friends, relatives, and "ethnogenic" institutions play important roles in the selection of desti-

nations for mobile African-Americans (Price-Spratlen 1998, 1999). Although we currently lack comparable neighborhood-level data on destination choices for more common local moves, it is reasonable to expect that a significant amount of information on housing opportunities is gathered informally through social networks. Given the racial homogeneity of these networks, and the fact that blacks continue to be disproportionately concentrated in poor tracts, it is also reasonable to expect that, in comparison to whites, black homeseekers gather more information about housing opportunities in poor tracts, possibly helping to maintain the high level of mobility of blacks into poor neighborhoods.

It is important to acknowledge that our focus on changes in the relative roles of race and income in shaping migration propensities between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods touches on just part of Wilson's multifaceted theoretical arguments. However, because of its implications for processes of neighborhood change and, more generally, the nature and extent of racial stratification, it is an aspect that has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. The results presented here suggest that, while SES remains a relevant predictor of mobility opportunities, race remains just as salient. The persistence of pronounced racial stratification in the face of controls for trends in microlevel and contextual conditions that distinguish blacks and whites suggests that some combination of forces that affected large racial differences in mobility outcomes three decades ago remain very much in place.<sup>1</sup> This fact alone should motivate additional research aimed at quantifying these forces and assessing their relative impacts on racially differentiated residential outcomes.

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# Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence<sup>1</sup>

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The authors examine the impact of globalization on state structures in the specific instance of the central bank. Following the world-system, world-society, and neoinstitutional perspectives in sociology, they assume that states are in cultural, political, and economic competition with each other, thereby seeking to maintain their position and status, frequently by adopting organizational forms or practices that make them isomorphic with their environment. The authors predict that countries boost the independence of their central bank from the political power as their exposure to foreign trade, investment, and multilateral lending increases. They also model the cross-national dynamic process of diffusion of central bank independence by examining the impact of cohesive and role-equivalent trade relationships between countries. They find support for their hypotheses with information on 71 countries between 1990 and 2000.

One of the most prominent themes of the globalization literature in the social sciences is the impact that increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, capital, people, and information exert on the institution of the modern nation-state. Many scholars have highlighted the ways in which economic and financial globalization undermine the state's capacity to act and regulate. Thus, in *Sovereignty at Bay*, the political economist Raymond Vernon (1971, pp. 249, 265–70, 284) noticed that the spread of multinational corporations creates “destructive political tensions,” and

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that there is a “need to reestablish balance” between political and economic institutions. More recently, the historian Paul Kennedy (1993) asserted that governments are losing control in the wake of globalization. Other scholars have argued that globalization challenges the state’s autonomy and capacity for independent decision making, raising “questions about the meaning of sovereignty in its external sense of a system ordered in terms of mutually exclusive territoriality” (Kobrin 1997, pp. 157, 159; see also Mazlish 1993; Sakamoto 1994; Cox 1996; Rodrik 1997). In each of these analyses, the modern state is seen as being at the mercy of globalization.

Sociologists have also joined this debate. Many have pointed out the relative weakness of the state in the face of globalization, warning about the “attenuation of the state” (Waters 1995), its “decline” (McMichael 1996), even its “timebound” or ephemeral character in world-historical perspective (Albrow 1997). In a more nuanced analysis, Evans (1997) points out that globalization might produce an “eclipse” of the state, because its associated neoliberal ideology of free markets is against the state, but not because globalization is inherently against the state. Evans argues that “strategies aimed at increasing state capacity in order to meet rising demand for collective goods and social protection look foolish in an ideological climate that resolutely denies the state’s potential contribution to general welfare” (Evans 1997, p. 85). He further argues that the state may stage a comeback if there is a “return of the ideological pendulum,” or a transformation of the state and a development of new elements of state-society synergy.

Political scientists and sociologists who study expansionary spending and social welfare policies have also pointed out that the effect of globalization on the state is profoundly shaped by the ideology informing policy making, and that states are not necessarily limited by globalization in the kinds of policies that they can pursue (Pierson 1994; Fligstein 2001; Gilpin 2000; Huber and Stephens 2001; Garrett 1998).<sup>2</sup> As Meyer et al. put it, “Globalization certainly poses new problems for states, but it also strengthens the world-cultural principle that nation-states are the primary actors charged with identifying and managing those problems on behalf of their societies. . . . [The state] may have less autonomy than earlier but it clearly has more to do” (Meyer et al. 1997, p. 157).

Some scholars build on this reasoning to argue that states should not be seen as passive pawns but rather as “adapting, whether out of necessity or desire” (O’Riain 2000, p. 205). After all, macrosociological theorists have long maintained that the global arena is a “playground” for states, where they compete for economic, military, diplomatic, and political su-

<sup>2</sup> Other scholars disagree on this point (Rodrik 1997, Vernon 1998, Stryker 1998).



premacY and survival. Thus, the world-system or the international arena, far from threatening states, actually fosters them (Wallerstein 1974; Poulantzas 1974; Tilly 1992). World-society scholars consider competition among states to be a phenomenon that contributes to an intensification of "formal organizing" (Meyer et al. 1997; Jepperson and Meyer 1991).

In a similar vein, international relations scholars point out that globalization has changed the nature of the state without necessarily debilitating or minimizing it. From a neorealist perspective, globalization reinforces the importance of domestic policies, as states jockey for position in the global economy and seek to advance the interests of their firms, resulting in a "mixed system," increasingly globalized and at the same time fragmented (Gilpin 1987, 2000; Berger 1996). After all, "today's globalization is authored by states and is primarily about reorganizing rather than bypassing them" (Panitch 1996, pp. 84–86). In this view, globalization has brought about three kinds of power shifts around the world: from weak to strong states, from states to markets, and from labor markets to financial markets, with some power evaporating or dispersing (Strange 1996; Garrett 1998; see also Hirst and Thompson 1996; Sassen 1996; Wade 1996). Thus, globalization induces a transformation of the state, not necessarily its diminution (Cox 1987; Stopford and Strange 1991; Held et al. 1999). As Cox writes, "Power has shifted not away from the state but *within* the state, i.e. from industry or labor ministries towards economy ministries and central banks" (Cox 1992, pp. 30–31).

We agree that globalization has shifted power around the state. The existing literature, however, has not empirically explored the mechanisms that account for such a shift. We recognize that globalization is an important process, but we do not accept one-dimensional accounts of the wholesome demise of the state (or of its strengthening, for that matter). Rather, we assume that variation in the autonomy and strength of the state and of its constituent parts does occur across countries and over time in response to both domestic and global forces. We consider the autonomy and strength of the state as a continuum that is amenable to empirical examination (Carruthers 1994; Guillén 2001a, 2001b). The goal of this article is to analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of globalization on specific state structures, controlling for domestic macroeconomic and political characteristics. We examine the case of the independence of the central bank from the executive branch of government as an instance in which both global and domestic factors affect the autonomy and strength of different parts of the state.

## THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE CENTRAL BANK, AND POLICY MAKING

The central bank is one of the key institutions of the modern rational state, one that all countries must establish if they are to be part of the world community (Meyer et al. 1997). Its role in the economy is certainly crucial: by influencing short-term interest rates, undertaking open market operations, and enforcing reserve requirements, the central bank controls the money supply. Monetary policy can have stabilizing, limiting, or augmenting effects on the rates of inflation, unemployment, and economic growth. Furthermore, the actions of the central bank may affect financial stability and the currency exchange rate (Blinder 1998; Eichengreen 1998; Maxfield 1997). Central bankers, of course, can make such decisions under varying degrees of political supervision, ranging from total subservience to the goals and means set by the government to complete independence.

The central bank has not always been as autonomous or visible an institution within the state as it became during the 1990s, although the virtues of granting the central bank independence from the political power were already being trumpeted as far back as the early 20th century (Eichengreen 1998). After the collapse of the global financial system in the 1930s, the next relatively orderly international monetary arrangement came into being with the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, which introduced pegged (though adjustable) exchange rates, established controls to limit capital flows, and organized the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the multilateral institution to assist countries with their balance-of-payments problems (Eichengreen 1998). Finance ministers became the key decision makers, while central banks and their presidents or governors played a relatively limited and quiet role in economic and financial policy making. During most of the post-World War II period, central banks operated as yet another state agency, without much discretionary decision-making power, save for a few exceptions like the United States and Germany.

The *de facto* collapse of the fixed exchange-rate system in 1973 led to a period of worldwide financial instability, which the increasing mobility of money across borders and the gradual removal of capital controls only exacerbated. Meanwhile, the economic crisis came hand in hand with high inflation and mounting trade and fiscal deficits in many countries around the world (Eichengreen 1998). The most advanced industrialized economies tried to tackle the situation in several ways. For example, the creation of the Group of Seven (G7) in 1987 attempted to bring about financial stability through policy coordination (Gilpin 1987). Toward the late 1980s and early 1990s, central bankers began to make headlines around the world, and the idea of central bank independence gained

support as a safeguard against the alleged ill effects of fiscally expansionary policies.

Following Evans (1997), it is also important to take into account the ideological background of the rise of the central bank to prominence, because it occurred in the context of fierce theoretical and practical debates among economists over the roles and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies. Starting in Chile and Britain, a policy-making movement often-times referred to as "neoliberalism" highlighted the importance of taking politics and the state out of the economy so as to make it possible for markets to function unhindered. Neoliberalism was a direct response to Keynesianism and to other forms of state intervention in the economy. This shift in the dominant paradigm of economic policy making neither took place simultaneously around the world nor was embraced to the same degree across countries (Hall 1989, 1993; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; McNamara 1998; Campbell and Peterson 2001; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). While both sides of the debate tended to emphasize the technical aspects of their arguments, the ideological and political undertones were readily apparent. Keynesianism favors the use of fiscal policy (e.g., government spending) as a way to not only manage the business cycle, avoid recessions, and generate full employment, but also to achieve certain cherished political goals, such as social cohesion through the creation of a "social safety net." Neoliberalism, by contrast, proposes fiscal discipline, reductions in subsidies, tax reform, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, tax cuts, deregulation, monetary stability, and free trade and capital movements, so as to foster entrepreneurship, investment, and long-run economic growth. A specific version of this policy cluster was the so-called "Washington consensus," a term coined in 1989 by John Williamson to refer to policies aimed at helping Latin America avoid its recurrent financial crises and achieve faster, steadier economic growth (Williamson 1990, 2000).

Neoliberal proponents made the idea of central bank independence their own. A central bank free from political contingencies is supposed to be in a position to pursue the goals of fiscal discipline and monetary stability by preventing the rest of the state from engaging in discretionary deficit spending. By controlling the inflation rate and preventing the government from causing inflationary shocks that could momentarily boost output, the central bank is heralded as a necessary check to self-interested politicians. Whereas dependent central banks could lend to the government and to public institutions, an independent central bank is barred from either activity, thus imposing austerity and stability on the economy. The idea of an independent central bank matches the technocratic ethos of the neoliberal paradigm, with its purportedly objective, nonpartisan, disinterested, and depoliticized approach to policy making. It is also an idea

that is frequently associated with the push for economic and financial globalization, because, according to the conventional economic wisdom, global markets can only operate successfully with a high degree of institutional convergence, that is, with the adoption of similar institutions, policies, and practices throughout the world (Sachs 2000). It is only fair to note, however, that not all economists or policy makers in favor of an independent central bank are neoliberal in their overall policy orientation (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 1998). Central banks can play wider policy roles. For instance, a central bank can be a guarantee to foreign investors that the value of their holdings will not be undermined.

### The Idea of Central Bank Independence

Central bank independence is characterized by insulation from influences and pressures by government officials, especially elected ones. Although the central bank is an instrument of the state-as-an-actor model, the very idea of independence is based on the premise that the state is an institution in which different groups vie for power and influence (Skocpol 1985). If the state is a “polymorphous crystallization” of social power (Mann 1993, p. 75), then central bank independence is best conceptualized as the re-centering of social power in the hands of economic technocrats and financial interests, following the group-affiliation tradition spelled out by Carruthers (1994).

The technical justification for central bank independence lies in the realm of agency theory in economics. Barro and Gordon (1983) applied the “time-inconsistency” problem developed in principal-agent frameworks to central banking (see also the earlier statement by Auernheimer [1974]). In particular, they posited that a central bank that is politically dependent on the government tends to impress an inflationary bias on the economy. According to their theory, governments have a preference for high employment and for minimal variations around a target inflation rate (Fuhrer 1997). According to this view, however, once the inflation-rate target is set, in order to win the favor of the electorate, the government has a strong incentive to inflate, thus increasing the employment rate by exploiting the short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation predicted by the Phillips curve. Neoclassical economics consequently developed a rational-expectations framework, whereby social actors will expect the government’s faltering commitment to low inflation and will incorporate a higher inflation rate in their decisions, thus neutralizing any effects on employment and producing a rate of inflation higher than it would be under a regime of credibility (Cukierman 1994).

A solution to this agency problem—the one favored by the neoliberal policy paradigm—is to grant the central bank independence over mon-

etary policy from any kind of political interference (Cukierman 1994; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991). The central bank expresses its commitment to low inflation and price stability by inscribing it in its statute. Rogoff (1985) suggests a further modification to central banking practices, advocating the appointment of a president or governor whose preference for low inflation is stronger than that of the general public, thus equating political conservatism with credibility of commitment (however, see Eijffinger and Hoeberichts [1998] for the distinction between conservativeness and independence). The coronation of this logic is the creation of an efficient institution: "If central bank independence is on average associated with lower inflation, there is no systematic impact on real output growth, nor on its variability. Thus, having an independent central bank is almost like having a free lunch; there are benefits but no apparent costs in terms of macroeconomic performances" (Grilli et al. 1991, p. 375).

The increasing consensus among economists about the advantages of central bank independence did not immediately result in cross-national diffusion (Keefer and Stasavage 2002). Figure 1 shows the number of countries that implemented legal changes to their central bank charters toward greater independence. During the 1990s, as many as 17 countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union made statutory changes toward greater independence; so did 13 countries in Western Europe, 11 countries in Latin America, 9 countries in Africa, and 4 countries in Asia.<sup>3</sup> Only 24 countries without a strongly independent central bank as of 1989 did not introduce any statutory changes during the 1990s. During the same decade, only Malta reduced the degree of central bank independence. By contrast, between the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in the

<sup>3</sup> Eastern European and post-Soviet region: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia FR (Serbia/Montenegro). Western Europe: Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Central/South American region: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. Africa: Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe. Asia: Republic of Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines. Also, New Zealand pushed toward central bank independence. Countries that did not introduce changes include Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan (where discussion about central bank independence in the 1980s did not translate into statutory changes), Qatar, Singapore, and the United States. Since ex-Soviet countries only became independent after 1989, we followed a different coding procedure. For event-history analyses, we only considered changes in central bank independence after the establishment of a central bank. The pooled time-series cross-section regressions include fixed effects, thus taking into account only changes over time.

## Central Bank Independence




FIG. 1.—Cumulative legal changes toward higher central bank independence

early 1970s and 1989, only eight countries made statutory changes to their central banks.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the 1990s is the appropriate time frame for analysis.

### EXPLAINING THE ADOPTION OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE

The idea that states are in cultural, political, and economic competition with each other was first developed into the world-system theory by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). Recent empirical research within this tradition has found that states seek to maintain their status in the hierarchy of the world-system, which is structured in terms of patterns of economic exchange, diplomacy, and military competition that tend to perpetuate a system of core, semiperipheral, and peripheral states (Smith and White 1992; Van Rossem 1996). The world-society perspective, which builds on selective aspects of the world-system approach, extends this line of reasoning when arguing that “by structuring so much modern value and activity in a system of explicit cultural, political, military, and economic competition and competitive isomorphism, the nation-state system (a) further intensifies the rationalization of society, but especially (b) increases the likelihood that this rationalization will lead to or be vested in formal organizing. It drives formal organizing both in the state, as state appa-

<sup>4</sup> Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Zambia. However, in each of these cases, the most significant changes toward central bank independence occurred during the 1990s.

ratus, and in society, as 'private' formal organization" (Jepperson and Meyer 1991, p. 209).

The process by which organizations such as firms or states adopt similar structural forms or practices is the central concern of neoinstitutional theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Actors and organizations behave in isomorphic ways in order to maintain their status and secure legitimacy within the normative social structure in which they are situated, they are coerced into adopting the practices or structures espoused by other organizations on which they are dependent, and/or they imitate each other when uncertainty makes the assessment of cause-effect relationships problematic, or when their bounded rationality renders it impractical to assess each and every available alternative course of action. Each of these dynamics invites organizations to adopt practices and structures that, over time, make them more similar to one another.

It is important to note that the world-system, world-society, and neoinstitutional perspectives are based on the premise that organizations and states are in competition with one another. Two key observations about competitive dynamics are necessary. First, the three theoretical perspectives underline that competition is not only economic in nature but also cultural and political. Second, the world-society and neoinstitutional approaches point out that, while competition is a necessary condition, isomorphic organizational change does not take place unless there are specific coercive, normative, and mimetic mechanisms enabling and directing change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer et al. 1997). Before we examine these international institutional forces, let us summarize the literature's arguments and findings regarding the domestic reasons for central bank independence.

#### Domestic Economic and Political Factors

The existing empirical literature on the adoption of central bank independence focuses on domestic economic and political factors. First, much research has explored the link between central bank independence and inflation rates, the assumption being that over time, countries would learn, hopefully not the hard way, that inflation can be subdued by granting the central bank independence, although not all of the evidence is consistent with the argument (e.g., Cukierman 1994; Grilli et al. 1991; Forder 1999). Second, countries with a high degree of political turnover are predicted to be more likely to grant a technocratic institution independence over politically charged matters so that the party currently in power can

"tie the hands of its successor" (Goodman 1991; Boylan 2001).<sup>5</sup> Third, central bank independence is more likely to occur when the degree of party fractionalization is higher, because it is a function of the potential conflict of interest between the government, on the one hand, and its legislative backbenchers and coalition partners, on the other. The more fractionalized the party system, the more scope there is for a conflict of interest between the government and other political forces. Interests threatened by the executive's autonomy to make economic policy will seek to remove monetary policy from the government's choice set (Bernhard 1998; Keefer and Stasavage 1998). Fourth, an independent central bank is deemed to be functionally consistent with political systems characterized by democracy, political freedom, and stability, that is, systems that include checks and balances on the discretionary behavior of the various branches of the government and the state (Bagheri and Habibi 1998; Moser 1999; Lohmann 1998).

Controlling for the economic and political characteristics suggested by the above arguments, we focus our theoretical analysis on the impact of global institutional forces on central bank independence. We examine two types of effects: (1) international coercive pressures that affect countries, including their dependency on foreign trade, investment, and multilateral lending; and (2) cross-national international influences that operate through the network of bilateral trade ties in the forms of cohesion and role equivalence effects. Let us address each of these in turn.

### International Coercion

Neoinstitutional and world-society theories predict that dependent organizations or states are more likely to engage in isomorphic change. Thus, Meyer et al. (1997, p. 157) argue that more dependent actors or states in the global system are more inclined to adopt formal structures or practices as they attempt to meet "the expanding externally defined requirements of rational actorhood." World-system researchers have identified a country's dependence on foreign trade, foreign investment, or multilateral lending as underlying status competition among states (Van Rossem 1996).

Trade creates dependency, because as a country increasingly relies on foreign markets in order to obtain inputs or sell its products, its status and prestige in the world become more important. As neorealist international relations scholars have noted, globalization and trade induce states to selectively engage in trade regionalism, industry protectionism, and mercantilistic competition in response to changes in the international

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that some previous empirical research has found precisely the opposite effect (De Haan and van't Hag 1995).



location of economic activities (Gilpin 1987, 2000). From this perspective, governments seek strong currencies—and hence lower inflation—as a way to enhance national status and prestige in the global arena. For instance, states with lower inflation and a stronger currency carry more weight in international trade negotiations (Helleiner 1994). There is also evidence indicating that the public, especially in export-oriented countries, prefers low inflation not only as a way to protect their purchasing power, but also as a sign of national prestige (Shiller 1996). Indeed, historical research on the creation of territorial currencies has shown its contribution to the formation of nationalist identities and the affirmation of territorial sovereignty and international power/prestige (Helleiner 2003).

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a second coercive international influence because it makes countries depend on the decisions made by organizations—multinational firms—headquartered abroad, one of the main examples of coercive isomorphism observed by neoinstitutional theorists. The issue concerning foreign investment is the recipient country's credibility within the international financial community. Politicians are likely to favor central bank independence in order to continue attracting foreign capital (Maxfield 1997; McNamara 2002). The control of monetary variables by an independent central bank is assumed to reassure foreign investors that the value of their investment will hold into the future, because inflation will be kept low and the exchange rate will not shift adversely to their interests. While Maxfield (1997) suggests that existing foreign direct (as opposed to portfolio) investors are not particularly keen on an independent central banking authority because they can exploit more direct and reliable information channels, we nonetheless argue that foreign direct investors such as multinational firms would favor independent central bank policies to the extent that they use host countries as export platforms, which has been increasingly the case with FDI since the 1980s (UNCTD 2002).

The third type of international coercive pressure became salient during the 1990s. The IMF—the agency in charge of assisting countries in financial difficulty—has increasingly attached certain conditions, including an independent central bank, to its lending agreements. Although the IMF has had the authority to demand certain terms as a condition of lending since 1952, the agency's enhanced visibility and stature in global financial affairs started during the Reagan presidency, which marshaled the idea of policy convergence across countries as the most effective way to fight financial turbulence in global markets. The Reagan administration saw in the IMF the institution that could impose and monitor a set of guidelines to ensure “responsible” or “disciplined” economic policy making around the world (Gilpin 1987). (Reagan's own policies, however, propelled U.S. fiscal and trade deficits to historical records.)

In the language of IMF-borrower agreements, country commitments to reach certain targets or to implement institutional reforms are called "conditionality terms." During the 1990s, the average IMF program included three times as many terms as during the previous decade. The record was set in the agreement with Indonesia, which contained 140 conditionality terms (Goldstein 2001). The IMF justifies conditionality terms on the grounds that they help countries signal credibility to the international financial community, and "securing this depends not only on short-run macroeconomic management given an existing set of institutions, but also on the quality of the institutions themselves." These could include "budgetary institutions, . . . the central bank (covering independence, competence, etc.), the regulatory regime governing banks and financial markets, and so on" (Khan and Sharma 2001, pp. 20–21).

Gaining access to the detailed terms of all IMF programs is not possible for confidentiality reasons (Goldstein 2001). This limitation notwithstanding, the few available letters of intent that countries submit to the IMF as a condition for obtaining credit include an explicit commitment to making the central bank more independent. For instance, the letter of intent sent to the IMF by the government of Indonesia on November 13, 1998, with the goal of securing multilateral financing, stated:

We are moving ahead with strengthening the regulatory and prudential framework for the banking system. A draft central bank law providing for independence of the Bank of Indonesia will be introduced into Parliament by end-December 1998. The banking law has been recently amended by Parliament and has entered into force, following its signature by the President; it permits major improvements in the areas of bank licensing and ownership, openness to FDI, bank secrecy, and empowerment of IBRA (Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency)

In a subsequent memorandum sent to the IMF, Indonesia reiterated the importance of central bank independence by stressing control over inflation as its primary target.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, the letter of intent signed by the Democratic Republic of Congo on April 12, 2002, stated that "the new statutes of the central bank (BCC), which enshrine its independence, will be published with some delay in April 2002 to ensure their consistency with our Constitution." Thailand, in its letter of intent to the IMF dated September 21, 1999, mentions the parliamentary discussion of "a new Central Bank Act (which would strengthen the Bank of Thailand and enhance its accountability)."

<sup>6</sup> Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies Medium-Term Strategy and Policies for 1999/2000 and 2000, signed on January 20, 2000, and letters of intent sent to the IMF Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/101998.htm> and <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2000/idn/01/>

And the Republic of Korea, in a case extensively discussed by Stiglitz (2002) as an example of unwarranted IMF meddling with a country's domestic affairs, similarly specified in its December 3, 1997, letter of intent to the IMF that "shortly following the Presidential elections in December, a special session of the National Assembly will be called to pass . . . a revised Bank of Korea Act, which provides for central bank independence, with price stability as its main mandate."

These quotations suggest that negotiations with the IMF are a mechanism through which the coercive power of the latter is manifested, as many economists have pointed out (Rodrik 1999; McNamara 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Goldstein 2001). As in the cases of foreign trade and FDI, loans from the IMF make countries dependent, and therefore more likely to adopt formal structures or practices that help them enhance, or at least maintain, their status and legitimacy within the international community (Jepperson and Meyer 1991; Meyer et al. 1997). This argument is also consistent with the coercive mechanism predicting isomorphism in a field of organizations (states, in this case) as it becomes more "dependent upon a single (or several similar) source of support for vital resources" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 155).

Given that a country's dependence on trade, foreign investment, or multilateral lending makes it more likely to conform to world standards regarding the organization of the state, we formulate:

**HYPOTHESIS 1.**—*The greater the exposure to foreign trade, foreign investment, or multilateral lending, the more independent the central bank.*

### Cross-National Networks

As suggested by the world-society and neoinstitutional approaches, the diffusion of practices in the global economy is not only driven by coercion but also by the network of ties linking countries to one another, which tend to generate the diffusion of organizational forms and practices for normative and competitive reasons (Guler, Guillén, and MacPherson 2002). Michael Mann has argued that the debate over globalization should be couched in terms of different socio-spatial networks: "Is the social significance of national and inter-national networks declining relative to some combination of local and transnational networks? And to the extent that global networks are emerging, what is the relative contribution to them of national/international versus local/transnational networks?"

<sup>7</sup> The letter from the Democratic Republic of Congo to the IMF is available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2002/cod/02/index.htm>, the one from Thailand at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/1999/092199.htm>, and the one from the Republic of Korea at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/120397.htm>.

(Mann 1997, p. 476). The antecedents of this view in sociology go back to world-system theory, whose ideas about the importance of interstate networks were borrowed from the pioneering studies of international financial circuits undertaken in the 1950s and 1960s by Fernand Braudel (1977). Recent research within this tradition confirms that countries are embedded in complex patterns of trade relationships that give structure and form to the overall world-system (Smith and White 1992; Van Rossem 1996).

The world-system, world-society, and neoinstitutional perspectives borrow from social network analysis the concepts and the tools needed to specify and assess the ways in which ties between actors (states in this case) shape the diffusion of practices or formal structures. Actors embedded in a network of relationships may adopt similar patterns of behavior based on two different kinds of imitation, namely, normative and competitive (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Guler et al. 2002; Burt 1987; Mizruchi 1993). Normative imitation builds on the Durkheimian insight that social density is a determinant of social cohesion and behavioral similarity (Collins 1994). The classic formulation focuses on the social conditions that produce moral authority and "force," that is, a dense pattern of social organization (Durkheim [1915] 1965). Social networks in which actors share strong connections to one another will tend to adhere to a strong group identity, solidarity, and conformity. Cohesive networks will produce "sacred objects," or symbols of focused attention that demarcate the boundaries of the group. Cohesive actors are predicted to imitate each other's patterns of behavior in their quest to appear appropriate within their shared social context of dense social relationships (Strang and Tuma 1993); as the number of actors or organizations adopting a certain innovation rises, the innovation itself achieves a legitimized status (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993).

We extend the argument to the international level, proposing that normative effects are likely to spread across countries that engage in intense transactions with each other, of which those that are trade related are of particular structural significance (Guler et al. 2002). In fact, sociologists of globalization have argued that the intensity of trade transactions indicates the density of the social network in which a given country is embedded (Albrow 1997), and therefore points to the level of formalized conformity within the network—in this case, the independence of central banks. Trade contributes to "establishing a relationship of identification as well as interdependence," and it does not occur in a vacuum, for it comes hand in hand with "cultural ties" (Waters 1995, p. 40). Research has shown that globalization is associated with more cohesive trading relationships (Kim and Shin 2002). Our argument is that countries that exhibit cohesive trade relationships are more likely to adopt similar pat-

terns of behavior, including the granting of independence to their central banks.

Explaining central banking practices in terms of normative network pressures to adopt independence rests on the assumption that countries seek credibility in the international financial system so as to boost their status and prestige. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement, currencies became tied to a different kind of standard, which, according to orthodox economists, incorporates objective knowledge of the economy so that the national currency is given a relative value correspondent to the productive capacity of the issuing country. Post-Keynesian economists and sociologists of money such as Ingham, however, claim that value is given by the relative success of the central bank at establishing credibility in relation to a country's creditworthiness by abiding to procedural correctness (Ingham 1984, 2004). Central banks that do not conform to formalized principles compromise the credibility of their currency in the international exchange markets. Applying our network reasoning to this problem, we reformulate credibility as the achievement of cohesive ties, and failure to conform as a violation of the norms of the network. Hence, conformity arises from normative pressure as well as from the expected negative consequences of violating the norms. Central bank independence becomes a symbol of group membership; failure to recognize its "sacredness" leads to rejection from the cohesive group. The country belonging to a trade-cohesive network crosses the insider/outsider boundary if it fails to adopt central bank independence. Accordingly, we predict:

*HYPOTHESIS 2.—The more a given country trades with other countries with an independent central bank, the more independent its own central bank because of normative pressure.*

The second type of imitation effect observed in the neoinstitutional and social networks literatures is related to competition. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) predict that as organizations attempt to deal with poorly understood technologies and ambiguous goals, they resort to imitating other organizations that they perceive as successful competitors. Pressure to conform arises from at least two conditions: the presence of a poorly understood organizational form in a context of uncertainty, and a competitive environment whereby organizations are under threat of seeing their market position and/or social status eroded.

Shifting the argument to the country level of analysis and the central bank case, it is quite apparent that both theoretical conditions hold. First, central bank independence as a practice is understood in multiple and competing ways, as the presence of rival frameworks in economic theory like Keynesianism and monetarism indicates (Forder 1999; Ingham 2004). Second, nation-states participate in international trade and other aspects of the global economy in which competitive pressures render the adoption

of legitimized organizational forms a viable strategy for economic and institutional survival, that is, for maintaining and enhancing their status (Van Rossem 1996; Meyer et al. 1997).

The mechanism of social comparison lies at the heart of the argument about competitive isomorphism. Competition between actors (or states) in a social structure such as that created by trading relationships is, following Burt (1987, p. 1291), driven by their desire "to live up to their image" and "to maintain their position in the social structure," an idea entirely consistent with the world-system and world-society perspectives. Competitors are substitutes for each other, a fact that induces status competition, with a clear consequence for the diffusion of practices: "Once the occupants of [the same] status begin adopting, ego is expected to follow suit rapidly in order to avoid the embarrassment of being the last to espouse a belief or practice that has become a recognized feature of occupying [the] status" (Burt 1987, p. 1294; see also White 1981, 2002).

Neoinstitutional and network theorists have conceptualized similarity in behavior in the context of competitive relationships in terms of *structural equivalence* or *role equivalence*, which are associated with separate notions of competition (Mizruchi 1993). It is useful to point out the differences between the two concepts. Structural equivalence refers to the extent to which two actors are related to the same third parties (Burt 1987), while role equivalence describes the extent to which two actors have similar *types* of relations to third parties (Winship and Mandel 1984).

Structural and role equivalence have different meanings in terms of conceptualizing trading relationships between countries. From the structural equivalence point of view, similarity occurs in a context of competition for access to the same third parties' markets (exports) or sources of supply (imports). From a role equivalence perspective, however, what matters is the nature of the relationship and not the nodes themselves. We define a *relationship* as the export or import of a particular type of product, and a *role set* as a country's total exports and imports by reference to each type of good, an approach pioneered by sociologists working in the world-system research tradition (Smith and White 1992; Van Rossem 1996). Winship and Mandel (1984) define role equivalence using a nested pair of dyad-by-dyad distance measures but note that other approaches are possible. We take advantage of one alternative they mention and define role equivalence as the overlap between two actors' role sets. Given this definition, when countries A and B trade in the same products but with a different set of countries, they are role equivalent but may not be structurally equivalent. Conversely, countries may be structurally equivalent but not role equivalent if they trade in different types of products but with the same set of countries. Thus, role equivalence captures present and potential competition in the same category of products, while

structural equivalence in the context of trade is not specific enough to isolate the effect of competition, because two countries may be structurally equivalent (i.e., trade with the same third parties) and yet not trade in the same commodities (Guler et al. 2002). In the context of the global economy, trading with the same third parties can hardly be an indication of competitive relationships unless the trade is in the same commodity type; that is, it is role equivalent.

Countries that compete with each other in the same commodity markets are likely to adopt similar patterns of behavior so as not to lose ground relative to others (Guler et al. 2002). Assume that countries A and B trade with the rest of the world in the same product categories; that is, they are role equivalent. Even when countries A and B export to different third countries, a more independent central bank in country A will likely prompt country B to grant its own central bank more independence, for two mutually reinforcing reasons. First, the two countries are more likely to monitor each other and to seek to learn from each other if they are competitors in trade. In other words, competitive relationships create a social channel for comparison, communication, and imitation. The second reason for imitation based on role equivalence is the risk of a country's failing to attract enough foreign capital under the assumption that having an independent central bank signals stability to the international financial and investment community. This argument is analogous to the idea that actors occupying equivalent positions in a social structure (peers) tend to imitate each other so as to enhance their own performance. As Burt (1997, p. 345) noted, structural situations in which an actor has "many peers create a competitive frame of reference." Competition invites the actor to be "tuned to peers' job performance" (much like how, in the economic sociology of White, markets are structured fields in which competitors observe each other—see White [1981, 2002]). Therefore, we expect role equivalent countries to behave similarly, because they learn from their peers how to become more effective at maintaining their status and prestige in the network of trade. We predict that:

**HYPOTHESIS 3.**—*The more a country competes in trade against third countries with an independent central bank, the more independent its own central bank.*

## DATA AND METHODS

We have collected longitudinal information on 140 countries between 1989 and 2000. The average GDP per capita for that sample was \$6,000. However, missing data on one or more of the variables reduced the sample for analysis to 71 countries, with the average GDP per capita increasing

to \$11,698 (the statistical difference is highly significant). This is a reflection of the fact that richer countries tend to gather and report better statistics. In order to correct for this potential source of bias, we apply a two-stage sample selection technique. In the first stage, we estimate the likelihood that a country has complete data on all of the variables used in the analysis.<sup>8</sup> In the second stage, we include the estimated probability as a control variable together with the other regressors. Given that our regression models also control for GDP per capita and include country fixed effects, we are confident that our results are not biased because of sample selection issues.

### Dependent Variable

We use the index defined by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapati (1992) to measure the degree of the central bank's legal independence. There are a variety of indexes that, like Cukierman's, code the legal position of a national central bank as defined by statute, organic law, or by the country's constitution. We chose Cukierman's index because it directly captures the extent to which the central bank is independent from the political power, and because it is the most widely used.<sup>9</sup> The index is a continuous score ranging between zero and one, where one indicates maximum independence. It is obtained by aggregating 16 characteristics of central bank charters describing four aspects: procedures concerning the governor of the central bank (appointment, dismissal, and legal term of office); relationship between the government and the bank, and the location of authority over monetary policies; objectives of the central bank; and relationship between the government and the bank in terms of borrowing (see app. table A1). Depending on the configurations of these four aspects, some of the individual components may not be applicable, since they aim at refining the impact of central bank activities only if they are permitted in the charter. For example, if a central bank is barred from lending to the government (see app. table A1), the subsequent refinements are not meaningful (e.g., preferred interest rates on advances to the gov-

<sup>8</sup> We estimated the following probit model using the sample of 140 countries, where the numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients: probability of inclusion in the sample =  $28.518 (24.965) + .0315 \times \text{GDP per capita} (.005) - 1.157 \times \text{government consumption} (.657) + .049 \times \text{checks and balances} (.007) - .018 \times \text{illiteracy rate} (.002) - .014 \times \text{calendar year} (.013)$ .

<sup>9</sup> The GMT index (Grilli et al. 1991), the Bade and Parkin index (in Bernhard 1998), and the Alesina and Summers index (Alesina and Summers 1993) are among the most used competing indexes. The Cukierman index presents a series of advantages over the others besides those mentioned above, such as greater sample size, clarity, and time coverage.



ernment). In such cases, the weights are recalibrated so as to avoid any biases.

The index is available by decade from the 1940s to the 1980s for a sample of 70 countries. Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002) updated it for the 1990s for a sample of 26 postsocialist countries. We reproduced their methodology to code all countries in the sample for each year between 1990 and 2000. Specifically, we collected all relevant legislation (charters, statutes, organic laws, and constitutional laws) primarily through the official Web site of the national central bank, and updated the index accordingly. We checked that our coding was consistent with the secondary literature (De Haan 1997; Tavelli, Tullio, and Spinelli 1998; Jacomé 2001). Cronbach's alpha for the updated index is .89, well above the usual thresholds, indicating that the various components of the index capture the same construct. We focus our analysis on the 1990–2000 period because of constraints on data availability, and because the 22 countries that changed the degree of independence of their central banks between 1950 and 1989 introduced very small adjustments to their legal codes. The bulk of the global spread of central bank independence occurred after 1989.

It is important to note that the Cukierman index is an interpretive tool of legal codes, and as such, it embodies two assumptions: (1) a legalistic as opposed to a behavioral approach is desirable in gauging central bank independence, and (2) central bank independence is an objectively measurable construct. The first assumption is potentially problematic: indeed, several important studies indicate that extremely independent central banks such as the Bundesbank react to political pressures when their institutional basis is undermined by antagonistic political coalitions (Lohmann 1998; for other countries, see Maxfield [1997]; Moser [1999]; Bernhard [1998]). The critique that there is an important gap between a legal code and an institutional practice is certainly germane: in legal studies, a similar distinction is drawn between the formal and the material constitution. The issue is thus one of validity, that is, whether the index measures what it is supposed to measure.

We believe that a legal measure of central bank independence is an appropriate and valid indicator of central bank independence for three mutually reinforcing reasons. First, economists argue that the mere adoption of a legal statute guaranteeing central bank independence dampens inflationary expectations in the economy. Consumers, workers, investors, and companies expect an independent central bank to fight inflation more forcefully than one subject to governmental influence, even without the bank's taking any kind of specific action. Hence, the "mere" passage of a law has real, practical implications because an independent central bank creates a "regime of credibility" in the pursuit of monetary stability. To the extent that actors believe the central bank will take action to curb

inflation, it may not be necessary for it to take action (Barro and Gordon 1983; Cukierman 1994).

The second reason in favor of using a legal indicator of central bank independence is that this article seeks to assess the extent to which globalization affects the state and the relative power of its different components. An actor, however, does not demonstrate its power only when it takes action to influence the behavior of others in a manner contrary to their interests. Power is also implicit and subtle, and it can have an effect on others even when there is no observable behavior on either the sending or the receiving end of the power relationship (Lukes 1974). Thus, it is sociologically meaningful and appropriate to study the legal adoption of central bank independence in order to assess how much power—explicit or implicit, observable or not—is being shifted toward that specific part of the state at the expense of others, especially the executive branch. In sum, the economic logic of expectations and the sociological idea of implicit power suggest that a legally independent central bank can be powerful and effective even when it does not act.

Third, a legal indicator of central bank independence is appropriate because it speaks to a country's institutional and political capacity to abide by the rules that seek to guarantee the credibility of monetary commitments. Since the issue is whether the statute of an independent central bank translates into practices autonomous from the executive branch, our model follows the recent literature in political science by controlling for the political conditions that prevent such legal requirements from being overruled (Keefer and Stasavage 2002; Bernhard 1998; Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002).

As to the objectivity of the Cukierman index, it is certainly important to note its limitations. Forder (1999) is the most passionate critic, as he points to discrepancies across cases and the allegedly arbitrary criteria used in the construction of the index. However, he is altogether opposed to code-based operationalizations of central bank independence, preferring behavioral approaches—a problem which we addressed in our discussion above. Banaian et al. (1998) and Mangano (1998) are equally concerned with issues of subjectivity, and suggest *ad hoc* solutions. There are, however, economists who believe in the validity of Cukierman's approach, and they adjudicate its usefulness through latent-variable-type models (Eijffinger, van Rooij, and Schaling 1996).

The use of Cukierman's legal index seems appropriate because of its focus on readily observable claims contained in central bank statutes, such as the expressed commitment of the bank to low inflation, the presence of a provision for the resolution of conflict with the government, and the length and condition of tenure of the central bank governor. In our coding of the legal components of the index, we have found it to

capture quite accurately the language of the legal documents across a diverse number of cases (the 71 countries of our sample that we coded directly)—yet another expression of the degree of international isomorphism brought about by globalization. The critique is perhaps more germane to previous decades in which states experimented with inward-oriented models of economic and social development.

### Explanatory Variables

We measure international pressures (predicted to be positive in hypothesis 1) in three ways. The first is trade openness, which indicates a country's exposure to foreign trade and is measured as the value of imports plus exports divided by GDP (World Bank 2002). The second variable is the value of inward FDI stock also divided by GDP, available from the United Nations' *World Investment Report* (UNCTD 2002). The third variable is the value of IMF lending divided by GDP (World Bank 2002).

To capture the effects of normative imitation, we used a network measure of trade cohesion (predicted to be positive in hypothesis 2). Our network model of international trade focuses on the strength of trade ties between pairs of countries to evaluate the intensity and the direction of the diffusion of economic and political institutional practices. World-system analysis provides a strong rationale for using trade measures to characterize a global social structure (e.g., Chase-Dunn 1998; Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000; Van Rossem 1996). The extent to which a given country trades with countries with independent central banks will influence its propensity to adopt an independent central bank for normative reasons. We collected bilateral commodity trade data for each year from the United Nations Global Common Database. Formally, we constructed a measure of cohesion in trade for country  $i$  at time  $t$  as follows:

$$\text{cohesion in trade effect}_{it} = \sum_j \text{CBI}_{jt-1} \times (\text{trade}_{ijt-1} / \text{trade}_{it-1}), \quad (1)$$

where  $\text{CBI}_{jt-1}$  is the central bank independence index for country  $j$  at time  $t - 1$ ,  $\text{trade}_{ijt-1}$  is the total trade (imports plus exports) between country  $i$  and country  $j$  in year  $t - 1$ , and  $\text{trade}_{it-1}$  is country  $i$ 's total trade with all countries during the same period. This measure ranges between zero and one because both the independence index and the trade shares range between zero and one, and the trade shares cannot add up to more than unity.

To assess the effects of competitive imitation, we used a network measure of role equivalence (predicted to be positive in hypothesis 3), as suggested by Winship and Mandel (1984) and operationalized by Guler

et al. (2002). Specifically, we focus on the similarities between the patterns of trade of each pair of countries as an indicator of the structural pressure to adopt central bank independence. We collected trade data by product category from the United Nations Global Common Database. The data are classified according to international standards of industrial production: we utilized the two-digit-level classification, yielding 77 different product categories. Formally, for each country  $i$  and year  $t$ , we constructed export and import product category share vectors:

$$\text{EPSV}_{it} = \text{exports}_{ikt-1} / \sum_k \text{exports}_{ikt-1}, \quad (2)$$

$$\text{IPSV}_{it} = \text{imports}_{ikt-1} / \sum_k \text{imports}_{ikt-1}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\text{exports}_{ikt-1}$  is the dollar value of exports from country  $i$  in product category  $k$  and year  $t - 1$ , and  $\text{imports}_{ikt-1}$  is the dollar value of imports to country  $i$  in product category  $k$  and year  $t - 1$ . Following Wasserman and Faust (1994), we stacked, or concatenated, the export and import product category share vectors to form a single vector,  $\text{PSV}_{it-1}$ , for each country  $i$  during year  $t - 1$ . We then calculated a measure of role equivalence in trade as follows:

$$\text{role equivalence in trade effect}_{it} = \sum_j \text{CBI}_{jt-1} \times r(\text{PSV}_{it-1}, \text{PSV}_{jt-1}), \quad (4)$$

where  $\text{CBI}_{jt-1}$  is the central bank independence index of country  $j$  in year  $t - 1$ , and  $r$  is the Pearson correlation coefficient between the product category share vectors for countries  $i$  and  $j$  during year  $t - 1$ . The correlation coefficient measures the extent to which there is an overlap between country  $i$  and country  $j$  in terms of their patterns of trade by product type. If the total number of countries (including all  $j$ 's as well as  $i$ ) is  $N$ , this measure can theoretically range between  $-(N - 1)$  and  $+(N - 1)$ . The reason is that, while the independence index ranges between zero and one, the sum of the correlation coefficients (unlike the trade shares in the cohesion measure) can be greater than unity, though not greater than  $N - 1$  in absolute value. Other properties of the cohesion and role equivalence measures are further assessed and discussed in Guler et al. (2002).

### Control Variables

We include in all models a number of domestic political and macroeconomic variables to control for alternative explanations of the adoption of

central bank independence that are not related to globalization. Given that a long research tradition in political economy establishes a link between the characteristics of the polity and central bank independence, we account for several effects. First, to control for political turnover, we use the number of elections held for the lower house of the national legislature in a given year, available from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive (Banks 2001). Second, to hold constant for regime stability, we used a "weighted conflict index," also obtained from the CNTS Data Archive, calculated as the weighted occurrence of events such as political assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, and demonstrations. And to capture the effects of institutional checks and balances on the power of the government to influence legislation, we included the variable *polity2* from the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), which assigns each country a score between  $-10$  (autocratic regime) and  $+10$  (full democracy). Third, we also hold constant for party fractionalization using the index proposed by Rae (1968), calculated as one minus the sum of each party's squared proportion of seats in the lower legislative chamber, as reported in the CNTS Data Archive. A higher score indicates a larger number of small parties occupying legislative seats. Regarding macroeconomic controls, we included the logged GDP per capita, government consumption as a percentage of GDP, and the inflation rate (World Bank 2002; UNCTD 2002). A time trend (calendar year) is included in all models.

## Method

Our data are repeated annual observations of the same fixed, that is, not sampled, political units (countries). All variables are time varying in nature. We report results using two different modeling strategies. First, we use event-history methods to model the adoption of an independent central bank. We express the probability  $P$  that a law increasing the independence of the central bank in country  $i$  is passed in year  $t$  as a function of the hazard ratios of selected independent variables at time  $t - 1$ . The complementary log-log model facilitates the longitudinal analysis of binary dependent variables and handles multiple events within a single time period. The hazard of adoption is expressed by the formula  $\log[-\log(1 - P_{it})]$ . Given that some countries experienced more than one event between 1990 and 2000, we calculate robust standard errors clustered on countries. In addition to the control variables specified above, we include a duration variable (length of time since the last event). We also control for the degree of independence of the central bank at time  $t - 1$  so as to account for the fact that countries with an already very independent central bank are less likely to introduce further reforms. We

measured all independent variables with a one-year time lag to address reverse causation.

The event-history approach has two limitations. First, coding the simple passing of a law as an event does not take into account how much stronger the central bank becomes; hence, we define an event as a substantial increase in the central bank independence index. In order to assess robustness, we report results with three different cutoff points: a central bank independence index increase of .10, .15, and .20, respectively. These numbers are within the range of weights that are assigned to the major aspects coded by the Cukierman index. For example, the central bank independence index would increase by about .10 if the limitations to lending to the government were made most stringent, it would increase by up to .15 if the central bank statute incorporated a strong commitment to price stability, and finally, it would increase by up to .20 if the policies concerning the central bank director made his/her position more autonomous (see app. table A1). With the .10 cutoff, reform events took place in 37 country-years; with the .15 cutoff, in 33 country-years; and with the .20 cutoff, in 26 country-years.

Second, the dichotomization of the central bank independence index (a continuous variable) clearly wastes information, no matter what cutoff point is used. Hence we also report results following a second modeling strategy, which involves estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and country fixed effects. The method surmounts the three estimation problems associated with pooled time-series cross-sectional data: panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous (i.e., cross-sectional) error correlation, and serial (i.e., longitudinal) error correlation (Beck 2001). We use the untransformed Cukierman index as our dependent variable because, even though it is bounded (it ranges between zero and one), the predicted values from the regression models do not exceed the bounds, thus not violating the homoscedasticity assumption of the error terms. We also ran, though do not report, the same models with the appropriate logistic transformation for bounded variables, namely,  $\log[\text{CBI}/(1 - \text{CBI})]$ , and did not find qualitatively different results. Given the ease of interpretation afforded by the raw index, we prefer this simpler and more intuitive model. We measured all independent variables with a one-year time lag to address reverse causation, and included fixed effects to control for autocorrelation.

## RESULTS

Tables 1 and 2 present the sample descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. It is important to note that the Pearson correlations reported in

TABLE 1  
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Central bank independence (CBI) . . . . .	47	.20	.14	92
Trade openness ([imports + exports]/GDP)				
(TO) . . . . .	69	49	13	3 97
Inward FDI stock/GDP (IFDIS) . . . . .	16	.15	.00	98
IMF lending/GDP (IMFL) . . . . .	.01	.02	.00	.36
Cohesion in trade (CiT) . . . . .	.42	.13	.15	.84
Role equivalence in trade (RET) . . . . .	8.95	3.77	1 89	18.70
Elections (ELEC) . . . . .	.27	.45	.00	2.00
Weighted conflict index (logged) (WCI) . . . . .	.34	.63	.00	7 70
Checks and balances (C&B) . . . . .	6 68	5.14	-8.00	10.00
Party fractionalization index (PFI) . . . . .	6 40	2.04	.00	9.71
Government consumption/GDP				
(GC/GDP) . . . . .	16	.06	.03	.43
GDP per capita, current dollars (logged)				
(GDPpc) . . . . .	8.52	1.53	4.44	10.74
Inflation rate (logged) (INF) . . . . .	2.02	1.59	-4.09	8 92
Calendar year (YR) . . . . .	1995 27	3.09	1990	2000
Probability of sample selection (PSS) . . . . .	62	23	.03	.97
Adoption of CBI (event, .10 cutoff)				
(ACBI10) . . . . .	.06	.24	.00	1.00
Adoption of CBI (event, .15 cutoff)				
(ACBI15) . . . . .	.05	.22	.00	1.00
Adoption of CBI (event, .20 cutoff)				
(ACBI20) . . . . .	.04	.20	.00	1.00

NOTE.— $N = 620$ , 71 countries. Abbreviations are supplied for use in table 2.

table 2 were calculated without country fixed effects. Table 3 reports the event-history model. Finally, table 4 reports the regression results using OLS with PCSEs and country fixed effects.

Our results indicate that international coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures explain the adoption of central bank independence, lending support for each of our hypotheses. Furthermore, the results are robust to the use of different modeling approaches and to the inclusion of a sample selection adjustment. The results using event-history modeling reported in table 3 support the prediction that dependence on IMF lending increases the probability of a reform that enhances the independence of the central bank (hypothesis 1). This result holds regardless of the cutoff point used to code the dependent variable (see models 2, 3, and 4). The two other indicators of dependence (trade openness and inward FDI), however, failed to reach significance in the full model. (Trade openness is at the borderline of significance in models 2 and 3, with  $P < .051$  and  $P < .055$ , respectively.) The results using OLS with PCSEs and country

TABLE 2  
CORRELATION MATRIX

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
CBI																	
TO	0407																
IFDIS	.0466	6465*															
IMFL	-.0106	-.0391	...														
CIT	.5100*	.0643	.1149*	...													
RET	.4411*	.1558*	.1982*	-.2182*													
ELEC	.0361	-.0326	-.0283	-.0134	6328*												
WCI	-.0036	-.1929*	-.0671	.1656*	-.0048	-.0034											
C&B	.2350*	-.1523*	-.0785	-.2220*	2222*	1596*	-.0201										
PFI	.1749*	-.1948*	-.1991*	-.0843*	2222*	1596*	.0637	-.1288*	...								
GC/GDP	.0769	.0428	-.1385*	-.2604*	.2957*	.1407*	.0368	-.0501	.4880*								
GDPpc	.2074*	.1566*	.1325*	-.4294*	.2123*	.3540*	.0263	-.1742*	.2682*	.2742*							
INF	-.0645	-.1897*	-.3073*	.2703*	-.1703*	-.2995*	.0144	.1783*	.5733*	.3072*	.4733*						
YR	.3747*	.1299*	.2384*	.0215	.7257*	.6233*	-.0222	-.0346	-.1917*	.0147	-.2564*	-.4739*					
PSS	.2750*	.0603	.0707	-.3343*	.2162*	.3000*	.0464	-.2465*	.0036	.1192*	.0134	.0034	-.2477*				
ACBI10	.2587*	-.0033	-.0184	.02	.0522	.0790*	.031	.0651	.7691*	.3671*	.3906*	.9240*	-.3894*	-.0157			
ACBI15	.2672*	-.0072	-.014	.0067	.063	.1022*	.0339	.0678	.0489	.0163	-.0052	.041	.0046	.0332	.0529		
ACBI20	.2702*	-.0039	-.0066	-.0079	.0596	.0975*	.0359	.0574	.061	.0486	.0041	.0607	-.0097	.0399	.0713	.9412*	
									.057	.0646	.0315	.0818*	-.0155	.0261	.0848*	.8305*	.8824*

NOTE.—N = 620, 71 countries Abbreviations are defined in table 1.

\* P < .05



TABLE 3  
LOGISTIC EVENT-HISTORY MODELS OF THE ADOPTION OF REFORMS TOWARD AN  
INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK, 1990–2000

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Trade openness/GDP ... .. .	.980* (.487)	903 (.462)	1.046 (.543)	1 067 (.717)
Inward foreign direct investment/ GDP ... .. .	−4.310 (2.375)	−4.005 (2.252)	−4.088 (2 231)	−3 704 (2.517)
IMF lending/GDP ... .. .	10.460* (4 116)	8 486* (4 164)	10 802* (4.933)	12.975** (4.920)
Cohesion in trade ... .. .	5 685** (2.035)	5 397** (2.015)	5.215* (2.307)	5.246 (2.850)
Role equivalence in trade ... .	.169* (.078)	.180* (.080)	.243* (.096)	.281* (.125)
Elections ... .. .	.236 (.345)	.231 (.341)	.259 (.345)	.309 (.393)
Weighted conflict index ... .. .	.492* (.205)	.489* (.192)	.548* (.219)	.564* (.268)
Checks and balances ... .. .	.085 (.069)	.014 (.100)	.013 (.111)	−.045 (.145)
Party fractionalization ... .. .	−.102 (.126)	−.085 (.126)	.065 (.147)	.212 (.196)
Government consumption/ GDP ... .. .	−6 066 (4.773)	−4.976 (4 714)	−7 500 (5.272)	−6.203 (5.468)
GDP per capita (logged) ... .. .	.132 (.202)	−.377 (.513)	−.350 (.556)	−.260 (.659)
Inflation (logged) ... .. .	.036 (.102)	.021 (.104)	−.043 (.112)	−.010 (.129)
Time since adoption ... .. .	.369* (.176)	.402* (.203)	.342 (.189)	.327 (.211)
Central bank independence, $t - 1$ ... .. .	−4.531** (1 365)	−4.671** (1.343)	−5.237** (1.443)	−5.529** (1 706)
Calendar year ... .. .	−.437* (.181)	−.463* (.207)	−.461* (.213)	−.511 (.261)
Probability of sample selection .		3 983 (3.850)	4 220 (4 020)	4.935 (5.106)
Constant ... .. .	864.600* (359 845)	918.145* (412.877)	913 355* (423.332)	1,008.957 (519 637)
No. of observations ... .. .	620	620	620	620
Log likelihood ... .. .	−116.10103	−115.4106	−102 85246	−84.497586

NOTE —71 countries, with lagged independent variables, robust SEs in parentheses For models 1 and 2, cutoff is 10, for model 3, 15, and for model 4, .20

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$

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TABLE 4  
UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS FROM FIXED-EFFECTS REGRESSIONS OF CENTRAL  
BANK INDEPENDENCE, 1990–2000

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Trade openness/GDP . . . . .	.077** (.030)	.066* (.033)	.084* (.033)
Inward foreign direct investment/ GDP . . . . .	.108* (.042)	.083 (.058)	.110* (.043)
IMF lending/GDP . . . . .	.642* (.291)	.751** (.286)	.599* (.282)
Cohesion in trade . . . . .	.305** (.098)		.308** (.099)
Role equivalence in trade . . . . .	.016** (.003)		.016** (.003)
Elections . . . . .	.006 (.009)	.005 (.009)	.006 (.009)
Weighted conflict index . . . . .	.014 (.007)	.013 (.007)	.014 (.007)
Checks and balances . . . . .	-.002 (.002)	-.004 (.006)	-.007 (.006)
Party fractionalization . . . . .	-.006 (.003)	-.010* (.004)	-.006 (.004)
Government consumption/GDP . . . . .	.002 (.203)	.168 (.227)	.125 (.183)
GDP per capita (logged) . . . . .	.015 (.065)	.015 (.068)	-.002 (.058)
Inflation (logged) . . . . .	-.004 (.003)	-.007** (.002)	-.005* (.003)
Calendar year . . . . .	-.003 (.004)	.019** (.002)	-.002 (.004)
Probability of sample selection . . . . .		.221 (.367)	.294 (.358)
Constant . . . . .	5.255 (7.095)	-37.785** (4.288)	4.775 (6.978)
Observations . . . . .	620	620	620
No. of countries . . . . .	71	71	71
R <sup>2</sup> . . . . .	.7816	.7646	.7818

NOTE — 71 countries, with lagged independent variables, panel-corrected SEs in parentheses

\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*  $P < .01$

fixed effects reported in table 4 support hypothesis 1 in that trade openness, inward FDI, and IMF lending increase the independence of the central bank. We find support for the normative and mimetic effects of cohesion and role equivalence in trade using either the event-history approach or OLS with PCSEs and fixed effects (hypotheses 2 and 3). This support is robust to the inclusion of a sample selection adjustment.

Although we argued that IMF credit and inward foreign investment are causes of central bank independence, it is possible that the reverse relationship is at work; that is, central bank independence could be a prerequisite for, and not the effect of, greater IMF credit or inward investment. The evidence, however, corroborates the direction of causality that we have argued. The countries that increased the independence of their central bank sharply during the 1990s had experienced increases in IMF credit or inward investment *prior to* the adoption of a new legal statute. For instance, Albania, Argentina, and Belarus made their central banks more independent in 1993, after both IMF credit and foreign investment had increased sharply the year before. Peru's central bank acquired a new degree of independence in 1994 when foreign investment started to boom. Poland enhanced the independence of its central bank in 1992 and 1998, after both IMF credit and inward foreign investment had started to rise. Thus, the evidence indicates that the direction of causality runs from global influences (e.g., IMF, foreign investment) to central bank independence, and not vice versa.<sup>10</sup>

The effects of the hypothesized variables that reached significance in the analyses reported in tables 3 and 4 are relatively large in magnitude. The interpretation of the coefficients of the event-history model 2 of table 2 is as follows. An increase of one standard deviation in IMF credit (0.02) leads to a 18.5% increase in the hazard of adoption of a statutory reform that makes the central bank more independent by 0.10 points in the Cukierman index ( $100 \times [\exp(8.486 \times 0.02) - 1]$ ). The corresponding figure for a one standard deviation increase in cohesion in trade is 101.7%, and in role equivalence in trade, 97.1%.

The OLS results in the fully specified model 3 of table 4 can be interpreted in a more straightforward way given that the dependent variable is the raw index of central bank independence. The coefficients indicate the effect on central bank independence of a change in the explanatory variable over time. An increase in trade openness of one standard deviation results in an increase equivalent to 1/5 of the standard deviation of central bank independence ( $0.084 \times 0.49 = 0.04$  or 1/5 of 0.20), 1/10 in the case of FDI, 1/20 in the case of IMF lending, 1/5 in the case of cohesion

<sup>10</sup> As a further test, we checked for the robustness of our results by excluding IMF credit and inward FDI from the regression, and we found no qualitative difference in the coefficients of the remaining variables. Following Vreeland (2003), we also calculated the probability that a country would seek an IMF loan based on a regression, using as regressors the country's currency reserves, budget balance, debt service, inward foreign investment, and inward portfolio investment; as well as the number of countries with an IMF loan. Including this probability as an additional variable in tables 3 or 4 did not change the pattern of results. Hence, the pressure from the IMF that we label as "global" is not originally caused by domestic characteristics.

of trade, and 1/3.33 in the case of role equivalence in trade. These effects are not as small as they appear at first sight, because they are net of all other independent variables in the full model and of the country fixed effects. Regardless whether the event-history or the OLS method is used, cohesion and role equivalence in trade are the largest effects in magnitude.

Turning to the control variables, we find little support for alternative explanations based on political or macroeconomic variables of a domestic nature. In the event-history regressions, the time controls, calendar year, central bank independence as of year  $t - 1$ , and the weighted conflict index were significant (table 3). The only variable that reaches significance in the full model using OLS with PCSEs and country fixed effects is the inflation rate, albeit with a negative sign.<sup>11</sup>

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article was to examine the impact of globalization on the state, using the specific case of the central bank and its independence from the executive branch as the empirical setting. Our approach drew from the insights of world-system, world-society, and neoinstitutional theories in sociology. We argued that, because of cross-national economic, political, and cultural competition in a context of globalization, the state is subject to coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures. In response to these pressures, the state reorganizes itself, with a strong tendency toward emulating the organizational forms and practices adopted by other countries.

Above and beyond the effects of domestic political and macroeconomic variables, countries more exposed to trade, foreign investment, multilateral lending, and cohesive and role equivalent trading relationships with previous adopters are subject to isomorphic pressures. Most of our empirical results were robust to modeling approach, estimation method, and the inclusion of control variables. Political or macroeconomic variables of a domestic nature failed to explain central bank independence. Thus, globalization is transforming the state structures that deal with monetary policy.

Our results do not directly address the weakening of the state as a result of globalization, but rather its reconfiguration or reorganization along more technocratic lines that tend to benefit certain groups of policy makers and external constituencies. The ideological background to these empirical findings should not be lost, however. As Strange (1996) suggests, since the

<sup>11</sup> Previous empirical studies have also found a negative relationship between the inflation rate and central bank independence (see Cukierman 1994; Forder 1999).

late 1970s, governments around the world have abdicated many of their Keynesian responsibilities concerning social welfare in favor of neoliberal regulatory models. As a by-product, they faced a fundamental crisis of legitimacy, a difficulty justifying the introduction of new policy paradigms from abroad. The state was reconfigured and restructured along technocratic lines in an attempt to make it more legitimate, shifting power from certain government agencies to others. Central banks are gaining in power, while the executive branch of government is losing control over monetary policy.

The importance of global pressures of a coercive, normative, or mimetic kind when it comes to explaining central bank independence raises tantalizing questions about the constraints that globalization can place on the democratic choice that the citizenry is supposed to be able to exercise over such important matters as the structure and nature of economic policy-making institutions. The very act of granting a group of appointed (not elected) technocrats independence from the political power—that is, from elected representatives or officials—reveals a fundamental tension in the way in which different kinds of issues are handled in modern societies. Some policy areas are subject to more or less continuous political scrutiny, and the officials in charge of them are subject to the democratic rules of the game. Others, especially monetary policy, have been socially and politically constructed as lying beyond the scope of democratic oversight and control. The fact that it is not domestic political conditions but rather global pressures that drive the adoption of the remarkable policy-making innovation of the independent central bank raises a great many questions about the effects of globalization on democratic standards and practices. Future research could perhaps explore the possibility that, while global influences matter most, domestic economic and political conditions moderate or exacerbate the effect of international coercive, normative, and mimetic forces.

While our study finds globalization to be the main cause of the transformation of state structures as exemplified by central bank independence, it is likely that a different choice of dependent variable might have found a debilitation of the state, and not just a transformation. Thus, it is imperative for future research to examine how other parts of the state have been affected by increasing trade, foreign investment, multilateral lending, and network effects. For instance, an analysis of the impact of these forces on social welfare or labor agencies within the bureaucracy is needed to shed further light on the question of the evolution of the modern state. Globalization is a complicated and multifaceted process whose effects vary greatly across countries and institutional arenas. Only careful empirical investigations of a variety of related phenomena will help sociologists

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understand the ways in which it is changing some of our most established institutions.

### APPENDIX

TABLE A1  
THE CUKIERMAN INDEX OF LEGAL CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE

Variable	Description/Definition	Numerical Coding
Chief executive officer or CEO (.20):		
Term of office	Over eight years	1.00
	Six to eight years	.75
	Five years	.50
	Four years	.25
	Under four years or at the discretion of the appointer	.00
Who appoints CEO?	Board of central bank	1 00
	A council of the central bank board, executive branch, and legislative branch	.75
	Legislature (congress, king)	.50
	Executive collectively (e g , council of ministers)	.25
	One or two members of the executive branch (e.g., prime minister)	.00
Dismissal	No provision for dismissal	1.00
	Only for reasons not related to policy (e.g., incapability or violation of law)	.83
	At the discretion of central bank board	.67
	At legislature's discretion	.50
	Unconditional dismissal possible by legislature	.33
	At executive's discretion	.17
	Unconditional dismissal possible by executive	.00
May CEO hold other offices in government?	No	1.00
	Only with permission of the executive branch	.50
	No rule against CEO holding another office	.00
Policy formulation (.15).		
Who formulates monetary policy? (.25)	Bank alone	1 00
	Bank participates, but has little influence	.67
	Bank only advises government	.33
	Bank has no say	.00

TABLE A1 (Continued)

Variable	Description/Definition	Numerical Coding
Who has final word in resolution of conflict? (.50)	Bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as its objectives	1.00
	Government, on policy issues not clearly defined as the bank's goals or in case of conflict within the bank	.80
	A council of the central bank, executive branch, and legislative branch	.60
	Legislature, on policy issues	.40
	Executive branch on policy issues, subject to due process and possible protest by the bank	.20
	Executive branch has unconditional priority	.00
Role in the government's budgetary process ( .25)	Central bank active	1.00
	Central bank has no influence	.00
Objectives (.15)	Price stability is the major or only objective in the charter, and the central bank has the final word in case of conflict with other government objectives	1 00
	Price stability is the only objective	.80
	Price stability is one goal, with other compatible objectives, such as a stable banking system	.60
	Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting objectives, such as full employment	.40
	No objectives stated in the bank charter	.20
	Stated objectives do not include price stability	.00
Limitations on lending to the government (.50)		
Advances (limitations on nonsecuritized lending; .15)	No advances permitted	1 00
	Advances permitted, but with strict limits (e.g., up to 15% of government revenue)	.67
	Advances permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15% of government revenue)	.33
	No legal limits on lending	.00
	Not permitted	1.00
Securitized lending (.10)	Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g., up to 15% of government revenue)	.67
	Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g., over 15% of government revenue)	.33
	No legal limits on lending	.00

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TABLE A1 (Continued)

Variable	Description/Definition	Numerical Coding
Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount; 10)	Controlled by the bank	1.00
	Specified by the bank charter	.67
	Agreed between the central bank and the executive	.33
	Decided by the executive branch alone	.00
Potential borrowers from the bank (05)	Only the central government	1.00
	All levels of government (state + central)	.67
	Those mentioned above and public enterprises	.33
	Public and private sector	.00
Limits of central bank lending defined in <sup>a</sup>	Currency amounts	1.00
	Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital	.67
	Shares of government revenue	.33
	Shares of government expenditure	.00
Maturity of loans <sup>a</sup>	Within six months	1.00
	Within one year	.67
	More than one year	.33
	No mention of maturity in the law	.00
Interest rate on loans must be <sup>a</sup>	Above minimum rates	1.00
	At market rates	.75
	Below maximum rates	.50
	Interest rate is not mentioned	.25
	No interest in government borrowing from the central bank	.00
Central bank prohibited from buying or selling government securities in the primary market? <sup>a</sup>	Yes	1.00
	No	.00

SOURCE —Cukierman (1992)

NOTE —Minimum = 0, maximum = 1 Weight in parentheses Weight for CEO is unweighted average of its four components, and weights for policy formulation and limitations on lending to the government are weighted averages of their respective components, as indicated

<sup>a</sup> These variables are averaged together into a single variable, which is then given the weight 10

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## Book Reviews

*Villa Victoria: The Transformation of Social Capital in a Boston Barrio.*  
By Mario Luis Small. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp.  
226.

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Contemporary urban ethnographic studies in sociology fall into two general types. Classically oriented studies, such as community studies and in-depth analysis of small groups, offer us another person's worldview—for example, the government bureaucrat, the gang member, or the housing project dweller. Along the way, they proffer grounded categorizations of persons (e.g., "decent" vs. "street") and explanations of social outcomes. A second and more recent line of ethnographic research is driven by a question or a problematic. The object under study—a place or social group—is fodder for the overall question. For example, a community's churches may be utilized to explain the role of religion in neighborhood gentrification, but the study may not provide a portrait of the community's churches.

*Villa Victoria* is in the second tradition. Mario Luis Small writes that the book is "not a community study. . . . By contrast, this book is focused exclusively on the relationship between concentrated poverty and social capital" (p. xvii). It participates in debates about the role of neighborhoods in determining individual outcomes—debates that have been waged most forcefully since the publication of William Julius Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged* [University of Chicago Press, 1990]. *Villa Victoria* injects wisdom and clarity in a field that continues to struggle with the basic question: How is poverty reproduced in urban America? Small's self-designated "conditional" approach employs middle-level theoretical precepts to offer a "comprehensive account of the particular condition" (p. 186), namely, how social capital develops in poor communities over time.

The book's strengths and weaknesses may all be traced to its self-positioning in this sphere of urban poverty research. In the 1990s, social scientists who were intent on documenting the *differences* between poor and middle-class persons dominated poverty research. To define a "poor community," they deployed arbitrary criteria such as 30% or 40% poverty levels and indefensible conflation of "neighborhood" with census tracts. In doing so, researchers isolated comparable pockets of poverty in U.S. cities. But they fell victim to their own fetishization. They believed that tracts were neighborhoods and that one poor community was as good as another. *Villa Victoria* echoes earlier criticisms that such approaches

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tended to ignore the experiences of the majority of residents—who were *not* in fact poor—and never really displayed much interest in the ties of poor people across social classes and urban spaces. Small argues that this folk sociology perpetuated a monolithic view of the urban poor and did not take into account a neighborhood's unique history.

Small focuses on the ties of poor residents outside of their communities and to other social classes. He builds an argument for how poor people develop (or do not develop) social capital, and why they may participate (or not participate) in community affairs. The ability to cross ecological barriers that separate their subsidized housing complex from the wider South End region, one's differing community attachment that can result from status attributes such as time of migration to the city, and the use of "critical" resources like schools and centers of employment in or outside the community all play a part in determining individual capacities to build social capital effectively. One of the most useful discussions is his employment of narrative frames to illuminate differences in how people become attached to place and, therein, how likely they are to participate locally.

In this sense, the book is clearly ethnographic. But in other ways, one is hard-pressed to locate ethnographic sensibilities in Small's work. He says *Villa Victoria* is a "historically informed" ethnography. But it is so driven by the need to realign the perspective of those working in the quantitatively dominant field of "neighborhood effects" research that the book is really more of a set of discrete, often reflective essays. Of course, one could argue that his use of qualitative material to answer thorny questions is consummately ethnographic. This is a matter of taste. Surely, not all ethnographers need to write community studies.

But at times, the lack of a traditional ethnographic interest impedes his argument. For example, *Villa Victoria* is a public housing complex. It is a product of local, state, and federal government, and private investment via the financial markets. Small narrates this history in which many institutions interacted to sustain the community physically and socially. Yet many of these actors drop out in the ensuing analysis. The picture is of a world made primarily by the residents themselves. Police, government officials, philanthropists, volunteers, and a host of other so-called "mainstream" actors that interact with residents do not receive much attention. Small follows a project dweller outside the community, and we expect to see the informant's engagement with the wider world. But Small retreats to a debate in the neighborhood-effects literature or introduces an underappreciated analytic tool (e.g., cultural framing theory). Small ends up missing ripe opportunities to make his points about social ties and interconnected spaces *ethnographically*, that is, via the lives of the people he studies.

Indeed, one can read entire stretches of this book without meeting his informants. It sometimes feels like Small is giving us a tour of sociology rather than the community. Again, this works when the point is to criticize

current social scientific fashions, but we do not really see how human agents in particular contexts aspire, make decisions, negotiate conflicts, and otherwise act human. An example is Small's discussion of the difference between "critical resources" like grocery stores that "serve sustenance needs" (p. 134), and "noncritical resources" like parks that "serve nonessential ends." Residents who do not leave Villa Victoria to utilize critical resources end up more isolated because they do not form mainstream ties so easily. But there is no theory to back up the critical/noncritical dichotomy—there is no real attempt to build off of residents' own distinction. This is consequential because a sidewalk or a park is also a place of economic exchange for poor people who do not have an office. Hence, it is "critical" and "noncritical." Its semantic flexibility may be important to recognize if claims are to be made about residents' attachment to their neighborhood and their desire to use a resource elsewhere. Small's framework also makes it difficult to use ethnography in other ways, such as in understanding the temporal contours of human action and the communicative structures that permit subjects to inform the researcher.

Summarily, *Villa Victoria* is the finest example of how ethnographic material can be mobilized to correct, refine, and reframe top-down, policy-driven research that does not proceed from a *verstehen* perspective. If the current fashion continues, more ethnographers will drop conventional longitudinal research designs for interview studies and snapshot portraits of individuals and families, all in the service of policy formulation. In their noble pursuit, they will certainly benefit from reading *Villa Victoria*.

*Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil.* By Edward E. Telles. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. ix+324.

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Edward Telles's rich and important book is the latest, and most systematic, sociological study of Brazilian race relations. As its title implies, the book is also comparative, as the significance of race in Brazil is explicitly compared with its significance in the United States and in South Africa, to a lesser extent. American race relations have, and arguably continue, to serve as the paradigmatic case against which other countries are compared and from which sociological theories are derived. The resulting problems, Telles argues, are that Brazil cannot be properly understood on its own terms, and that extant sociological theory cannot fully explain the Brazilian case because Brazil deviates from its key assumptions. Thus, Telles is involved in a three-pronged discussion. He takes issue with both former and prevailing views of Brazilian social relations, and he seeks to



modify sociological theory, which presumes that "high rates of intermarriage and low levels of residential segregation" indicate "greater acceptance of outgroups" (p. 224). As he convincingly shows, such social proximity neither directly nor automatically translates into full inclusion in Brazil's economic and political life.

Telles's conceptual framework of Brazilian race relations is constructed along two dimensions. Rates of intermarriage and residential data are located along a "horizontal" dimension, signifying inclusion. Indicators of material wealth, social status, and educational attainment are located along a "vertical" dimension, signifying hierarchy and subordination. The once-dominant "racial democracy" idea corresponds to the horizontal. According to Telles, its proponents are partly right in their insistence on the positive social effects of racial intermarriage and on the negative effects of historical material disadvantage. Yet, he finds that they dangerously underestimate both the force of racist thought (e.g., profoundly negative antiblack ideas) and the effects of this racist thought on economic and educational outcomes. Similarly, he finds that proponents of the prevailing "racial inequality" ideal are partly right in their emphasis on the racial component of Brazil's "hyperinequality." Yet, he finds that they too readily dismiss the social significance of "miscegenation" and residential integration. As he writes, "miscegenation in Brazil is not merely ideology" (p. 223).

In the end, Telles does not choose between the two views, but rather attempts to reconcile them by highlighting two related, if apparently contradictory, points. The first is that *in spite of* profoundly, if subtly, racist attitudes, Brazilians intermarry at demonstrably higher levels than either Americans or South Africans. White and nonwhite Brazilians also live in closer residential proximity than do Americans and South Africans. He explains that both marriage and residential patterns are largely a result of Brazil's hyperinequality, where the majority of white and nonwhite Brazilians are trapped at the bottom. Brazil has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, with nonwhites "concentrated in the lowest rungs," along with many whites (p. 110). In other words, shared class experience seems to diminish, if not completely eradicate, the effects of a "racist culture" (p. 220). Yet, the clear desire for lighter skin still prevails, leading Telles to conclude that "in the marriage market, whiter skin is preferred and persons with the darkest skin, especially women, are largely rejected" (p. 193). Telles's second, and related, point is that *because of* deeply racist attitudes, upward mobility is stunted, and nonwhite Brazilians hit "a discriminatory glass ceiling." Here, Brazil's hyperinequality accounts for both the highly restricted channels for mobility and for the few resources that nonwhite Brazilians can marshal. The patently unequal nature of Brazilian public education is a key variable. The government heavily subsidizes public universities, spending "6.5 billion dollars" annually for "only 5 percent of the college age cohort, which

is roughly twenty times its expenditures for each elementary or secondary student" (p. 124).

Telles's framework suggests that it is impossible to determine which factor—extreme class inequality or a racist culture—best explains Brazilian racial inequality. They are inextricably connected and reinforcing, although not in the ways predicted by sociological theory. We would expect intermarriage and residential integration to be more reliable indicators of full inclusion, but they are not. We would also expect racial hierarchy and deeply negative perceptions to extend to the more voluntary and private realms of marriage and residence, but they do not. Faced with Brazil's realities, Telles argues against an "either/or" approach, instead identifying three interrelated factors "that are primarily responsible for Brazil's profound inequalities: *hyperinequality*, a *discriminatory glass ceiling*, and a *racist culture*" (p. 220).

Finally, Telles turns to the legal and policy remedies now being considered in Brazil. He finds that although antidiscrimination law has been on the books since 1951, with the passage of the Arinos Law and the updated Caó Law in 1989, it has been largely ineffective. Support for affirmative action policies in higher education and the workplace is growing, although universal class-based policies rather than race-based policies garner far more support. Telles generally supports class-based remedies, as they will necessarily benefit browns and blacks, the vast majority of whom are poor. Yet, he worries that the particular needs of browns and blacks may not be fully met. First, he worries that those poor white students, although disadvantaged, would be better positioned because "predominately white public schools are better resourced than predominately nonwhite schools" (p. 252). Second, these policies, precisely because they are class based, ignore the racial dimension of inequality. However, Telles acknowledges the problems of race-based remedies, which largely hinge on group classification. By what process will the beneficiaries be chosen, given the fluidity of racial and color identifications? Telles, like many Brazilians, worries about potential abuse, chiefly whites "darkening" themselves. In the end, Telles seems to endorse both class- and race-based policies. He also argues for deliberate efforts to eliminate Brazil's racist culture. In this book, Telles greatly advances our knowledge of race's significance in Brazil and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. It should be required reading in any sociology course about Brazil and/or race.

*Under Siege: Poverty and Crime in a Public Housing Community.* By Walter S. Dekeserdy, Shahid Alvi, Martin Schwartz, and E. Andreas Tomaszewski. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2003. Pp. x+184.

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*Under Siege* is the most recent work on crime in public housing. It uses responses to 325 questionnaires and 54 interviews by public housing residents. It differs from recent works by Susan J. Popkin et al. (*The Hidden War* [Rutgers University Press, 2000]) and Sudhir A. Venkatesh (*American Project* [Harvard University Press, 2000]) in two important ways. First, it expands the geographical base from Chicago to an unidentified Canadian city. Such extensions are needed, although there is work on public housing in Britain that is not mentioned. Second, concealing the city and the specific housing projects breaks with a tradition extending back to William Moore, Jr. (*The Vertical Ghetto* [Random House, 1969]) and Lee Rainwater (*Behind Ghetto Walls* [Aldine, 1970]), and continuing through the recent works. Anonymity is not lost nor is additional shame cast by identifying the city and projects. Concealment can have adverse effects by not drawing attention and potential private and governmental help to these projects.

The concealment is contrary to the authors' recommendation for "news-worthy criminology," which seeks to create the motivations for social changes by publicizing research results. The media grabs attention by connecting stories to places and people. Only knowing that somewhere, in some city in eastern Ontario, some housing projects have serious problems, is less than eye-catching. Regardless, the expansion is important for Canadian criminology and for understanding the effects of public housing. For years, it seems that only the United States allows and, at times, promotes public housing, creating social disasters among the disadvantaged. Yet, massive public housing projects are in many countries, but there is little research on their effects. Also, the book shows that Canada has an overly positive view of itself from contrasting itself with the United States. This has partially blinded it to its own problems.

This work also differs from the earlier books in its use of a Marxist or "left-realist" perspective. Some readers will be heartened by this and some disheartened. It seems to have positive and negative consequences. There is much more stress on macrolevel social processes at the societal level than in previous works. It continually ties the major dimensions of public housing problems to large-scale features of capitalism rather than to the machinations of local politicians. These are viewed as deriving from the capitalist context. A second positive feature of the book is the strong effort to support its perspective with empirical research using methods and techniques from "mainstream" criminology. Karl Marx allegedly developed a questionnaire, but it apparently was never used. This book's meth-

odology will be reviewed later. Also to its credit are the attempts to integrate research and theory from "mainstream" criminology, particularly social disorganization.

In spite of its strengths, the book's perspective seems to contribute to its weaknesses. While it attempts to integrate a variety of findings and theories from the mainstream, it attacks others too severely. Sensible proponents of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) and "broken windows" do not claim these approaches will eliminate crime. Not all proponents of either supported "zero-tolerance" policies. Both perspectives have helped to "take a bite of crime," even if they have not devoured it. The next emergent weakness is that the book does not pay enough attention to the "enemy within." Of course, not blaming the victim again and again is important, but can anyone realistically ignore Bill Cosby, who grew up in a Philadelphia housing project?

Parallel to its use of mainstream theories are the book's attempts at using mainstream methodology, including quantitative analysis. The survey methodology and sampling have weaknesses. Only 29% of eligible households responded. A thorough follow-up design was not used. The direct contact with the authors may have affected the response rate. No incentive for participation was provided. Chapter 4 frequently did not clarify which variable was dependent in the cross-tabulations, and the percentages in table 4.6 appeared to have been computed in the wrong direction. The use of logistic regression was a plus, and the results were relatively strong given that respondents from an elderly project were not separated from those in family projects. The analyses needed to identify the relative importance of variables when more than one remained in these analyses.

Although based in realist leftism, the work's suggestions for change at times seem unrealistic. Community organization, while important, often cannot succeed without the assistance of the police, since the disorderly are often younger, stronger, more aggressive, and less fearful of harming or being harmed than the "orderly poor." Indeed, public housing residents often request additional police and security guards at their buildings. Having children raised in day cares can have substantial drawbacks. Emphasizing trade or other vocational education for impoverished and, especially, minority areas may be viewed as discriminatory, despite the lucrative remuneration in some of these occupations.

Regardless, the book is worth considering in discussions of public housing. It can foster debates which can lead to meaningful change that can realistically be accomplished.

*Total Confinement: Madness and Reason in the Maximum Security Prison.* By Lorna A. Rhodes. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. Pp. xiv+315. \$19.95.

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In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, a minor tradition of prison ethnography charted how formal structures of power and legitimacy intersected with the informal structures of the inmates' social world, but it faltered when its practitioners not only encountered the critical onslaught of radical and Foucauldian theorists who sought more abstract and catholic models of power, but were also increasingly denied access to closed, defensive institutions that discovered that they had little to gain from close inspection. It is instructive that *Total Confinement*, marking its return in America, should have been carried out not by a sociologist, but by a social anthropologist.

*Total Confinement* is a compelling examination of the controlling logic exercised in a maximum security prison for men in Washington State. It is in effect a balanced phenomenological account of the transactions between an often justifiably fearful staff, anxious to maintain their authority, and prisoners who were subject to—and often actively resisting—exceptional levels of regulation, violence, and constraint. Both groups tried to maintain a tough masculine presence that enabled them to confront their associates and one another without flinching or weakening, without losing face and respect, and without “being broken.” Lorna Rhodes makes telling use of photographs and advertising copy, inmate art and poetry, to show how that presence was expressively elaborated. While advertisements marketing physical restraints, weapons, and armor harped, for example, on the hazards of the officers' position, inmates cultivated a folk art celebrating the heroic struggle of those who would not kowtow before their oppressors. Power and resistance were particularly concentrated on a minute control of the body of a prisoner in an escalating conflict between his desire to remain autonomous and the officer's determination to subdue him. Prisoners so controlled could be reduced in time to using their own fluids and excreta as missiles, and, in all this, Rhodes says, the prison provided a machinery for the manufacture of “monsters.” Yet conflict could also be arrested, and toward the end of the book, Rhodes describes how a new policy of civility and attentiveness to inmate complaint started to reverse its course.

The prison's regime was based on the production and enforcement of detailed rules and classifications of behavior that were coupled to a running assessment of how far, in what manner, and for what surface and underlying reasons prisoners could be said to be in compliance. Rule observance was held to be a token both of the efficient functioning of the institution and of the prisoner's ability to acquire and exercise self-

control—redemption being signified by obedience. The inmate's good faith and rational capacities then became focal concerns, and judgments were made continually about whether infractions were signs of a "badness" which must be punished or a "madness" which should be entrusted to the mental health unit. Since it was impermissible to punish those who did not understand the rules, the unit's staff had to be alert in any negotiations to the possibility that inmates were feigning incomprehension. Prisoners could, after all, be rational in trying to appear irrational, and, facing sometimes overwhelmingly complex decisions, staff were sometimes forced to fall back on their own vernacular psychiatry and simple diagnostic manuals.

*Total Confinement* is original and accessible. Its core phenomenology is impressive. But, because so much space is devoted to that core, it is inevitable that other areas of potential significance were sketched only lightly or not at all. We learn little about Rhodes's methods and how, as a woman, she conducted herself in such a masculine and tightly regulated place. We are given no history of the great wave of incarceration that has washed over America, no history of the supermaximum prisons and their specialist units, and almost nothing about the processes of "transcarceration" which endowed them more and more with the functions of mental hospitals and other institutions. There is no consideration of the possibility, flagged first by Irwin and Cressey, that much prison behavior is actually an extrusion of life outside the walls; nothing on the male cultures of honor and respect, analysed by Bourgois, Elias, Polk, and others, which are vital to that life; and nothing on an earlier discussion, pioneered by Cressey and Galtung, of the endemic tensions between treatment and control in prison. There is also something of the American myopia about work that is not American. In her discussion of the use of bodily wastes as weaponry, for instance, Rhodes might have found it helpful to consider Kieran McEvoy's treatment of dirty protests in *Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland* [Oxford University Press, 2001]. And, in her writing about the uses of power and legitimacy, she could have turned to Sparks et al.'s *Prisons and the Problem of Order* [Oxford University Press, 1996]. But it is always possible to construct such a list of things uncited and unconsidered, and Rhodes should be congratulated on producing a work of considerable merit.

*Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives: Delinquent Boys to Age 70.* By John H. Laub and Robert J. Sampson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. vii+338. \$49.95.

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In 1950 Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck published *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency*, which reported on the results of a study comparing the life

histories of 500 white boys ages 10–17 who were incarcerated for delinquency, and a sample of 500 white boys who were not incarcerated. The two groups were matched case by case on age, race, ethnicity, IQ, and residence in the low-income areas of Boston. Data were collected by the Gluecks on the two groups when they were 14, 25, and 32 years old.

John Laub and Robert Sampson's most recent publication, *Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives: Delinquent Boys to Age 70*, is another attempt to mine the rich vein left by the Gluecks (their earlier work on the subject was *Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points through Life*). In this work the authors try to answer the question of why some people cease delinquent or criminal behavior while others persist in it. In this latest attempt to answer this question, Laub and Sampson follow up on those they could locate of the 500 "serious and persistent delinquent" boys in the original Glueck study by searching local and national criminal records to see who "persisted," "desisted," or "terminated" their criminal behavior. In addition, Laub and Sampson located and interviewed a subsample of 52 of the boys in the original sample of 500. At the time Laub and Sampson interviewed them, most of them were in their late 60s and 70s.

How far one can generalize from a sample of white delinquent boys who grew up in the Depression is open to debate. Regardless, the data are invaluable and should stimulate further inquiry using different samples (girls, nonwhites, people born in the affluent 1950s) rather than being dismissed out of hand because they are not fully representative.

The degree to which the 500 incarcerated youths were "serious and persistent delinquents" as the Gluecks claimed and as Laub and Sampson label them is open to question. A closer look at the data from the Gluecks' original study raises doubt that these really were "serious and persistent" delinquents. The offense most frequently committed in the Gluecks' sample is "violation of probation" (322 total offenses for the 500 boys in the sample). Furthermore, the Gluecks placed all the minor transgressions of the people in their sample into separate categories, while they added more serious offenses together; thus, it appears that the most frequently committed offenses were the most serious. It is also questionable whether the sample was really one of "persistent" delinquents. The mean number of offenses recorded for the sample was 3.66. Does this make them "persistent?" It is thus important to bear in mind that the study, then, is based on a sample of run-of-the-mill white male delinquents.

Laub and Sampson use the data from their study to do a number of things: (1) describe the number of people who persisted in, desisted, and terminated criminal behavior; (2) assess the empirical validity of current theories about why people persist in, desist, or terminate criminal behavior; and (3) attempt to provide a theory of the difference between persistors, desistors, and terminators. They find what other studies have found: the peak age for criminal behavior is between 15 and 19, with a steady decline thereafter until about age 46, when most people stop.

The subsample of 52 men who were interviewed by Laub and Sampson provide some interesting life histories that the authors use to supplement the quantitative data in an effort to evaluate extant theories of criminal behavior and to develop their own theory of why some people persist in criminal behavior and others do not. Criminologists interested in evaluating the empirical utility of the ever-expanding list of "criminological theory" will be interested to learn that none of these theories adequately explains the difference between persistors, desistors, and terminators. Laub and Sampson argue that they "uncovered enormous heterogeneity in criminal offending over the life course. . . . Most important, long-term patterns of offending cannot be explained by individual differences (e.g., low verbal IQ), childhood characteristics (e.g., early onset of misbehavior), or adolescent characteristics (e.g., chronic juvenile offending)" (p. 286). Instead, they suggest that the following factors account for delinquents' desisting or terminating their delinquent/criminal behavior: (1) marginality-(de)connectedness, (2) will-human agency, (3) historical context, and (4) chance, or "random development noise."

The most explicit claim in the theory is that desistors and terminators differ from persistors in that desistors were "embedded in structured routines. . . . Structures, situations, and persons offered nurturing and informal social control." On the other hand "the life of the persistent offender was marked by marginality and a lack of structure. . . . For those without permanent addresses, steady jobs, spouses, children and other rooted forms of life, crime and deviance is an unsurprising result" (p. 280). Is it an unsurprising result or is persisting in crime incompatible with these "rooted forms of life"? The age-old problem of social science rears its ugly head, and we do not know whether marginality-connectedness is the cause or the consequence of persisting in criminal behavior. Biographies and autobiographies of people embedded in a criminal lifestyle suggest that lack of connectedness is a consequence of being a criminal, not a cause.

The other variables—will-human agency, historical context, and chance—that Laub and Sampson introduce to explain the difference between desistors, terminators, and persistors are little more than a list of variables that criminologists intuitively "know" are important factors in determining why people do what they do. The same list could be applied to "explain" why people choose to go to college rather than enter the workforce, choose to go to church or avoid going to church, choose to get married or remain single. A theory that explains everything in the end explains nothing. Such a list also makes it impossible to evaluate the utility of the theory because it is a tautology: if one persists in crime, it is because they choose to; if they desist, it is because they choose to.

The reason so-called "criminological theory" always ends up with a commonsense list of just about everything that we intuitively believe "causes" people to behave the way they do is because we keep asking the wrong question. We simply cannot hope to answer the question "Why do some people persist in crime while others do not?" any more than we can



explain why some people commit crime in the first place while others do not. The answer to such a question requires no less than a general theory of human behavior.

But there are patterns in the rates of deviance or crime of different groups that cry out for sociological as opposed to psychological explanations. Laub and Sampson might have come closer to finding a scientifically useful theory had they asked a sociological rather than a psychological question.

Despite the problems with the Laub-Sampson theory, this is an invaluable and imaginative study that should provide data for criminologists to examine for years to come. The combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods is a refreshing break from the fetish with quantitative data that characterizes most criminological research. The shortcomings of this excellent book are more those of the discipline and its inherent biases than shortcomings of the authors. They have provided an excellent example of the thinking and research methods of modern criminology along with a rich source of data on the life course of people who were once labeled as delinquent and were incarcerated in a reformatory.

*Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and Reciprocity.* By Geoffrey P. Alpert and Roger G. Dunham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. ix+191. \$65.00 (cloth); \$22.99 (paper).

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Geoffrey Alpert and Roger Dunham note an important irony for police scholarship: use of force is widely regarded as an essential element of the police role, but scholars have not developed a strong understanding of what influences how much or how well police use it. This volume attempts to advance understanding by improving the quality of data and developing a theoretical framework. The book offers empirical analyses of data from two police departments: Miami-Dade and Prince George's County, Maryland. It concludes with a chapter that outlines an "authority maintenance theory" to make sense of the patterns in police force that the authors and others have observed.

The book wrestles with the challenges of acquiring and interpreting useful data: defining force, establishing criteria to evaluate it, obtaining accurate accounts of force, getting details on the behavioral dynamics between police and citizens, and obtaining the cooperation of police agencies in collecting such sensitive data. It is useful in detailing these problems and exploring ways to overcome them. The chapter on the selection of research sites shows refreshing candor in accounting for the dropout of two of four police departments that originally agreed to participate.

Alpert and Dunham note the challenges of obtaining accurate accounts

of use of force when the authors of those accounts are interested parties likely to distort the reports for their purposes. Noting the cost of using disinterested, on-scene researchers, the researchers recommend and themselves rely heavily on the control-of-persons reports required of police supervisors when officers use force or receive an injury complaint. The authors offer a sobering assessment of the limits of such data by conducting a comparison of accounts from these reports to those from the suspects involved. As one expects, police reports tend to play down the extent of force, while suspects describe more frequent and more egregious use of police coercion. The analysis indicates that significant police underreporting of these use-of-force events may occur.

The heart of the empirical analysis is an application of the "force factor," a measurement method the authors previously developed. Building on the widely employed professional expectation that police force be proportional to a citizen's level of resistance and that escalation of force with noncompliant citizens occur in small increments, the authors assess the step-by-step difference between the level of police force and the level of suspect resistance throughout each encounter. This permits researchers to measure the extent to which officers exceed or underuse force according to standards set forth by their agency. This study finds that police typically use no more (and often less) force than the department deems appropriate, although there are some substantial deviations in both directions. Considering a large number of potential influences on the force factor, the researchers find that officers who have served longer tend to use more force relative to what is deemed appropriate. In Prince George's County, officers give black suspects more force relative to their resistance than they do to white suspects. Alpert and Dunham offer a lengthy discussion of the relationship between a large number of independent variables (type of problem, suspect characteristics, suspect resistance, officer characteristics) and the nature of the police force–citizen resistance pairing for each of the separate stages of the encounters.

The book's concluding theoretical framework draws on Goffman, Blumer, Turk, Black, Sykes, and Brent to generate general propositions and hypotheses about how police and citizens behave in circumstances where power and authority are distributed asymmetrically between the police and the public. Both police and citizens maneuver to maintain their authority, and police force or citizen resistance results when one party fails to render the deference the other expects or otherwise blocks the goals of the other party. This process tends to escalate incrementally until one party changes goals. Although the authors seek a theory without psychological characteristics, their framework necessarily requires divination of concepts familiar to psychologists: cognition, goals, and motives. Their presentation falls short of what one expects of a theory, but it is the most interesting part of the book. One wishes that it were more fully developed and that it had guided the empirical analysis, to which only a tenuous connection is made.

Readers may also wish for two other things. The book fails to give a sense of “being there”; it is virtually devoid of detailed narrative accounts that could illustrate some of their points, especially those dealing with the complexity of encounters involving multiple transactions between police and the public. Researchers will also want more details on methodological issues: greater clarity on unit of analysis, dealing with a truncated sample (the absence of cases where *no* force was used), and a more sophisticated multivariate analysis (e.g., using hierarchical linear models). In sum, the book addresses an important topic and packages some interesting, though not particularly novel ideas, but it could use greater coherence in empirical analyses and theoretical interpretation.

*Why Did They Kill? Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide.* By Alexander L. Hinton. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005. Pp. xxii+360. \$55.00 (cloth); \$21.95 (paper).

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When the Vietnam War spilled over into Cambodia, it precipitated a civil war from which the Khmer Rouge (KR) emerged victorious. The KR established a “prison without walls” from April 1975 to January 1979. During its genocidal rule, 1.5 million people died from starvation, illness, overwork, mass killings, and executions, about 20% of the entire Cambodian population. Inspired by an extreme form of Marxism and Maoism, the KR wanted to establish a socialist utopia by coercion. City folk were labeled evil, corrupt, class enemies, and bad elements because they morally contaminated others like microbes spreading disease; they had to be eliminated for the sake of national purification or be redeemed by manual labor. They were forced to evacuate cities and were resettled in agricultural communes and labor camps. As well, farming was collectivized: villagers ate from a common kitchen, and labor was organized in quasi-military teams. When the impossible productivity goals were unrealized, the KR leadership blamed internal enemies, including traitors within its ranks, which led to purges, more incarceration, torture, confessions, and executions in prison camps.

Alexander Hinton, an anthropologist doing his dissertation fieldwork in 1994–95 in a Cambodian village, reconstructs the prison without walls from interviews and life histories of survivors, victims and perpetrators, and cadres and ordinary people, as well as the abundant documentation from prison camps, such as interrogators’ diaries and confessions extracted under torture. It is a well-written book of interest to genocide scholars, human rights scholars, political sociologists, and Southeast Asia specialists. The central question is: How could so many people persecute, brutalize, torture, and kill so many others who were like themselves? As

Hinton writes, "most of the prisoners resembled their captors in terms of youth, rural origins, social class, ethnicity, and revolutionary origins" (p. 275).

Hinton's reasons will not surprise those familiar with the Holocaust and genocide literature: a fanatical ideology that morally justifies killing a group politically labeled "enemy" and dehumanized in propaganda, indoctrination of uneducated young males who become the perpetrators, obedience to authority in a hierarchy that diffuses personal responsibility, peer dynamics within the perpetrator teams, and total control over victims without accountability. Hinton adds a cultural dimension he finds salient in the Cambodian genocide over and above these explanations, which in my view is redundant because they are also present in the extermination organization and culture of other genocidal regimes. The periodic purges of KR cadres and their torture, confessions, and executions are attributed by Hinton to Pol Pot's obsession with internal subversion of his revolution and to the instability and impermanence of patron-client relations embedded in Cambodian culture. Yet what could be more typical of revolutions, since the Jacobin terror, than terror turned against the revolutionaries themselves?

Hinton describes the efficient bureaucracy of death organized by the KR. Village heads recorded the occupation and family background of everyone; the records were passed up the chain of command which sorted the bad elements to be executed locally and others who were deported to labor camps and "new villages"—children, women, and old folks were included in both groups—where they were worked to death. In the prison camps, victims were shackled, humiliated, starved, and tortured before being killed, and, as an interrogator told a victim, they were "worth less than garbage" (p. 226), which is reminiscent of the Rwanda genocide term for Tutsi victims as "cockroaches." Hinton's most graphic source of victimization stories comes from interviews with survivors of the Tuol Sleng camp who, because of special skills (such as an ability to fix the camp generators or to paint portraits of Pol Pot) were spared and incorporated into the custodial staff. Readers familiar with Goffman's "total institutions" will recognize the degradation rituals and the symbolic wall between custodians and inmates; what was added in Cambodia is truncheons, whips, shackles, electric shocks, water tanks, plastic bags, and other machinery of confession coercion and the final execution.

What made the perpetrators Pol Pot's willing executioners? At bottom, the Cambodian perpetrators are similar to those in all 20th-century genocides: ordinary people, indoctrinated through an extreme ideology that justifies killing those who are labeled as enemies of the state, of the party, and of the nation; who are encapsulated in a military, party, or state apparatus that diffuses personal responsibility; and who will torture and kill other ordinary people who have done them no harm.

*Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid.* By Fran Lisa Buntman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. vii+340.

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This is an important book for scholars interested in understanding prison resistance and linkages to political movements that challenge power relationships. Fran Lisa Buntman analyzes "strategies and histories of political prisoners" at Robben Island, South Africa, as "part of broader (national) resistance movements and as a contribution to theories of resistance" and as a "site of state reform" (pp. 2-6).

In resistance to racial rule, the prisoners helped to build the African National Congress (ANC) as a major movement, against which the national government developed repressive "security legislation" (p. 18) that allowed long sentences for political purposes and legitimated the use of torture during interrogation. We might remember that Mandela was incarcerated under laws that resemble the United States' own Patriot Act.

Later chapter titles demonstrate prisoner orientation: after "Resistance for Survival" and "Resistance Beyond Survival" comes "Prisoner Politics and Organization on Robben Island," "Debates and Disagreements," and "Influencing South African Politics." "Political Imprisonment and the State" and "Theorizing Islander Resistance" make contributions beyond Robben Island, with generalized application to prison resistance, but without specific discussion of social movements that might have benefited the work overall.

Chapters build on the foundation of resistance, first as a tool for survival, in that Robben Island becomes a "university of struggle" (p. 34), especially against rampant racism within the prison walls. These themes run throughout the work, so that we learn that increasing prisoner isolation and brutalization simply increases resistance and the discipline needed to survive. There is remarkable similarity between the practice of denying access to legal and outside support systems on Robben Island (p. 54) and contemporary imprisonment tactics used against "terrorist" groups and individuals, including "hunger strikes" (p. 58).

The work tells us about prison relationships to external and internal oppression systems, including "banning" (pp. 75-76) and break-ups of families and marriages. The formation of "community" and its relationship to "black consciousness" in the prison (p. 84) leads to an important discussion on the "political organization" (p. 96) within the prison, and as "beyond survival" politics.

"Debates and disagreements" arising in the prison population, such as "how best to resist" (p. 112) and generational conflicts, are used by Buntman to present new definitions of "categorical resistance" (p. 126), providing the strategic resistance necessary to continue the struggle over its

long course and in the face of periodic defeat, recruitment problems, and internal divisions. The chapter on debates and disagreements ends with a description of the tactic of "walking away" from disputes which is stunningly similar to how American Indian leaders dealt with like issues.

Ensuing chapters prove critical to social scientists concerned with social movements and prisoners that were or become leaders, underscoring the prison as a "university" giving mandates to "graduates" in terms of struggle and organization. Buntman identifies leaders who believed Robben Island was an ANC meeting place for comrades and graduates "contributing so constructively in the liberation struggle" (p. 149). One contribution was reestablishing congressional tradition for all people, including trade unions and the historic KwaZulu-Natal conflict (p. 169).

Robben Island, as prison and antimovement strategy, backfired as it "merely succeeded in consolidating the opposition" (p. 193) extending from the "vengeful and racist" 1960s and 1970s through prison reform and state change. We should note that similar, if not as intense or drastic, strategies were tried in American prison systems against black power and the American Indian Movement, also viewed as centers of opposition and training. Security systems of prisons and state structures changed because of these struggles, because "prisoners and their allies knew that the state was vulnerable to national and international criticism of the treatment of prisoners" (p. 210). Buntman's claim that this late-stage struggle was absolutely critical to South Africa's transition to democracy is important in "theorizing islander resistance" and the destruction of apartheid racial rule.

The Robben Island prison became known for a "code of conduct rested on the principle that any action must advance the cause of struggle" (p. 238)—including resistance to homosexuality as divisive—and the power within "law and order" they constructed and would export. This led to resistance as "dignity and self-consciousness" and "open challenge" toward reduced state power, finally "defeating the oppressor's end" (p. 261), and penultimately to resistance as "appropriation of power" and "self-determination" needed to build a nondualistic, inclusive South Africa. I might surmise it contributed toward awe-inspiring reconciliation movements too.

As often found in work developed from a dissertation, there is emphasis on methodology and detail, including a listing of interviewees. This can be forgiven in a work contributing to scholarly research and an acknowledgement of these people's lives. The final conclusion discusses "resistance as transformation," compared to China's Wei-Tien (p. 275) and the Irish Republican Army's Sands in Northern Ireland (pp. 279–80). Throughout Buntman's work, prisoners report personal growth as beneficial. The United States could do well to reflect on this in many of its own situations, not the least being Guantanamo Bay and military prisons in Iraq, where, at last report, there are more than 9,000 "detainees" without counting

those spirited away to secret locations. Perhaps that awareness could be this book's greatest contribution.

*Games Prisoners Play: The Tragicomic Worlds of Polish Prison.* By Marek M. Kaminski. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xvi+215. \$29.95.

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Prison seems an unlikely place to find rational action. The cruelty and abnormality of prison life apparently manifest the irrational and even pathological in human nature. In this gem of a book, Marek Kaminski argues the opposite: "Prison socializes an inmate to behave hyperrationally" (p. 1). Prisoners are masters of strategic calculation and designers of ingenious games. To make this argument, the book (like Diego Gambetta's work on criminality) combines ethnographic observation and formal analysis. The analysis uses the tools of game theory; the reader is not assumed to have prior knowledge of these tools. The observation is personal. Fortunately, at least for us, the author was imprisoned for five months in 1985 as a result of his work with the Solidarity movement. He is therefore in a unique position to decipher the games that prisoners play.

Almost all of these games were connected with the stratification of inmates into three castes: "grypsmen," the ruling majority; "suckers," a despised minority; and "fags," a tiny minority reviled for providing sexual services. A rookie inmate, like the author, was subjected to a variety of games designed to detect his underlying character. Was he sufficiently tough and clever to qualify as a grypsman? The hallmark of these initiation tests was deception. According to Kaminski, inmates who became fags were not the victims of violent rape, contrary to their own accounts. Instead, a grypsman would confidentially offer to protect the inmate from brutal harassment, in return for a single act of fellatio. By accepting this offer, the inmate condemned himself permanently to the status of fag. A similar deception was used in the ritual "baptism" required of a rookie who wanted to become a grypsman. It was staged to make the inmate believe he was going to endure a terrible beating; at the last moment, he would be offered the chance to opt out. Making this choice would relegate him to the status of sucker. An inmate with the courage to continue would discover the blows to be harmless. Again, deception is at the heart of the game: the rookie does not know the real payoffs. For the grypsmen, such games enabled them to identify worthy candidates for caste membership without having to inflict so much violence that the prison administration would intervene.

With initiation tests, prisoners designed cruel games to create a certain proportion of victims. Under some circumstances, however, prisoners de-

liberately victimized themselves. Kaminski explains self-inflicted injuries as rational rather than pathological. If a grypsman became degraded (or "fagotized"), the primary means to recover his former status was to harm himself. This signaled his underlying loyalty to the caste, by demonstrating how much pain he was willing to endure rather than lose status. Seeing this, elders among the grypsmen might accept his redemption. In addition, self-harm was frequently used to force the prison authorities to move the inmate to another cell, to obtain some respite in the hospital, or to achieve early release. There is a fascinating account of how prisoners created more elaborate techniques of self-harm in response to countermeasures by the authorities. When dealing with the authorities, self-inflicted injuries were often faked, partially or completely. Indeed, by faking illness, the author gained his own release.

Kaminski's analysis of phenomena such as self-injury and initiation tests demonstrates the payoff to formal modeling; the perspective of rational choice provides unexpected insights. The book also details the grypsmen's subculture. This is less amenable to game theory; symbolic anthropology (e.g., Mary Douglas) would seem more relevant. Without touching on this literature, the author provides a wealth of evidence. Besides passing initiation tests, a rookie had to master a symbolic universe with its own logic. All objects within this universe were classified into three categories: pure, like a clean plate; dirty, like the inmate's own penis; and untouchable, like the toilet bowl or another man's penis. The danger of pollution was omnipresent and could have dire consequences: contact with an untouchable object would contaminate (fagotize) a grypsman. (This ability to contaminate was, paradoxically, the fag's only power of resistance.) To thwart this danger, a host of complex behavioral rules specified what must be done to prevent pollution. Similarly, there was a specialized argot with its own set of rules. Calling a fellow grypsman "a whore" was blasphemy, serious enough to cause degradation. But the phrase "whore-your-mum" was merely amicable banter. These elaborate rules, linguistic and behavioral, helped to prevent outsiders from passing as grypsmen and cultivated mental agility to offset the tedium of prison life. Argot duels allowed grypsmen to spar without physically fighting. Some inmates enforced the rules with malice, trying to ensnare a fellow grypsman into degradation. By contrast, there is an unexpectedly moving story about a famous bandit, paralyzed after shooting himself to avoid capture. To allow grypsmen to assist his excretory functions without suffering contamination, a special dispensation was granted. This example may reveal the limits of any theory founded entirely on self-interest; even in the harsh world of the prison, altruism was not unknown.

Written with refreshing directness—funny and horrible by turns—and complemented by delightful illustrations, *Games Prisoners Play* is entertaining enough to assign to undergraduates. It makes a highly original contribution to the literature on prisons. The book will also prove valuable for introducing game theory: diagrams and an appendix give the neophyte



a taste of formal analysis, which will stimulate further reading. There could be no better advertisement for rational choice.

*The Uncertainties of Knowledge.* By Immanuel Wallerstein. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004. Pp. 211+viii.

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Immanuel Wallerstein tells a fairly clear story in this book. Massive changes in the larger world are shaping changes in the social sciences (and, for good measure, the natural sciences too). The changes in the larger world are major because they signal a growing “bifurcation”—that is, sufficient contradiction among the implications of different processes that there is no single equilibrium or developmental path to which to return, but rather an unstable system that must make a more or less unpredictable “choice” between radically disparate alternative futures. Wallerstein’s chosen language for describing this situation is not dialectical materialism (at least not in familiar Marxist forms) but the complexity theory of Ilya Prigogine, the Belgian physical chemist who won a Nobel prize for the analysis of dissipative structures.

The changes in the social sciences are signaled by a growing number of anomalies in the established theories and by the inclination of leading researchers to roam across the boundaries of traditional disciplines. These disciplines were established in the 19th century around certain constitutive axes of differentiation that reflected the then basic organization of the social world and the projects of dominant powers within it: past versus present, West versus rest of the world, and market versus state and civil society. The disciplines that resulted make less and less intellectual sense today, and are likely to be replaced by some new division of academic labor. Wallerstein notes that reasons for resistance to this trend are numerous and powerful, most rooted in the self-interest of scholars with disciplinary positions and reputations at stake. But he notes also that there are important material pressures for change coming both from a loss of public confidence in social science (not insignificant when it comes to getting the public to pay for it) and from the need for deans and provosts to rationalize academic production within universities. The likely outcome, Wallerstein thinks, is a reorganization around three dimensions of the social science project: quantification (which somewhat surprisingly he more or less equates with mathematicization) in pursuit of universal or at least very *longue durée* laws; idiographic interests in particular places, peoples, and cases; and historical social science concerned with the processes of systemic transformation over moderately long durations.

Throughout the book Wallerstein suggests that the famous *Methodenstreit* of the late 19th century was a specious argument and set social

science on a problematic course. Yet, the first two branches of the reorganized social science he envisions basically reproduce the poles of the Methodenstreit. Wallerstein somewhat surprisingly accepts the distinction of universalizing from particularizing inquiries, but demands that these be complemented by large-scale comparative historical analyses of systemic transformations.

The last of these, Wallerstein suggests, has the most potential for (re)integrating social science with natural science. It is not our putatively universal facts, nor certainly our case studies, but our models of systemic transformations that will establish a common ground with those who are pushing the limits of knowledge in biological and physical sciences. This is partly so because the exciting issues in all cases involve uncertainty and deep changes, rather than deterministic processes. By trying to adapt to earlier deterministic models of natural processes, social scientists were at the very least not playing to their strength. In other words, "determinism was conjoined with linearity, equilibrium, and reversibility to add up to a set of minimal criteria for calling theoretical explanations 'scientific'" (p. 38). But this underestimates the intrinsic uncertainty and dynamism of the social world.

Alongside this main argument, Wallerstein develops other themes. Some have to do with practical issues in the organization of intellectual work, and here he is right that more sociological inquiry into the conditions of knowledge formation is needed. It is not just a possible source of epistemic gain, it is a crucial source of insight into the institutional bases that make possible, but also structure, our work. And these are indeed under enormous pressure. One symptom that Wallerstein stresses is the "creeping flight of scholars, especially the most prestigious ones, to positions outside the university system" (p. 31). This is perhaps less visible in social science because there are fewer opportunities outside the university system than, for example, in biotechnology. But it is happening nonetheless, and not just with senior scholars seeking think tanks, but with talented graduate students deciding academia is not for them.

I suggested that there is a clear story line. It is not developed cumulatively throughout the book, for this is a collection of occasional essays and lectures that revisit similar themes with considerable overlap and some differentiation of specific focus. Wallerstein focuses sometimes on knowledge-producing institutions, sometimes on the challenges of overcoming the differentiation of perspectives that constituted economics, politics, and sociology as different disciplines. The link between the two is the effort to develop world-systems analysis as a transcendence of the opposition, not in theory, but in comparative historical research. Braudel is Wallerstein's symbolically favorite ancestor, but the story is largely Wallerstein's own. As he writes:

By now I was also writing a large series of articles, published all over the place. If one wishes in an article (or talk) both to argue the case for world-systems analysis and to discuss a specific issue, one has to balance the

presentation between fundamental premises and particulars of the case. I tried to make each important article say at least something worth saying that I had not said before. But I had of course also to repeat much of what I had already said, or the audience/readers might not be able to follow my reasoning. Grouping these articles together in collections had the virtue not merely of making them more available but of elaborating the theoretical skein (p. 96)

Quite so.

*After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology.* By Tia DeNora. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xv+176. \$65.00 (cloth); \$23.00 (paper).

Peter Weeks  
*St. Thomas University*

The title of this book encapsulates its being both an homage to the work on the music sociology of Theodor Adorno on the centenary of his birth and also moving beyond it in both being critical and making his arguments amenable to empirical investigation. Tia DeNora notes that Adorno is the first theorist of modern times to take seriously the issue of music's *causative* properties. This is in sharp contrast with current music sociology, which DeNora characterizes as being "a sociology *of* music" concerned with how musical activity (composition, performance, distribution, and reception) is socially shaped. Thus, music tends to be viewed as a social *product*, and what is ignored is the way in which the music *itself* is a dynamic medium in social life. After all, the numerous attempts in the history of Western music either to enlist or censure music's powers presupposes the importance of the latter. The music's specific musical properties and how they may act on people need to be investigated in their empirical detail, including their effects on people—their bodily responses, moods, and activities. Thus, music is not merely a structural reflection of the social, but also is *constitutive* of it.

Adorno's music sociology—which is most accessible in his *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* [Seabury Press, 1976] and *Essays on Music* [University of California Press, 2002]—essentially argues that music's formal properties evince modes of praxis that inculcate modes of consciousness. For him, music not only evokes emotions and bodily responses, but is also potentially a means of knowledge formation. Adorno argues that music has the potential of either raising critical awareness of the society in general, or of serving as an agent of control through the dulling of consciousness, as in advertising and marketing or the mindless repetitiveness and standardization of popular music. Further, he argues that the composer (subject) is understood in dialectic relationship to the musical material (object) or the tradition of musical conventions at his disposal,

as a potentially exemplary form of social praxis. In relation to Beethoven, Adorno propounds the role of the composer as potentially intervening in the shaping of music history—and, by extension, in other social realms more generally. Schoenberg's 12-tone compositional methods preserve what he considers to be music's cognitive role in liberating music from functional tonality with its hierarchy of tones as tonic, dominant, subdominant, and so forth, analogous to liberation in society. Because of the strangeness of Schoenberg's music, it does not afford listeners simple responses or reminders of the familiar, but through contradictions, dissonances, and the like, is progressive—challenging them to attend to the world in new ways. As DeNora points out, by conceiving of the composer as a subject—a maker of music history—Adorno presages Anthony Giddens's "structuration theory."

DeNora takes issue with Adorno's argument that popular music involves merely standardized and bland products of "the cultural industries" through which it trains the unconscious for conditioned reflexes—thereby undercutting consumers' capacity to reason about their society. Arguments about the commodification of music, as DeNora reminds us, resonate well with current theories of "McDonaldization" by George Ritzer and others. But, quite aside from their clearly elitist implications, music sociologists agree that Adorno's conception of the cultural industry is overgeneralized as a monolithic force, ignoring the empirical evidence of heterogeneity among the large as well as the independent companies involved in music production. Further, his charge that popular music is formulaic is undermined by the observation that a great deal of folk music follows predictable patterns, and indeed a great deal of Western art music as well. As DeNora suggests, these musical conventions may be viewed as not only constraining but also as *enabling*.

In contrast to Adorno's "black box" approach, as well as his method of deriving meaning from immanent analysis of the structures of musical works, DeNora turns to empirical investigations of what music does and is made to do in actual contexts. Research findings reported include her own from her *Music in Everyday Life* [Cambridge University Press, 2000], which employs in-depth interviews, revealing how actors work themselves up into particular subjective states in connection with their upcoming activities. She surveys other related studies of music as conditioning action through its aesthetic configuration of spaces, including retail ones, and reconfiguring actions through time, for example.

It is clear that DeNora's book is a significant contribution to the sociology of music through its fresh treatment of Adorno's important questions as an occasion for delineating new directions. In addition to the theoretical sophistication of her analysis, she addresses relevant developments in this field. The impressive breadth of her work reflects that of the range of her previous publications. This book should be of interest to those in music sociology, music education, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, as well as musicology.

*The Making of English National Identity*. By Krishan Kumar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xiv+367. \$24.99.

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Until fairly recently, most social scientists and historians viewed nationalism as a quintessentially modern phenomenon that first arose in or around the French Revolution. It was viewed as “modern” not only in the more mundane sense that it happened to emerge between 1750 and 1800, the years between the French Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution which historians conventionally use to mark the transition from the early modern period and the beginning of the modern era. It was also coded as “modern” in the more consequential sense that it partook in the hallmarks of “modernity” as defined by 20th-century social theorists: popular sovereignty, secularity, capitalism, mass culture, etc. This interpretation is sometimes referred to as the modernist theory of nationalism.

Beginning around 1990, the modernist position began to come under attack, particularly from English historians, who claimed to discern evidence of English nationalism before the modern era—well before in some cases. Different scholars gave different dates. Some, like Patrick Wormald, traced it all the way back to the 8th century, to Bede’s *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum* (*Ecclesiastical History of the English People*). Others saw it arising during the Middle Ages, either in tandem with the English monarchy (Susan Reynolds) or together with English language and culture (Adrian Hastings). Still others located the birth of English nationalism somewhere in the centuries after the Reformation, whether in the Reformation proper (Liah Greenfeld), the Glorious Revolution (Steven Pincus), or the union with Scotland (Linda Colley); in this reading, Protestantism and nationalism went hand-in-hand in the discourse about England as a “Protestant nation” threatened by the resurgence of continental Catholicism. Let us call this the premodernist interpretation.

In *The Making of English National Identity*, Krishan Kumar seeks to do two things: (1) to defend the modernist view of England, and (2) to describe and explain modern English nationalism. The defense takes up the first half of the book. It consists in a systematic critique of the major variants of the premodernist position. In essence, Kumar argues that genuine nationalism cannot be found in England or anywhere else before the French Revolution—the central tenet of the modernist view. Inevitably, this argument hinges on how one defines “genuine nationalism.” Kumar is not as clear or explicit as he might be on this point. Reading between the lines and piecing together his various statements on the subject (e.g., pp. 33–34, 47, and especially 119), I take his position to be that “genuine nationalism” is at once a secular and egalitarian political ideology, which assigns individuals a unique and exclusive political identity, *and* a collective sentiment that transcends class and status, which arises out of a

common way of life and set of institutions. To be genuine, a nationalist discourse cannot be interlaced with religion, be committed to hierarchy, overlap with other social or political identities, be confined to a particular group, or be divisive in its effects (see, e.g., pp. 57–58, 92, and 175) Nor can it exist in the absence of a fully formed nation-state and mass culture. If it fails even one of these litmus tests, it is not genuine nationalism.

As a convinced premodernist, I must confess that I find this part of Kumar's book quite unconvincing. While it is certainly true that few if any of the examples advanced by the premodernists would pass Kumar's litmus test, I suspect that few instances of modern nationalism would pass it either. Contemporary Polish nationalism? Too religious. Right-wing American nationalism? Not only religious, but divisive. How about in the American South, then? Undercut by a strong regional identity. Maybe in Nazi Germany? Too inegalitarian and hierarchical. Frankly, I doubt that modern England passes the test. Indeed, I wonder whether Revolutionary France would pass. As David Bell (*The Cult of the Nation in France* [Princeton University Press, 2003]) has recently shown, the nationalism of the French Revolution was built around the forms of French Catholicism, with its emphasis on mission, education, and ritual. But the moment one relaxes the standards, the modernist argument unravels, because there are many premodern ideologies and movements that would also pass less demanding tests. What is needed here, I think, is not a litmus test that separates genuine nationalism from fake nationalism, but a conceptual framework that would allow one to distinguish and analyze the various degrees and forms of nationalism, a framework capacious enough to accommodate and classify the learned musings of the venerable Bede, the guttural rants of the Nazis, and everything in between.

In the second half of the book, Kumar turns his attention to "genuine" English nationalism. "Why," he asks, "in 'the springtime of nations,' when so many other nations in similar situations were fervently embracing nationalism, did the Scots not do so?" (p. 175). Why, for that matter, did the Welsh not do so? And why, one might further ask, did the English not give voice to the full-throated sort of nationalism that we hear in Italy or Germany during this period? The answer, Kumar argues, is that the Scots and the Welsh were so involved in the imperial project known as "Great Britain" both economically and culturally, that they had no desire for independence from England, while the English, for their part, were not about to scare away their friends and allies by proclaiming their own superiority. Not until the late 19th century, says Kumar, a full century after the French Revolution, when the imperial project began to fray and unravel, did genuine nationalism emerge in the British Isles, first on the Celtic fringe, and then in the English core, but even then only in an attenuated form. This, to my mind, is the most convincing and original part of the book. Even if one believes, as I do, that English history is replete with "genuine nationalism," both before and during the French Revolution, the quiescence of the English in the springtime of nations

raises important questions, and Kumar's answer is the best answer I have encountered.

*Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After.* By Peter Sahlins. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pp. xiv+454. \$67.50 (cloth); \$29.95 (paper).

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The study of citizenship in *ancien régime* France may at first appear anachronistic. Was not citizenship nourished during the French Revolution from its previously shriveled status, only then to become the vigorous frame of political modernity? In this rich and fascinating book, Peter Sahlins shows that citizenship existed *avant la lettre*, in the early modern period. Sahlins convincingly demonstrates that although the modern language of citizenship as a political right and identity did not exist in the 17th and 18th centuries, the classification of people in the kingdom into "ours" and "others" was a legal reality. In *Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After*, Sahlins examines the legal principles that distinguished "French naturals," "foreigners," and "naturalized foreigners," as well as the actual administrative practices that underlay this mode of division.

This is not a book explicitly concerned with revising the "timing" of citizenship. Sahlins does not claim that what are considered the key elements of modern citizenship actually existed in the early modern period, a move that has been prominent in studies of nationalism in recent years. In fact, he makes it clear that modern citizenship is distinct from its early modern form. Modern citizens are legally defined as "nationals" of a given nation-state, with rights and benefits attached to that membership; politically, they are democratic participants in the governance of the nation-state, and culturally, they are members of an "imagined community." While none of these aspects of citizenship could be found in the early modern period, the notion of citizenship as nationality, both as a legal concept and as an administrative practice, nevertheless existed. In so doing, Sahlins helps to dismantle the common assumption that citizenship as nationality had no place and no meaning before the age of nationalism.

Citizenship in old regime France was not articulated in terms of rights one would enjoy as a citizen, but rather in terms of the restrictions and liabilities a foreigner would encounter. Citizens, then, were negatively defined as those "*not* subjected to the disabilities, incapacities, and liabilities of being an alien resident in France" (p. 5, original emphasis). The most significant of these disabilities, and the one on which Sahlins's demonstration principally rests, is that of the *droit d'aubaine*, a royal right of escheat whereby the king (or his financial officers) could confiscate the

estates and property of foreigners who died in the kingdom without native heirs, unless they had individually or collectively been exempted. It also prohibited foreigners from holding political offices and religious benefices. The *droit d'aubaine* became, Sahlins shows in great detail, the key legal mechanism for distinguishing foreigners and citizens, and the motivation behind thousands of requests for naturalizations from 1660 to 1789. It was, in fact, the centerpiece of absolutist French nationality law.

These petitions and their administrative treatment constitute the data examined. Sahlins therefore studies a specific group of foreigners, those who were granted letters of naturalization to become "foreign citizens"—the unnaturally French alluded to in the book's title. The empirical analysis is based on a collection of 6,732 naturalizations and declarations of naturalization during those 130 years (naturalizations were acts that granted citizenship to foreigners, whereas declarations were establishments or confirmations of an individual's French citizenship). By carefully examining both the foreigners' requests and the state's bureaucratic protocol, Sahlins brings to life the processes and procedures of naturalization, both from the perspective of the foreigners seeking naturalization and its benefits, and from that of the absolute state.

In the mid-18th century, however, that system was shaken by two concurrent developments that together contributed to the "citizenship revolution": the *droit d'aubaine* was slowly abolished, thereby erasing the legal distinction between citizens and aliens, while the "citizen" emerged as a key discursive trope in the public sphere, increasingly linked to the political language of "rights." Those two developments shifted the conceptual framework of citizenship from the legal to the political realm, setting the stage for revolutionary citizenship. In the process, citizenship was at once expanded and contracted: while early modern (legal) citizenship depended on the capacity to inherit or transmit property in the kingdom, regardless of age, class, or gender, modern (political) citizenship was used to refer to the entire population of France—even though in practice, only propertied males of a certain age could exercise their newly acquired political rights. Sahlins effectively captures this tension and oscillation between legal and political definitions of citizenship in the third part of the book, which straddles the old and new regimes, blurring the traditional divide between "before" and "after" the French Revolution.

*Unnaturally French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After* beautifully intertwines social, political, and legal history in a compelling narrative of the making and unmaking of the "absolute citizen." Because it reveals new sinews of the dense cords linking law and politics in early modern and modern France, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of citizenship, immigration, and nationalism, as well as to those specializing in the sociology of law and historical-comparative sociology.



*The Sikh Diaspora in Vancouver: Three Generations amid Tradition, Modernity, and Multiculturalism.* By Kamala Elizabeth Nayar. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004. Pp. 276.

Connie Elsberg

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For this ethnographic study, Kamala Elizabeth Nayar interviewed 100 Sikh individuals in Vancouver, mostly from families who settled in Canada between the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nayar tells us that she began her project with an interest in "the process of adaptation and integration" as experienced by this sizable and visible minority, but that her interviews soon led her to focus on relations between the three generations she was interviewing, as she discovered that each seemed to occupy a different cognitive world. Topics, such as family life, religion, and public representations of the Sikh community, are passed through this filter of generational perspectives

Nayar draws on standard modernization and immigration literature—Parsons, Shils, and Inkeles on modernity, for example—and, what is more interesting, on the work of Walter J. Ong on orality and literacy. She argues that "the Sikh community as it has arrived in Canada . . . has predominantly been an illiterate (or not very educated) farming community" (p. 4). Thus, these "Sikhs are a group with a religious identity that is rooted in a traditional society, and they are facing pressure to come to terms with a modern society" (p. 5).

Drawing on Ong's work, she depicts "distinctive thought forms prevalent among the generational groups" (p. 25). Members of the grandparent generation tend to exhibit thought patterns formed in an oral, nonliterate tradition ("orality"). Members of the parental generation, on the other hand, are more likely to be literate. In this generation there is "a shift toward *some* comprehension of the abstract" (p. 27) and some degree of individuation. But they differ from much of the younger generation, whose view of the world is more analytical. The young are critical thinkers, and are more reflexive and self-oriented. These depictions of the generations are interesting and helpful, but, at times, the discussion of orality and analytics seems to reify differences between generations unnecessarily.

Although Nayar identifies problems faced by each of the generations, she seems particularly concerned about the youth (a concern expressed by many commentators on the Sikh diaspora). She finds members of the younger generation grappling with a multitude of issues. They are critical of the Punjabi value of *izzat* (honor), which, they believe, leads members of the community to cover up problems and avoid difficult issues. They complain that their parents do not seem to respect their individuality (individualism is not highly valued in the community) or recognize their distinctive emotional needs. Many feel that their elders have transmitted the form, but not the substance, of their religion. They would prefer more

interaction with the Canadian mainstream and speak of living in a "Punjabi bubble." Nayar argues that Canada's multiculturalism policy exacerbates their isolation, as "it now seems to be encouraging ethnic groups like the Sikhs to turn in on themselves" (p. 221). She clearly would like to see the young given more encouragement to adopt modern modes of thinking and to participate more fully in the broader Canadian culture.

This book should be of interest to students of the Indian diaspora, readers in the fields of Sikh and Punjabi studies, students of immigration in North America, and social workers and policy makers working with Indo-Canadian communities. It provides an interesting view of three generations' experience of the North American environment and includes such background information as a short history of Sikhs in Vancouver and an overview of Sikh religious beliefs.

The reader might want to put Nayar's ethnography in the context of other works on Sikhs living abroad. For example, Verne A. Dusenbery's discussion of the strategies used by Sikhs in Singapore to take advantage of a policy of multiracialism there, and his comparison of that case to situations in Britain, Canada, and the United States, provides an interesting comparison ("Socializing Sikhs in Singapore: Soliciting the State's Support," in *The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the Diaspora*, ed. Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier [Manohar, 1996]). Shinder S. Thandi's discussion of provisional identities among Sikh youth in England, and his sense of identity as "fluid and plural," might throw further light on the attitudes of Vancouver's Sikh youth ("Sikh Youth Aspirations and Identity: Some Perspectives from Britain," in *Sikh Identity: Continuity and Change*, ed. Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier [Manohar, 2001]). Brian Axel's work on the centenary of Maharaj Dulip Singh treats the Sikh diaspora as "a collectivity which transcends the boundaries of nation-states," and it echoes Nayar's finding that cultural enactments offer potentially powerful means of communicating across generations—and even across continents ("Notes on Space, Cartography, and Gender," in *The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the Diaspora*, ed. Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier [Manohar 1996]).

*Asian American Religions: The Making and Remaking of Borders and Boundaries.* Edited by Tony Carnes and Fenggang Yang. New York: New York University Press, 2004. Pp. 399. \$65.00.

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In the last decade or so, we have witnessed a steady growth of scholarly research on the religions of contemporary Asian immigrant groups. Some of this research was first brought together in a volume entitled *Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration*, edited by

R. Stephen Warner and Judith G. Wittner (Temple University Press, 1998); the first compendium devoted exclusively to Asian American religions appeared in 1999 in the volume *Spiritual Homes: Religions and Asian Americans*, edited by David Yoo (University of Hawaii Press, 1999). This collection by Tony Carnes and Fenggang Yang represents the newest effort on the topic.

Like the earlier collection by Yoo, this volume, which attempts to bring together the latest research on the religions of the post-1965 Asian ethnic groups, is ambitious in its breadth; placing the religions presented under the rubric of "Asian American religions," the essays in this volume range from studies on Chinese American Christians and Korean American evangelicals to studies on Indian Christians, South Asian Muslims, Hindu Indians, Thai Buddhists, and Philipino Protestants and Catholics. The articles in this volume, for the most part, are empirically well grounded and theoretically well conceptualized, and are useful not only as introductions to the different religious groups found within the Asian ethnic communities, but also for illuminating new dimensions of Asian ethnic religious experience. As such, this collection helps move the field forward.

The volume starts out with an informative article by Kenneth J. Guest on the role of Christianity in the lives of young Fuzhou Chinese immigrant workers in New York City's Chinatown, a piece of research that provides an illuminating portrayal of the role this ethnic religion plays in the adaptation process of this recent group of Chinese immigrants to the United States. The second essay in the section, by Elta Smith and Courtney Bender, provides a fascinating look at the creative religious practices of New York City South Asian Muslim taxi drivers; this is followed by two articles exploring different aspects of the Indian American Hindu experience. The first of these, by Ashakant Nimbark, investigates the meaning and implications of increased religiousness in, or "desecularization" of, immigrant Indian Hindu media, while the second article by John Hawley examines the transnational symbolism of American diasporic Hinduism.

The next section of the volume brings together a group of articles that revolve around an important topic in immigrant religions, the generational/intergenerational issues. This section includes two articles on second-generation Korean American campus evangelicals by Rebecca Y. Yim and Soyoung Park, both of which offer a revealing look at the role Korean evangelicalism plays in the lives of second-generation Koreans as they attempt to negotiate various aspects of intergenerational religious tensions and forge a distinct second-generation group identity. These essays are accompanied by an article, by Prema A. Kurien, exploring the intergenerational dynamics within an Indian American Christian church—a Syrian Christian church based in Kerala—focusing, similarly, on the role that Christian religion plays in the autonomous identity formation of the second generation.

Taken together with the studies on Korean American evangelicals, what this article helps to illuminate, most of all, is the *diversity* that exists in

the ways ethnic religions function for different immigrant groups; in this article, the author demonstrates that while the Indian Christian second-generation members, like the Korean evangelicals, critique and claim a separate identity from the first generation by asserting their own Christian identity as being more authentic, their appropriation of the conservative American evangelical belief system in this process renders the second generation, unlike the Koreans, even more conservative than their parents. The next article by Yang on gender issues within a Chinese Christian church also offers an interesting look at how the second-generation Chinese Christians, influenced by the views of American fundamentalism, emerge as more conservative than the first generation, for whom Christianity was a liberating force in China.

Following a section that introduces two brief articles examining the relationship between ethnic religions and political attitudes/preferences, the final section concludes with three essays that focus on new innovations emerging within Asian ethnic religions, particularly the role they are playing in the development and creation of new religious sensibilities that transcend boundaries of various kinds—ethnic, religious, and national. The first article by Russell Jeung, for example, explores the religious beliefs and practices being forged by a second-generation pan-ethnic Asian American church in the Silicon Valley. The second essay, by Todd Perreira, is an eye-opening look at a Thai Buddhist Temple, also located in the Silicon Valley, in which religious boundaries are transcended by serving as a place of worship for intermarried Thais and their partners with differing religious persuasions. Finally, an article by Joaquin Gonzales and Andrea Maison on Philipino Protestants and Catholics in the San Francisco Bay Area looks at the ways these two religions are used as a “transnational link for transporting social and cultural capital” for Philipino Americans, serving as a bridge between the home and host countries.

While this is a volume to be recommended to anyone interested in obtaining an introduction to the religions of the Asian ethnic communities in the United States, it is also to be noted that this book contains both the strengths and weaknesses inherent in a collection with such reach and breadth. The strengths are obviously that this volume successfully provides us with a panoramic view of the religions of Asian ethnic religions in all their diversity. The nature of this very diversity, however, invites us to ponder the following question: To what extent are we justified in applying the category of “Asian American” religions to the range of phenomena presented in the book in such an unproblematic manner? To me, the differences we observe among these various religious traditions, which are highlighted as clearly in this volume as the similarities among them, point to the need to question the wisdom of applying this externally constructed, frequently contested category, which not only reinforces the homogenization of this highly diverse group of people and their experiences, but also obscures the need to theorize these differences.

*Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society.* By Riaz Hassan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xviii+276.

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The rarity of survey research on Muslim societies is one reason to welcome this book. Based on interviews with a purposive sample of more than 4,000 respondents in four significant Muslim countries, and enlisting the collaboration of social science research centers in each country, Riaz Hassan embarks on an ambitious agenda of exploring how Muslims view themselves and the world today. Some readers will take issue with the method, sampling techniques, or survey questions, while others will perhaps question the suitability of a streamlined approach of this kind, given the complexity of the societies involved. But these possible, and quite legitimate, criticisms must not distract from the intrinsic value of any effort that puts on the table the comparative sociology of Muslim societies. Especially given American sociology's inexplicable persistence in ignoring Islam—or, at best, treating it as a marginal concern—any well-meaning counterefforts, however imperfect, can only help provide more foundations for informed discussions. In the book itself, the methodological limitations are counterbalanced with an excellent, globally informed exposition of the issues involved.

This unique study is based on surveys conducted in four countries: Indonesia, Egypt, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan. With about 400 million inhabitants, they are home to one-third of the world's Muslims and to half of the population of Muslim-majority countries. They represent different regions of the Muslim world, as well as different historical trajectories. The study therefore finds variations between these regions, which are to be expected given this global spread, but also remarkable similarities. Kazakhstan in particular differs in almost all indicators from the other three countries, revealing much lower rates of piety and a tendency for Islam to be more closely associated with national identity than with a specific set of moral guidelines or a sense of cosmopolitan community. The author repeatedly suggests that this anomaly reflects the success of seven decades of Soviet rule in degrading the spiritual values of society, which are only now being highlighted again, albeit in a way that subordinates them to secular values.

What is undeniable is that the Muslim world as a whole is witnessing a religious renaissance. Across various countries, the study finds that the "traditional self-image is a powerful feature of the Muslim mind" (p. 141). Yet it is hard to generalize, since this renaissance is linked to different factors in each country, which indicates that there is nothing "inherently Islamic" about how Muslims think (p. 223). The author suggests that the diversity of bases of the increasing piety among Muslims will lead to a globally decentered *ummah*, whose strength will be not in its unity but

rather in regional patterns of adjusting Islamic belief to modern needs. These regional ummahs, each linked differently to forces of globalization, will house strong liberal and conservative interpretations of Islam. While the increase in piety seems to be a product of modernity, it is not necessarily a hindrance to it (p. 144). One example of this concerns the political role of religion. Here Hassan suggests that the best route toward separating religion and state may pass precisely through a religious state. Both the evidence from this study and recent experience show that integrating Islam into the state may not be in the best interest of Islamic institutions themselves, since they tend to lose credibility and confront lower rates of social trust when this is the case. However, it also seems that a religious state is more able to decouple, albeit unintentionally, religion from the state, as evident in how the Iranian constitution was amended in 1989, with Ayatollah Khomeini's approval, to allow for government policies not based on the *shari'ah*. The point here is not that all Islamic states will do so, but that only an Islamic state could dare deviate from the *shari'ah* so openly. In this connection, Hassan notes that ironically, it was precisely the enforcement of the *Chador* on women that had allowed them more access to the public sphere and independent economic life, and also allowed the percentage of women students in Iran to double so quickly, finally reaching parity with men.

As the first comparative survey study of its kind, this work is highly recommended. It is clear, however, that simple data, left uninterpreted or interpreted inadequately, can be dangerous. This is a special concern in this case, given the geopolitical significance of Islam and the ongoing, largely ill-informed acrimonies around it in the West. For example, when Muslims respond to survey questions by affirming the finality of the Qur'an and the sufficiency of the early tradition of Islam, they are doing no more than providing what they believe to be the proper response by a Muslim to questions of that kind. Such responses do not imply that they actually *live* that way, that is, by using the Qur'an or early traditions as constant references in their lives. Similarly, supporting the founding of an Islamic society does not seem to correlate with a consistent theology, but rather with an interest in coupling modernity with a sense of justice, authenticity, and meritocracy, and an absence of the corruption that Muslims are so used to in the political systems under which they languish and increasingly reject.

*Cults, Religion, and Violence*. Edited by David G. Bromley and J. Gordon Melton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xx+249. \$60.00.

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In this book, David Bromley and J. Gordon Melton analyze and comment on a small number of incidents during the 1990s in which members of four contemporary religious movements were involved in acts of collective violence. These events include the collective suicides by members of the Solar Temple in Switzerland and Quebec in 1994 and by members of Heaven's Gate in California in 1997, the violent confrontation between the FBI and the Branch Davidians in Texas in 1993, and the gas attack by members of Aum Shinrikyo at a subway station in Tokyo in 1995. The authors also comment on the violent ends of the People's Temple group in Guyana in 1978 and the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments in Uganda in 2000. These were all comparatively small religious groups, that, until their violent ends, appeared to be largely nonviolent.

The authors observe that these incidents have led many people, especially those in the organized anticult movement, to characterize contemporary religious movements as "cults," which were prone to acts of violence. This book was written in large part to counter this characterization and to criticize corresponding efforts by public authorities in some jurisdictions to limit the religious freedom of contemporary nontraditional religious groups.

The book begins with a half-dozen essays in which the authors attempt to view these four incidents in relation to broader themes. Bromley views these events as extreme examples of what he refers to as dramatic deuouements. He uses this term to argue that these violent acts should be viewed not simply in relation to the features of these groups, but rather in terms of particular estranged interactions between alternative religious groups and the larger society. Calling attention to the tens of thousands of recently formed religious groups, in the next essay, Melton and Bromley indicate how the view of new religious movements as violence prone badly represents the existing evidence. Thomas Robbins views these incidents as examples of what he refers to as "extreme volatility," found especially in groups that are intensely regimented in order to realize alternative social realities at wide divergence from their contemporaries. Other chapters examine variations in the way groups manage charismatic authority, public authorities respond to contemporary cults, and cult-watching groups attend to the activities of these movements.

The book then includes specific essays on the four groups involved in collective violence in the 1990s. John R. Hall examines the confrontation between public authorities and Branch Davidians that led to a fiery end

and the death of all members of the group still living in its commune. He is particularly critical of the way those opposed to this group acted in almost self-fulfilling ways to aggravate the confrontation in which many of the members of the group apparently committed suicide. Massimo Introvigne and Jean-Francois Mayer examine events that led up to suicides and homicides of members of the Solar Temple at about the same time in Switzerland and Quebec. Ian Reeder studies the evolution of the Aum Shinrikyo group from meditation to direct assault on innocent bystanders. Robert W. Balch and David Taylor, who had both been studying the Heaven's Gate group from its inception about 25 years earlier, attempt to make sense of the group's decision to commit collective suicide. All of these essays are well researched and competently written.

Nonetheless, there are several ironies in the way this book is written. For example, the editors and most of the authors acknowledge that it is difficult to develop relevant sociological variables to explain these extremely rare examples of collective violence compared to the thousands of new religious groups that for the most part have been nonviolent. They note as well that the four groups on which they have focused differ sharply from each other in terms of the religious traditions from which they emerged and the activities of the groups themselves. Yet, the authors attempt variously to develop generalizable variables relevant to these cases. They treat these cases as extreme examples of broader phenomena, such as "dramatic denouements," "the mismanaged efforts to maintain charismatic legitimacy," "volatility in religious groups," and the "mismanagement of official confrontations between counter cultural religious groups and public authorities." By attempting to develop these explanatory schemes, the authors tend to make these incidents seem not rare and extraordinary, but in some ways explicable and possible when viewed within recommended frameworks, if certain kinds of factors fall into place.

These incidents were clearly disturbing. They were especially disturbing to this collection of religious sociologists, most of whom have spent considerable effort in previous works helping to explain both the reasons for the efflorescence of contemporary religious groups as well as the development of anticult groups founded especially by dissidents who have dropped out of these groups.

To be sure, violence has often been justified and aroused by religious groups both in the present and in the past. In the past, religious sentiments have given rise to crusades, wars, insurrections, and mob outbreaks, as well as the uses of inquisitions, executions, and torture. During the 1990s, members from established world religions used violence to attack members of their own and other faiths in Indonesia, India, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Middle East, as well as the United States. Both Mark Juergensmeyer (*The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* [University of California Press, 1993] and *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* [University of California Press, 2000]) and Jessica Stern (*Terror in the Name*



*of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* [Harper Collins, 2003]) provide numerous examples of members from established religious groups using violence against unarmed people during the past decade. In comparison to these expressions of violence by members from established religious groups, members of new religious groups have in general been comparatively nonviolent.

From this perspective it might well be more appropriate to argue that these incidents of violence were largely idiosyncratic, aggravated in particular settings about which it is almost impossible to generalize. These incidents were aggravated at times by attacks by dissidents, by the suspicions of leaders who had already committed some morally questionable or illegal acts, and/or by the jumpiness of public authorities. Alternatively, it might make sense to discuss the violent incidents in three of the four groups, as well as the People's Temple, in relation to religiously inspired acts of martyrdom. With the exception of the Aum Shinrikyo group, the violence committed by these groups was largely either self-inflicted or self-aggravated, corresponding roughly to Durkheim's analysis of acts of altruistic suicide.

Nonetheless, in spite of my reservation about its attempts to develop sociologically viable generalizations in reference to these exceptional incidents, I commend this book for its sound and thorough research, its accessible writing, its sophisticated analysis of group dynamics, as well as for a number of instructive observations about these contemporary religions. For example, in her essay on cult-watching groups, Eileen Barker helpfully calls attention to the considerable difference in the character and activities of groups established to keep track of the activities of new religious movements. In his chapter on the Branch Davidians as well in his previous work on the collective suicide by members of the People's Temple, John Hall offers a number of useful suggestions about how authorities might more effectively interact with groups that arouse suspicions of possibly illegal activities. At the same time as a number of management consultants are recommending the virtues of charismatic leadership, several of these authors—in particular, Lorne Dawson in his essay on charismatic leadership—point to the destabilizing character of this kind of leadership, especially when it is expressed apart from any well-recognized systems of accountability, and whenever such leaders find themselves unable to continue to produce wonders that followers have come to expect.

*Truth, Power and Lies: Irish Society and the Case of the Kerry Babies.* By Tom Inglis. Dublin and Chester Springs, Pa.: University College Dublin Press and Dufour Editions, 2003. Pp. xv+288. \$79.95 (cloth); \$35.95 (paper).

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In this fascinating book, Tom Inglis uses a tragic scandal from rural County Kerry in the 1980s to shed light on the transformations of Irish society in the latter half of the 20th century and to show how truth is produced in such a context. In doing so, he tells several stories about the changing meanings of religion, sexuality, and law enforcement in Ireland's transformation from Catholicism to liberal individualism. As such, this book will prove most interesting not only to those interested in the sociology of law and, specifically, forced confession, but also to those engaged in discussions of the relationship between tradition and modernity.

In 1984, two infants were found dead and abandoned in the course of several weeks, one washed up on the shore in Cahirciveen, one on the Hayes family farm in Abbeydorney, some 40–50 miles away. A spectacle emerged around the tragedy, involving the Hayes family's eventual (and, it would seem from Inglis's careful presentation of the evidence, credible) claim that their confessions were coerced by police and the police's univocal insistence that 25-year-old Joanne Hayes conceived twins by two separate fathers and "did away with" them in two very different ways. Indeed, these are but two of the narratives at play in the case; a large part of Inglis's project is to sort through the many stories and to determine to what extent the claims presented are plausible.

In sorting through the tangled versions of truth that emerged in the prosecution of Joanne Hayes, in the subsequent tribunal brought forth to investigate the police's actions, and in the media portrayals of the whole affair, Inglis casts the controversy as a story the Irish in the 1980s told themselves about themselves. At the same time, he illustrates Bourdieu's point that states seek to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of not only physical violence but also symbolic violence. Beginning with the sense that any authoritative linear narrative does violence to the complicated experience of tragedy, he works to avoid creating such an easy answer of his own. Not a strict relativist, Inglis insists that certain criteria exist to determine truth from lies or exaggerations; truth, to him, is a matter of degree rather than absolute certainty, and he endeavors to sort it out.

Inglis spends the first 100 pages telling the story of the case through the evidence presented by various sides. In doing so, he provides a striking illustration of the Foucauldian point that plausibility is shaped by power; he illustrates in detail how the language of truth is often recognized in the form spoken by state actors such as police and judicial figures. In the

last 150 pages, he presents the Kerry babies case as a condensation of the massive changes affecting Irish society in the 1970s and 1980s, including, most significantly, the shift from a traditional, conservative, Catholic society to a liberal, modern, individualist one. He sees both individuals and societies experiencing dramatic changes in piecemeal fashion rather than as a smooth transition. The individual who rejects traditional Catholic teachings against extramarital affairs might find it unthinkable to use contraception. The person who has always respected the local police as a relatively beneficent force might continue to respect that authority as the police extract a false confession from him or her. And the society that has begun to celebrate sexual freedom and self-expression may also convene what Inglis carefully determines to resemble a "witch-hunt" to purge itself of the women it deems a threat to social order.

Inglis analyzes these tensions through seven chapters: on the broader historical shifts in Irish material conditions and worldviews; on honor and shame; on how hierarchy shapes perceptions of the lies, great and small, that all people tell every day; on checks against state power; on the complicated roles of the news media; and on the meanings of women's bodies and sexuality. His concern not to create a pat linear narrative leads him to present the different perspectives on the case in these many "chunks," which lends itself to some repetition across the chapters, and, at points, it is hard to discern what the specific discussion contributes to Inglis's overall argument. However, these difficulties are outweighed by the striking way in which Inglis presents the difficulties of trying to assess the truth amidst great differences in power and access to the legitimate means of truth production. Through his thoughtful analysis of documents, Inglis opens possibilities foreclosed by the official government reports and challenges us to think about the precariousness of both truth and democracy.

*Women's Movements Facing the Reconfigured State.* Edited by Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith, and Dieter Rucht. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 350. \$75.00 (cloth); \$25.99 (paper).

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*Women's Movements Facing the Reconfigured State* presents the collaborative effort of leading scholars of social movements to understand developments that have taken place over the past three decades in women's movements in Western Europe and North America. Women's movements in this part of the world show a similar pattern of change that begins with radicalism, autonomy from the state, informal organization, and confrontational tactics in the 1970s, and moves to a moderate, state-involved, formally organized, and accommodationist stance in the 1990s.

The central theme of this volume is that this common trajectory among women's movements is related to fundamental changes that have taken place in the configuration of state power in advanced industrialized nations.

Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith, and Dieter Rucht introduce the concept of *state reconfiguration* to examine the changing relationship between women's movements and states. State reconfiguration refers to the process of restructuring and relocation of power that began in Western Europe and North America in the 1980s, when various changes occurred in national states' jurisdiction and responsibility for providing social welfare services to citizens. The editors identify four types of changes: *uploading*, or the transfer of national state authority to supranational bodies such as the European Union; *downloading* power to lower state levels; *lateral loading*, or the delegation of power to nonelected state parties, such as courts and executive agencies; and *offloading* traditional state responsibilities for social welfare to nongovernmental organizations such as the family, the market, and the community.

The heart of the book consists of eight chapters that present case studies or comparative analyses of women's movements in different national contexts. Focusing on Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Britain, Germany, Sweden, and the United States, the substantive chapters show that all nations in Western Europe and North America experienced reconfiguration, but that there are important variations in the extent and forms of the changes in political structures in different countries. Relocation of power facilitated as well as constrained women's movements, and in all of these countries, feminists have been highly adaptive and have shown remarkable continuity in responding to opportunities as well as threats associated with state reconfiguration. The essays in this volume show that as women's movements have interacted with nation-states, they have not simply responded to state action. Rather, they have been central players in the reconfiguration of state power and have had a major impact on the policy, discourse, and institutions of these nations.

This is a well-integrated volume that contributes new insight into the continuity and change that has occurred in women's movements in advanced industrial societies. All of the chapters share both a comparative perspective and a longitudinal framework that examines changes in women's movements' relationships with the state from the 1970s to the 1990s, and they are informed by a shared theoretical framework that compares the process of state reconfiguration in each of the countries with the pattern of change in women's movements. The case studies, written by leading scholars of women's movements such as Jane Jenson, Celia Valiente, Donatella della Porta, R. Amy Elman, Alexandra Dobrowolsky, Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, and the three coeditors, are uniformly well written and based on first-rate scholarship. The book concludes with three excellent synthetic chapters by Carol Mueller and John McCarthy, Rucht,

and David Meyer that position the theory and research in the literature on social movements.

Together, these essays also represent an extraordinary contribution to social movement theory. The editors do exactly what scholars of women's movements have demanded for two decades. By placing women's movements at the center of social movement theory, Banszak, Beckwith, and Rucht introduce an important concept—the notion of state reconfiguration—that improves on the political opportunity framework by identifying specific structures of the state that alter the political circumstances of social movements. For some readers, however, this explanation of the transformation of women's movements will not be entirely satisfying. Adopting the logic of political opportunity and contentious politics approaches, the authors treat women's movements primarily as challenges to the state. Women's movement scholars, including many authors in this volume, generally agree that the targets and forms of claims making used by women's movements are influenced by the multiple fields and institutional contexts in which gender differentiation and hierarchy operate. This calls for a broader definition of social movements that recognizes feminism as a complex movement directed at achieving change in a variety of institutional arenas, both cultural and political. The book is self-consciously limiting in another way. The exclusive focus on women's movements in Western societies left me wondering how women's movements have responded to reconfigurations in non-Western societies undergoing transition to market economies or democracy, or struggling over the relationship between religion and politics. These criticisms do not detract, however, from the important contributions of this volume.

*Abortion, Motherhood, and Mental Health: Medicalizing Reproduction in the United States and Great Britain.* By Ellie Lee. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003. Pp.vii+293. \$45.95 (cloth); \$22.95 (paper).

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Is the stress of modern motherhood enough to provoke psychiatric illness? In *Abortion, Motherhood, and Mental Health*, Ellie Lee adds another significant dimension to our understanding of the medicalization of reproduction, arguing that the experience of mothering is increasingly viewed as risky to women's mental health. She begins by describing the emergence of "post abortion syndrome" (PAS) in the United States and Britain in the late 1980s. Championed by abortion opponents, PAS describes a range of adverse mental and emotional consequences following abortion, from depression to—at its most extreme—a variant of post-traumatic stress disorder. Lee argues that when abortion opponents could not gain ground with arguments about the sanctity of life, they reinvented

the problem of abortion, reconstructing women as “victims” who needed protection from the lasting emotional damage wrought by abortion, and thus shifting the ground for banning abortion from morality to medicine.

The book does an excellent job of situating the emergence of PAS historically, in both the United States and Britain. Lee argues that a prevailing “culture of victimhood” and the emergence of “the syndrome society” facilitated the social construction of PAS. Although at times her analysis of the British scene is richer, American readers will find much of interest here—particularly so the contrasting politics of abortion in the two societies. Lee shows how abortion is represented as a right in the United States—and therefore a political issue—whereas in the United Kingdom abortion remains primarily a medical issue. She also shows how PAS claims makers relied on several prevalent cultural tropes—the notion of health care as an industry (thereby impugning the financial motives of abortion providers), the idea that women’s health is understudied and neglected, and, ironically, even the woman’s rights movement—in asserting the connection between abortion and mental health. She illuminates a compelling parallel between the emergence of posttraumatic stress disorder among Vietnam veterans and the emergence of PAS: in both cases, a new medical diagnosis arose out of a potent political struggle.

Yet the idea of PAS failed to resonate in mainstream medicine or in the wider society at large. Lee presents several arguments to explain why this is the case. One is that medical researchers and scientists were able to dismiss the scanty evidence for PAS and to argue that greater rigor was necessary to demonstrate empirically a connection between abortion and mental health. Even more significant for her story, claims about PAS failed because motherhood was itself increasingly being represented as a significant mental health risk for women. Against the emerging claim that becoming a mother exacts a hefty toll on women’s health, the argument that avoiding birth and unwanted motherhood via abortion could risk women’s health became much less tenable.

In the latter half of the book, Lee is interested in why claims about the mental health effects of abortion failed to gain traction in the culture at large, even as we have so readily embraced claims about the psychodetrimental effects of pregnancy and motherhood. She describes this paradox as a “selective medicalization” of reproduction. Like the diagnosis of PAS, the diagnosis of postnatal depression casts a wide and capacious net in which almost any emotion that a woman experiences after childbirth can be construed as evidence that she suffers psychiatric depression. In fact, the diagnosis pathologizes many elements of feminine—indeed, human—experience. Lee argues that claims that “motherhood is an ordeal” (p. 190) redraw the boundary lines between the normal and the abnormal. Indeed, it is precisely through the power of medicalization that experiences that are normal in the context of major life events are folded into a list of symptoms that describe a psychiatric condition. In the case of postpartum depression, such experiences include “fatigue, sluggishness, ex-

haustion, disturbances of appetite and sleeping, feelings of hopelessness and depression" (p. 185), according to the American Psychiatric Association—all completely within the bounds of normal for new mothers. It then becomes difficult to distinguish between the normal feelings of loss that inevitably accompany birth and a medicalized pathology that asserts that women who experience these feelings are mentally ill.

The greatest weakness of the book is that both Lee's methodology and her data are oblique. She tells us that she uses a "contextual constructionist approach to social problems" (p. 3) and that the book takes the form of an extended cultural analysis, but Lee never tells us what she is analyzing or how. She cites a variety of sources, including debates about legislation, newspaper and magazine articles, medical books and journals, and both popular and scholarly accounts of abortion and motherhood, but she is never explicit about her approach or her materials.

The book will be of interest to sociologists of medicine as yet another finely detailed examination of the seemingly relentless march of medicalization in which ever-larger swaths of human experience become pathologized and thus subject to expert intervention. Lee's analysis cogently illustrates the power of cultural sanctioning to shape our understandings of life events. In this sense, claims about PAS and postpartum depression alike represent essentialist arguments that construct female biology not only as destiny, but as the ultimate threat to mental well-being. The irony is that women are cast as victims regardless of the reproductive choices they make.

*Clinical Psychiatry in Imperial Germany: A History of Psychiatric Practice.* By Eric J. Engstrom. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp xi+295. \$49.95.

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In 1891, the Prussian ministry of education financed and built the first independently administered psychiatric hospital in Halle. The Halle clinic represented the culmination of years of jurisdictional wrangling between academic and applied psychiatry, neuropathology, and other medical specialties dating back to midcentury. With the emergence of Halle and other urban, university-based clinics, an entirely new set of institutional arrangements came to replace the traditional rural asylum. These academically oriented clinics educated professional elites, conducted research, and developed clinical practices. University psychiatric clinics served as the site in and through which academic psychiatrists succeeded in wresting control of the profession from their asylum-based (i.e., alienist) medical rivals. Significantly, toward the end of the first decade of the 20th century, academic psychiatry had established itself as an independent discipline,

with powerful state support and modern institutional arrangements, including full academic chairs and professorships. Nearly every imperial German university had one of these clinics.

Eric J. Engstrom's comprehensive study of the rise of the psychiatric profession in imperial Germany makes a strong case for the importance of examining the day-to-day tasks and work conducted in the university psychiatric clinic. The central question is how control of professional work and its administration ends up resolving jurisdictional disputes in favor of one occupational group over another. For instance, clinic-based psychiatrists and internists battled over the disposition of cadavers: who got them, and under what circumstances. Psychiatrists wanted to keep terminal patients on their wards, rather than sending them to die elsewhere, in order to accumulate material (brains and nervous systems) for psychiatric pathoanatomic examination. Ironically, their success created a kind of death row for patients. The greater jurisdictional struggle, of course, was over who controlled the laboratory and laboratory research therein. Using Foucault's economy of power and knowledge as the bridge to a sociology of professional work, Engstrom skillfully analyzes psychiatry's transition from subordinate to dominant profession. Contests aimed at usurping the scientific credibility of occupational rivals were a driving force. Wilhelm Griesinger's bold declaration of the incurability of insanity is a good example. Not only did Griesinger's rhetorical strategy undermine the legitimacy and administrative bases of alienist professional work, it also created a "lifetime-guaranteed" market for psychiatric services (since patients who cannot be cured cannot be released from care) and the assurance of professional longevity.

Engstrom's investigation of how a profession constructs the domain of work (and its knowledge base) is a testament to the long-lasting influence of the seminal research of Abbott, Friedson, and others in the sociology of the professions, and he conducts this examination with a thoroughness and attention to detail that signals the highest-quality scholarship. In addition, Engstrom's book contains an exhaustive use of primary sources as well as a complete and varied list of secondary sources. Unfortunately, readers without a solid knowledge of Wilhelmine welfare state policies and the relationship between the state and its citizens with respect to poor relief and institutionalization will have a more difficult time understanding why the state was so important for German psychiatry's development. In addition, there are continual references to public prejudice against psychiatry. Yet, except for a short discussion of the antipsychiatry movement (about which little concrete detail is given), it is not clear why and how the public was opposed to psychiatry. Public aversion suggests that the profession needed to take into account cultural sanctioning of its work, if only to coordinate its activities with changes in demand for services. It would have helped to know something of the broader societal and cultural trends accompanying changes in the demographics of psychiatric patients. For instance, there is a theme running through the book



about the relationship between state-subsidized beds, the need for increasing the number of middle-class patients, and the issue of social control of the lower classes that suggests a changing demand structure. This theme, however, remains underdeveloped. Lastly, while Engstrom's study focuses on German psychiatry, there is little mention of parallel trajectories in Great Britain, the United States, and France. Readers unfamiliar with the rise of psychiatry in those countries will need to consult other studies.

Still, these minor and secondary complaints do not detract from a book that will be of considerable interest to historians of American and European psychiatric medicine, and sociologists interested in work, occupations, and the professions. Organizational scholars will also appreciate this study, not only because the focus is on organizations per se, but also because struggles for professional dominance were so self-consciously aimed at organizational preeminence. In short, Engstrom offers a theoretically grounded and evocative analysis of the sociopolitical, cultural, and institutional twists and turns that jurisdictional claims making took in the rise of academic psychiatry and the dominance of the psychiatric clinic in Germany. This study is all the more impressive for the seeming ease with which the story is told.

*If You Tame Me: Understanding Our Connection with Animals.* By Leslie Irvine. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004. Pp. xiii+223. \$19.95 (paper).

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This volume is an important contribution to the recent explosion of sociological analyses of the roles of animals in human life. The contribution is on two levels. First, Leslie Irvine collected qualitative data on an important sociological phenomenon: people who visit, and sometimes adopt, cats and dogs at an animal shelter. By participant observation as a volunteer animal adoption counselor in the shelter, she determined, for example, that appearance, behavior, and emotion are important in making a match. She distinguishes, however, between how these criteria are employed by three different types of adopters: "planners," "the impartial," and "the smitten." On this level, this is classic sociological ethnography—and autoethnography, as when she relates her own status as one "smitten" in her cat-person-unexpectedly-adopts-unmanageable-canine experience. Following early chapters that review domestication, theories of why people keep animals, and the histories of the categories "animal," "pet," and "companion animal" in the West, Irvine's empirical chapters offer interesting insights into cat and dog adoption and cohabitation.

The early chapters also set the stage for a contribution on a more fundamental level of sociology, which emerges as Irvine contemplates

what she observes between dogs or cats and people at the shelter and in more ordinary situations. Irvine addresses the place of animals in a core subject matter of sociological theory, the self. What we are seeing is an invigorating return to speculations from earlier in sociology, such as that of Weber: "In so far [as the behavior of animals is subjectively understandable] it would be theoretically possible to formulate a sociology of the relations of men to animals, both domestic and wild. Thus many animals 'understand' commands, anger, love, hostility, and react to them in ways which are evidently often by no means purely instinctive and mechanical and in some sense both consciously meaningful and affected by experience" (*The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* [Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 104]).

Why had not sociology pursued such a course? Partly, the reason may have been the lack of what Irvine coins "animal capital," or "resources that enable the development of meaningful, nonexploitive companionship with animals" (p. 66)—capital stemming partly from strengthening ethological evidence of animals' mentality. Also, another reason was the linguistic bent of symbolic interactionism. The dominance of the latter in theories of the self produced an interlude in social theory from which we are now awakening. Pioneers Arnold Arluke and Clinton Sanders held that "a central proposition here is that the difference between the abilities of people and nonhuman animals—a perceived difference that has thus far excluded animals from serious sociological attention—is a matter of degree rather than kind" (*Regarding Animals* [Temple University Press, 1996, p. 55]). Following suit, Irvine marshals animal capital to build a grounded theory of animals as subjective selves, differing only in degree from human selves. Her animal capital manifests in an ability to utilize densely contextualized descriptions of or by those close to animals to make seasoned judgments of animal intentionality.

But some will still need to be convinced that claims such as hers are not "mere" anthropomorphism. Her response is a central contribution—the application of psychological and sociological models to the problem of animal selfhood. Here she adopts this reviewer's earlier analysis of child-animal interaction (*Children and Animals* [Westview, 1998]). I argued that children perceive animals as selves because they display the key markers of agency, coherence, affect, and continuity (sources of "core" self and other documented in empirical work in infant development synthesized by Daniel Stern in *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* [Basic Books, 1985]). Irvine focuses on the animal side, showing how animals convey these traits in interaction, and thus have selves. My data were on children, with animals with whom they lacked extensive relationships. Irvine's cases are adults with enduring companionships with particular animals, and include cat-cat, dog-dog, and cat-dog interactions, and they strongly support her extension of this framework.

Irvine carves off a bigger challenge to argue that dogs, and perhaps cats, can attain intersubjectivity with humans, evincing a further form

of selfhood and relatedness. According to Stern, intersubjectivity refers to sharing attention, affect, or intentions; it occurs with little awareness and before language between mothers and infants. The human experience of intersubjectivity shapes our perception of animals; we infer not only that a feeling is shared, but (crucially for true intersubjectivity) that it is known to be shared. Are such inferences necessarily distorted? Or is there a valid range of "degrees" of acknowledged sharing of subjective states with animals? In my view, Irvine's cases where a history of sharing "reinforces itself and reinforces the self" (p. 161) say yes. Along the way, Irvine puts symbolic interactionist role theory, frame analysis, theories of play, and other sociological mainstays to original uses. In the end, she affirms the *reality* of selves, and the stern demands placed on us, knowing animals have them.

*Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*. Edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. Pp. 314.

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This volume presents a significant attempt to cope with a difficult concept: cultural trauma. Jeffrey Alexander's opening chapter attempts to structure a theory of cultural traumas. This is followed by several illustrative cases.

A cultural trauma occurs "when members of a collective feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways" (p. 1). Moreover, Alexander adds, "trauma is not something naturally existing; it is something constructed by society" (p. 2).

This characterization implies that delving into the issue of cultural traumas requires knowledge of and acquaintance with such complex conceptualizations as definitions of realities (i.e., constructionist theory), memory, and identity. Furthermore, since this definition does not exclude the translation of cultural traumas to the personal level, diving into both psychology and history (as per specific case) may become mandatory. And indeed, the first four illustrative chapters are long (Alexander's chapter on the Holocaust lasts for 68 pages) and present in-depth analyses of traumas in a historical context.

Alexander portrays two approaches to cultural traumas. One is a "lay trauma theory" that states that traumas are naturally occurring events that shatter individuals' or collectives' sense of well-being. This approach is divided into either an "enlightenment" version suggesting that "trauma is a kind of a rational response to abrupt changes" (p. 3) or a "psychoanalytic" version that "places a model of unconscious emotional fears and

cognitively distorting mechanisms of psychological defense between the external shattering event and the actor's internal traumatic response" (p. 5). Alexander rejects this approach because events do not "in and of themselves, create collective trauma. . . . Trauma is a socially mediated attribution" (p. 8). Distinguishing between events and socially constructing events, Alexander's key term is "the social process of creating a cultural trauma." He conceptualizes these traumas as structured by claimsmaking activity (minus Joel Best's works), carrier groups, audiences and situations, classifications, and constructing a master narrative focusing on (a) the nature of the pain, (b) the nature of the victim, (c) the relation of the victim's trauma to the audience, and (d) an attribution of responsibility. The traumas are further structured by institutional arenas which include religion, aesthetics, the law, science, mass media, state bureaucracies, stratification hierarchies, and, lastly, identity revision memory and routinization. Alexander uses this all-inclusive, complex structure to interpret, in a separate chapter, many representations of the Holocaust.

Focusing on psychological issues, Neil Smelser reinforces Alexander's view by adding that "no discrete historical event or situation automatically or necessarily qualifies in itself as a cultural trauma, and the range of events or situations that may become cultural traumas is enormous" (p. 35). With these propositions in mind, one needs to identify the sociocultural context in which "something" will be defined as a cultural trauma, realize the stealthy quality of such traumas (e.g., what is viewed as trauma at one point in time may not be viewed as so in another and vice versa). Ron Eyerman's illuminating chapter probes the role of "cultural trauma in the formation of African American identity. . . . The trauma in question is slavery . . . as a collective memory, a form of remembrance that grounded the identity-formation of a people" (p. 60). Bernhard Giesen's somber chapter analyzes the Holocaust as the traumatic reference of German national identity. However, having two chapters focused on the Holocaust may concentrate too heavily on one event. Piotr Sztompka raises the intriguing idea that cultural traumas are a necessary and natural product of normal processes of social change, and coins the term "traumatogenic social change," thus making the concept all inclusive. The book ends with Smelser's short analysis of 9/11, focusing on other wars involving the United States and on responsibility and guilt.

There are a few troubling issues with this book. First, the concept of a cultural trauma is so broadly defined that it includes too much and becomes a useless buzz word. Indeed, Smelser notes (p. 31) that there is "some conceptual muddiness" in the concept of trauma. Second, a constructivist myself, I read the book with utter pleasure. Still, I think that too little theoretical effort was invested in exploring the implications of using this approach, or what it tells us about the traumas themselves. The differences between an essentialist and a constructivist position (that is, recognizing the quality of an event vs. its social construction) on traumas is not insignificant. One noteworthy problem is that little information

on events that could have been cultural traumas, but were not, is presented or available. In addition, varieties of the constructivist approach are not debated, and a choice between those approaches is not explicitly made (although the authors seem to be very close to choosing the "contextual constructionism" version). Relevant criticisms of the constructivist approach are not mentioned. Finally, the discussions on collective memory and commemoration ignore some interesting and relevant developments (e.g., the work of Jeffrey Olick or Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi).

This book grabs the reader's attention and imagination and is intrinsically interesting to read. Not only is it written in a fluent, readable style, but the subject also makes fascinating reading. The concepts, the expansive historical canvas, and the personal-cultural connections are all enticing and provocative ideas, written by scholars who know their craft. I recommend this remarkable book without any hesitation. The concept of a cultural trauma is probably here to stay (for a while at least), and this book does a magnificent job of presenting it.

*Who Owns Native Culture?* By Michael F. Brown. Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. 315.

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Anthropologist Michael Brown offers not so much a straightforward academic study as an excursus, grounded in research, on the problematics of "culture" in a time of proliferating cultures. In a series of case studies of battles concerning the ownership rights to native or indigenous (interchangeable terms) artifacts, places, and practices, the reader is lead through layers of political, religious, bureaucratic, and moral entanglements. When one finally emerges on the other side, one is left with a useful picture of the contemporary muddle.

Notable for the tone, tenor, and temperament Brown brings to the discussion, he is decidedly unsentimental in his evaluation of claims to culture brought by natives and other bodies, like the United Nations. At the same time, he is conscientious of and sympathetic to the histories of colonial oppression that contextualize current conflicts between governments, commercial interests, and indigenous peoples worldwide. He questions the practical ability of native peoples to lay exclusive, restrictive claim to their "culture," while acknowledging that "heritage" can and should be respected.

Wary of "totalizing solutions" on the part of any party in a dispute, Brown provides hard-nosed interpretations of cases that deal with, among other things: the copyright ownership of native art and native symbols, such as the well-known Zia sun symbol used by the State of New Mexico; the multiply intertwined interests of drug companies, governments, and

local peoples regarding knowledge and patents of botanical materials; the status of native religious sites such as Wyoming's Big Horn Medicine Wheel and Devils' Tower over against public use of public lands; and questions of authenticity regarding the claims of Ngarrindjeri people with regard to the Australian government's plan to build a bridge over a religious site.

Acknowledging that it is difficult to square the "emotivism of heritage claims with the factual demands of the law" (p. 197), Brown addresses important epistemological and philosophical discontinuities that exist between heritage, law, and morality. In the case of the Zia Pueblo seeking to copyright more than 17,000 of its images, he points out the clear asynchronicity between a copyright that can expire in 75 years and a "moral right" which is, in effect, perpetual. The Zia's efforts, he concludes, are "less about intellectual property than about resistance to the uncontrolled proliferation of signs" (p. 86). It is about cultural integrity, albeit imperfectly pursued.

Brown uses his anthropological acumen to analyze the status of "culture" by examining how the various parties involved frame the conflict. For instance, in discussing the notion of "cultural privacy" often deployed in support of native peoples' claims, Brown points out the contradiction in the idea by reminding us that the "salient features of culture are, by definition, shared and therefore public" and that they are not uniformly distributed among a people and are often acquired from others (p. 28). Thus, it is important for those involved in disputes to recognize that the sharing of cultural knowledge and information is part and parcel of the workings of "culture," and has been from time immemorial.

Questions of the locus of cultural knowledge pose problems regarding who can speak for a "people." In the Hindmarsh Island bridge debacle in Australia, Ngarrindjeri claims that building a bridge and marina would destroy a secret, sacred site used for women's fertility rites were found to be highly suspect when government authorities consulted historical ethnographies, contemporary anthropologists, and, interestingly, the testimony of some elder Ngarrindjeri who denied such a site exists (pp. 173–85). One encounters related problems in the issues surrounding ethnobotany where it is evident that the intricacies of native knowledge and cultural ownership can no longer be divorced from questions of corporate interest and technology. The healing and lifesaving potential of many plants will never be realized unless pharmaceutical companies commit resources into research, extraction, and testing. Yet, the financial return to indigenous people will never match the value of medicines that actually make it to the market. Complicating matters still further is the ambiguity of who can make claims to such knowledge and serve as a legitimate representative—the state? a native bioprospector who knows the plants? an ethnic group as a whole?—when negotiating with companies (pp. 109–14).

Guided by a sense of "pragmatism," Brown wishes to see a "multicul-

turalism without illusions” arise which accepts that conflicts over values are inevitable when societies and legal systems encompass groups that practice different ways of life (pp. 230–31). His belief in the ability of “civil society” to work out these conflicts on a case-by-case basis at times seems to ignore the very power plays he has painstakingly detailed. Getting entangled as he does in the contradictory space where pluralism, corporate interest, and the facticity of ongoing political arrangements come together, however, should not be a reason for outright criticism, but rather an opportunity to admire Brown’s sincere effort to become enmeshed in the problems.

*Unpopular Culture: The Ritual of Complaint in a British Bank.* By John Weeks. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp. viii+166.

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*Ohio State University*

Everyone complains. But John Weeks’s field observations suggest that British bankers have it down to an art form. And this is ineffective complaining, too. Even good ideas get complained to death. I could feel my energy draining away just thinking about working at the site of this study. Weeks spent three months in the Securities Centre with additional time spent elsewhere in BritArm—Weeks’s pseudonym for a large British bank. He was initially recruited as part of a consulting project to advise the bank on its organizational culture. The initial project fell apart, but Weeks was allowed to stay on and to focus on whatever he wanted. The resulting dissertation and book focuses on complaining, its varieties, and its ineffectiveness. The book is at least half literature review, with the remainder split between analysis and vignettes illustrating the varieties of complaining.

The conceptual frame for the paper is a critique of management literature on “fixing” corporate culture as a strategy for improving productivity. The book provides a good overview of both the literature on organizational culture and its critique. Weeks’s insight is that “fixes” at BritArm quickly get swallowed up in the tar pit of nay-saying and cynicism. Weeks analyzes this negation of change using the literature on cultural and social reproduction—Paul Willis’s work on the reproduction of working-class culture in schools (*Learning to Labor* [Columbia University Press, 1977]) and Michael Burawoy’s work on reproduction of class relations in the workplace through games and making out (*Manufacturing Consent* [University of Chicago Press, 1979]).

Weeks’s most effective material comes late in the book where he discusses the ways in which an attempt at internal reform is picked to death by cynics. Everyone agrees with the general points of the critique, but no one wants to change things. Why? Weeks does not quite tell us, but

the sense one gets is that no one wants to get up out of their chair and do anything—it would be too much work. A partial answer may also lie in the different subcultures in the bank. The “Thatcherites” want to cut costs, and the “Labourites” want to expand production, improve technology, and retain workers. But again, these politics do not seem to go anywhere except the middle—do nothing.

Highly thematic ethnographies, such as *Unpopular Culture*, run the risk of moving so quickly to their theme that they omit a solid description of the context. By late in the book I thought I had pieced together a hypothesis for why these folks were so whiny. But I had to read closely and often between the lines. First, the work at the bank is boring to the point of sapping one’s spirit. Complaining is thus a form of “gallows humor” among the condemned. Second, the workplace is a large bank with distant corporate headquarters. Everyone loves to complain about “corporate.” Visit any large corporation and you will hear this same line. Third, British banking has recently been opened up to competition by the British equivalent of “savings and loans” banks, international competition, and financial services offered by nonfinancial institutions, such as large retailers. The angst of numbing work and control by distant entities has thus been intensified by heightened competition and insecurity. Who would not complain? But I am not sure this is the answer—I did not get enough context to tell.

Organizational ethnographies are becoming more thematic. Maybe reviewers or editors are telling them they need to do this. In the process, however, they sometimes omit what makes ethnography so uniquely valuable as a research tool—thick description and context. Weeks never really tells us much about the bank or the work. We need a traditional chapter 2 on the history and structure of the bank, then a chapter 3 on the nature of the work, then a couple of chapters on vertical relations and horizontal relations in the bank. Without these, it is hard to tell what is going on. Qualitative researchers correctly criticize statistical analyses for ignoring context and averaging the “effects” of variables across unspecified contexts. Yet thematic ethnography can be criticized for this same limitation if it omits the context. Sometimes I felt like I was reading a Kafka novel called *The Bank*. Kafka’s hero in *The Trial* knew he had been accused of something, but closed doors, changing hours, and vacuous forms left him clueless as to what. Weeks’s bank workers are surely complainers, but I am not sure why.

Organizational culture consultants should read this book and be embarrassed enough to find an honest line of work. Executives should read it in order to understand that organizational cultures develop from the bottom up and are not easily swayed by slogans or fads. Ethnographers should read it and remind themselves to continue to write up the deep description first—it is necessary groundwork for interpreting the subsequent thematic material.



*The Next Upsurge: Labor and the New Social Movements.* By Dan Clawson. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp. xii+235.

Victoria Carty  
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One of the most pertinent questions facing workers' rights activists in the contemporary era, in which the interests of multinational corporations and neoliberal policies have left workers extremely vulnerable, is "What to do now?" As Dan Clawson reminds us, history time and time again reveals that what yesterday seemed impossible can suddenly become commonplace. *The Next Upsurge* is an insightful and provocative book about the potential of the labor movement, which is clearly at a crossroads. Today, less than 10% of all workers in the private sector belong to unions. Clawson offers invaluable advice for activists and scholars as to how the labor movement can break out of its current stalemate. This is not just a book about the potential revival of the labor movement; it also provides glimpses as to how all activists may form a truly progressive movement that will help fulfill the ideal of radical democracy. Clawson argues that labor, which will be at the forefront of such a movement, has positioned itself either to create an upsurge or to take advantage of favorable external conditions.

Three main points are interwoven throughout a series of case studies. The first is that the growth of union membership has always been in dramatic, swift increases, not incremental growth. The second is that success relies on fusion between union coalitions with other social movement allies. Clawson argues that one of the biggest mistakes of labor in the past has been its neglect of other progressive social movements. The third point is that labor must be a *movement* and release itself from the confines of organizational contradictions. Union and nonunion workers must replace the top-down business unionism approach and engage in a mobilization from below.

The book begins with an analysis of the rise and decline of the labor movement. Clawson traces how the current vulnerability of workers is a result of a series of government policies that have diminished labor's bargaining power and increased employer animosity toward unions. The emergence of the undemocratic nature of unions began in 1935 with the Wagner Act, followed by the creation and extended power of the National Labor Review Board (NLRB) in the Keynesian era of the 1960s, and exasperated by the neoliberal policies under the Reagan administration. What power unions now exert takes place within the undemocratic organizational features of business unionism.

To reverse these setbacks, Clawson highlights what the labor movement must do differently. This includes working outside of the framework of the NLRB, increasing union membership, increasing rank-and-file involvement to truly empower workers, and strengthening solidarity be-

tween workers and other activists. Most important, Clawson argues that the labor movement has to abandon its past exclusionary practices and work in solidarity with other groups across borders of any kind. A new progressive movement will entail all oppressed peoples who have been excluded from power across class, race, gender, and national boundaries, working in solidarity to integrate their issues, agendas, and mobilizing strategies. In this type of mobilization, "it is no longer clear what is a 'labor' issue and what is a 'women's' issue or an 'immigrant' issue (pp. 194–95).

Clawson provides evidence of previous successful mobilizations by detailing how several novel initiatives have helped organize workers, communities, students, minorities, immigrants, and women at the local, national, and international level to overcome oppression. For example, in Stamford, Connecticut, a coalition of low-wage service-sector unions successfully organized via powerful unions such as the United Automobile Workers (UAW), the Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees (HERE), and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in conjunction with churches and community organizations. The "Justice for Janitors" campaign in Los Angeles employed tactics of the civil rights movement, working outside of the conventional NLRB representation election campaign. Workers' centers that bridged concerns among new immigrant workers and the labor movement were essential to both the Stamford and Los Angeles campaigns. To highlight the importance of international solidarity, Clawson includes the Teamsters' 1997 strike against UPS, in which U.S. workers were supported by European unions, and the ongoing antisweatshop campaigns through which U.S. unions, labor-support groups, students, consumers, and other activists have used their power to assist workers in Central America.

What lessons we can glean from these case studies are that union functioning works best when it is democratic and worker controlled, and that struggles for social justice must be inclusive. These campaigns united labor concerns across the boundaries of race, gender, and immigrant rights among rank-and-file union members and nonunion members across national borders. Clawson concludes that if unions can combine the new style and tactics of new social movements such as media-savvy and military-symbolic actions with the mass mobilization characteristics of unions such as broad outreach, local chapters, and face-to-face mobilization, this may serve as an explosive political force whose potential is just being tapped.

Though this is a very inspiring piece of work, there are a few shortcomings to Clawson's analysis. For example, the "New Voices" leadership under John Sweeney of the AFL-CIO has been instrumental in a number of recent successful worker campaigns. The New Voices approach combines a top-down approach with other creative strategies that have relied on rank-and-file union members as well as other activists outside of the labor movement. Thus, democracy does not necessarily exclude the valuable

force of effective leadership. Second, Clawson could more systematically address the logistical and practical questions regarding fusion. Organizations and institutions have structures that may impede the fluidity and reciprocity between them. A final caveat, which is true of any prediction, is that only time will tell. Though the looming crisis for workers in today's global economy may be a necessary condition for radical change and upsurge, it may not be sufficient. But, regardless of the accuracy of the prediction, this is an essential book for anyone interested in progressive social change and the role that the labor movement has to play in such a transformation.

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
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
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